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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This dissertation studies the use of tax increment financing in major league venue 
projects in North America. Although there is a vibrant literature on TIF, little has crossed over to 
the sports venue context, leaving a gap where some of the most expensive and potentially risky 
TIF projects anywhere are concerned. Likewise, while there is considerable literature 
questioning the merits of public subsidies for sports venues, there is insufficient work focusing 
squarely on TIF and sports venues. This relative absence of literature concerning sport venue TIF 
matters because providing subsidies through TIF may effectively obscure the public cost of 
sports facilities. This thesis shines a light on venue related TIF through contributions under three 
central headings: scope and inventory, theory development, and normative development. 
In the past two decades, TIF has become a more frequent element in subsidizing venues 
and the real estate development surrounding these facilities. Specifically, over $1.8 billion in TIF 
has been spent on 22 major league venues across five major leagues, with well over a third of 
non-temporary major league venues where TIF was eligible to be used having a direct or strong 
TIF connection at the time of construction or substantial renovation. The TIF inventory also 
reveals direct TIF use concentrations in particular sub-federal jurisdictions. Likewise, less 
permissive TIF statutes often overlap with jurisdictions where direct TIF contributions were 
absent. 
I argue that if legally and fiscally available, TIF can be an effective means for local 
growth coalitions to sell politicians on approving subsidies through mitigating public approval 
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and political risk associated with providing public dollars to sports venues. In particular, TIF’s 
salability as self-financing, provides political cover to decision makers and reduces the risk of 
popular opposition. Likewise, TIF allows financial risks associated with venue subsidies to be 
better mitigated by marrying the revenue source to the good being funded, and allows local 
governments to use taxes that would otherwise go to overlaying taxing jurisdictions (such as 
schools). While the case studies in this dissertation indicate major risks with venue related TIF, if 
politicians wish to move ahead with such projects, citizens should insist on harm reduction 
measures. These include ensuring but-for, preventing predatory overlaying capture from school 
districts, avoiding reliance on sales TIF, shifting underperformance and legal risk from public to 
private partners by making sure that promises of real estate development are matched by 
enforceable contractual obligations, and ensuring multiple points of transparency. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1. CONTEXT, SIGNIFICANCE, AND PURPOSE 
The focus of this dissertation is the use of tax increment financing (TIF) in North 
American major league stadium and arena projects. Despite a broadly skeptical academic 
literature, TIF has become a favorite legal and policy tool of local economic development in the 
United States. In more recent years, TIF has also become a common presence in conversations 
surrounding the construction, renovation, and ancillary development surrounding professional 
sports venues.  
At the same time considerable work exists showing that sports venues do not positively 
impact economic growth in a city or region. As the literature questioning the returns on public 
subsidies of professional sports venues creates pause for government and political actors, TIF 
poses an opportunity to reframe the subsidy conversation in more favorable terms by venue 
proponents. Although there is a vibrant literature on TIF, little has crossed over to the sports 
venue context, leaving a glaring gap where some of the most expensive and potentially risky TIF 
projects anywhere are concerned. Likewise, while there is a lively literature on public subsidy of 
sports stadia and there are some publications making note of venue based TIF, there is limited 
work focusing squarely on TIF and sports venues. With this dissertation finding that over $1.6 
billion of TIF (in 2020 dollars) has been used to directly subsidize 22 major league venues and 
that well over a third of non-temporary major league venues where TIF was eligible to be used 
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have a direct or strong TIF connection, the potential value of more deeply exploring venue TIF is 
underlined. 
From a policy perspective, this relative absence of sport venue TIF literature matters 
because providing subsidies through TIF statute capacities may be an effective means of 
obscuring the true public cost of sports facilities. Likewise, TIF may be a way for actors desiring 
a stadium or arena to obtain a public subsidy that may attract less scrutiny or resistance than 
other revenue sources. Conversely, TIF – as a subsidy frequently tied to the creation of assessed 
real estate value – might be central to the seemingly growing phenomena of team driven real 
estate development surrounding arenas and stadiums, which can also bring the potential to 
transform blighted areas of inner cities or anchor new suburban centers.  
More squarely for the academic literature, the void of sport venue TIF literature matters 
because if venue TIF use is indeed a more frequently occurring or financially significant 
phenomena, we want to know why. Likewise, we may be interested if TIF can be a better way to 
use or reform law to frame a policy of venue subsidy? First however, we have to establish the 
nature and scope of venue TIF use. Accordingly, this dissertation intends to shine a light on 
venue related TIF through several primary contributions to the literature under three main 
headings: scope and inventory, theory development, and normative development. Beyond a 
public notice and identification function which may serve cities and their citizens as a referential 
resource in contemplating the merits of TIF in a stadia related project, I intend to help begin 
closing the identified academic research gaps while setting a baseline for work on associative 
relationships and the normative value of venue TIF. 
From literature and document review, data collection, and case studies, this dissertation 
leads to a working theory of TIF use in the venue context. An initial theory and literature review 
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chapter is followed by a complete accounting of TIF in major league stadium, arena, renovation, 
redevelopment, and ancillary real estate development projects in the United States and Canada. 
Subsequently, I undertake a comparative mechanical analysis of TIF statutes in American 
jurisdictions where major league professional sports are present, or the capacity to host major 
league sports exists. Then there are four case studies, which are intended to be particularly 
instructive of a certain venue related TIF experience (or set of experiences) that will better 
contextualize the work for the larger non-academic audience. These case study chapters address 
instances of venue TIF use in Dallas, Louisville, and Detroit. Finally, I conclude with a revisiting 
of research questions and results, the aforementioned working theory for venue TIF, and policy 
recommendations. 
Although this work takes the broad outline of a traditional dissertation, it also shares 
much in common with dissertations consisting of a series of thematically linked papers. To this 
end, the majority of chapters are intended to be able to stand alone as a piece of literature. 
Accordingly, most chapters have methods within the particular chapter as opposed to there being 
a distinct research design or methods chapter.  
 
1.1.2. Introducing TIF 
At its core, TIF involves the designation of a geographic district, ranging anywhere from 
a single parcel to many square miles, and the setting of a revenue baseline. Revenues within the 
district above the baseline amount are allocated to projects within the same district for a 
statutorily defined period, while pre-existing revenues flow as they did before. After the TIF 
district reaches its sunset, incremental revenues will return to the general fund or wherever they 
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would have gone absent the TIF designation. The most common source of revenue for TIF is 
property taxes, but some states allow the use of other sources, most notably sales taxes 
Depending on the enabling statutory framework, TIF districts can be created on petition 
from a developer or by local government initiative and may be used to fund public or private 
projects. In almost all states municipalities may establish TIF zones. Many states also have 
provisions for counties to create their own TIF districts or participate in municipally created 
districts.  
From its 50s-era roots in California, TIF laws have become an exceedingly popular 
vehicle of subsidy among local governments in the United States, with some variety of TIF 
having been used by 49 states and a further three Canadian provinces. Estimates place the 
number of unique TIF districts in the thousands (Briffault, 2010), but there has been no firm 
national level inventory. Although initially associated with redevelopment efforts in blighted 
inner city locales, TIF has expanded beyond these urban roots into many greenfield sites in 
suburban and exurban locales (2010).  
Common TIF funded projects include those related to site preparation (such as parcel 
acquisition, demolition, remediation), local infrastructure (roads, sidewalks, parking garages, 
streetscaping, lighting, utilities), and professional costs (planning, engineering, architecture, 
legal). Where permissible by statute, TIF can be more aggressively applied to local government 
building projects, direct subsidy of developers, as well as major capital infrastructure projects 
and partnerships. Yet not all TIF statutes are the same – ultimately the legal frames and specifics 
determine what can be done and how, making law central to the TIF story however it is 
examined. 
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1.1.3. Public Finance of Sports Venues 
Long (2013) has documented the significant extent to which major league sports venues in 
North America have both capital and operating costs heavily subsidized by public partners. 
Although stadium and arena deals may be frequently accompanied by promises of economic gains, 
a wide range of academic work exists showing that sports venues do not positively impact 
economic growth in a city or region (see Baade, 1996; Coates and Humphreys, 2008; Humphreys, 
2019; Quirk and Fort, 1997; Siegfried and Zimbalist, 2000). Still, the venue, its resident sports 
team, and a surrounding entertainment district can be seen as a way to compete for talent with 
alternative locales. This Tiebout (1956) competition is on two levels: between regions for the 
monopoly scarce opportunity to host a franchise, and within a region to direct activity to a 
particular area.  
Others argue that despite not positively impacting regional economic growth, professional 
sports can beneficially reallocate activity within a region (Austrian and Rosentraub, 2002; 
Rosentraub, 2009; 2014; Rosentraub and Swindell, 2009), a notion supported by the neighborhood 
effects cited by Matheson (2019). Likewise, access to the major leagues may impact firm or talent 
location decisions (Delaney and Eckstein, 2006). However, while the presence of a new venue 
may alter the composition of local services and property values (Humphreys and Zhou, 2015), 
there is mixed evidence on relationships between land values and venue location, with some 
showing positive localized returns (Ahlfeldt and Maennig, 2010; Dehring et al., 2007; Feng and 
Humphreys, 2012; Propheter, 2019; Tu, 2005) and others finding stronger appreciation in a 
neighborhood after the departure of a sports team (Humphreys and Nowak, 2017). 
But how do stadium subsidy deals get done? Building off of urban regime theory, so-
called “local growth coalitions” of politicians aligned with major local companies and media 
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outlets, have been viewed as influencing public subsidies (Delaney and Eckstein, 2006; 2007). 
Beyond making arguments of economic growth and redevelopment, local growth coalitions 
spend significantly on ballot measures, and frame the alternative of not reaching a deal as losing 
the team. Politicians can also succumb to the pressure of not wanting to be remembered for 
losing a local institution or national status symbol (Euchner, 1994; Zimbalist, 1998, p. 23). 
Indeed, Delaney and Eckstein (2007) found that local growth coalitions have more success in 
former industrial cities that have seen structural economic challenges. Conversely, cities without 
teams may wish to offer generous subsidies to gain or reclaim “big league” status. The 
proliferation of these growth coalitions play a significant role in forming a theoretical base for 
this work. 
 
1.2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This inquiry at the intersection of TIF and public finance of major league sports venues 
poses two primary research issues. First, is why TIF has become a more frequent and financially 
substantial form of subsidy for major league sports venues? From this initial question, a second 
question arises of whether should TIF be used to subsidize major league venues? These primary 
questions are intended to be addressed through the general theory development exercise, which 
will be informed by the results of the substantive chapters and case studies. The primary 
questions are ordered as they are because this work needs to initially document and understand 
the phenomena, the process of which is crucial to subsequently informing the second normative 
based question. 
Secondary research questions, which will be primarily addressed by a particular 
substantive or case study chapter, include:  
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1. To what extent has TIF been used to subsidize major league sports venues? 
2. To what extent has TIF been used to facilitate real estate development ancillary to 
major league venues? 
3. What are the prospective risks and benefits of using property tax versus sales tax based 
TIF in a venue context? 
4. Is there a relationship between TIF statute permissiveness and venue TIF outcomes? 
5. Does the presence of a major league sports venue make a TIF district more successful 
in terms of construction and neighborhood desirability outcomes relative to similar TIF 
districts absent such an anchor? 
6. When a major league venue uses a TIF subsidy, is but-for present, and how is but-for 
determined? 
These secondary questions are intended to help build theory explaining why TIF is used as well 
as lead into a discussion whether TIF should be used to subsidize major league venues? The 
concluding discussion will also provide normative policy recommendations addressing under 
what circumstances TIF can potentially be viewed as a positive inclusion for a venue project. 
 
1.3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
 
 
 
Methods Overview 
 
This dissertation uses a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods, depending on the 
context of each chapter. While much of the dissertation will rely upon document review and 
synthesis, as well as the single case study method, cases themselves use a range of lenses to 
address the relevant issues. These lenses and issues are further detailed in the case study 
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overviews below. Likewise, the mix of methods extends beyond the case study chapters. This 
mix should not be thought of as a traditional mixed methods project in that different chapters use 
different methods as appropriate for the objectives of that chapter as opposed to the same mix of 
methods being used across all chapters. Both the multidisciplinary nature of TIF, as well as the 
diverse objectives of this dissertation to inventory, further investigate particular elements, and 
then build normative capacity on the subject of venue TIF, make a range of methods an 
appropriate and necessary toolkit. 
 
Chapter 2. Literature and Theory Review 
This chapter undertakes an expansive review of literature and theory relevant to TIF and 
subsidization of sports venues. Beginning at a high level with the public investment decision, I 
then discuss the public choice critique of government spending decisions. This is followed by an 
overview of the infrastructure investment decision, covering the perspectives of economic 
growth, deficit spending, transfer payments, pork, and local government competition. Next, 
public-private partnerships and traditional procurement processes are reviewed, with a focus on 
the concepts of resource pooling and optimism bias.  
Following this, the chapter moves to non-TIF local government financial assistance in 
general. The instruments covered in this sub-section include abatements, land transfers, tax 
credits, grants, subsidized loans, and enterprise zones. After addressing the issue of whether non-
TIF financial subsidies work, three headings of motivations for the provision of such incentives 
are delved into: interjurisdictional competition, fiscal stress, and political culture.  
I then expand upon the basics of TIF and theoretical explanations for TIF use, prior to 
comparing TIF to other forms of local government financial assistance, and discussing reasons 
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why state governments and overlaying taxing jurisdictions would allow TIF use. I also discuss 
and analyze the broad TIF literature, dividing this discussion into headings concerning property 
valuation, economic development, fiscal outcomes, jurisdictional outcomes, legal, as well as use 
and mix type. 
The TIF review is then complemented by a similarly deep discussion of government 
subsidies for professional sports venues. Starting with how venues are subsidized, I move to 
reasons for explaining these subsidies and the literature evaluating these motivations, including 
economic development, local area development, inter and intra-regional competition, political 
public choice and growth coalitions, as well as intangible value. 
 
Chapter 3. Surveying and Accounting for TIF Use in Major League Venues 
 
For each non-temporary 2018 venue in the five major leagues, data is collected on TIF 
contributions to direct capital costs as well as to projects using TIF related to ancillary 
development. Other variables are collected with the intent to facilitate understanding of the 
presence or absence of TIF more broadly. These variables include gross and percentage public 
contributions to total costs, location within an urban area, ancillary development intent, the 
presence of master-planned urban development, legal jurisdiction, the use of debt or 
reimbursement, the use of property or sales tax increment, the date of construction or substantial 
renovation, and the use of TIF in renovations or redevelopment of former venue sites. 
Primary findings include that of 125 non-temporary major league venues in 2018, 107 
were located in TIF eligible jurisdictions. 22 of these 107 have seen TIF contributions to direct 
capital costs, while another 17 have TIF uses deemed as having a strong relation to the facility. 
The 39 strong TIF connection venues represent 31% of stadiums and arenas in the five major 
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North American leagues and 36% of facilities where TIF could have been used at the time of 
construction. Direct TIF funding is most frequently seen in arenas and MLS stadiums. In 2017 
dollars, $1.817 billion of TIF has been spent directly on venues, with a per venue average of 
$82.6 million. Where TIF was directly used, it accounted for an average of 24.4% of total capital 
costs and 60.3% of public capital costs. 
 
Chapter 4. Surveying TIF Statutes in a Major League Context 
 
Again, as TIF is a financial and policy instrument exclusively operationalized through 
state and local taxes and does not exist at the federal level, state TIF statutes govern the 
parameters and jurisdiction of TIF in the United States. This chapter primarily evaluates 10 
categories of TIF statute elements in the states where the five major professional sports leagues 
operate clubs. The data set also includes some states where there are not currently major 
professional sports teams resident, but these states are deemed to have the potential to host a 
major league team. The categories of TIF statute characteristics are: taxation sources that can be 
captured, permissible accompanying purposes, approval sources, forms of financing, 
requirements for a TIF district, type of TIF district available, permissible uses of TIF for public 
improvements, permissible uses of TIF for private improvements, permissible land uses, and TIF 
district lifespans. Data is compiled for 42 variables for all jurisdictions in the data set from a 
direct review of state TIF statutes complemented by secondary sources.  
This chapter finds that a lowest common denominator TIF statute (where 25 or more 
jurisdictions agree) will allow for municipalities and counties to create TIF districts and select 
projects to allocate increment that are both site specific and area wide. Eminent domain and 
special assessment overlay, as well as revenue bonds and pay-as-you-go, will be permitted. 
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However, TIF will be limited to property taxes, and TIF funds can exclusively be used on public 
improvements, specifically infrastructure, beautification, parking structures, land acquisition, 
soft costs, and site preparation. Finally, the strong consensus statute requires a public hearing, 
and allows TIF to be used mixed-use, residential, and commercial zones. Just as importantly, 
most jurisdictions studied do not permit sales TIF or the funding of strictly private 
improvements. The absence of allowable TIF contribution to private improvements also provides 
another incentive for public venue ownership. 
 
Case Studies 
 
Beyond inferences or observations that can be made from the broader data set, I intend to 
include case studies that are particularly instructive of a venue related TIF experience or aspect 
that will better contextualize the work for the larger non-academic audience. There will again be 
four case study chapters, drawing upon issues, lenses, and methods from law, urban planning, 
and public policy. In addition to particular venue TIF experiences or impacts, cases were selected 
for depth, consistency, and availability of data. 
Specifically, Dallas was a starting point for case study research for multiple reasons: 
there was over 15 years of experience from which to evaluate the project, the local economic 
development agency and city kept detailed, consistent, and easily accessible data, the original 
arena deal process touches upon several theoretical trends in the literature, and there is a suite of 
similarly downtown core proximate TIF districts to compare outcomes with.  
Louisville was selected for its significance to work on sales TIF and the deep range of 
sources to draw upon. The KFC Yum! Center is one of the largest uses of sales TIF in any 
project (venue or not), and also represents a prime opportunity to link my work to other 
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interdisciplinary conversations on megaproject underperformance. Similarly, Detroit was the 
final case selection for its status as the largest venue TIF project in history, the scale of its initial 
ambition as an agent of urban transformation, the deal making process’ relation to the literature, 
its ability to demonstrate the impacts of overlaying capture, as well as the presence of a 
pioneering community benefits aspect in a venue TIF project. 
Other promising cases were not selected for two primary reasons: there is significant 
existing work on them (even if that work does not center upon TIF), and jurisdictional diversity. 
For instance, San Diego’s Petco Park is already extensively covered in several academic articles 
and book chapters, even if TIF is not the core element of these works. Likewise, Edmonton’s 
Rogers Place is the subject of an entire recently published book. With the jurisdictional diversity, 
the several sport TIF clusters in Frisco, Texas presents venue TIF as a compelling suburban 
development strategy, but this dissertation already has two case studies based in the same Dallas 
metro area. 
 
Chapter 5. But-for and Capture in Dallas 
 
This chapter broadly evaluates the use of TIF in the Dallas Sports Arena TIF District 
(SATD) that was originally created to reimburse public improvements surrounding the American 
Airlines Center, as well as the Victory Park development that has been constructed within the 
SATD since the arena’s 2001 opening. Specifically, the SATD is examined in terms of two 
common TIF criticisms that the literature (and particularly the law based literature) has identified 
as especially valid: that many TIF projects lack a legitimate but-for element and that sub-optimal 
transparency allows projects to escape sufficient scrutiny. After an overview of Texas TIF and 
local TIF policy in Dallas, the SATD story is set out prior to an analysis of outcomes through 
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these two critical lenses. The but-for component includes elements of analyzing what would have 
happened in the SATD absent the potential for TIF subsidy. 
Dallas has seen TIF subsidize an initial arena framework that likely would have 
proceeded in much the same way absent the TIF subsidy – driven by market conditions. 
However TIF has been useful in filling gaps in the deal and correcting mistakes. Without a 
flexible earmarked source like TIF to correct the initial developer’s mistakes, the Dallas arena 
may well not have not emerged as well from stagnation during the Great Recession and reached 
its current construction value. At the same time, the presence of arena parking requirements has 
severely limited development potential. The problems of but-for in the Dallas arena project also 
bring forth issues of TIF transparency. In particular, the local economic development agency can 
be viewed as having been captured by arena proponents, leading to a decision tree where the 
available options to the City were limited to making the best of a flawed initial structure created 
by the same proponents in the first place. 
 
Chapter 6. Does the Arena Matter? 
 
Building upon the work in Chapter 5, this chapter examines the use of TIF in the broader 
context of Dallas downtown redevelopment. With 20 active or retired TIF districts including the 
SATD, Dallas has made TIF a central element of its competitive strategy for talent and firms 
within its region. The range of similarly core proximate Dallas TIF districts without a sports 
venue anchor, provides a strong opportunity to relatively situate the use of TIF in a sports venue 
context, with the core research issue being: does the arena anchor make a substantial difference 
in development outcomes? For this chapter, development outcomes are conceived in two broad 
ways: financial value and urbanist revitalization. 
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Although there have been more successful TIF districts in the terms conceived by this 
chapter, the SATD has eventually delivered major gains in construction value and density, albeit 
at a far higher subsidy cost than the other TIF districts discussed. Dallas illuminates that interest 
from developers with financially feasible mixed-use urbanist vision is more indicative of positive 
outcomes than the presence of an expensive amenity anchor. Still, the SATD has eventually 
provided infill far superior to that found in districts where developer interest was lagging or 
absent. 
 
Chapter 7. Sales TIF and Megaproject Underperformance in Louisville 
 
This chapter connects the literatures on megaproject underperformance to the venue and 
TIF conversations through a project that stands out as one of the worst examples of financial and 
revenue underperformance of a major North American sports venue in decades. In the case of the 
KFC Yum! Center, the original project revenue structure has completely failed to cover the arena 
debt. As a result, the authority responsible for the arena’s construction and operation, was left 
headed towards default before a substantial state bailout occurred in 2017. This financial failure 
has centered on two element: sales TIF and the arena lease. The core of the chapter then evaluates 
the Louisville experience through works representative of the primary explanatory lenses in the 
megaproject underperformance literature. In particular, the Louisville case exemplifies how rent-
seeking by a local growth coalition, when paired by optimism bias, strategic misrepresentation, 
and a volatile revenue source like sales TIF, can lead to disaster in the context of a venue finance 
structure. 
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Chapter 8. Four Issues of TIF in Detroit  
The final case evaluates the use of TIF in Detroit’s Little Caesars Arena. This project 
represents the largest TIF expenditure in a sports venue to date. Some $324 million in TIF 
subsidies were provided to the arena, with a further $74 million available if certain construction 
targets are met. While the arena and its subsidies were sold alongside promises that the 
accompanying District Detroit would quickly transform 50 blocks of the city, real estate 
development has thus far failed to meet the promised vision. Criticism has in many respects 
thematically overlapped with critiques found in the TIF literature. In particular four aspects are 
illuminated: but-for, transparency, overlaying capture, and community benefits. Although the 
first two criticisms are also covered in the first Dallas case study, this chapter addresses both 
from different perspectives. 
There are several key findings in Detroit. First, is that public partners in venue TIF deals 
can only rely upon enforceable contractual obligations. Second, where a TIF deal is reliant on 
state level support, state politicians need to undertake due diligence and resist quick deals pushed 
by growth coalitions that may expose the state and local jurisdictions to poor outcomes in the 
longer term, especially where contracts insufficiently guarantee performance. Third, public 
partners should be wary of TIF deals that rely upon capturing increment that would otherwise be 
created and flow to schools. Fourth, as in Dallas, while an arena can perhaps deliver some 
development benefit, public parties need to consider the opportunity cost of alternative projects 
that could be achieved either with fewer subsidies, or in the absence of subsidies and crowding 
out in the first place.  
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Chapter 9. Results, Theory, and Policy 
After revisiting the secondary research questions, results, and key findings, this 
concluding chapter addresses the two primary research issues through a theory development 
exercise. Subsequently, I provide policy recommendations for conditions under which the risks 
present in venue TIF may be mitigated. Finally, I review primary limitations and briefly discuss 
particularly interesting avenues for future research.  
As noted, roughly $1.8 billion in TIF has been directly spent on 22 major league venues, 
with strong TIF connections to a venue being identified in 8/30 MLB stadiums, 6/18 MLS 
stadiums, 10/29 NBA arenas, 14/31 NHL arenas, and 7/29 NFL stadiums studied. TIF bond 
issues have been more common than reimbursement and property taxes much more frequent than 
sales TIF. TIF has also become more common in venue finance since 2000. The TIF venue 
inventory also reveals direct TIF use concentrations in particular sub-federal jurisdictions.  
From these findings, this chapter argues that if legally and financially available, TIF can 
be an effective means for local growth coalitions to sell politicians on approving subsidies 
through mitigating public approval and political risk associated with providing public dollars to 
sports venues. In particular, TIF’s salability as self-financing (whether true or not) and the 
difficulty in comprehending TIF, provides political cover to decision making politicians and 
reduces the risk of popular opposition. Likewise, TIF allows financial risks associated with 
venue subsidies to be better mitigated through tying the revenue source to the good being funded, 
and allows local governments to use money that would otherwise flow to overlaying taxing 
jurisdictions (such as schools). For senior sub-federal governments, keeping local revenues 
(which may or may not be created) local, can be more attractive than a direct grant or allocating 
statewide revenue sources.  
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While the case studies indicate substantial risks accompanying TIF use in the venue 
context, if politicians wish to move ahead with such projects, citizens should insist on a range of 
harm reduction measures. These include ensuring measures consistent with attaining true but-for, 
preventing predatory overlaying capture, avoiding structural reliance on sales TIF, shifting 
underperformance and legal risk from public to private partners by making sure that promises of 
real estate development are matched by enforceable contractual obligations, and ensuring 
transparency at multiple points of sub-federal government touching TIF.  
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE AND THEORY REVIEW 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This sprawling chapter addresses the many literatures relevant to understanding TIF and 
sports venues, with the intent of setting a literature and theory baseline from which this 
dissertation’s substantive chapters can address the identified research gaps. The review touches 
upon works and lenses from public policy and finance, law, urban planning, economics, and 
sport management. As will be evidenced throughout this dissertation, each of these categories is 
directly relevant to understanding the multifaceted phenomena of venue TIF more generally, as 
well as the empirical and normative questions specifically raised in this dissertation.  
Starting from a high level rationale for public investment and finance, this chapter 
eventually delves down to the two core areas of sports venues and TIF. The process first leads 
through explorations of why governments invest in infrastructure, specifically the concepts of 
economic growth, Keynesian deficit spending, pork, and local government competition. From 
rationale, the discussion leads to two primary means for framing infrastructure projects: public-
private partnerships and traditional procurement. This is likewise followed by two key 
conceptual elements of infrastructure projects: resource pooling for public-private partnerships, 
and optimism bias. As noted, infrastructure is both a primary purpose of TIF and category into 
which sports venues can be more clearly classified. 
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Next, since TIF is a primary legal means of local government financial assistance, the 
review situates competing forms of subsidy as well as the issue of whether these subsidies are 
effective. Subsequently, I overview three primary motivations for the provision of such 
incentives: competition between jurisdictions, fiscal stress, and political culture. This section also 
sets up later review of sports venues as recipients of such subsidies.  
Building upon this literature base, the chapter then moves to theoretical explanations of 
TIF. This is followed by contextualizing TIF relative to other prospective forms of local 
economic development subsidy, in addition to the reasoning underpinning why states and other 
non-initiating jurisdictions would permit TIF use in the first place. From here I undertake a deep 
review of the TIF literature under six headings: property valuation, economic development, fiscal 
outcomes, jurisdictional outcomes, legal, and land use mix type. While other works have 
summarized literature on the first three headings, I aim to build upon this and add three further 
headings. The legal category is a particularly important contribution given the reality of the 
existing literature inadequately accounting for how TIF outcomes are at their core shaped by 
particular policy choices operationalized through law – many of these works focus on a certain 
state legal framework, or comparison of frameworks. 
The TIF overview leads into a complementary core sub-section concerning subsidies for 
professional sports venues. Specifically, I discuss literature concerning forms and value of public 
venue subsidy before addressing the rationale for such subsidies. The primary explanatory lenses 
for sport venue subsidy examined in this chapter are: economic development, local area 
development, jurisdictional competition, politics and growth coalitions, and intangible value. In 
addition to setting the stage for subsequent inventory and case study chapters, the TIF and sports 
 22 
 
venue reviews also provide a base for the working theory of TIF use in sport venues offered in 
Chapter 9. 
 
2.2 WHY PUBLIC FINANCE? 
This chapter begins with a brief and basic discussion of the public investment decision. 
First, I review the rationale for state intervention in the economy and efficient resource 
allocation, followed by the normative pursuit of equality through intervention, taxation, and 
which level of government should finance a state action.  
 
2.2.1 Allocation Efficiency and Failures 
Broadly the rationale for state intervention or the absence of such an intervention can be 
ascribed to either the social contract or limited-interventionist approach (Szymanski, 2017). 
Stemming from Rousseau (1762), the social contract outlines in return for the power to legislate 
and be governed by law, people accept to be bound by law. Alternatively, the concept of limited 
intervention (or laissez-faire), shares much with Mill’s utility concept that individuals should be 
free to pursue their own happiness to the extent that they do not harm others (the harm principle) 
(Mill, 1966). The classical utilitarianism of Bentham, in particular the notion that the state should 
aim to provide the greatest happiness for the greatest number (Burns, 2005), does something to 
meld Rousseau’s social contract and Mill – namely that individuals should accept state 
sovereignty to legislate for the greatest happiness for the greatest number, in return for the 
protection of law and the ability to pursue individual utility subject to the harm principle. 
Drawing upon classical utilitarianism and the social contract, the scope for state 
intervention then may be set where the collective outcomes of individuals pursuing their own 
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utility fail to perform a function that maximizes happiness for the greatest number. What defines 
such a situation, however? The best available answer from economists is the concept of 
allocative (or Pareto) efficiency, meaning that resources have been optimally allocated insofar as 
a benefit cannot be allocated to one party without making another worse off (Szymanski, 2017).  
Efficiency in this context can be defined as perfectly competitive (many actors, complete 
information, free participation or non participation in the market) and reaching equilibrium 
(actors have no preference for an alternative choice) (2017). To reach this efficiency, actors will 
aim to maximize utility through Smith’s (1776) invisible hand of supply and demand. However 
there are barriers to achieving Pareto efficiency. Five key market failures are externalities, 
information asymmetry, public goods, scale economies, and transaction costs (noted by 
Szymanski, 2017). To varying extents, all are present in the narrower TIF context later discussed. 
 
Externalities 
An externality is a cost or benefit affecting a party who did not choose to be subject to the 
impact (Buchanan and Stubblebine, 1962). There are positive and negative externalities. A 
commonly used example of a negative externality is pollution, where polluters may garner 
financial benefit from their activity and the cost is borne by those who see no financial gain. 
Likewise, a form of positive externality is vaccination, where others who do not bear the cost of 
vaccination benefit from lessened chances of coming in contact with a communicable disease. A 
common bond between the two is the difference between individual and collective cost-benefit. 
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Information Asymmetry 
Information asymmetry is where one party has better information than the other, allowing 
the party with superior information to gain an advantage. Two primary forms of information 
asymmetry are adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse selection entails a party entering 
into an advantageous transaction because the other party does not have the same information, 
and can be further subdivided into signaling and screening (Akerlof, 1970). Signaling sees that 
one party may signal through a particular attribute (such as educational attainment) that they can 
fill a need of the other, but the signal may not really be indicative of actual potential (Spence, 
1973). Screening, on the other hand, is a way for low information parties to make others reveal 
their advantageous information (such as high information salespeople) (Akerlof, 1970). 
The asymmetry of moral hazard sees a party engage in more risky behaviour than they 
otherwise would because they know another party is disproportionately responsible for the cost 
(such as “too big to fail” banks) (Krugman, 2008). Moral hazard shares a thematic similarity 
with negative externalities, with the distinction being the externality results from differing 
information. The moral hazard form of information asymmetry is also often associated with 
agency problems, whereby an agent will use superior information to make a decision that may 
benefit the agent at the expense of the principal if the agent and principal have divergent 
interests.  
 
Public Goods 
Public goods are those that are non-rivalrous and non-excludable. This means that a 
party’s potential consumption does not decrease availability for another party and that it is very 
difficult to prevent a party from receiving the benefit without paying (Samuelson, 1954). A 
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classic example of a public good is national defense – a person benefitting from the national 
level protection offered by a standing military does not make the military less able to protect 
others, and it is difficult to limit the benefit of a military to only those who pay. The provision of 
public goods is a particularly common justification for government intervention, although the 
scope of public goods can be limited by the potential for a good to be a club good (Buchanan, 
1965). For instance a road network may be commonly classified as a public good, but a toll road 
can be excludable.  
 
Scale Economies 
Scale economies in production prevent prospective competitors from challenging market 
power or dominance of established actors, which can include monopolies or oligopolies. 
Although elements of scale economies can be found in many sectors, monopoly or oligopoly 
situations are especially present in capital intensive sectors where barriers to entry are high, such 
as telecommunications or utilities (see Christensen and Greene, 1976; Demsetz, 1968). In fact 
utilities are often viewed as a “natural” monopoly that operates more efficiently if there is 
monopoly power (1968). More generally, the potential efficiency and market power of 
entrenched actors through scale economies provide a rationale for state intervention in the form 
of regulation or public ownership (1968). 
 
Transaction Costs 
Finally, transaction costs can be a barrier to what would otherwise be efficient deals 
between actors (see Williamson, 1979). On a small scale these costs may not create significant 
distortions, but if many transactions are not undertaken because of their costs, then less than 
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optimal allocations may follow (Szymanski, 2017). Transaction costs can be classified under 
several key headings: information, bargaining, and enforcement (Dahlman, 1979). With 
information, there are costs associated with researching and obtaining information about 
potential transactions to judge their efficiency (1979). Once information is satisfactorily 
gathered, then bargaining and negotiation will also come with expenses (1979). Finally, after 
parties enter into an agreement, there may be costs accompanying the enforcement of negotiated 
outcomes (1979). 
 
2.2.2. Normative Interventions 
Beyond correcting for gaps in efficient allocation caused by market failures, states may 
wish to intervene as a matter of normative policy. These normative motivations tie to classical 
utilitarian notions of creating the best outcomes for the greatest number. However in some 
instances, creating what may be viewed as such an outcome can make certain parties worse off, 
which in theory is a Pareto inefficient transaction. The tension between maximizing collective 
utility and the harm principle protecting the pursuit of individual utility, thus can be fertile 
ground for normative interventions. Two related and notable grounds for normative intervention 
are equality and the reduction of inequality through social goods. 
 
Formal vs. Substantive Equality 
The literature on equality can perhaps be best be viewed through lenses of formal and 
substantive equality. The former is concerned with equality of rules (or opportunity), while the 
latter focuses on equality of distribution regardless of, or with less emphasis on, the process and 
rules through which results were obtained. With formal equality, the role of the state is limited to 
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setting out and enforcing administrative norms through which individuals have the same formal 
ability to pursue utility in the marketplace. What outcomes individuals achieve within this scope 
of state governed opportunity is beyond the scope of the state (Nozick, 1974), and left to Adam 
Smith’s invisible hand. Facially neutral, rules-based equality is often criticized as providing 
unsatisfactory solutions for the reality that individuals never come from the same resource 
starting point, and that this inequitable origin has no relation to individual choices. 
Substantive equality attempts to address the gaps of administrative equality through 
distributive justice and the veil of ignorance (Rawls, 1971). Despite Rawlsian (1971) attempts to 
theoretically conceptualize distributive justice in terms somewhat inverse to utilitarianism (the 
state shall intervene to address economic inequalities except where the worst off would have a 
superior outcome to an equal distribution), substantive equality in one sphere may well spur 
externalities that lead to the worst off being eventually worse off than they would have otherwise 
been absent the distributive intervention.  
 
Social Goods 
Social goods are traditionally conceptualized as goods that while potentially excludable, 
can provide the greatest benefit to the greatest number. In some conceptions, a social good can 
share overlap with common pool resources, whereby exclusion of potential beneficiaries is 
difficult or costly. Often state intervention in the pursuit of mass utility in a particular instance, 
and the compounding returns from that first transaction can justify an initially inefficient 
transaction. This sort of calculus, frequently combined with a normative pursuit of equality, can 
justify government actions such as the provision of public education.  
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From this broader concept, an extension can be made from economic utility to non-
economic happiness. Specifically, if societal happiness can be measured in terms of economic 
utility, then the state intervention to provide outputs of happiness can have some sort of rules-
based justification. For instance, with a stadium, even if the later described literature shows no 
regional economic growth resulting from a club or facility’s presence, there is some argument to 
be made that the presence of a club, event, or facility can create an increased return of happiness 
amongst the local population (Dolan et al., 2016; Kavestsos and Szymankski, 2010). 
Accordingly, surplus units of mass happiness arising from the club, event, or facility, distributed 
amongst the local population, can perhaps have some financial utility value that more traditional 
economics does not measure or focus upon.  
 
Taxation 
Beyond simply providing the means to fund efficient allocations, taxation creates new 
distortions and inefficiencies – taxes reduce the purchasing power of firms and individuals, 
manufacturing an additional need for redistribution that would not otherwise be present (Tresch, 
2015). In Pareto terms then, the objective of tax policy should be seen in end results of taxation – 
if the net outcome of taxation from a revenue source that exceeds the benefit of its alternatives, is 
likewise able to improve one party’s welfare without reducing the welfare of another, the 
allocation should be efficient (2015). 
Tax policy must also struggle with efficiency and equality trade-offs (2015). Mirroring 
issues with distributive justice, the most efficient tax outcome in terms of gross growth and 
welfare allocated among all parties may often be at odds with the an allocative outcome that 
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produces greater welfare for more or most participants. Accordingly, the trade-off is often 
between growing the pie of jurisdictional wealth and creating more equal slices.  
The challenges of administration and simplicity are also worth noting (2015). An 
efficient and simple tax system may lower the cost of collection, but may leave allocative 
efficiency on the table. Conversely, compliance costs of a convoluted system may entail a 
deadweight loss. When combined with higher tax rates on higher earners, these parties may 
embark upon expensive tactics to leverage asymmetric information to aggressively avoid or even 
evade taxes (2015). In turn, the tax authority’s cost of collection will be likewise heightened, 
again altering the optimality of finance and allocation.  
The picture is further complicated by jurisdictional competition (see Tiebout, 1956), a 
factor that plays a significant role in subsequent discussions in this chapter. Here the “consumer 
voter” may choose their own optimal allocation of taxation and goods through their potential for 
mobility, subject to the transaction costs of moving (1956). 
 
2.2.3. Federal and Sub-Federal Jurisdiction 
A discussion of jurisdictional competition based on tax policy then leads to the issue of 
what level of government should be responsible for what aspects of the allocative and finance 
functions of an intervention. In the United States and Canada, federalism exists whereby powers 
are constitutionally divided between the federal and state or provincial governments, with a body 
of case law precedent to supposedly clarify the dividing lines. Within the sphere of the state or 
province, there are further divisions of local power (municipalities, counties). 
Theoretically, the literature on fiscal federalism addresses what goods or functions are 
most appropriately allocated by each level of government. Oates (1972, p. 54) argues that “in the 
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absence of cost-savings from centralized provision of a good and of interjurisdictional 
externalities, the level of welfare will always be at least as high (and typically higher) if Pareto-
efficient levels of consumption are provided in each jurisdiction than if any single uniform level 
of consumption is maintained across all jurisdictions.” Oates bases this theory on an efficiency 
presumption for decentralization based upon perceived information asymmetry between local 
and central governments – local governments are more likely to know local wants (Oates, 1999). 
Some of the jurisdictional mobility taxation problem described above can be mitigated 
against through strong federal control. Indeed the federal governments of the United States and 
Canada have far stronger taxation powers than their sub-federal counterparts, which makes 
moving to attain a lower tax rate a less potentially attractive proposition for two reasons: 1) much 
of the pool of prospectively disparate allocations if more functions were sub-federal are off of 
the table; and 2) moving countries is a stronger barrier to movement than between sub-federal 
jurisdictions and localities within sub-federal jurisdictions. This mobility incentive has been 
further blunted in practice through federal governments leveraging their superior taxation powers 
to achieve influence in non-constitutionally federal spheres of jurisdiction through the incentive 
of transfer payments conditional on meeting national standards.  
However, this activist fiscal federalism has itself been somewhat negated by a broader 
neoliberal trend of decentralization since the 1980s. Federal governments, concerned with 
structural budget deficits and drawing from neoliberal ideology proposing a smaller and more 
localized role for the state, have in certain respects rolled back federal fiscal creep and devolved 
spending roles to sub-federal governments (although Keynesianism made a comeback in the 
wake of The Great Recession). Likewise, state and provincial governments have had to reconcile 
significant debt loads, lower tolerance for taxation, and the fiscal imbalance created by federal 
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offloading, often leading to cutbacks in program and capital spending. Two common (and later 
discussed) means of achieving this balancing objective have been further offloading of fiscal 
responsibility on local governments, or entering into partnerships with private firms for delivery 
of government interventions. 
 
2.2.4 Public Choice 
Public investment decisions can be alternatively explained through the lens of public 
choice. Built from the works of Buchanan and Tullock, as well as Arrow’s (1963) related social 
choice theory, public choice applies economics to political issues. In particular, the individual is 
assumed to rationally choose from a range of allocation options to maximize their own utility, as 
opposed to collective benefit (Mueller, 1976). Public choice is thus more concerned with the 
incentives of actual political and policy actors and institutions and how these incentives mould 
outcomes.  
For this dissertation, two particularly relevant aspects of public choice are rent-seeking 
and regulatory capture. Rent-seeking can be defined as an actor attempting to gain financial 
value without producing value equivalent to the expense. Tullock outlines that rent-seeking can 
be efficient as significant value can be garnered at relatively low cost – consider the expense of a 
bribe compared to the value of a government contract (Tullock, 1980). With regulatory capture, 
instead of a bribe or campaign contribution, an industry or actor will co-opt a public entity in 
order to serve the interests of a particular group as opposed to the polity as a whole. 
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2.3. WHY INVEST IN INFRASTRUCTURE 
Beyond the larger public investment decision, it is also worth examining the reasons for 
public works infrastructure investment from both a general and local perspective. As public 
works are typically the destination of TIF captured funds, venues are a form of public works, and 
many public works are delivered through public-private partnerships, this conversation will 
eventually extend through the remainder of this chapter’s discussion. This section provides an 
overview of two basic and somewhat overlapping justifications for government investment in 
public works infrastructure before delving into factors that further influence local decisions to 
invest in public works. 
 
2.3.1. Economic Growth 
There is a significant literature associating public works infrastructure investment with 
various aspects of national and regional economic growth. Traditional public works such as 
highways have been shown to have positive impacts on GDP in general (Finn, 1993; Kollias and 
Paleologou, 2013), state gross domestic product (Garcia-Mila and McGuire, 1987), state 
personal incomes (Helms, 1985), and open up regional markets (Lakshamanan, 2011). More 
generalized public capital infrastructure investments have likewise been demonstrated to increase 
manufacturing output (Eberts, 1986; Nadiri and Mamuneas, 1993) and bring private investment 
(Pereira, 2000), although some research has shown that research and development investment 
has a superior social rate of return to public works (Nadiri and Mamuneas, 1993).  
Indeed the gambit for many governments is that infrastructure investment will to some 
extent eventually self-finance, in that economic growth will lead to higher tax receipts. Where 
there is a policy and political debate on infrastructure spending, the conversation more concerns 
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project selection, relative merits, value for money, and what the appropriate private sector 
partnering role is in the delivery of these perceived public goods. Both the self-finance and 
private partnership aspects play an important role in the later discussed TIF investment decision. 
 
2.3.2. Deficit Spending 
Related to the perception of public works being associated with economic growth, is the 
common use of public works projects as Keynesian instruments of economic stimulus in 
recessions. Starting with the Depression-era embrace of massive public works programs to drive 
employment and aggregate demand for goods, governments have with varied success sought to 
counter recessions and stagnation with infrastructure spending. More recently, most western 
economies rolled out enormous stimulus packages largely centered on public works following 
the 2008 financial crisis.  
Although literature has shown that competently executed public works stimulus projects, 
which the OECD defines as a program balancing “expediency, reporting and monitoring,” can 
create significant multipliers (Stoney and Krawchenko, 2012, p. 498; Watt and Nikolova, 2009), 
public works based fiscal action is not always successful. Notably, Japan has largely failed with 
its far from infrastructure driven efforts to emerge from the stagnation of its “lost decade” that 
has become a “lost 20 years” (Bayoumi and Collyns, 2000). Challenges were also seen with the 
post financial crisis stimulus spends in the United States, Canada, and United Kingdom. In these 
three countries, there was an ongoing tension between getting money to “shovel ready” projects, 
whether those projects also had significant long term growth value for money, spending 
oversight and transparency, as well as political agency (Stoney and Krawchenko, 2012).  
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2.3.3. Local Government Infrastructure Investment 
 
Transfer Payment Capture and Pork 
In the fiscal federalist reality of the United States and Canada, local governments have 
added incentive beyond the generally cited short term stimulus and long term growth benefits of 
public works. Namely, infrastructure spending represents an opportunity to capture funding from 
superior levels of government. While almost all public works are inherently local, many are 
heavily funded by the federal and state governments.  
Thus there is a local incentive to justify projects that might not be the most efficient use 
of resources from a national or statewide perspective, simply because that money can bring more 
local value than it could if it were committed to a competing project in another locality. A state 
will likewise have an incentive to support an otherwise mediocre local project if the alternative is 
federal funds being lost to another state. Similarly, federal-backed debt can generally be had at 
lower interest rates than most state debt, and most state debt at lower rates than local debt, 
lessening project costs, and altering cost-benefits analyses.  
US federal politicians also have electoral incentives to redirect projects (or pork) to their 
states and congressional districts. Much the same logic can apply to statehouse representatives 
and their even smaller localities. With the exception of those politicians who find more utility in 
establishing their brand as anti-pork, funding directed at a mediocre project within their district 
or state is more electorally valuable than that funding otherwise being directed outside of their 
represented locality, even if the national economy would see a greater multiplier. For American 
representatives with the constant re-election pressure of two year cycles, bringing home the 
bacon is a tangible means of answering the question of “what have you done for me lately?” For 
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leadership playing with narrow margins in navigating legislation through Congress, attaching 
tens of millions in funding for a local public works project is a relatively small price to pass a 
larger bill worth tens or hundreds of billions. In its extreme, this sort of coalition building via 
logrolling cited by Stiglitz (1998), results in “bridge to nowhere” debacles. In its more frequent 
and less extreme variants, this activity falls under the national radar, but makes a visible local 
impact. 
 
Local Government Competition 
Local governments also use public works infrastructure as a tool in the competition for 
the tax bases and economic activity brought by the presence of jobs, talent, and firms. Stemming 
again from the work of Tiebout (1956), firms and in-demand workers have options on where to 
locate. Absent major barriers to mobility, quality infrastructure is a boon to manufacturing and 
service firms alike. Workers are also attracted to places with public amenities, as well as 
accessible commuter, regional, and national transport options. Both firms and talented workers 
are likewise attracted to the presence of one another. 
Also pertinent to American local jurisdictional infrastructure competition, is the extent to 
which schools are funded by local government. In some states, school funding is dominated by 
local property taxes, meaning that cities with a stronger tax base are able to provide a better 
funded public education at a lower tax rate. Beyond schooling, the absence of a broad tax base 
makes a jurisdiction less attractive to prospective higher income residents who would be taxed 
more highly and receive worse individualized returns on their taxes, with that return deficit 
having to be made up for in some other way. While infrastructure to bring tax base growth is one 
means to address this issue, this chapter will later discuss another – local economic development 
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programs. As we will see, TIF can be a flexible method of fitting programs under both of these 
headings. 
 
2.4. PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) are a catch-all term for a wide range of relationships 
between private and public organizations to deliver goods or services. McQuaid (2000) classifies 
PPPs based upon their purpose, the parties involved, the timing, location, and means. This 
section aims to evaluate PPPs more generally, as well as how they pertain to the primary and 
overlapping contexts of this chapter – local infrastructure, local economic development, TIF, 
professional sports venues, and sport venue TIF.  
 
2.4.1. Basics of PPPs 
PPPs are a means to pursue mutual benefit (Holland, 1984) through the sharing of project 
risks and rewards in a way where all partners will theoretically be better off than they would be 
absent the partnership (McQuaid, 2000). PPPs can be seen as stemming from the concept of 
comparative advantage, whereby the opportunity cost of production is lower for one actor than it 
is for another – here there are potential efficiency gains for the public through allowing the 
private sector have a particular role in production or service provision. The increased popularity 
of PPPs in recent decades can be viewed alongside the rise of neoliberalism and privatization.  
PPPs are often centered on a particular project, or a larger series of projects unified by 
geography. Venue centered PPPs can focus on the venue itself, or encompass a larger series of 
projects designed to bring about local economic development (Bennett and Krebs, 1994). 
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Although this section focuses on more traditional infrastructure PPPs, local economic 
development subsidies can also be considered PPPs.  
Depending on the nature of the project, major infrastructure PPPs can be formulated 
through some combination of design, build, ownership, operation, transfer, and finance. PPPs 
differ from more traditional government procurement relations in that these partnerships are far 
more continuous in nature (Grimsey, 2004). While governments may enter and renew contracts 
with the same private partners over long periods of time, the framing contracts of PPPs are far 
more enduring in nature (2004). A PPP will also often see more significant shifts in balance of 
power over the course of the partnership than other contracts (McQuaid, 2000). 
 
2.4.2. Advantages and Risks of PPPs 
Other cited advantages of PPPs in infrastructure and local economic development are 
resource pooling and protection against optimism bias. With the first, different public and private 
partners can bring complementary competencies to a project (McQuaid, 2000; Webb, 1991). For 
instance, a public partner may bring superior financing capacities but private partners can more 
efficiently design, construct, and operate. Building upon resource pooling, efficiency can bring 
improved public perceptions and confidence, as well as bring longer term partnership stability 
(McQuaid, 2000). 
Optimism bias in infrastructure projects leading to cost and time overruns, in addition to 
underperformance upon completion, is well discussed by Flyvbjerg et al. (2009). Namely, project 
estimates too frequently become products of optimism as opposed to realism, driven by decision 
makers succumbing to the psychological concept of the “planning fallacy.” This issue is 
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compounded by “anchoring,” which sees a reference point established from an initial estimate 
and subsequent estimates failing to sufficiently adjust even when major problems arise.  
A well-designed PPP can guard against the public partner from bearing the primary risk 
of optimism bias driven underperformance, cost overruns, or completion delays. Although public 
risk cannot always be avoided, by aligning project risks and rewards to ensure that the private 
parties would have more to lose through underperformance and more to gain through meeting 
performance standards, the public’s exposure can be mitigated through incentives other than 
contractual bonus or penalty clauses. As we will see, the pay-as-you-go version of TIF as a PPP, 
where improvements are funded or reimbursed as increment is created, has a built-in hedge 
against optimism bias through only providing public funds as they materialize through private 
partners delivering on commitments to build. 
More broadly, we might consider a simplified example of a private partner responsible 
for design-build (including cost/time overruns) and operation of a venue and the public providing 
a share of the facility capital cost, land, and infrastructure via TIF reimbursement, as well as its 
access to cheaper financing, in return for a share of operating revenues and a much lower capital 
cost than if the venue were a purely public project. Through the fusion of construction and 
operation, the private partner would have an added incentive to ensure timely and on-budget 
completion by subcontractors so that operating and TIF revenues from real estate began flowing 
– the self-interest of the private operator would align with the public partner’s interest in project 
success and reducing the public scope of risk at the cost of sharing upsides. Here potential 
agency conflicts actually align. 
Though similar arrangements could be achieved through contracts short of partnership, a 
private operator would only be concerned with the revenue flow from whenever operations 
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began, the design-builder would look to take the most self-advantageous option of a penalty 
clause for late completion, bankruptcy, or going over budget to speed completion. While the 
independent self-interests of the design-build contractor could end up aligning in a way that 
would maximize project welfare, there is a greater risk that they will not, and the financial risk of 
incentive non-alignment is held mostly by the public actors. The PPP instead comprehensively 
addresses long term project risks and rewards in a way that is most likely to work for all parties, 
while likewise utilizing the strengths of the respective parties.  
Yet PPPs are not foolproof. Partnerships can be derailed by unclear definition of 
objectives, resource costs, uneven power balances, actors appropriating power, negative 
externalities on other public services, organizational problems, and philosophical differences 
(McQuaid, 2000). Using the same simplified hypothetical venue partnership, what was viewed as 
an optimal distribution of actor strengths, risks, and rewards, may unravel through undue 
administration costs that turn operating profit into deficit, or a private partner leveraging 
oscillating bargaining power at an opportune time to extract a better deal from a public partner 
stuck with a range of bad options. Similarly, the risks exist that both public and private elements 
of the partnership will engage in rent-seeking activities to benefit narrow interests, financial 
issues will arise drawing resources from other public spending priorities (such as schools), and 
that the organizational structure will be incapable of responding to unforeseen challenges. While 
these pitfalls can be fought through transparency and initial contract design that anticipates 
potential future issues and includes safeguards to mitigate against the worst reasonably 
foreseeable outcomes, the initial bargaining reality of the public actors (often responding to the 
monopoly bargaining power of teams championed by Ross, 1988) has seen many venue PPPs 
eventually lead to disaster.  
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2.5. LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE 
For governments pursuing interventions to facilitate economic growth in a region, 
municipality, or neighborhood, financial assistance to private business is frequently the direct 
complement or alternative investment opportunity to more indirect infrastructure spending (see 
Bartik, 1991). This financial assistance is commonly operationalized as property tax abatements, 
land transfers at below market value, tax credits, grants and subsidized loans, enterprise zones, 
and TIF. These incentives can also be packaged on an ad-hoc basis in “one time” deals to attract 
or retain particular firms or projects. After a brief overview of certain instruments and the 
sprawling literature on the effectiveness of local government financial assistance, this section 
focuses on common explanations of why financial incentives are provided.  
 
2.5.1. Non-TIF Financial Assistance 
 
Property Tax Abatements 
Property tax abatements involve the deferral, reduction, or elimination of property taxes 
for a period of time (Dalehite et al., 2005). Abatements are typically conditional on the creation 
or renovation of new or obsolete commercial or industrial facilities, or real estate development in 
blighted areas, and can be used alone or alongside other financial incentives. After job creation 
tax credits, abatements are the most common means of local economic development assistance 
(Bartik, 2017). Abatements are popular with local governments as property taxes constitute the 
most significant aspect of local government fiscal power devolved by states.  
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Criticism of property tax abatements generally center on ineffectiveness and 
indiscriminateness – abatements can be overused or succumb to “me too” situations where their 
overall effectiveness is diluted (Maurer, 2005). Similar to TIF, abatements can operate on a but-
for basis, whereby a local government can claim that the beneficial activity was made feasible by 
the tax break. However, instead of revenue being theoretically diverted to some good, the tax is 
simply retained by the firm or eventually paid at a lesser present value.  
 
Land Transfers  
Local governments will often acquire or come into possession of land through various 
means, including tax delinquency, eminent domain, and strategic acquisition. Often these lands 
are held through local government controlled or affiliated entities, such as municipal 
corporations, development authorities, and land banks. To bring more attractive projects, local 
government related entities will assemble, clear legal encumbrances against, prepare for 
construction, and transfer the lands to developers for below market value consideration. These 
land transfer subsidies can be accompanied by local government infrastructure and service 
contributions. In return, developers will often have period in which construction milestones must 
be met, or the local government will have an option to repurchase. Where land has been acquired 
for substantial consideration, but still under market value, a repurchase price well below the 
initial subsidized price serves as a strong contractual incentive for recipients to follow through on 
their commitments.  
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Tax Credits 
Employment-based tax credits are the most common form of local financial assistance 
(Bartik, 2017). Available in almost every state, this type of incentive provides a credit for jobs or 
payroll created or retained. Job retention is conceptualized on a but-for basis – but-for the credit 
the job would have left the jurisdiction. Some states also have schemes where a portion of 
income tax revenue created from new jobs will be credited to the employer.  
Whereas property tax abatements are the tool of choice for local governments, tax credits 
are the primary means of state governments with a more expansive range of fiscal options. Tax 
credits are also often targeted at specific industries (such as manufacturing, technology, or film). 
A tax credit is particularly potent if it is refundable, meaning that the firm in receipt of the credit 
will receive a rebate from the government even if there is no tax owing. While the incentive may 
be of value to the firm, research indicates that tax credits are of little statistical significance in 
growth terms (Bartik, 2017). 
 
Direct Grants and Subsidized Loans 
Often firms will receive direct grants from state and federal appropriation programs (such 
as the HUD Community Development Block Grant). Common headings include those for job 
training, new project development, brownfield cleanup, and energy efficiency. The intention of 
these grants is to offset project costs to make a particular project, or a particular means of 
executing a project, more attractive relative to investment alternatives. Likewise, for project 
costs not covered by or eligible for grants, state and local governments can offer tax-exempt 
loans for certain types of construction or manufacturing related expenses. In addition to lower 
than market interest rates through the tax exemption, these bond issues have far longer maturity 
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periods than commercial debt. Some public choice literature theorizes that grants are intended to 
effectively buy votes, with larger state bureaucracies positively associated with more and larger 
grants (Grossman, 1994).  
 
Enterprise Zones 
An enterprise zone is a geographic district where a combination of the above discussed 
tax and regulatory incentives (as well as TIF) are combined with the intent of spurring 
redevelopment. Enterprise zones became a popular tool for states in the 1980s to address urban 
blight, with 37 states and the District of Columbia implementing enterprise zones by the early 
1990s (Papke, 1993). In addition to direct incentives, enterprise zones will often be packaged 
with urban planning efforts and infrastructure investment (Fisher and Peters, 1997) in an attempt 
to accelerate redevelopment. However in a review of the New Jersey program, Boarnet and 
Bogart (1995) found in the first eight years that there was no evidence of a positive impact on 
gross or sectoral employment, or property tax generation. 
 
2.5.2. Do Non-TIF Local Financial Incentives Work? 
A significant body of literature indicates that financial incentives for local economic and 
business development are of limited or mixed effectiveness in terms of jobs and growth (Bartik, 
2017; Due, 1961; Peters and Fisher, 2002; 2004; Rubin and Wilder, 1989), although some 
reviews based on certain econometric methods found more cause for optimism (Bartik, 1991; 
Newman and Sullivan, 1988; Peters and Fisher, 2004; Wassmer, 1994). Still, other scholars 
underline methodological issues with studies showing positive effects, such as flawed data or 
troubles replicating results in other locations or timeframes (Fisher and Peters, 1997; McGuire, 
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1992; Peters and Fisher, 2004) as well as the lack of substantive significance accompanying 
statistically significant positive results (Bartik, 1991; Peters and Fisher, 2004).  
Likewise, there are sub-literatures taking a dim view of instruments such enterprise zones 
or subsidized loans (Boarnet and Bogart, 1996; Dabney, 1991; Peters and Fisher 2002; 2004). 
With enterprise zones in particular, criticisms center on their ability to only divert economic 
activity from other localities (Papke, 1993) or public revenues to big business (Lambert and 
Coomes, 2001) as opposed to creating jobs (Bondonio and Engberg, 2000), growth, or increased 
property values (Boarnet and Bogart, 1995). 
Bartik’s 2017 work is perhaps the most comprehensive and recent attempt to provide an 
in-depth assessment and analysis of the impact of financial incentives on local economic 
development across states. Comparing the impact on property, sales, and income taxes from 
abatements and four types of tax credits some 25 years after his more optimistic 1991 review, 
Bartik concludes that these incentives are usually of statistically insignificant, and sometimes 
negative value, considering their cost. Interestingly however, Bartik does not evaluate TIF.  
Despite the questions and red flags raised by the literature, local economic development 
actors themselves believe their incentives are useful in growing the tax base (Wolman and 
Splitzley, 1996) and these actors seek out credit for subsidy impacts (Peters and Fisher, 2004; 
Wolkoff, 1992; Wolman, 1988). So if these policies are a mix of somewhat negative, somewhat 
positive, or undetermined value, how beyond rent-seeking and optimism bias by local actors do 
we explain their wide penetration? There are three primary headings under which the literature 
classifies the “why” of local financial assistance: interjurisdictional competition, fiscal stress, 
and political culture (Saiz, 2001).  
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2.5.3. Interjurisdictional Competition 
Local financial assistance has been traditionally understood through a public choice lens 
as a means to compete for economic growth with alternative destinations in a federalist 
framework (Saiz, 2001; Tiebout, 1956). Historically, the bottom line in this calculation has been 
measured in jobs (Bartik, 1991) and the tax base they bring with them. In recent decades, more 
attention has also been paid to developing innovation, a skilled workforce, entrepreneurship, and 
the lifestyle amenities that firms and workers in this space desire, as well as assistance directed at 
business retention and incubation (Zheng and Warner, 2010). In each instance, this competition 
for residents and employers is an extension of the previously mentioned basic theory on local 
government expenditure whereby “the consumer-voter may be viewed as picking that 
community which best satisfies his preference pattern for public goods” (Tiebout, 1956, p. 418).  
In this competition cities are willing to the use tools most readily at their disposal to maximize 
their opportunity to realize growth objectives (Peterson, 1981; Wolman and Spitzley, 1996), 
subject to politically imposed limits, wants, and incentives (explained in a broader context by 
Elkin, 1987; Wolman, 1988; Wolkoff, 1992). Alternatively, localities that would otherwise 
prefer to not compete with incentives may feel compelled to offer assistance to retain what they 
firms and jobs they have, or remain on a level plane with their neighbors (Maurer, 2005). 
A more modern variant of interjurisdictional competition, focused on skilled workers and 
innovative firms, has perhaps been most popularly communicated through Florida’s creative 
class and cities frameworks. Florida argues that the highly educated, innovative, and professional 
“Creative Class”, accounting for roughly 30 percent of the workforce, desires cities with the “3-
t’s” of talent, tolerance, and technology. Within these cities, the creative class seeks a stimulating 
“Street Level Culture” (Florida, 2002), effectively a proxy for urbanist environments with 
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experiential diversity. Thus instead of direct subsidies for firms and jobs, the creative frame 
looks to develop an attractive urban environment, with various forms of financial assistance 
being tools to that end.  
Localities might also aim to create or expand clusters where firms in the same industry 
sector might seek geographic proximity to their direct suppliers, customers, or competitors 
(Porter, 2000). In the venue context for example, a cluster may include multiple clubs, possibly 
in multiple facilities, with other entertainment related amenities also in close proximity. Clusters 
can create competitive advantages for firms and their host localities, such as increased 
productivity and wages, economies of scale, innovation, and new businesses (2000). Thus 
instead of competing at the firm level, local governments are competing to make their clusters 
attractive. While subsidization of initial actors in a proposed cluster might appear tempting to 
local governments, Porter (2000) argues that government interventions should focus upon 
building existing clusters where the market has found some sort of rationale for location as 
opposed to altogether new ones.  
 
2.5.4. Fiscal Stress  
In addition to strict interjurisdictional competition, some scholars highlight the 
motivation of fiscal distress or capacity (Saiz, 2001). Within this thread, there are two competing 
approaches. The first outlines that local governments are spurred to respond with financial 
assistance where economic and fiscal stress is present to attempt to regain normality in both 
respects and avert the death-spiral of declining revenues, departing revenue creators, and 
increased demand for services (Saiz, 2001; Zaltman, 1973). Alternatively, others argue that 
financial assistance emerges from superior capability, meaning that a surplus of resources lowers 
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the risk of new attempts to spur economic diversification or growth (Bozeman and Slusher, 1979, 
p. 349; Levine, 1978, p. 317; Saiz, 2001).  
 
2.5.5. Political Culture 
A third explanation for the use of financial incentives to business by local governments 
comes from political culture (Basolo, 2000; Reese and Rosenfeld, 2001; Saiz, 2001; Wright et 
al., 1987). While acknowledging that interjurisdictional competition leads local governments 
towards investment in financial assistance programs versus more “progressive” spending on 
goods such as affordable housing, Basolo (2000) emphasizes the impact of “political variables” 
in outcomes.  
A strong element of these political variables flow from regime theory. Providing a more 
explicit refutation to strict public choice understandings of local financial incentives, regime 
theory argues that the complexities of local politics impact policy through brokering, coalition 
building, and resource sharing between public (elected and bureaucratic) and private centers of 
political and economic influence (Basolo, 2000; Stoker, 1998). This also relates to the literature 
on community power, whereby elites in one jurisdiction compete with elites in other jurisdictions 
to implement economic development agendas (Basolo, 2000; Molotch, 1976; Polsby, 1963), 
manifesting itself in variations of the “growth machine” concept through which coalitions of elite 
local organizations promote self-beneficial urban policies while selling these policies as 
benevolent (Delaney and Eckstein, 2006; Lauria, 1997; Logan and Molotch, 1987; Molenkopf, 
1983; Molotch, 1976; Schimmel 2006; Troutman, 2004). These models also explain some of the 
impetus for the PPPs, including those concerning professional sports venues, subsequently 
discussed. 
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Yet Reese and Rosenberg (2001) take a step back and argue that the common 
methodological explanations fail to explain any number of instances. These include structural 
explanations (whether a city has a strong mayor or ward system), political stripes of elected 
officials, fiscal stress, businesses seeking incentives, businesses being the critical level of 
analysis, or localities experimenting with alternatives to see what works. While Reese and 
Rosenberg (2001) acknowledge that there is some merit to the “accepted truths” explaining local 
financial assistance incentives, their argument is more that one-size does not fit all. Instead, they 
set out that whether “surface similarities” falling under the headings of public choice, fiscal 
stress, or political culture apply in any particular instance can be best seen through the lens of 
civic culture, defined as the “local systems for political and/or public action and processes for 
distribution of goods” (2001, p. 208).  
Although this local civic culture theory primarily comes off as an extension of political 
culture arguments, the ability to place more or less emphasis on certain sub-characteristics from 
any one of the three broader explanatory headings as local circumstances entail is quite 
attractive. As we will see in the venue and TIF contexts, each of these explanations have some 
merit, but to what extent each is determinative can be highly dependent on local facts.  
 
2.6 KEY TIF ELEMENTS AND STRUCTURES 
 
2.6.1. Blight and But-For 
In addition to the TIF basics overviewed in the introductory chapter, most jurisdictions 
will have some form of blight or but-for requirements. These elements are sometimes also found 
in other local economic development incentives. But-for means that absent the use of TIF, the 
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development would not occur, occur as quickly, or it would occur in a less fiscally beneficial 
form. But-for can be established in a number of ways. Sometimes a project proponent will sign a 
contract affirming that but-for TIF subsidy, they would not undertake the project or not 
undertake the project to the extent that the costs of the change would exceed the TIF subsidy. In 
other jurisdictions, a TIF board may make a but-for determination. While quantitative measures 
can be used to contribute to a but-for determination, many states leave findings to the subjective 
whims of local governments or their delegates.  
Blight stems from the concept of urban blight or decay, a process through which neglect 
of the physical environment is often accompanied by job loses, firm and resident departures, a 
rise in crime, and general economic deterioration. TIF conceptions of blight often include the 
designation of the area as an economic, social, or public health liability. More specifically, a 
blight definition may require one or some combination of the following to be present: 
deteriorating or obsolete structures, unsafe conditions, vacant lots, assessment delinquency 
exceeding land value, environmental contamination, and inadequate infrastructure.  
However many state TIF statutes have other less specific provisions that allow for TIF 
zones to be established in areas beyond the traditional conception of blight. These expansionary 
provisions can be as subtle as “inadequate planning” or a problematic “street layout” (Briffault, 
2010, p. 78). In a review of TIF statutes, Johnson and Man (2001) found that while 33 states had 
blight requirements, only seven imposed quantitative measures of blight, such as internal rate of 
return calculations. These numbers are updated in part by the legal inventory work later found in 
this dissertation. 
With a combination of vague blight and but-for provisions, TIF has moved beyond 
redevelopment of blighted urban brownfields, to simply being a means to finance development 
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of any nature. Instead of being a limit on TIF expansionism, courts have in many instances 
provided deference to local government interpretations, leading to such infamous examples of 
TIF being used as the seed for growing a Walmart Supercenter out of a blighted Wisconsin fruit 
orchard (Farwell, 2005). 
 
2.6.2. Financing TIF 
There are three somewhat overlapping means of using increment to fund improvements. 
With significant increment generation usually taking years to follow the designation of a TIF 
zone, many jurisdictions will use the collateral of anticipated increment to issue debt so that the 
compounding benefits of redevelopment can be experienced earlier. Local governments can 
choose between debt supported by future TIF revenues, or general obligation bonds backed by 
the general fund. While the latter often allows for a more advantageous interest rate, the risk to 
the taxpayer is heightened as most municipal revenues will be on the hook to cover any TIF 
underperformance. In large part for this reason, some jurisdictions have a statutory bar to general 
obligation TIF debt.  
Other states have even more severe restrictions on TIF-backed borrowing. For local 
governments in those jurisdictions, or for those who prefer to avoid the risks of debt issue more 
generally, a pay-as-you-go approach will often be taken where TIF improvements will be funded 
as increment is created. Finally, a third compromise option exists where developers will finance 
improvements to be reimbursed upon sufficient increment generation. Mostly operationalized by 
contract priority, the developer and the local authority will typically agree as to what project or 
party receives what amount of incremental revenue when. This form of project finance combines 
the benefit of early improvement impact with TIF performance risk being transferred from the 
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public to the developer. However, as will be demonstrated in this dissertation’s first Dallas case 
study, developer reimbursement TIF is liable to fund projects that do not meet a true but-for 
standard.  
 
2.7. TIF THEORY 
Despite the relatively sprawling TIF literature, there have only been two works primarily 
focused on theory (Brueckner, 2001; Weber, 2013). These articles focus on both the financial 
and political utility from the perspective of a local government (typically a municipality) 
contemplating TIF use. This section explains and builds upon these two theoretical lenses, and 
then expands the conversation on expected return to state and local government bodies that either 
enable or participate in, but do not initiate, TIF use. 
 
2.7.1. Financial Utility 
Weber (2013) conceptualizes TIF as a means of smoothing revenue fluctuation for local 
government over a project’s lifetime – by nature the costs of a new development project (such as 
servicing infrastructure) will be frontloaded and the revenue benefits mostly received on the 
backend. TIF provides a means to finance improvements up-front while limiting the risk pool to 
project itself. To demonstrate that a prospective investment is worthwhile to local government in 
the first place, Weber (2013, p. 58) argues that developers need to show that their projects will 
create revenues in excess of “the sum of discounted future increases” of the current use and that 
this beneficial revenue scenario does not happen – effectively but-for.  
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2.7.2. Political Utility 
From this set of initial financial considerations, Weber proposes that TIF provides a 
bureaucratic incentive for local economic development agencies to gain an earmarked and secure 
funding source that does not have to be fought over with rival elements of local government 
come budget time (Weber, 2013). Complementing this is Brueckner’s (2001) argument that TIF 
creates a political shield for elected officials relative to the alternative of raising property or other 
taxes to fund improvements. In this alternative, while property owners near the proposed 
improvement would be likely to support the tax hike assuming their property values would be 
expected to increase, many more property owners who would not directly benefit from the 
project are inclined to oppose the rate hike (2001). Politicians, even those who may support the 
proposal in the abstract as a worthy public investment, must make some combination of two 
calculations: first, weigh the project benefit against the wider direct cost to non-benefitting 
ratepayers, and second, anticipate the electoral impact (2001). 
Although the relative value that any given politician will place on each calculation may 
differ based upon their own incentive structures (such as issue saliency, potential for beneficial 
logrolling, electoral competitiveness, ambitions, or philosophy) as well as the personalized inputs 
into those structures, TIF alters both equations in ways that improve a project’s political 
feasibility. In terms of project utility, there is no new direct tax hike – the benefits of the project 
can be realized with no party paying a higher rate of tax. If true but-for is present, then the 
project creates new revenue without depleting the general fund of revenues that would have 
otherwise still been created. However if there is not but-for, then the project is merely diverting 
revenues from the general fund, meaning that all ratepayers are experiencing an increased tax 
burden relative to the absence of TIF.  
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While the utility cost-benefit may dissipate in this instance, the political cost-benefit does 
not. Although the end effect may well be that taxpayers not directly benefitting from the project 
will have a higher share of the tax burden, this potential end is far more obscured from view than 
a direct rate hike. On the front end, elected officials can claim but-for and highlight the partially 
plausible truth that the improvement will not increase anyone’s taxes. Whereas a direct tax raise 
will be visible on a bottom line, the additional relative tax burden paid due to a TIF project 
diversion will not be. Thus the incentive for non-directly benefitting owners to mobilize 
opposition is lessened and the range of voices elected officials will be hearing from will be more 
heavily loaded towards project proponents. 
 
2.7.3. Overlapping Capture 
Even where but-for is not present and the financial utility cost-benefit calculation does 
not on its face meet muster when limiting consideration to the general revenues of the 
jurisdiction in which a TIF project is being evaluated, Brueckner (2001) highlights that a TIF 
project may yet still become financially viable through TIF’s ability to capture revenues from 
overlaying and neighboring jurisdictions. In the most common instance of real property TIF, 
while property tax revenue will generally make up a plurality of diverted revenues, most 
jurisdictions will have some combination of dedicated school, county, transit, hospital, and 
library mill rates that may combine to be almost as significant as revenues flowing to a municipal 
general fund. Further, as the boundaries of these overlaying taxing jurisdictions often do not 
mirror municipal boundaries, TIF is an opportunity to lessen the relative share of these 
overlaying services for the ratepayers of the TIF initiating municipality.  
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Thus the capture of these taxes that would not otherwise flow to the general fund can 
change the cost-benefit from the narrow perspective of municipal officials concerned with purely 
municipal programs and outcomes. Some jurisdictions (such as Texas) however, control for 
predatory municipal TIF use, whereby otherwise uneconomical projects are made feasible on the 
backs of overlapping increments, by allowing for counties or school districts to negotiate the 
extent of their participation. Still, this opportunity for municipalities to capture overlaying 
increments through negotiated participation allows for the framing of TIF projects in ways that 
will be viewed as financially beneficial for all parties and also more lucrative than the same TIF 
project in a single jurisdictional model where the alternative is for all revenues to flow the 
general fund. 
 
2.7.4. Competition 
Similarly, TIF provides a safer means for localities to compete with infrastructure or 
financial assistance to firms. Whereas a non-TIF dependent grant to lure (or retain) a firm or 
project may not produce a return sufficient to justify the subsidy, a pay-as-you-go or developer 
reimbursed TIF project will only pay out to the proponent if the return is as expected. As 
previously noted, this shifts the risk of underperformance from the municipality to the private 
party, forming a sort of stop-loss mechanism on a subsidy race to the bottom. Considering the 
well-documented phenomena of underperformance in megaprojects (see Flyvbjerg et al., 2009), 
this risk shifting is especially pertinent to the venue context. 
TIF’s flexibility provides even further political advantage. For bureaucrats, besides the 
already earmarked nature of TIF budgets that Weber (2013) points out, TIF provides a pool of 
local economic development funding that is typically not subject to direct oversight by elected 
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officials. This means that increment can often be allocated or reallocated depending on project 
needs without having to go back to council. TIF can also provide the opportunity for a trial and 
error approach – early funded elements proven ineffective can in some instances be replaced 
with prospectively better investments. Likewise TIF can be used to more expediently plug 
unforeseen gaps or needs. For elected officials, flexibility allows for mistakes to be covered up 
without being subject to the more direct public scrutiny of new council business.  
 
2.7.5. Why TIF For Local Governments? 
The aforementioned flexibility and political upside relative alternative means afforded by 
TIF explain much, but not all, of its appeal to local governments. As noted, local governments 
are creatures of state or provincial governments and their more closely controlled fiscal powers 
are limited to those devolved by these sub-federal powers – this scope typically includes property 
tax abatements, TIF, land assembly, and certain grants. Thus in some jurisdictions, the nature of 
the statutory drafting provides an inherent relative advantage for certain instruments, and in some 
places the policy nudge is weighted towards TIF.  
Alternatively, local governments can turn to programs more directly controlled by senior 
governments, such as tax credits, block grants, enterprise zones, and tax exempt loans. While 
these senior government programs may be more lucrative, there is a loss of local control, and 
often restrictions limiting competition within a state – a state job creation tax credit for example 
cannot generally be used to lure firms already within the state.  
Likewise, because of state determined limits or requirements for grants, there may be 
other significant gaps in project funding. Indeed a survey of municipal managers cited the three 
most popular objectives of TIF use to be new business attraction, downtown redevelopment, and 
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retention or expansion of existing business (Forgey, 1993; Griefer, 2005). It is hard to 
conceptualize a subsidy that could at once, and with as little political friction as TIF, be provided 
as a direct grant to lure business, a source of funding to repair downtown sidewalks, and pay for 
remediation of a potential site for venue expansion.  
Thus local governments who wish to intervene in local economic development can try to 
take what they can get from superior governments, but in the pursuit of filling gaps left by state 
programs or providing an advantage relative to neighbors within a state, are ultimately left with a 
selection of local means. Compared to abatements, land, and financial grants, TIF has a potent 
combination of flexibility, being politically advantageous, and to some extent able to shift 
underperformance risk to private parties. It is this troika of overlapping motivations that can to a 
large extent explain TIF’s development into what Briffault (2010, 65) has coined “the most 
popular tool.” This said, TIF is often just one of multiple incentives present.  
 
2.7.6. Why Do State Governments Enable TIF? 
As states (and Canadian provinces) are ultimately the enablers of TIF statutes, a larger 
question concerns what these sub-federal powers hope to achieve through TIF use by their local 
governments. The answers can be broadly classified under three overlapping headings: 
circumventing state constitutions, devolution, and risk shifting. As American states have a far 
lengthier and more extensive body of TIF use than Canadian provinces, this section focuses on 
states. 
In some states TIF has been a means to sidestep the need to gain direct voter approval or 
legislative supermajorities for alternate financing schemes.  This has especially been the case in 
California following the implementation of Proposition 13 in 1978, which capped the inflation of 
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most property taxes and requires a two-thirds legislative majority to overturn. By 2001, TIF 
accounted for over a tenth of California’s property tax base. Indeed TIF caused such a significant 
fiscal hole for local governments that the state ended redevelopment authorities altogether in 
2012, but brought TIF back in a more limited form in 2015. In other jurisdictions (such as North 
Carolina), TIF bonds are not subject to the same voter approval requirements as general 
obligation bonds (Juby, 2004).   
TIF also provides a means to facilitate local financial assistance at a lower cost to the 
state government. This effective devolution is consistent with the earlier mentioned trend of 
fiscal downloading from federal to state or provincial governments, and in turn, to local 
governments. To address what local governments may view as a growing fiscal imbalance 
between what cities have to pay for and their available revenues, TIF can be a particularly 
attractive means. With instances where TIF is dominated by property taxes, instead of creating a 
new state transfer program, TIF merely allows local governments to shift what would already be 
their own revenues in targeted directions. Although a transfer program would be more financially 
lucrative for local governments, transfers generally come with conditions, and sometimes these 
are ad-hoc and politically influenced. The comparative upside of TIF is that within limits 
prescribed by statute, local governments are free to design and allocate increment to projects of 
their choice. 
The less common use of TIF for diverting consumption taxes has slightly more favorable 
distributional consequences for local governments. Unlike property taxes, consumption taxes in 
the US are overwhelmingly state revenues, with some local governments being allowed to add 
points to the state rate. Thus instead of merely being able to divert their own local revenues, local 
governments can capture state revenues, much as they capture overlaying school district and 
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county property taxes. The incentive for the state here becomes as much one of devolution of 
financial risk as it is devolution of financial responsibility. Compared to some form of grant 
program – where while the state gets approval on the front end and may have monitoring levers 
for continued funding, ultimately the risk of project underperformance of the state’s investment 
is substantially held by the state – if a grant goes to an eventually failed project, the amount of 
that grant is a loss of state resources. With sales-TIF however, the state merely approves a 
diversion of incremental revenues – no current revenues are lost – and if the project 
underperforms the state has no sunk grant costs. Further, if the project is a fiscal success the state 
will eventually benefit when increment reverts to its pre-TIF destination.  
The sub-federal risk calculation applies much the same to traditional property assessment 
TIF, meaning that the state gains all of the risk transfer benefits while potentially fully devolving 
the fiscal cost to local governments. This combined devolution of fiscal and risk responsibility 
can go a long way to understanding why almost every state government allows for TIF. Indeed 
where TIF has been restrained, it has seemingly been to protect local governments from 
themselves, and ostensibly the state from the consequences of TIF induced or contributed fiscal 
stress. 
 
2.7.7. School and County TIF Participation 
While state and local governments have obvious incentives to enable or embark upon TIF 
projects, overlaying jurisdictions whose share of property tax increment is liable to be captured 
and diverted from its intended purpose, have less clear reasons to consent to TIF participation. 
The simple answer in some states is that non-initiating jurisdictions have no choice – their 
increment is frozen at baseline levels when local governments choose to implement TIF. With 
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school districts however, the picture is complicated by state aid formulas. Some states, such as 
notorious TIF user Illinois, or later discussed Michigan, have formulas by which the state sets a 
minimum per-student amount and will make up the difference for districts that fail to meet the 
per student threshold.  
Thus for school districts near or below the state aid level, captured TIF is merely replaced 
by state funding and TIF has the potential upside of creating greater than state aid level funding 
in the longer term when increment reverts back at the TIF district’s expiry. This seemingly 
neutral or slightly positive incentive can be compounded by negotiated agreements between a 
school board and municipality. For instance, local governments may agree to transfer a share of 
their sales or other tax revenues in the TIF zone to make up for lost increment. Accordingly, a 
school board could receive state aid for lost property taxes on top of negotiated shares of non-
property tax increments. Negotiated participation agreements in some cases additionally allow 
school boards to allocate more of their increment than the minimum mandated by statute, 
providing boards with bargaining power over project design.  
Where a county is not the TIF initiator, there is a more facially understandable reason for 
participation than with a school board. If the county or its development agency believes that 
financial assistance to business, and specifically TIF, works, then it will be inclined to be 
supportive. Likewise, if TIF is viewed as a means for the county to compete with neighboring 
counties, the county will happily allow a municipality to take on the primary share of the subsidy 
cost for a project that will likely benefit the county as a whole, if not all municipalities in the 
county. Also, where state statute allows for negotiated county participation, counties can 
negotiate project design to reflect specific county objectives, as well as minimize the potential 
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for deadweight losses through predatory competition between municipalities within the same 
county. 
 
2.8. THE APPLIED TIF LITERATURE 
Building upon the three-pronged TIF review structure of Greenbaum and Landers (2014), 
the economic-focused TIF literature can be divided into three overlapping threads: property 
valuation outcomes, economic development outcomes, and fiscal outcomes. Beyond these 
streams, this review adds a further three outcome categories: jurisdictional, legal, and mixed-use. 
The first of these, jurisdictional, overviews and compares works broadly concerning relative 
impacts of TIF on neighboring and overlapping jurisdictions. The subsequent legal thread brings 
together works that often focus on statutory interpretation and litigation concerning TIF, with 
particular attention to the concepts of but-for and blight. Here articles compare different state 
frameworks or center on the legislative application of TIF within a particular state. Other works 
aim to develop guidelines on best TIF practices and evaluate TIF as a legal and policy transplant, 
and even as a socio-historical phenomena. Finally, I have created a category for publications 
addressing TIF by land use, with the focus being on mixed-use districts and developments. While 
the six broad categories of TIF that this review contemplates are intended to facilitate the 
isolation and discussion of trends within the TIF literature, these categories are by no means 
silos. In fact, there is significant overlap between categories and works, with multiple articles 
having sufficient relevance to merit inclusion into more than one category.  
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2.8.1. Property Valuation 
Providing some answers to previous questions as to whether TIF itself causes growth 
(Anderson, 1990), Man and Rosentraub (1998) demonstrate that out of a data set of 151 Indiana 
cities, the 23 that adopted TIF saw median growth in owner-occupied housing values of 11% 
relative to what they would have otherwise been without TIF, showing that TIF can indeed 
stimulate broad growth for communities that adopt it. Similar findings were made by evaluating 
TIF in Chicago (Smith, 2006) and Milwaukee (Carroll, 2008; Carroll and Sachse, 2004), with 
Carroll going so far to argue that the impact of TIF was underappreciated. 
While there are substantial indications of a positive relationship between TIF and 
property values, the picture becomes more confusing with multiple papers taking more 
ambiguous or contrary positions. Weber et al. (2003) conclude that TIF does not result in 
assessment gains for industrial properties, but does for mixed-use TIF districts. Returning to 
Chicago with a 2002 to 2012 data set, Kane and Weber (2016) again show mixed results in terms 
of positive growth relationships, with commercial real estate subsidies having the strongest and 
infrastructure the weakest. From this, the authors suggest that a proper evaluation of TIF 
effectiveness requires that variations in subsidy spending be accounted for. Also analyzing TIF 
hotbed Chicago, Farris and Horbas (2010) similarly point out the difficulty in measuring and 
isolating TIF effectiveness, for their part recommending that variations in subsidy spending 
should be adequately accounted for. 
Likewise, the examination of Wisconsin municipalities over a 23 year period found little 
reason to suggest that TIF has had significant impacts on cumulative value of industrial or 
residential properties, or aggregate property values in general (Merriman et al., 2011). However 
Merriman et al. (2011) did find that TIF had a positive impact on commercial property values 
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and stimulated real estate development within TIF districts themselves without this replacing 
development that would have otherwise occurred within a jurisdiction absent TIF. 
Others have taken more novel approaches. Bland and Overton (2016) argue that the 
private as opposed to the public role is what achieves land value gains in a TIF project, although 
the public role is necessary leverage to maximize these private gains. Immergluck (2009), on 
another level altogether, related analysis of TIF zone property value changes related to media 
reporting of events in Atlanta, finding that local media coverage of the planning process 
correlated with significant property value increases, possibly spurring a wave of speculation and 
gentrification. This latter work pushes consideration of the extent to which findings showing TIF 
spurring property value appreciation can be attributed to speculation. 
 
2.8.2. Economic Development Outcomes 
The broad economic development literature is no more conclusive than that of property 
valuation. Providing a jumping off point for many subsequent TIF inquiries, Anderson’s (1990) 
examination of Michigan cities determined that faster growing cities use TIF. Yet a decade later, 
Dye and Merriman (2000) contradicted this notion, finding that cities adopting TIF grow more 
slowly than non-TIF using cities. In coming to this conclusion, they acknowledge that variances 
in the literature (including with Man and Rosentraub, 1998) could be explained by different 
dependent variables, statewide versus metro-wide samples, and states that have divergent 
requirements for blight to be present for TIF use. 
Looking at TIF from a block-group level, again in Chicago, Lester (2013) examines the 
impacts of TIF on real estate development and the broader growth of economic opportunity 
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within TIF districts, including business creation and building permits. Controlling for selection 
bias, Lester finds that TIF does not positively impact economic opportunities for local residents. 
Also in the TIF-heavy Illinois context, Byrne (2010) found mixed TIF impacts on another 
common development measure, job growth. Building off of Man’s (1999) study of TIF and 
employment outcomes in Indiana which demonstrated mostly positive relationships between TIF 
and employment, Byrne (2010) finds that industrial development facilitating TIF districts have a 
positive association with employment, while retail-focused TIF developments have negative 
impacts. He considers these outcomes consistent with retail TIF districts merely rearranging 
already existing employment within a TIF using jurisdiction as opposed to industrial focused TIF 
districts actually seeing employment gains taken from neighboring cities. 
 
2.8.3. Fiscal Outcomes 
The base of this thread was well described by Greenbaum and Landers (2014) and 
centered on two works. Dardia (1998) looked at California TIF projects and found that the 
revenue credited to the presence of TIF was in excess of captured TIF revenues in less than a 
quarter of the circumstances examined. Kriz (2001) concluded, using a Monte Carlo net impact 
simulation model for a Minnesota data set, that TIF’s net financial benefit was present only 
where pre-TIF growth in value exceeded 2% and true but-for conditions existed. Greenbaum and 
Landers (2014) saw these results (especially in the case of Kriz) being consistent with earlier 
work on TIF from Huddleston (1982) and Lawrence and Stevenson (1995), although the latter 
study also cited a reduction of property tax burden as the life of a TIF district progressed. From 
this collection of work, Greenbaum and Landers (2014) deduce that TIF exposes local 
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governments to losing captured TIF revenue that would have been generated absent TIF either by 
economic development or property value increases. 
Expanding this fiscal impact base, Hicks et al. (2015), studying TIF use by Indiana 
counties over a nine year period, conclude that the average TIF district experiences no significant 
impact from TIF. Specifically, there is no impact on sales tax collections and over half of the 
increment growth can be attributed to growth that would have happened in the absence of TIF. 
Hicks et al. (2015) also note significant adverse impacts of TIF capture on school funding. 
Out of this body of work, others lay out recommendations for TIF to mitigate against 
deleterious fiscal impacts. For Sands et al. (2008), later echoed by Hicks et al. (2015), the 
greatest fiscal threat posed by TIF is revenue capture from overlaying jurisdictions. However 
these authors also point out that the absence of capture will greatly restrict the benefits from TIF 
use. Along with emphasising slow appreciation as a superior threshold for TIF initiation than 
traditional blight, they argue that the initial TIF design and neighborhood plan needs to be well 
conceived to attract investment, but that on a jurisdictional basis, planners should protect against 
allowing TIF to diverge neighbourhoods or cities into “haves and have-nots” (Sands et al., 2008). 
This last point is especially pertinent with Felix and Hines (2013) finding that mid-income areas 
preferred TIF-use, but that TIF was rarely seen in low-income jurisdictions. 
 
2.8.4. Jurisdictional Outcomes 
Going beyond the impact of TIF within a particular municipality, Byrne (2005) analyses 
the prospect that neighboring jurisdictions may have “strategic interactions” with one another 
when making decisions concerning the use of TIF. Byrne’s tests confirm these strategic 
interactions influence the introduction of TIF and further show that municipalities do not design 
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TIF use to draw revenues away from their neighbors, somewhat going against the portrait of 
intergovernmental conflict later painted by Briffault (2010). Byrne also finds that cities are 
influenced to use TIF by property tax rates, the mix of property use, the ratio of owner-occupied 
residences, and population gains. Skidmore and Kashian (2010) build upon this with an analysis 
of the same 23 year data set of Wisconsin municipalities as Merriman et al. (2011), and find a 
temporary effect increasing property taxes in these overlapping jurisdictions which expires with 
the life of a TIF district. Accordingly, they argue that TIF impacts tax rates beyond the 
implementing municipality.  
Again using the same Wisconsin data, but relating TIF to annexation and jurisdictional 
overlap via border expansion as opposed to overlaying capture, Skidmore et al. (2009) find that 
as much as a staggering 54% of all land annexed by municipalities in the state, some 119 square 
miles, can attributed to TIF. The authors argue that the popularity of TIF-driven annexation can 
be understood through TIF’s ability to capture revenues from other levels of government and 
efficiently concentrate funds aimed at development within the new districts.  
On the same broad competitive aspect of TIF, Mason and Thomas (2010) examine three 
questions concerning TIF competition, municipal inequality and path dependency. Out of this 
analysis, they surmise that certain competitive dynamics impact TIF use, namely that any 
particular city’s use of TIF will make neighboring municipalities more likely to also use TIF. 
Further, the authors find a positive relationship between TIF use and inequality between cities as 
well as the presence of path dependency. 
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2.8.5. Legal Outcomes 
Starting with perhaps the most definitive work of legal TIF scholarship, Briffault (2010) 
challenges the notion that TIF has been of assistance to cities using it and further underlines that 
it is a frequent source of intergovernmental conflict and flashpoint for tension over the role of 
public funds being used for private benefit. Through a broad survey of TIF’s history and 
development, Briffault argues that TIF has spread rampant because of its highly decentralized 
nature, playing off of local government fragmentation and competition for investment.  
In a similarly wide ranging legal TIF survey, Lefcoe (2010) frames and then evaluates six 
common criticisms of TIF, dividing these six issues into “the questionable, the contingent and 
the convincing.” The questionable criticisms, that prospering suburbs use TIF to lure investment 
from the core and that TIF should only be used in blighted inner cities, are labeled as 
questionable because they attach too high of a value to the impact that TIF has (agreeing 
implicitly with Greenbaum and Landers’ (2014) notion that TIF is often merely one of many 
variables). The contingent criticisms, TIF subsidy of retail merely displaces sales tax revenue 
and TIF drains school and county revenues, to Lefcoe (here weakening the consensus on these 
impacts) depend on an evaluation of TIF revenues generated regionally compared to what would 
have been created absent the project. Finally, the convincing criticisms to Lefcoe are that TIF 
projects are disproportionately designed to benefit private developers and local governments fail 
to provide sufficient transparency on their TIF initiatives. On these last points, Lefcoe has much 
in common with the below mentioned critical analyses of Weber and O’Neill-Kohl (2016) and 
Pacewicz (2013). 
Most legal TIF publications however concern one or a handful of state TIF frameworks, 
often consisting of a statutory review coupled with a law reform proposal. For instance with the 
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well-trodden Wisconsin example, Knavel (2002) argued that the lack of a built-in means to limit 
TIF use in Wisconsin is a problem that requires legislative amendment to correct and reorient 
TIF in Wisconsin back to its intended target of renewal within blighted brownfields. Knavel 
explains that the overly broad definition of “blighted” and lack of TIF limitation has led to TIF 
being a means of greenfield development and this greenfield use has encouraged undue sprawl, 
becoming an existential threat to agricultural and environmentally sensitive lands. Likewise, 
Eagon (2017), showing that the ensuing 15 years brought little change, argues that a series of 
statutory amendments to address clarity, predictability, measurable objectiveness and mitigating 
risk exposure will bring the state’s use of TIF back to its intended purpose. Specifically, the law 
reform proposal includes a cap on increment spending to create a financial reserve, the inception 
of regional bodies to promote cross-jurisdictional cooperation and lessen the race to the bottom, 
and the selective use of pay-as-you-go TIF financing to mitigate risk.  
Sticking with the single state comprehensive overview and proposal, in the St. Louis 
metro context, Wilson (2014) finds utility in TIF for both large and small cities, but also 
significant risk for abuse, including from major national retailers. He suggests reforms to the TIF 
commission to provide greater power to enforce the statutory but-for test and also believes 
solutions can be found through eliminating the jurisdictional “prisoner’s dilemma” between local 
governments in the region via coordinated development efforts, perhaps implying that Byrne’s 
(2005) finding of interjurisdictional “strategic interactions” should be formalized.  
Lefcoe and Swenson (2014), describe the history, process and aftermath of California’s 
decision to end TIF, detailing the step-by-step wind down of regional development authorities, 
including the repayment of already existing obligations (such as bonds). The authors also 
overview litigation concerning the statutory changes, namely the “pay-to-stay” option whereby 
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dissolution of regional development authorities could be avoided through the payment of stiff 
penalties. The most notable finding is that cities were not interested in the possibility of 
continued redevelopment authorities if they could not capture the increment of overlapping 
jurisdictions via TIF.  
On the limited survey side, the early work of Reece and Coyle (1979) evaluates the TIF 
laws and outcomes of California, Minnesota, and Kansas. With the latter, they overview 
unsuccessful court challenges to the TIF law from the State Attorney General at the time. The 
Kansas Supreme Court rejected arguments based on prospective violations of the Kansas 
Constitution, insufficiently clear definitions to designate project areas, and most significantly, the 
(state) constitutional requirement for real property to be assessed and taxed at uniform rates 
(1979). Reece and Coyle find that the benefits of TIF (speaking from 1979) are apparent, insofar 
as encouraging efficient and profitable land use without having to surmount voter reluctance to 
raise taxes.  
Extending the selective survey model to the eminent domain context where even if TIF is 
not always present, the treatment of blight definition is certainly instructive, Brown (2004) 
analyzes blight tests and case law where those tests were at issue in California, Maryland, and 
Colorado. He finds that the former has the strongest thresholds to meet, but that more stringent 
thresholds are appropriate for the California context, and also concludes that the Maryland test is 
atypical in that it only considers property-specific criteria as opposed to those concerning the 
area surrounding the property.  
Lefcoe (2008), writing after the landmark Supreme Court decision on eminent domain for 
economic development,1 distinguishes between three types of development project forms (civic 
                                                          
1 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
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betterment, plan implementing, and tax driven) before demonstrating why the latter form is 
especially well tread by governments. Lefcoe (2008, p. 49) then discusses how certain state level 
courts require a local government to show “tangible land use public benefits” where 
expropriation is at play and out of this argues that projects under the civic betterment and plan 
implementation banners can meet this threshold, but purely tax-driven economic development 
projects cannot. 
There are also useful legal works centring on states that are not prime grounds for TIF 
use and study (these prime grounds being the Great Lakes region and California). Examining TIF 
in the Tennessee law and policy context, Mamantov et al. (2014) conclude that TIF is a legally 
valid means to finance infrastructure without creating new general obligation debt and this tool 
may be crucial to retain or attract investment in a competitive climate. Still they warn that the tax 
and legal impacts need to be considered on a case-by-case basis and are highly negotiable.  
On a transparency plane, Juby (2004) examines the introduction of TIF in North Carolina 
through the lens of the tension between judicial review and the democratic process. Here the 
author is concerned with whether TIF, through providing local governments the ability to get 
around voter approval for bond issuance, is even a valid legislative means considering the state’s 
system of government. Juby argues that although bond approval requirements were intended to 
be a substantive and procedural limit on local government, TIF does not sufficiently alter the 
framework of checks and limits to be void of validity for that reason alone. Juby further sets out 
that communities should focus on applying empirical realities of TIF (implicitly as espoused by 
the economically directed literature) in order to gain ideal outcomes while guarding against poor 
ones.  
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Finally, from something of a rent-seeking lens, Weber and O’Neill-Kohl (2016) examine 
the history of TIF in Illinois, arguing that TIF is more than a natural progression from devolution 
to, and competition between, local governments, accompanied by fiscal belt-tightening. 
Seemingly building off of Pacewicz’s (2013) work on the expansion of TIF beyond being a “last 
resort” to a consultant-driven industry, Weber and O’Neill-Kohl reveal a network of consultants 
experienced in unlocking federal urban renewal funding, which transitioned to lobbying for 
incentives surrounding property tax to be shifted to property development from being based in 
job outcomes. 
 
2.8.6. Use Type and Mixed-Use Outcomes 
Where some authors found inconclusive or net negative cumulative impacts for TIF use 
on the whole, in certain instances these findings change when considering the land use of a 
particular TIF area. With Weber et al. (2003), earlier mentioned for finding no rise in industrial 
TIF property values, mixed-use parcels are remarkably more positively related to gains. The 
authors account for this mixed-use premium difference through a desire on the part of owners to 
adapt their lands to other uses. Building upon this, Carroll and Sachse (2004), though finding a 
17% decline for a residential property in Milwaukee TIF districts, also show that placement in a 
TIF district specifically zoned for residential or mixed-use led to an almost 38% increase in 
assessment. Carroll’s (2008) Milwaukee study is even more bullish in quantifying, and 
successful in isolating, a significant value premium for mixed-use, with these assessment 
classifications bringing 13.5% and 9.4% increases in assessments respectively.  
These results are supported by a number of qualitative works, including Geisman (2004), 
who found St. Louis’s first “neighborhood” TIF district as particularly successful in improving 
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streetscapes and boosting a “struggling” retail and mixed-use area, and Rabianski and Clements 
(2007), whose industry survey saw 84% of respondents cite TIF as an important public policy 
component needed for a mixed-use development to have financial success. 
McIntosh et al. (2015) look at TIF in both the Australian and transit infrastructure 
context, through a case study on a light rail line in Perth. They argue that TIF can generate 
significantly more funds for Transit Oriented Development projects than previously believed 
possible as well as ensuring that real estate buildout occurs beyond the planning phase.  
The literature direction on TIF mixed-use however is only slightly tempered by Eagon 
(2017), who writing from a legal perspective on TIF in Wisconsin notes that mixed-use is one of 
three categories where TIF may be used in the state, and only one of two where there is no 
requirement for blight. He accordingly argues that the expansion of TIF to a mixed-use category, 
while allowing suburban and rural jurisdictions to more readily utilize TIF, has also impeded the 
ability of urban areas to have a relative advantage in addressing blight.  
 
2.8.7. Overview 
The applied literature is quite varied in terms of evaluating TIF’s merits, as well as the 
lenses through which these merits are evaluated. Thus TIF proponents have academic cover 
through which to make their pitches, and governments, with something of a confirmation bias 
inclination to believe that their economic development financial assistance efforts work, have 
sufficient grounds to justify TIF investment decisions. At the same time, opponents have ample 
reason to mobilize against TIF in their communities, especially where but-for arguments are 
spurious and schools bear the burden of overlaying capture.  
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However, some generalized conclusions can be drawn from the literature and many 
elements of these outcomes provide support for the above outlined theory. First, TIF most 
positively influences commercial and mixed commercial/residential use property values. Second, 
TIF does not typically meet a but-for standard where economic development and fiscal growth 
are concerned. Third, TIF is often used as a means of competing with neighboring jurisdictions 
and thus may reallocate economic activity within a region more than create new growth. Fourth, 
specifics of the TIF statute influence proliferation and project structure, and overlaying capture is 
a strong incentive. Fifth, mixed-use TIF projects can make for more vibrant neighborhoods more 
quickly, even if there is not a net economic gain within the new jurisdiction. Sixth, and finally, 
TIF is typically just one of many variables present in a particular project – often TIF will 
accompany other local economic development financial incentives.  
 
2.9. GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIZATION OF PROFESSIONAL SPORTS VENUES 
In the postwar era, North American professional stadia have transitioned from largely 
private enterprises to PPP infrastructure projects with a heavy role for public authorities (Coates, 
2007; Coates and Humphreys, 2000; Long, 2013; Baade and Matheson, 2011). Coates and 
Humphreys (2000) note a trend of sharply expanding public ownership of stadiums between 
1950 and 1990. Likewise, Long (2013) shows that the public share of facility capital costs rose 
significantly in the postwar period before a decline between 1980 and 2000, followed by a 
stagnation thereafter. The 2017 update of Long’s “Public Capital Costs” by league found average 
shares of 58% and $324 million per stadium for MLB, 49% and $339 million for the NFL, 46% 
and $193 million for the NBA, 40% and $164 million for the NHL, and 36% and $142 million 
for MLS. These 2017 capital costs show that despite lessened or stagnating cost shares, more 
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elaborate facilities have seen the dollar values of those public shares rising beyond inflation.2 In 
addition to direct facility capital costs, these stadium PPPs often involve infrastructure costs, 
forgone property taxes, and significant ongoing operating subsidies flowing from public to 
private partners through lease agreements (Long, 2013; Zimbalist and Long, 2006).  
 
2.9.1. How Are Stadiums and Arenas Subsidized? 
Beyond the TIF that is the focus of this dissertation, there are a wide range of tax revenue 
sources that are used for stadium finance. These sources include taxes on retail sales at the city, 
county, and state levels, lodging and car rentals (so-called “tourist” taxes), alcohol, tobacco, fuel, 
gaming (excise taxes), income (“jock” taxes), admissions, parking, food and beverage, and 
utilities. Public contributions also come in the form of direct grants, general fund contributions, 
subsidized loans, property sales and land transfers, income and sales tax rebates, capital fund 
allocations, infrastructure improvements, utility and transit allocations, and operating subsidies 
(sometimes disguised as management fees).  
Although the US federal government does not participate in direct stadium subsidies, 
sub-federal governments are able to manipulate stadium deals to see that bonds are exempt from 
federal taxation. While the Tax Reform Act of 1986 attempted to thwart tax exemptions for 
stadium bonds through preventing more than 10% of debt service being secured by direct or 
indirectly used private business property, this merely led to local and state governments issuing 
bonds unrelated to stadium revenues (Gayer et al., 2016). In turn, sales, property, income, 
gaming, excise, and tourist taxes have become the sources of choice to take advantage of 
                                                          
2 The MLS per stadium averages are misleading because they include clubs playing in NFL or MLB stadiums with significantly 
higher capital costs than soccer specific stadiums.  
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federally subsidized bonds, and by inadvertent design, these revenue streams can have little 
relation to the project they are funding (2016).  
 
2.9.2. Why Do Governments Subsidize Venues? 
 
Economic Development 
The first of several basic and overlapping explanations as to why governments provide 
financial subsidies to professional sports venues is that governments may believe that the arena 
and the club that plays in it are worthwhile infrastructure and local economic development 
investments, despite not being economic public goods. To this Keynesian inspired end, project 
proponents will most commonly tout economic impact studies that show the venue and certain 
associated events (such as a league championship or all-star game) generating hundreds of 
millions of dollars in economic activity. These studies most typically multiply the number of 
expected visitors and the anticipated spending per visitor, with a multiplier (generally around 2 
times) to simulate the pass-through effect of visitor generated activity (Baade and Matheson, 
2011). 
While these impact reports may seem facially impressive, a well-developed literature on 
stadium economics has three common critical headings (2011). The first of these flaws is 
substitution – impact studies implicitly assume that absent the new stadium or the presence of the 
club, the projected spending would not occur (Coates and Humphreys, 2000; Baade and 
Matheson, 2011). Likewise, moving a facility to a new location within a city or metro area only 
substitutes or redistributes activity in one geographical area for activity in another (Coates and 
Humphreys, 2008; Rosentraub, 1997).   
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Similar to substitution, a second criticism is displacement. Here sports visitors crowd-out 
prospective visitors to a city or neighborhood that are deterred by the excess activity or 
congestion perceived as accompanying major sporting events (Baade and Matheson, 2011). The 
crowd-out effect is most commonly associated with mega-events such as the Olympics or World 
Cup, but can apply to prospective visitors to a downtown restaurant or cultural event being 
dissuaded by game day crowds – as with substitution, the competition for entertainment dollars 
extends beyond sports. Finally, impact studies are also criticised on flawed multiplier 
assumptions. Namely, salaries paid to players and owner profits are not likely to circulate 
through a local economy, preventing assumed multipliers from materializing (2011). 
These three primary critiques of economic impact studies are accompanied by a host of 
works more broadly detailing the lacklustre returns on stadium investments (including Baade, 
1996; Baade and Sanderson, 1997; Coates and Humphreys, 1999; 2003; 2008; Fort, 2006; 
Humphreys, 2019; Noll and Zimbalist, 1997; Quirk and Fort, 1997; Rosentraub, 1997; Siegfried 
and Zimbalist, 2000; Swindell and Rosentraub, 1998). Some examine more specific elements of 
stadium investment returns. For instance, professional sports have been found to have no impact 
on regional or urban personal incomes (Baade, 1996; Baade and Dye, 1990; Coates and 
Humphreys, 1999; 2002; Gius and Johnson, 2001), retail and service sector incomes (Coates and 
Humphreys, 2003), or the broader urban and regional economy (Lertwachara and Cochran, 
2007). Similarly, facility projects have minor or negative impacts on regional employment 
(Baade and Sanderson, 1997; Hudson, 1999), and no noticeable effect on construction 
employment (Miller, 2002).  
Other works have focused on mega-events, which are often a substantial component of 
the impetus for stadium construction. Here too the literature is bearish on the impact of these 
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events, with the Super Bowl showing no or minor growth in taxable sales (Coates, 2007; Porter, 
1999) or personal incomes (Coates and Humphreys, 2002; Baade et al., 2008; Coates and 
Humphreys, 2008). While some employment gains were associated with the Atlanta Olympics 
(Hotchkiss et al., 2003) and some redistributed economic growth with the Sydney Olympics 
(Madden, 2006), others found crowding out (Leeds, 2008) and flat hotel occupancy rates (Porter 
and Fletcher, 2008) accompanying Salt Lake 2002, and no economic gains derived from the 
Olympics more generally (Zimbalist, 2015). The reality of the World Cup similarly fails to meet 
overly rosy projections (Szymanski, 2002), with few or no significant economic gains being 
found (Peeters et al., 2014; Zimbalist, 2015).  
 
Local Area Development and Renewal 
While the literature is clear that stadiums do not positively impact conventional measures 
of economic growth in a city or metro area, a more plausible alternative is that a stadium project 
can redirect activity from one geographic area to another. Local and state governments might 
decide that having a stadium or arena in a particular neighborhood or central business district has 
more utility than an existing or alternative facility in another locale (for example, a decentralized 
area near several freeways). This geographical redirection argument has both an economic and a 
social component. With the former, some scholars argue that a centrally located stadium has 
economic advantages relative to alternatives, such as income gains where two stadiums are 
present in a central business district (Nelson, 2001), or that urban facilities induce longer and 
higher spending visits (Santo, 2005). There is also evidence of proximity to facilities being 
associated with higher residential real estate values (Ahlfeldt and Maennig, 2010; Feng and 
Humphreys, 2012) or rents (Carlino and Coulson, 2004), supported by case studies quantifying 
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significant land value gains within three kilometers of an arena (Ahlfeldt and Maennig, 2007) or 
near a suburban NFL stadium (Tu, 2005).  
Others, namely Rosentraub (2009; 2014), see a facility as an effectively once in a region 
amenity opportunity best used as an anchor for mixed-use neighborhood development or 
revitalization. Rosentraub argues that while sports are an insignificant influence on a regional 
economy, sports are rare in their ability to drive traffic to a geographic location, and if 
accompanied by enforceable commitments to ancillary real estate development, a venue 
centering a viable entertainment district can be a worthy public investment (Austrian and 
Rosentraub, 2002; Baade, 1996, p. 37; Rosentraub, 2009).  
Thus despite a venue perhaps failing to create any net economic gains in a region, some 
local governments might be swayed by the social utility of a revitalized downtown or inner city 
neighborhood. Indeed, since 1990 a strong majority of professional sports facilities have either 
been replaced or extensively renovated with these urban redevelopment objectives in mind, 
leaving a large and living sample of results. Robertson (1995) outlines a three-prong test to 
evaluate urban redevelopment projects, focused on reuse of existing spaces and buildings, new 
construction related to the facility, and new activity related to the facility (Corwin, 2011).  
Without detailing every project, success meeting these standards can be found in San 
Diego, Cleveland, Indianapolis, Los Angeles, Pittsburgh, Dallas, Toronto, and Columbus 
(Corwin, 2011; Rosentraub, 2009; Sroka, 2017), even if there can be substantial outstanding 
questions regarding economic opportunity cost and causality or but-for. These opportunity cost, 
causality, and but-for questions are especially focused where urban facilities have been only 
somewhat or not successful in seeing ancillary construction and activity (including Denver’s 
arena, Chicago, Atlanta, and Phoenix). While some of these sites have eventually seen some 
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ancillary development and activity, there are many urban facilities surrounded by surface parking 
and devoid of life outside of event times.  
 
Competition 
Thus we return to the issue of what makes sports and sports facility investment “special” 
in order to further refine why governments choose to invest. Building off Rosentraub’s (2009) 
argument that a sports team and the facility it plays in represent once in a metro area opportunity, 
each of the stadium, the club, and an appealing mixed-use entertainment district within which 
stadiums and clubs are found, can be viewed as a means to compete with alternative locations for 
firms and workers through providing a combination of relatively rare amenities, sometimes 
complemented by a desirable packaging of more common amenities (such as performing arts 
venues, theaters, restaurants, shopping). This competition is both between metro areas for the 
scarce opportunity to host a club because of league monopolies (Ross, 1988), and between 
jurisdictions within the same metro area to direct what impact the facility and club have to their 
particular corner of the region.  
Effectively, these explanations are extensions of the previously detailed Tiebout (1956) 
competition between local governments and regions. For talented workers evaluating competing 
places to live and firms evaluating places to locate with the desires of talented workers in mind, 
the opportunity to access a professional sports team may help influence decisions. Alternatively, 
even if there is more research needed to show a positive association between location decisions 
and sports teams, local politicians or talent-seeking corporations may be susceptible to this line 
of argument (Delaney and Eckstein, 2006; 2007).  
 79 
 
Indeed, local growth coalitions fronted by major local corporations and supported by 
primary local media sources, have been noted as influential in pushing politicians towards 
funding facility projects (Delaney and Eckstein, 2006; 2007). In addition to selling the stadium 
as a magnet for talent and urban redevelopment, these coalitions will frame a bleak alternative if 
a stadium deal is not reached and the team leaves (Cleveland will become Dayton), and spend 
heavily if the matter is placed on a referendum ballot (2006; 2007). Again, this alternative is 
made real by the scarcity of major league teams, and a history of teams that have moved to 
resolve unsatisfactory stadium situations. Although some economists liken the employment 
impact of a stadium to a large department store (Bergman, 2015), the departure of a beloved 
major league team is far more noticeable than the shuttering of another Macy’s. 
Building upon the previously discussed regime theory literature, Delaney and Eckstein 
(2007) argue that these growth coalitions go beyond traditional models of owner relocation 
threats extracting corporate welfare. Instead, these elite coalitions are deeply embedded into the 
local political culture and this element makes their efforts more effective. Evidence from Buist 
and Mason (2010) on newspaper framing and referendum results in Cleveland provide further 
support to the media advocacy element. For Delaney and Eckstein (2006; 2007), the success or 
failure in getting a stadium deal done is in many respects a function of the strength, weakness, or 
absence of a local growth coalition, an argument supported by the work of Paul and Brown 
(2001) overviewing elite influence on stadium referendums. Although this local growth coalition 
explanation is in many ways convincing, the Minneapolis area, which was cited as an instance 
where a weaker growth coalition was not able to attain stadium objectives, has since seen three 
new stadiums constructed, leaving a need for updated analysis.  
 80 
 
While local growth coalitions may believe their prospective talent pool seeks the amenity 
of major league teams in modern stadiums, Florida’s previously discussed “Creative Class” 
theory has already provided at least something of an alternative. Likewise, good public schools 
can be seen as important in retaining talent and allowing young families to justify remaining in 
trendy urban neighborhoods. The key point is perhaps that this bundle of goods can be replicated 
in many places and sports is an element to add to this bundle with a higher replacement value. 
Thus while a stadium in an urban desert alone might not exceed (and likely fail to match) more 
typically cited “Creative Class” type amenities that a talented and mobile workforce craves (e.g., 
a collection of character houses and condos walkable to coffee shops, restaurants, bars, and 
upscale grocery stores), a well-integrated venue project brings upside that most competing 
creative-targeted bundles cannot match.  
If the implied “secret sauce” of Rosentraub-derivative arguments in favor of stadium 
PPPs is to properly design and phase mixed-use real estate development centered on the stadium 
anchor, the extension is whether the profitable end outcome can be replicated with alternative 
subsidies more efficiently (and cheaply)? And if so, what is the marginal value of a stadium 
subsidy investment relative to subsidizing these sorts of districts absent a stadium? The issue 
becomes whether a stadium is that much more of a useful or influential amenity than 
prospectively less expensive amenities? These alternatives include the historic or waterfront 
districts core cities commonly use as redevelopment tactics intended to be harder for suburbs to 
replicate (Robertson, 1995), or even investments to subsidize grocery stores, lifestyle centers, or 
covering freeways dividing downtown neighborhoods.  
Beyond the metro vs. metro cage match framed by local growth coalitions, much of the 
competition for clubs is induced within the same region, typically with a core city angling with 
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one or more of its suburbs for the right host a team. Again while this competition is not bringing 
much or any net growth surplus to the region (the argument for some surplus is again that a 
facility can be more valuable – economically or less tangibly – in one locale than another), some 
local governments believe that subsidizing a stadium within their boundaries is worth the cost. 
When there are multiple local governments in the same region reaching the same conclusion, a 
bidding war can ensue, leading to the eventual “winner” paying far more in subsidies than they 
would have absent the competition. This sort of deleterious competition has been documented in 
Dallas-Fort Worth by Nunn and Rosentraub (1997), with history repeating itself 10 and 20 years 
later in new stadiums for the Cowboys and Rangers, respectively. Similar competitions followed 
by generous subsidies to replace facilities less than 25 years old have also been recently seen in 
Atlanta.  
While lower subsidies in a single-bidder scenario prompt the thought that teams would 
simply threaten relocation in the absence of a sufficient offer, the barriers to relocation are 
higher. Leagues generally have internal regulations requiring relocations to be approved by 
super-majorities of owners, and relocation from a particular market to an alternative might not 
necessarily align with the interests of enough owners for approval. If relocation is seriously 
pursued, but fails, the club may lose what local support it had for a stadium deal, reducing the 
political risks associated with losing the team and the sense of urgency to getting a deal done.  
 
Politics and Public Choice  
Much of this competition discussion inherently overlaps with political considerations and 
is well-suited to analysis through a public choice lens. Yet if politicians are seen as acting within 
their own economic and electoral self-interests, the frequent unpopularity of subsidizing 
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billionaires to retain or attract teams of millionaires would seem counterintuitive to advocating 
such subsidies in the pursuit of vote maximization. The previous discussion on local growth 
coalitions provides some explanation, but stadium opposition can prove just as electorally 
valuable as facility boosting – for instance, the most well-known local arena subsidy opponent 
was elected mayor in Dallas following significant subsidies being granted to a downtown arena 
(Sroka, 2017). More recently in 2017, a center-left mayor in right-leaning Calgary, rode 
opposition to more significant arena subsidies to a strong re-election margin over an opponent 
openly supported by the Calgary Flames ownership. At the same time, politicians can receive 
substantial flak when the team leaves for a competing suburb. Atlanta Mayor Kasim Reed has 
drawn fire from anti-subsidy voters for generously subsidizing the transformation of the Georgia 
Dome parking lot into a new Falcons stadium and the Georgia Dome into a parking lot, as well 
as corporate and urban development boosters for losing the Braves to suburban Cobb County.  
One explanation may lay in following the money. Literature has found that campaign 
contributions at the federal level can significantly affect congressional voting (Adamany, 1977; 
Austen-Smith, 1987; Poole and Rosenthal, 1997) and can likewise influence local government 
outcomes (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000). An alternative to a direct rent-seeking relationship 
through contributions being associated with approved stadium deals would be for unclear 
political incentives to lead prominent local politicians toward kicking the can to ballot measures 
and letting “the people” decide. Regardless of whether state law requires a referendum for 
stadium deals, a referendum becomes political cover in a high profile lose-lose situation – 
oppose the project and make enemies in the corporate community and with fans for whom the 
issue is highly salient, or back the project and lose a measure of popular support. If the least bad 
electoral cost-benefit of taking a position in this scenario is difficult to calculate, then effectively 
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the position of the “public decides” lets both sides train fire on one another instead of politicians 
that happen to become spokespersons for a particular side. This passive triangulation also leaves 
incumbents less exposed to prospective challengers gaining traction by vocally taking 
contrasting positions to playing to whatever constituency the politician offended.  
While no referendum is preferable for facility proponents unless if local politicians are 
hostile, a referendum void of high-profile opposition figureheads is better than a referendum (or 
initiative) contested against a moderately popular mayor (Paul and Brown, 2006). In most 
referendum campaigns, proponent groups will have significant multiples more than opposition to 
spend on shaping public opinion (Brown and Paul, 2002), although the efficacy of a spending 
advantage is questionable (Paul and Brown, 2006). Referendums can also be targeted at the 
specific population that polling shows most amenable to passage (city, county, multi-county) and 
are a form of agenda control that frames spending options in “all or nothing” terms most 
favorable to proponents (Fort, 1998). For instance, voters more proximate to the proposed project 
may be more likely to support the ballot question (Coates and Humphreys, 2006), which may 
point towards keeping referendums local. However Horn et al. (2015) add wrinkles both near and 
far in that the voters least likely to support a project in a statewide referendum were those in 
areas physically closest and furthest away, while support was strongest with those who would 
have “easy access” and in counties closest to the stadium. Similar findings with regard to 
neighborhood proximity in the Munich context have been presented by Ahlfeldt and Maennig 
(2012). 
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Desperation and Aspiration 
Another previously touched upon explanation for political support of stadium subsidies 
might come from desperation impacting cost-benefit decisions of key actors. Sports represent a 
highly visible representation of a city on a national stage. The loss of this status, amplified by 
efforts of local growth coalitions, places pressure on politicians to not have their legacy be losing 
a sports team. Delaney and Eckstein (2006; 2007) note that local growth coalitions have been 
more successful in places where economic declines have been seen (Cleveland, Cincinnati, and 
Pittsburgh), a notion supported by Euchner’s (1994) analysis of why cities fight to keep sports 
teams. The inverse aspect of desperation also applies in that cities without major league teams 
strive to attain or reclaim status, or at least parity with cities they see as their peers. In attempting 
to gain status, these striving cities may be willing to offer more than others. In Oklahoma City 
and Memphis for example, basketball arenas to house relocated franchises were completely paid 
for by public funds (Long, 2013). Much the same can perhaps be seen with the exceedingly 
generous subsidies provided by Las Vegas to the Raiders.  
Long’s (2013) data set seems to confirm notions in the literature that seemingly less 
attractive markets (likely summarized as metro areas with populations that are some combination 
of smaller, less prosperous, older, and less interested in the sport) pay more in subsidies. For 
some similar demographic reasons, certain cities may struggle economically in general, or have 
trouble attracting amenities that would in turn attract more demographically valuable residents. 
These more desperate cities know their value to a club owner and league is weaker, and may 
perceive the team retention stakes involved in as being higher than in larger markets with more 
entertainment options. Large markets are provided further relative bargaining power through the 
potential loss for the owner, and the league which would approve any move, of a market with 
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more financial upside than smaller relocation candidates, although leagues may prefer to capture 
the gains through expansion fees as opposed to relocation. As leagues have implemented various 
forms of revenue sharing, lessening league gross revenues hits every team’s bottom line, making 
supermajority approval for relocations where such outcomes are perceived as likely to ensue 
questionable.3 
In both instances then, politicians will bear the short term consequences of their decisions 
to probably overpay relative to the average or median facility subsidy for a sport to compensate 
for the perceived inadequacies of their market, and likely will not be in office to see deals 
underperform in the longer run. Thus the incentive for elected officials may lean toward the short 
term, where the decisions are effectively framed as team vs. no team. If the price of “team” is 
still too high, then the next best alternative is to minimize blame for “no team” outcomes (likely 
via ballot measure). 
 
Intangible Value 
This discussion leads us directly to the intangible value of sports, although the intangible 
has been an underlying element present throughout this section. Simply, there is some sort of 
public value or good in having professional sports teams in a city that critical analyses of 
economic impacts do not fully explain, whether that value is found through happiness (Kavetsos 
and Szymanski, 2010; Littlejohn et al., 2015), access to an amenity, urban redevelopment, or 
otherwise. Contingent valuation research, whereby intangible value is measured through what a 
person is willing to pay for a good, indicates that willingness to pay for stadium subsidies is 
significant, although not equivalent to actual subsidies (Johnson and Whitehead, 2000; Owen, 
                                                          
3 Despite this however, there are instances of both big cities providing big subsidies and leagues relocating from more valuable to 
less valuable markets. 
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2006; Santo, 2007). As we will see, the gap between the public’s willingness to pay and cost of 
retention or acquisition of a team may be an important component of why TIF has entered many 
stadium deal equations. 
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CHAPTER 3. VENUE TIF USE INVENTORY 
 
3.1. PURPOSE 
This chapter undertakes the first inventory of TIF in major league stadium and arena 
related projects. There are two primary components to this chapter: the TIF use inventory, and 
descriptive summaries for each of the venues with a strong TIF connection as found in the 
inventory. More broadly this chapter contributes to the existing literature through identifying 
venue TIF uses and inventorying a range of their characteristics, and then making observations 
about these uses and characteristics that form a basis for theory building. From the inventory, 
cities and their citizens can identify where and how TIF was used and then select where to 
compare the promises and inputs to the outcomes. From the broader observations, academics can 
pick up the torch to more easily pursue specific questions that are not otherwise addressed in this 
dissertation. 
This chapter finds that of 125 permanent major league venues in 2018, 107 were located 
in jurisdictions where TIF was eligible to be used. Of these 107, 22 venues have had direct TIF 
contributions to capital costs, and another 17 have TIF uses with a deemed strong connection to 
the venue. These 39 venues account for 31% of total venues in the five major leagues, and 36% 
of venues where TIF could have been used at the time of construction. In 2017 dollars, $1.817 
billion in TIF has been spent on the 22 venues directly using TIF, with an average per venue 
spend of $82.6 million. In the venues where direct TIF contributions were seen, TIF accounted 
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for 60.3% of public capital costs, and 24.4% of total capital costs. Direct TIF use is most 
common in arenas and MLS stadiums. 
 
3.2. DATA COLLECTION AND FRAMING METHODS 
For each 2018 venue in the five major leagues, I collected data on TIF contributions to 
direct facility capital costs as well as to projects using TIF related to facility development. Where 
multiple venues were used by a team in 2018, the newest facility was used. These costs were 
adjusted to 2017 dollars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Direct venue costs were 
conceptualized to include expenses such as land acquisition, site preparation, and infrastructure, 
consistent with the capital cost models of Long (2013). Direct TIF contributions were then 
calculated as a percentage of both total and public capital costs.  
Each area surrounding a venue was also assessed for the presence of a TIF district. A TIF 
district is considered present if its geographical boundaries at least neighbor a block upon which 
a facility complex resides. Beyond the parcels upon which a stadium or arena directly reside, a 
venue complex includes land parcels held by public or private entities related to club or facility 
holding parties. For instance, parcels occupied by parking lots owned or leased on a long-term 
basis by a club, a stadium-related authority, or a municipality (in connection to a stadium 
construction agreement) are considered part of a facility complex. At the same time, parking lots 
held by private parties unrelated to club or venue owners, or municipal parking structures with 
no clear relation to the venue, are not included in the facility complex definition.  
Where a TIF district is deemed present, the strength of the district’s connection to the 
venue is further evaluated as either “strong” or “not strong.” A strong connection includes those 
that were established by governments with the intention to primarily stimulate, subsidize, or 
 103 
 
capture real estate growth in the immediate proximity of the facility. The TIF district need not 
fund the venue directly (through bond repayment contributions or otherwise. Instead, the 
intention is assessed through the role of the facility in government documents (such as TIF plans, 
reports, contracts, council proceedings, and memos), media coverage, and a review of the TIF 
geography and land use. The key guiding question for this connection test is: but-for the venue, 
would the scope and intent of the TIF district be substantially different? Generally the sub-
categories fitting this definition are: direct subsidy of a new or renovated venue, infrastructure, 
ancillary real estate, and immediate legacy venue redevelopment. 
Even TIF district sites some geographic distance from a venue can garner a “strong” 
connection through what happens with a direct legacy venue. A direct legacy venue means the 
facility previously hosting a team within the same jurisdiction – a city for a municipally 
subsidized venue, or a county for a county subsidized one. A good illustration of this phenomena 
is found in Memphis. While there is otherwise no TIF district with a strong connection to the 
FedEx Forum in Memphis, the previous Memphis Pyramid arena across downtown has been 
redeveloped into a Bass Pro Shop with a significant TIF contribution. Accordingly, through 
creating the impetus to redevelop the Memphis Pyramid that would not have otherwise existed, 
this TIF use meets the threshold for the FedEx Forum to have a strong connection.  
Conversely, an example of both a “not strong” connection and an instance where 
designation could change from “not strong” to “strong” is found in Orlando, with the Amway 
Center. While the arena is within a TIF district, this district encompasses most of downtown 
Orlando, and would exist without the arena’s presence. Further, the arena was not a listed goal of 
the TIF area’s creation (the TIF district has been around since 1982) and instances of increment 
paying for arena related improvements or infrastructure have not been identified.  
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Although the City of Orlando has expressed some interest in future participation the in 
Magic’s mixed-use development across the street from the Amway Center, TIF funding has not 
materialized. Likewise, the City may choose to provide a TIF subsidy to the University of 
Central Florida’s Creative Village mixed-use project on the site of the demolished Amway Arena 
(approximately 600 meters from the Amway Center), but at the time of writing this has not been 
confirmed. If TIF funding was provided to either project, this would be a sufficient condition for 
changing the categorization to “strong.” While with the project adjacent to the current Amway 
Center the cause for re-designation is obvious, the redevelopment of the former arena site is 
deemed to have a legacy connection to the new facility. Simply conceived, but-for the new 
venue, the old (23 years old at the time of demolition) arena would likely not have been 
demolished and redeveloped.  
Beyond TIF strength, venues were coded on three further real estate development related 
variables: whether the venue was intended to spur ancillary development, whether the original 
development plan included major concurrent development on the blocks consisting of the venue 
or immediately adjacent, and whether master-planned or block sized development on adjacent 
blocks later developed. As with TIF district strength, each of these variables is coded on a binary 
basis. The purpose of these three variables is to at a very basic level see if there is overlap 
between TIF use and various development intentions and outcomes.  
For the first variable, I examine media and government sources to derive intent from key 
actors at the time a venue deal was made. The threshold here is relatively low – there do not have 
to be concrete development plans at the time of the deal. Rather, a broadly stated intent from key 
public and private actors for the facility to generate development is all that is required. Key 
public actors include municipal council members, county commissioners, mayors, city managers, 
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governors, state legislature leadership, and key local state and federal Congressional 
representatives. This designation also applies to equivalent positions in Canada. On the private 
side, these key actors include team owners and business managers, real estate developers 
associated with the team, and vocal members of the so-called local growth coalition (as espoused 
by Delaney and Eckstein, 2006). As noted, these growth coalitions typically encompass media 
decision makers (editors, publishers), executives of large local businesses, and large local 
landholders.  
With the original development plan and the issue of whether that plan included block-
sized construction adjacent to the venue, this variable is measured through media reporting, 
accounts from developer groups, and government documents. These documents are either 
contemporaneous to the time of the deal (prior to construction), or are from a later date and 
demonstrate that at the time of the venue deal, there was substantial development planned that 
had not been made public.  
Importantly, the ancillary development itself does not have to be constructed at the same 
time of the venue – rather it is the time of the planning that matters. For example, while the plans 
for what became Patriot Place were not public knowledge at the time Gillette Stadium opened, 
later accounts from the Kraft family show that the development was part of the vision at the time 
of the initial facility development (Abelson, 2007).  
Likewise, these plans do not necessarily have to have been realized. Prior to the Great 
Recession, the ownership of the Philadelphia Union had comprehensive retail and residential 
development plans for the waterfront brownfields surrounding Talen Energy Stadium in Chester 
(DeGeorge, 2018). However these plans were downsized and little has happened besides an 
office complex at one end of the planned development area. Still, because there were clearly 
 106 
 
documented development plans at the time the stadium deal was made, Talen Energy Stadium is 
classified in the affirmative.   
Conversely, there are many facilities where the “build and hope development follows” 
strategy was embarked upon, and there are instances these aspirations have been made real even 
if there are significant time lapses between facility and ancillary construction. Here there need 
not be a direct relation between the club or facility and the resulting development. Instead, it is 
the scale – as described below – that matters.  
For instance, with the Google Village primed to take over surface parking and 
neighborhood around San Jose’s SAP Center, the potential for rail and transit connections are 
likely the primary development driver and Google is not related to the club (Avalos, 2018). 
Indeed, the San Jose Sharks are actively opposing plans that threaten the arena’s surface parking 
(Donato-Weinstein, 2016). Still, the planned development of all available land around the arena 
is deemed sufficient for this categorization. 
As for the scale of development, the minimum threshold is a substantial use beyond the 
club or event traffic. In locales such as Charlotte and Oklahoma City, this has been a mid-sized 
chain hotel integrated into the arena block. Office space, residential, or retail developments also 
qualify. However substantial does include office space primarily used by the sports club (such as 
that in Pittsburgh’s PNC Park) or retail limited to storefronts in parking garages (as with Marlins 
Park in Miami). From significant construction within the venue block such as a hotel or office 
tower, the scale can range up to multi-block neighborhood development such as that seen with 
San Diego’s Petco Park or Edmonton’s Rogers Place.  
Venue locations were also coded in one of four ways. The first category represents 
facilities located in downtown or downtown-adjacent areas in historic core cities. Downtown-
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adjacent means a neighborhood with a strong connection to the central business district (CBD), 
but separated by a physical barrier (such as a river, rail yard, or freeway) or with a distinctive 
land use pattern from the CBD. As a rule of thumb, these adjacent areas will be walkable from 
CBDs. A historic core city has a history of urbanization and urban land uses going back through 
the pre-World War 2 period. While there may be more than one historic core city a metropolitan 
area (such as Minneapolis and St. Paul, Dallas and Fort Worth, or New York and Newark), most 
metro-areas will have only one. A historic core city does not include suburban downtowns, or 
old suburbs that have urbanized in the post-war period (such as Anaheim).  
The second heading includes venues within the borders of a historic core city, but outside 
a CBD or adjacent area. This category includes the major league ballparks in New York and 
Chicago, and Mapfre Stadium in Columbus. These venues are integrated into existing mature 
neighborhoods outside of CBDs. While there may be plenty of low density parcels surrounding 
the facility (as with Citi Field in Queens or new Comiskey Park in Chicago), the venue area is 
well within the bounds of the core city. These stadiums can be differentiated from the third 
category, sports complexes within core cities such as those found in Philadelphia, Oakland, and 
Kansas City. Although complexes combining more than one facility may appear suburban in 
form, land use, and transportation patterns, they remain within the taxing boundaries of core 
municipalities.  
Finally, there are suburban venues. These can be in low density locations such as the 
sports complexes, or suburban downtown areas. The key unifier is that these facilities are outside 
the jurisdiction of core cities. While this category is broad, the previously discussed coding of 
development intent and outcome is intended to differentiate between low-density sports facilities 
and those intended to anchor higher density suburban developments. 
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3.3. LEAGUE LEVEL INVENTORY AND SUMMARIES 
 
3.3.1. Major League Baseball (MLB)  
Of 30 MLB parks, 27 are in jurisdictions that would have allowed for TIF to be used for 
direct stadium costs at the time of construction or substantial renovation (Minneapolis, Phoenix, 
and Toronto were not). However there are only three that have used direct TIF contributions to 
the public share of capital costs: Detroit, San Diego, and San Francisco. These ballparks 
respectively opened in 2000, 2004, and 2000. While TIF had a central role in San Diego, the 
other two instances saw TIF contributions not exceed 10% of the total capital cost. From this 
vantage point, TIF has not been a significant contributor to MLB stadium financing and where it 
has been used, it was in the early 2000s with nothing to indicate this being a growing trend in 
recent years.  
However TIF has been a stronger presence in development efforts near or related to 
ballparks. Of 19 ballparks that were designated as having been intended to spur development, 12 
have an ancillary TIF presence, with eight classified as “strong.” Of these 19, eight are found to 
have had significant original development plans, while nine have seen such plans emerge after 
the deal making stage.  
With the eight venues deemed to have a strong ancillary TIF connection, all were also 
found to have been intended to spur development with half being accompanied by immediate 
development plans. Two more stadiums have seen major development plans emerge in later 
years. Of these eight stadiums, seven are located in downtown or downtown adjacent areas. In 
terms of ancillary real estate construction, the strongest results have been seen in San Diego, San 
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Francisco, and Washington – each of the areas surrounding these ballparks has been transformed 
from low density brownfields to vibrant urbanist neighborhoods in the years following stadium 
construction. In the remaining cases however, the results have been mixed. Strong TIF 
connection baseball stadiums are overviewed below. 
 
Table 1. 
MLB Stadium TIF Use 
City Stadium Year New/Reno. Direct (D) or 
Strong (S) 
Bonds Property (P), 
Sales (S) 
Taxes 
Arlington Globe Life 
Park 
1994 New S Y P 
Cincinnati Great 
American 
Ballpark 
2003 New S Y P 
Detroit Comerica 
Park 
2000 New D Y P 
Miami Marlins Park 2012 New S Y P 
San Diego Petco Park 2004 New D Y P 
San 
Francisco 
AT&T Park 2000 New D Y P 
St. Louis Busch 
Stadium 
2006 New S Y P, S 
Washington Nationals 
Park 
2008 New S Y P, S 
 
Table 2. 
MLB Stadium TIF and Development Use 
 
City Stadium Ancillary 
TIF 
Strong TIF 
Connection 
Intent to 
Spur 
Dev. 
Master 
Planned 
Original 
Intent 
Master 
Planned 
or Block 
Sized 
Dev. 
Later 
Location Pop. 
(2018) 
(‘000) 
Anaheim Angel 
Stadium 
Y N N Y - 3 352 
Arlington, 
TX 
Globe Life 
Park 
Y Y Y Y - 4 398 
Baltimore Camden 
Yards 
N N N Y - 1 611 
Boston Fenway 
Park 
N N Y N N 2 694 
Chicago  Wrigley 
Field 
N N Y Y - 2 2,705 
Chicago Guaranteed 
Rate Field 
N N N N N 2 2,705 
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Cincinnati Great 
American 
Ballpark 
Y Y Y Y - 1 302 
Cleveland Progressive 
Field 
N N Y N N 1 385 
Cumberland, 
GA 
SunTrust 
Park 
N N Y Y - 4 103 
Denver Coors 
Field 
Y N Y Y - 1 704 
Detroit Comerica 
Park 
Y Y Y N N 1 672 
Houston Minute 
Maid Park 
Y N Y N N 1 2,325 
Kansas City Kauffman 
Stadium 
N N N N N 3 491 
Los Angeles Dodger 
Stadium 
N N Y N N 2 3,990 
Miami Marlins 
Park 
Y Y Y N N 2 470 
Milwaukee Miller Park Y N Y N N 2 594 
Minneapolis Target 
Field 
N N Y Y - 1 425 
New York Citi Field N N N N Y 2 8,398 
New York Yankee 
Stadium 
N N N N N 2 8,398 
Oakland Oakland-
Alameda 
Coliseum 
Y N N N N 3 429 
Phoenix Chase 
Field 
N N Y N Y 1 1,660 
Philadelphia Citizens 
Bank Park 
N N N N Y 3 1,584 
Pittsburgh PNC Park N N Y N Y 1 302 
San Diego Petco Park Y Y Y Y - 1 1,425 
San 
Francisco 
AT&T 
Park 
Y Y Y N Y 1 883 
Seattle T-Mobile 
Park 
N N Y N N 1 744 
St. Louis Busch 
Stadium 
Y Y Y Y - 1 303 
St. 
Petersburg, 
FL 
Tropicana 
Field 
N N N N N 3 265 
Toronto Rogers 
Centre 
N N Y N Y 1 2,930 
Washington Nationals 
Park 
Y Y Y Y - 1 702 
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Cincinnati – Great American Ballpark 
Although a mixed-use masterplan for the 120 acre area along the Ohio River between 
Great American Ballpark and Paul Brown Stadium emerged alongside the stadium in the early 
2000s (Urban Design Associates, 2000), and a master development agreement was signed in 
2007, the first construction was not completed until 2011. $29 million in TIF backed bonds have 
been approved for The Banks, with 86% spent as of 2017 (The Banks, n.d.). $11 million in TIF 
(Cincinnati Bell Connector, n.d.), in part from The Banks, has also been used to contribute to a 
streetcar line linking the stadium neighborhood to downtown and other redeveloping areas to the 
north.  
The majority of blocks in the area have been filled in, although three unfinished and 
undeveloped blocks still remain closer to Paul Brown Stadium (LeMaster, 2013). The 
development includes multiple apartment buildings over ground level retail, a hotel, a museum, 
and an office building occupied by General Electric (Monk, 2018). All lots to the eastern half of 
the development, where the ballpark neighbors an arena, have been infilled. 
Alongside the two overwhelmingly publicly funded stadiums, a major $92 million 
investment was made in a 45 acre riverfront park (Cincinnati Parks, n.d.), pushing the total 
public investment in the area into the range of $1 billion, with the masterplan calling for $600 
million to $800 million in private investment (The Banks, n.d.). While the result 15 years after 
the completion of the second stadium is nearing closer to a desirable mixed-use waterfront 
district, The Banks is another instance where the question should be asked whether similar 
results could have been attained without massive public stadium investments that have had 
significant fiscal burdens (see Albergotti and McWhirter, 2011)? With specific regard to TIF, it 
appears that it may have been useful in closing feasibility gaps for particular projects, but the 
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redevelopment results do not seem any more impressive than those seen north of downtown in 
TIF areas (namely the Over-The-Rhine neighborhoods) absent major anchors. 
 
Detroit – Comerica Park 
Comerica Park received $40 million in direct TIF construction funding from the Detroit 
Downtown Development Authority (DDDA) (Crain’s Detroit Business, 2014). The DDDA is a 
TIF district encompassing almost all of downtown Detroit in addition to a portion of the 
midtown neighborhood. Representing a significant portion of Detroit’s total property tax base, 
the DDDA made significant direct contributions to both Comerica Park and neighboring Ford 
Field. However not much in development terms happened around the ballpark until more recent 
years and is substantially related to the discussion in this dissertation’s Detroit case study.  
 
Miami – Marlins Park 
Marlins Park on the former Orange Bowl site in Little Havana received no direct TIF 
funding and there is no strong ancillary TIF connection in the ballpark vicinity. However TIF 
played a significant role in the ballpark deal through freeing up other taxes to directly support the 
stadium. Funding for Marlins Park and accompanying parking garages were two of seven 
projects contemplated by a complex 2007 revenue agreement between the City, County, and two 
redevelopment agencies (with TIF powers). This agreement had the effect of extending a 
downtown TIF zone to replace revenues from tourist and convention taxes. These released taxes 
formed the backing for $98 million in city and county bonds for the stadium, and $50 million in 
parking structures (City of Miami et al., 2007).  
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While the ballpark was intended to spur redevelopment, the surrounding blocks in Little 
Havana has seen little construction. The City parking garages were designed with street facing 
retail at ground level, but businesses have struggled outside of event times and spaces sit vacant 
or occupied by public offices (O’Donnell, 2016). However for a TIF study, Marlins Park is 
another instance where TIF has operated to flexibly divert funds between projects with 
contributions from multiple levels of government.  
 
San Diego – Petco Park  
San Diego is the most significant and most complicated direct and indirect use of TIF in 
MLB stadiums. Petco Park was funded by two distinct sources of TIF – one formal and one 
informal – and the relative shares of these sources have oscillated over the years. The original 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) based upon the 1998 stadium referendum saw the City’s 
Redevelopment Agency – through the Center City Development Corporation (CCDC) – commit 
$50 million of funding through incremental property taxes in the 24 block ancillary development 
area the same document created and obliged the Padres to find partners to develop (City of San 
Diego, 1998). In California prior to 2013, Redevelopment Agencies were effectively TIF 
agencies. 
The Ballpark Cooperation Agreement that formalized the Redevelopment Agency’s 
participation in 2000, was amended in 2001 to increase the CCDC’s contributions to $95 million, 
with the City of San Diego issuing bonds to cover $206 million (City of San Diego, 2009). While 
backed by the general fund, the City bonds were intended to be paid off through incremental 
tourist occupancy taxes created through the hotel rooms the Padres were to construct under the 
MOU. After a 2007 refinancing of the City bonds, annual payments were pegged at $11.3 
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million (2009). However the City experienced a significant loss of revenues in 2008 alongside 
the Great Recession. Combined with better than expected incremental property tax revenues and 
slightly weaker hotel tax returns in the ballpark area, the CCDC agreed in 2009 to a second 
amendment to the Ballpark Cooperation Agreement which would see the CCDC cover these 
$11.3 million payments through 2013 (2009).  
This structural alteration was seemingly made permanent with a third amendment to the 
Agreement in 2011, which saw an extension of CCDC payments through 2032 (City of San 
Diego, 2011). Under this plan, TIF would have become the largest single source of funding for 
Petco Park. With the state-level demise of redevelopment in 2012 however, this TIF debt 
repayment plan came to an abrupt halt. Thus accounting for the 2004 present value of the $11.3 
million TIF payments between 2009 and 2012, the total TIF contribution to Petco was roughly 
$133 million or 29% of the total cost and 44% of the public cost. The number may be further 
adjusted by the court order (under appeal at writing) forcing the City to reimburse the last $11.3 
million payment made during the winding down of the CCDC (Halverstadt, 2015).  
Considering that the end of California redevelopment authorities led to the reversion of 
TIF revenues back to where these funds would have otherwise flowed, incremental revenue from 
the real estate development near Petco Park has effectively continued to pay debt service. Instead 
of being directed through the CCDC however, the City’s share of incremental taxes has gone 
through the general fund to pay the outstanding bonds. While on the face of it, this might seem to 
have not had a bottom line impact on debt repayment, since the City of San Diego now only 
receives a fraction of the entirety that previously flowed to the CCDC (17.5%, according to 
Halverstadt, 2015), payments have returned to being a significant fiscal burden on the City. 
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In addition to risks of changing TIF statutes, Petco Park is a strong study in how 
overlaying capture of increment from other taxing authorities can make a project more feasible 
than it otherwise would be for a proponent municipality. At the same time, had redevelopment 
been left in place, San Diego would have shown that it is possible to largely pay for a modern 
baseball stadium with incremental revenue from ancillary development. A decade after opening, 
almost $1.8 billion in real estate construction has transformed the blighted area surrounding 
Petco Park into an attractive mixed-use neighborhood with a substantial residential component. 
This transformation has been held up by some academic works as one of the shining success 
stories of stadium related real estate development (Cantor and Rosentraub, 2012; Rosentraub, 
2009; 2014). However it seems better than expected real estate construction has been severely 
undermined by a poorly framed initial legal framework, the falling apart of which has 
highlighted a deal premised on overlaying capture.  
 
San Francisco – AT&T Park 
San Francisco was rare in the most recent generation of ballparks in being almost 
completely privately financed. The only direct public contribution was $15 million in TIF funds 
from the San Francisco Redevelopment Authority (Sport Facility Reports, 2011). Much like 
Petco Park, AT&T Park was built in a downtown adjacent blighted area. As with San Diego, the 
neighborhood has filled in with a mix of uses in the years since opening. The Giants themselves 
are joining the development fray, breaking ground in 2020 on a 28 acre mixed-use development 
across McCovey Cove that has been in the works since a 2008 request for proposals from the 
Port of San Francisco (2019). The development approved in 2017 will include up to 1,500 
residential units and 1.5 million square feet of commercial space (Dineen, 2017).  
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While AT&T Park may represent a successful instance of ballpark-anchored 
neighborhood development, the expanding economy and demand for housing and office space in 
San Francisco may well have led to similar outcomes at some point absent the stadium amenity. 
With San Francisco however, the public construction investment was probably as low as 
realistically possible, even if the team received considerable financial benefits through below 
market land grants and property tax abatements. Although TIF was a flexible instrument able to 
address a defined infrastructure need within the ambit of the Redevelopment Authority, the 
money likely could have been found elsewhere. However TIF may have been preferable for City 
politicians looking to avoid a visual of direct public contributions to the stadium and keep the 
guise of the facility being entirely privately financed.  
 
St. Louis – Busch Stadium 
Initially conceived as a two-block and $60 million project in 2002, the vision for Ballpark 
Village had become far more ambitious by the 2006 opening year of Busch Stadium. This 
version would have brought an estimated $387 million of mixed-use development (consisting of 
residential, retail, office, and entertainment) to 10 acres formerly hosting the previous Busch 
Stadium and beyond the outfield of the new ballpark (Levin, 2013). The project was 
accompanied by approvals for $56 million in TIF from the City of St. Louis and additional sales 
TIF from the state, limited to the boundaries of the undeveloped ten acre site (Altman, 2016). 
The approving ordinances allowed for the issue of revenue bonds secured by increment (City of 
St. Louis, 2009). 
Despite the eventual availability of over $100 million in subsidies, the project 
experienced considerable delays and reconfiguration (Industrial Development Authority of The 
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City of St. Louis, Missouri, 2017). Finally in 2012, a two-block $100 million first phase 
consisting of bar and restaurant options alongside a Cardinals museum and public plaza began 
construction, opening in 2014. From a development agreement between the City, the Cardinals, 
and their developer partners, Cordish, this first phase saw the issue of $18 million in revenue 
bonds by the Missouri Downtown Economic Stimulus Authority (MODESA) (2017). These 
bonds were backed by both property and sales TIF, as well as a special 1% sales tax on Ballpark 
Village businesses (2017). Cordish was required to purchase the bonds and would be reimbursed 
with 50% of the increment collected (Missouri Development Finance Board, 2012). Cordish was 
also obligated to build a minimum of 100,000 square feet of retail space and $10.7 million in 
infrastructure, although a significant component of the infrastructure ended up being surface 
parking lots on the blocks to be developed in later phases (2012).  
Phase two was approved in 2016, with an amended development agreement covering 
$261 million in construction on two blocks, including a high-rise apartment complex, Class ‘A’ 
office building, and hotel (Industrial Development Authority of The City of St. Louis, Missouri, 
2017). With the sunset of MODESA as a state board in 2013, $107 million in phase two revenue 
bonds were issued by the St. Louis Industrial Development Authority in 2017 (2017). Revenues 
still encompassed those pursuant to the MODESA Act, which serves as an umbrella 
authorization for state and local increment on property (in this instance PILOTs), sales, and 
payroll taxes (2017). $18 million of this $107 million was intended to refund the 2013 bond 
issue, with $68 million forming the primary new available subsidies beyond the 2013 series. Of 
this $68 million 2017 value, $43 million is intended to be supported by TIF sources. Under the 
amended development agreement, the apartment building is eligible for $41 million in subsidies 
of a $121 million total cost and the office building for $24 million in bond proceeds from a $66 
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million budget (2017). With the completion of phase two, roughly half of the ten acre Ballpark 
Village site will be infilled.  
 
Texas – Arlington, Globe Life Park  
The City of Arlington, a low density suburb of Dallas, created a 2,100 acre TIF zone in 
2006 to fund public improvements in its sports and entertainment district (Tarrant County, n.d.). 
At the time of TIF implementation, the district was anchored by Globe Life Park and a Six Flags 
amusement park, with Cowboys Stadium under construction. In more recent years, Arlington has 
approved a successor ballpark to be constructed on the current stadium parking lot, accompanied 
by a $250 million mixed use development containing commercial and hotel uses (Office of 
Communication, 2018).  
The TIF zone is divided into a “core” and “surrounding” sub-districts (City of Arlington, 
2015). The core district is home to the three stadiums and was allocated $48.8 million in public 
improvement funding (2015). The surrounding sub-district was approved for a further $66.7 
million in TIF spending (2015). There are four participating taxing jurisdictions until 2026. Each 
of the City, the County, and the County Hospital are participating at a 70% rate, while the 
County College District is allocating 50% (2015). From 2027 to 2031, the City will be the sole 
contributor (2015).  
In the first ten years, the core area has seen increment created significantly in excess of 
projections (2015). However with the first series of bonds issued in 2008 – some $34 million – 
the City has transferred payments from its general fund to be reimbursed by increment in the 
future (2015). These proceeds have been primarily spent on flood control and road 
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improvements, with the remainder of planned improvements waiting until further increment is 
created (2015).  
While the first set of improvements may have been intended to provide for sufficient 
traffic infrastructure for Cowboys Stadium, it has had the same benefit for Globe Life Park and 
its successor, as well as the accompanying Texas Live entertainment district. Beyond Texas Live 
and the conversion of Globe Life Park into some office or residential use, there are no known 
plans to further alter land use patterns or infill surface parking lots. Thus in Arlington, TIF is 
seemingly a straight infrastructure play. 
 
Washington DC – Nationals Park 
Although Nationals Park did not receive direct TIF funding, TIF did play a significant 
role in facilitating the stadium deal. The largely blighted area surrounding Nationals Park near 
the southeastern waterfront was designated the Ballpark TIF Area. Up to $450 million in 
incremental property and sales tax proceeds from ancillary development in this TIF area was to 
be directed to a Community Benefit Fund, from which a maximum of $300 million in TIF bonds 
were authorized for issue (District of Columbia, 2005).  
Within the Community Benefit Fund, earmarks were made for certain wards and projects, 
with the largest allocations for school construction and library improvements (Montgomery and 
Woodlee, 2004). The Community Benefit Fund in general, as well as each of the specific 
allocations, can be viewed as a product of coalition building for the stadium vote in 2004. 
Considerable mixed-use development around Nationals Park and the Navy Yard Metro station 
has transformed the neighborhood, creating over $1.5 billion in incremental assessments in the 
decade since the ballpark’s 2008 opening (Fisher, 2018; Montgomery and Woodlee, 2004). 
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Although only roughly a third of new construction is within the formal Ballpark TIF Area, the 
Community Benefit Fund as originally designed was on track to become fully funded.  
However, the original intent of the Community Benefit Fund has not been met. In 2009, 
unspent balances from the fund were taken to cover general fund expenses (DeBonis, 2011). In 
2011, the DC Code sections concerning the Community Benefit Fund were amended to make 
transfer of increment to the fund subject to yearly approval in the District’s budget and financial 
plan (District of Columbia, 2010). With no predictable allocation of revenues, the capacity to 
issue bonds was effectively muted. Whereas the 2011 financial plan projected dedicated TIF and 
Community Benefit Fund taxes as ranging from $58 million to $108 million in fiscal years 2012 
through 2014 (2010), the 2012 financial plan revised these projections to zero (District of 
Columbia, 2011).  
In DC, while TIF funded commitments unrelated to the facility itself, it effectively served 
a more common role as a flexible means to allocate funding to close a bargaining gap – here 
between key council members – and close a deal. Still the DC ballpark deal, which came with no 
enforceable commitments of ancillary development tied to the provision of large public stadium 
subsidies, was a first visible step in a remarkable neighborhood transformation (Boswell, 2016). 
While ancillary development activity took several years after ballpark opening to accelerate, the 
project should also be noted as an instance where results have demonstrated that increment could 
have been used to substantially repay stadium debt. However, as with places like San Francisco, 
optimism should be controlled by DC’s relatively strong local economic conditions over the 
period where real estate development has blossomed, as well as high demand for mixed-use 
urbanism in inner city locations.  
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3.3.2. National Football League (NFL) 
Twenty-nine active and permanent NFL stadiums are included, of which 27 were in a 
jurisdiction where they could have been eligible for direct TIF funding (Arizona and Minnesota 
were not). Although two venues have used TIF directly in construction (Detroit and San 
Francisco), TIF has been an even less substantial contributor to stadium finance in the NFL than 
in MLB. As with baseball stadiums, TIF is more relevant in ancillary development. Fifteen NFL 
stadiums that have seen some intent of spurring ancillary development. Twelve of these 15 have 
ancillary TIF districts and seven have strong connections to the facility. Seven stadiums had 
strong initial development plans, while eight had plans emerge in the years following 
construction. With the seven TIF districts that had strong connections to NFL stadiums, three had 
initial plans for ancillary development (Detroit, Green Bay’s renovation, and San Francisco) and 
three had plans that followed years later (Cincinnati, Dallas, and Tennessee).  
Fifteen of 29 stadiums were intended to spur ancillary development, with 15 eventually 
delivering related ancillary development (although only 14 of 15 stadiums overlapped). In terms 
of geography, three of seven venues are downtown or downtown adjacent, one is otherwise 
within a core city, and three are in suburbs. More broadly, while 15 stadiums are downtown or 
downtown adjacent locations, suburban locales are next most common (eight), with three apiece 
in sports complexes or on inner city sites.  
Table 3. 
NFL Stadium TIF Use 
City Stadium Year New/Reno. Direct (D) or 
Strong (S) 
Bonds Property (P), 
Sales (S) 
Taxes 
Arlington AT&T 
Stadium 
2009 New S Y P 
Cincinnati Paul Brown 
Stadium 
2000 New S Y P 
Detroit Ford Field 2002 New D Y P 
Green Bay Lambeau 
Field 
2015 Reno. S N P 
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Miami 
Gardens, FL 
Hard Rock 
Stadium 
2016 Reno. S N P 
Nashville Nissan 
Stadium 
1999 New S Y P 
Santa Clara, 
CA 
Levi’s 
Stadium 
2014 New D Y  P  
 
Table 4.  
NFL Stadium TIF and Development Use 
 
City Stadium Ancillary 
TIF 
Strong TIF 
Connection 
Intent to 
Spur 
Dev. 
Master 
Plan 
Orig. 
Intent 
Master 
Plan or 
Block 
Sized 
Dev. Later 
Location Pop. 
(2018) 
(‘000) 
Arlington, 
TX 
AT&T 
Stadium 
Y Y Y N Y 4 398 
Atlanta Mercedes-
Benz 
Stadium 
Y N Y Y - 1 498 
Baltimore M&T 
Bank 
Stadium 
N N N N N 1 611 
Buffalo 
(Orchard 
Park) 
New Era 
Field 
N N N N N 4 3 
Charlotte Bank of 
America 
Stadium 
N N Y N N 1 872 
Chicago Soldier 
Field 
N N N N N 1 2,705 
Cincinnati Paul 
Brown 
Stadium 
Y Y Y N Y 1 302 
Cleveland First 
Energy 
Stadium 
N N Y N N 1 385 
Denver Empower 
Field 
N N N N Y 1 704 
Detroit Ford Field Y Y Y Y - 1 672 
East 
Rutherford, 
NJ 
MetLife 
Stadium 
N N N Y - 4 10 
Foxborough, 
MA 
Gillette 
Stadium 
N N Y Y - 4 17 
Glendale, 
AZ 
State Farm 
Stadium 
N N Y Y - 4 250 
Green Bay Lambeau 
Field 
Y Y Y Y - 2 322 
Houston NRG 
Stadium 
Y N N N N 2 2,325 
Indianapolis Lucas Oil 
Stadium 
Y N Y N N 1 867 
Jacksonville TIAA 
Bank Field 
Y N N N Y 1 903 
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Kansas City Arrowhead 
Stadium 
N N N N N 3 491 
Landover, 
MD 
FedEx 
Field 
N N N N  N 4 22 
Miami 
Gardens, FL 
Hard Rock 
Stadium 
Y Y N N N 4 113 
Minneapolis U.S. Bank 
Stadium 
N N Y Y - 1 425 
Nashville Nissan 
Stadium 
Y Y Y N Y 1 669 
New 
Orleans 
Mercedes-
Benz 
Superdome 
N N N N N 1 391 
Oakland Oakland-
Alameda 
Coliseum 
Y N N N N 3 429 
Philadelphia Lincoln 
Financial 
Field 
N N N N Y 3 1,584 
Pittsburgh Heinz 
Field 
N N Y N Y 1 302 
Santa Clara, 
CA 
Levi’s 
Stadium 
Y Y Y Y - 4 129 
Seattle Century 
Link Field 
N N Y N Y 1 744 
Tampa Bay Raymond 
James 
Stadium 
N N N N N  2 392 
 
Detroit – Ford Field 
Neighboring Comerica Park, Detroit’s Ford Field received $70 million in funding from 
the DDDA TIF zone (Crain’s Detroit Business, 2014). The design of Ford Field included office 
space in the attached former Hudson’s department store warehouse, in a concept similar to 
Camden Yards. A second phase office building followed in 2005, which became PwC’s Detroit 
office until 2012 (Henderson and Duggan, 2012). The remaining available lots between Ford 
Field and two freeways remain surface parking, while properties connecting Ford Field to the 
rest of downtown are currently occupied by a criminal justice precinct and partially-finished jail 
that will be redeveloped by Dan Gilbert and the University of Michigan. Further future 
development opportunities may arise with the conversion of the I-375 spur into a boulevard 
behind Ford Field’s parking deck. 
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Green Bay – Lambeau Field 
While Lambeau Field is within the boundaries of Green Bay, its parking lots are mostly 
surrounded by the Village of Ashwaubenon. The Packers acquired significant land holdings 
across the street from Lambeau in Ashwaubenon, forming the basis for a 45 acre mixed use 
development known as the “Titletown District” planned alongside substantial renovations to the 
stadium. The Village has agreed to provide $12.5 million in TIF subsidies to Titletown, which 
will cover infrastructure like streets and utilities (Krumholz, 2017; Ryman, 2018; USA Today 
Network Wisconsin, 2017). Currently under construction, Titletown will include up to 150 
apartments, 70-90 townhouses, as well as 225,000 square feet of office space and retail, all 
centered on a ten acre of park space (2018; 2017). The TIF subsidies will come in the form of 
rebates (2017). 
 
Miami – Miami Gardens, Hard Rock Stadium 
Although Dolphins owner and real estate developer, Stephen Ross, has not seen fit to 
announce any construction plans for the surface lots surrounding the renovated Hard Rock 
Stadium, Miami-Dade County has saw fit to create a TIF area (Community Redevelopment 
Agency under Florida law) to the north, west, and south of the stadium in 2017 (Keith and 
Schnars, 2018). County forecasts showed that TIF could divert up to $136 million over 30 years 
(Hank and Nixon, 2017),  although notably increment will not be taken from Hard Rock 
Stadium. As part of the agreement with the City of Miami Gardens, TIF will fund a cultural 
center in the area with a 1,000 seat theatre and catering operation (2017). The City would also 
like to develop a “town center” in the TIF zone, with retail, dining, and hotel options (2017).  
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San Francisco – Santa Clara, Levi’s Stadium 
In 2011, Levi’s Stadium received $4 million in TIF up-front and a further commitment of 
$36 million upon increment generation (City of Santa Clara, 2011). This agreement was made 
while the Governor was threatening the end of TIF in California (Rosenberg, 2011), which came 
to fruition later in 2012. As the TIF funding was a pre-existing commitment of redevelopment 
agency, the winding down of TIF ensured that the successor agency was still obliged to fulfill the 
funding (Yang and Geare, 2016).  
Levi’s Stadium was part of a larger Bayshore North TIF area, which the city hoped would 
see aggressive development (City of Santa Clara, 2012). At the time of redevelopment agency 
dissolution, there were several outstanding TIF obligations for Bayshore North, including Levi’s 
Stadium. While there was an element of overlaying capture with this TIF district, under 
California law at the time, most overlaying taxing entities received a pass-through of 25% of 
increment, with certain school districts receiving a majority of what would be their share absent 
TIF (City of Santa Clara, 2007). 
Prior to Levi’s Stadium, the Bayshore North TIF area already hosted a Six Flags 
amusement park and a convention center. However transformation will come in the form of 
CityPlace, a $5.6 billion mixed-use project across the street from the stadium, developed by 
Dolphins owner Stephen Ross’ company (Pacheco, 2018). With a lawsuit from neighboring San 
Jose resolved in Santa Clara’s favor, construction on the 240 acre, 9.2 million square foot project 
is slated to begin in 2019 (2018). The development is intended to include 5.4 million square feet 
of office space, 1.1 million square feet of retail, 250,000 square feet of dining, and 190,000 
square feet of entertainment, along with 1,680 residences (2018). 
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CityPlace will not benefit directly from TIF as the Bayshore North TIF area was 
effectively frozen in place with the death of California TIF in 2012, and there has been no use of 
the weakened 2014 TIF replacement of Infrastructure Finance Districts. Still, the presence of one 
of the largest developments in the western states in a TIF area across the street from a directly 
TIF funded stadium is notable, even if one can argue that both the stadium and CityPlace 
developments may have proceeded much the same absent TIF. 
More recently in 2019, the 49ers won an assessment appeal resulting a 50% reduction in 
their property taxes and a $36 million initial rebate from the County and overlaying tax 
jurisdictions (Vo, 2019). If the decision survives judicial appeal, it means that the 49ers receive a 
major and retroactive property tax break without reduction in their TIF subsidies, and while 
undermining the capacity to generate increment. For this and other reasons, the relationship 
between the County and the 49ers has been likened to a divorced couple “living in the same 
house and sharing the kids” (Meacham, 2019). 
 
Tennessee – Nashville, Nissan Stadium  
In the same year as Nashville’s stadium project was approved by referendum, 
metropolitan council implemented the East Bank Redevelopment Plan covering the largely 
blighted area surrounding the stadium site. This plan allowed for up to $25 million in TIF to be 
used in the vicinity through 2025, although only $7 million had been allocated as of 2017 
(Metropolitan Nashville Audit Committee, 2018). Almost all of the increment has flowed to a 
single condominium project across the freeway from Nissan Stadium (Metropolitan 
Development and Housing Agency, 2018), with little tangible connection to the facility. As it 
stands, the area around the stadium is almost completely occupied by surface parking lots with 
 127 
 
no notable ancillary development except a Quality Inn and riverfront park at opposite edges of 
the lots. The same hotel developer has proposed an eleven story La Quinta branded property 
beside the Quality Inn (Williams, 2011). Other than the hotels, there are no concrete 
development plans that can be reasonably tied to the stadium’s presence. 
 
3.3.3. National Basketball Association (NBA) 
Twenty-six of 29 NBA arenas in the data set would have been theoretically eligible for 
TIF in their jurisdictions at the time their project finance structure was determined (Minnesota, 
Sacramento, and Toronto would not have been). Seven have seen direct TIF contributions in 
their construction or substantial renovation: Dallas, Detroit, Denver, Los Angeles, Milwaukee, 
Salt Lake City, and Washington DC. Direct TIF funding has ranged from a low of $12 million in 
Los Angeles, to $324 million in Detroit, the latter which represents the largest ever venue TIF 
spend. 
There are ancillary TIF zones near 18 arenas, with 10 having a substantial connection to 
the facility. Twenty-five of 29 venues can be viewed as having been intended to spur ancillary 
development. Of the 10 arenas with strong TIF connections, five had initial plans for 
development (Dallas, Detroit, Los Angeles, Memphis, and Milwaukee), and a further five saw 
plans materialize later (Chicago, Denver, Indianapolis, Salt Lake, and Washington DC). Two 
cities are notable for using major TIF contributions (as a percentage of the project value) to 
subsidize redevelopment of previous arenas (Indianapolis and Memphis). 
Of these 10 arenas with substantial TIF connections, nine are found in downtown or 
adjacent locations, while one is otherwise within a core city (Chicago). Of all NBA arenas in the 
data set, 24 have downtown or adjacent locations, three are otherwise within core cities, and two 
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are in sports complexes. Basketball arenas are far more frequently found in central locations than 
football or baseball stadiums, which may be associated with lessened land and parking 
requirements, as well as relatively more fathomable financial costs.  
Table 5. 
NBA Arena TIF Use 
City Arena Year New/Reno. Direct (D) or 
Strong (S) 
Bonds Property (P), 
Sales (S) 
Taxes 
Chicago United 
Center 
1994 New S Y P 
Dallas American 
Airlines 
Center 
2001 New D N P 
Denver Pepsi Center 1999 New D N P 
Detroit Little Caesars 
Arena 
2017 New D Y P 
Indianapolis Bankers Life 
Fieldhouse 
1999 New S Y P 
Los Angeles Staples 
Center 
1999 New D Y P 
Memphis FedEx Forum 2004 New S Y P, S 
Milwaukee Fiserv Forum 2018 New D N P 
Salt Lake Vivant Smart 
Home Arena 
1992 Reno. D N P 
Washington Capital One 
Arena 
2007 Reno. D Y S  
 
Table 6. 
NBA Arena TIF and Development Use 
 
City Arena Ancillary 
TIF 
Strong TIF 
Connection 
Intent to 
Spur 
Dev. 
Master 
Planned 
Original 
Intent 
Master 
Planned 
or 
Block 
Sized 
Dev. 
Later 
Location Population 
(2018) 
(‘000) 
Atlanta State Farm 
Arena 
Y N Y N Y 1 498 
Boston TD Garden N N Y N Y 1 694 
Charlotte Spectrum 
Center 
N N Y Y - 1 872 
Chicago United 
Center 
Y Y Y N Y 2 2,705 
Cleveland Rocket 
Mortgage 
Field 
House 
N N Y N N 1 385 
Dallas American 
Airlines 
Center 
Y Y Y Y - 1 1,345 
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Denver Pepsi 
Center 
Y Y Y N N 1 704 
Detroit Little 
Caesars 
Arena 
Y Y Y Y - 1 672 
Houston Toyota 
Center 
Y N Y Y - 1 2,325 
Indianapolis Bankers 
Life 
Fieldhouse 
Y Y Y N Y 1 867 
Los 
Angeles 
Staples 
Center 
Y Y Y Y - 1 3,990 
Memphis FedEx 
Forum 
Y Y Y Y - 1 650 
Miami American 
Airlines 
Arena 
Y N Y N Y 1 470 
Milwaukee Fiserv 
Forum 
Y Y Y Y - 1 594 
Minneapolis Target 
Center 
Y N Y N Y 1 425 
New 
Orleans 
Smoothie 
King 
Center 
N N N N N 1 391 
New York Barclays 
Center 
N N Y Y - 2 8,398 
New York Madison 
Square 
Garden 
N N N N N 1 8,398 
Oakland Oracle 
Arena 
N N N N N 3 429 
Oklahoma 
City 
Chesapeake 
Energy 
Arena 
Y N Y Y - 1 673 
Orlando Amway 
Center 
Y N Y N Y 1 285 
Philadelphia Wells 
Fargo 
Center 
N N N N Y 2 1,584 
Phoenix Talking 
Stick 
Resort 
Arena 
N N Y N N 1 1,660 
Portland Rose 
Garden 
Y N Y N N 1 653 
Sacramento Golden 1 
Center 
N N Y Y - 1 501 
Salt Lake Vivint 
Smart 
Home 
Arena 
Y Y Y N Y 1 200 
San 
Antonio 
AT&T 
Center 
Y N N N N 3 1,530 
Toronto Scotiabank 
Arena 
N N Y N Y 1 2,930 
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Washington Capital 
One Arena 
Y Y Y Y - 1 702 
 
 
Chicago – United Center 
The 463 acre Central West TIF district was created in 2000, completely surrounding the 
United Center and its parking lots. At the time of the redevelopment plan, 15% of the district was 
vacant, although no assembled blocks were entirely empty (S.B. Friedman & Company, 2000). 
The plan called for up to $98 million (1999 dollars) in TIF spending through 2023. Primary 
objectives for TIF spending included land assembly for new commercial development, 
environmental remediation, and infrastructure (2000). 
As of 2017, $193 million in increment had been collected, and $67 million had been 
allocated (City of Chicago, 2018). While public investments have not massively diverged from 
initial projections, private investment has underperformed. While after fiscal 2018, the district is 
projected to be over halfway to its final total of public investments, it will only be 7% of the way 
to meeting its private investment objectives (2018). Indeed in gross terms, there has been slightly 
more public investment than private, indicating that increment has been generated from property 
appreciation over time as opposed to new construction or transformation.  
Although there is a consensus that the neighborhood has improved considerably in the 
almost 25 years since the United Center opened in terms of public safety and blight, this has not 
translated into a visual transformation or major construction value gains (O’Connell, 2015). The 
Bulls and Blackhawks ownership groups (jointly owning the United Center) have had plans for a 
mixed-use entertainment district, but all that has come to fruition has been a six story office 
building attached to one end of the arena in 2017, and practice facilities for both professional 
teams.   
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Dallas – American Airlines Center 
The American Airlines Center is detailed through two case study chapters of this 
dissertation.  
 
Denver – Pepsi Center 
In Denver, $36.5 million in TIF funding was provided for site preparation, remediation, 
and infrastructure for what became the Pepsi Center (Renew Denver, n.d.). This made TIF a 22% 
contributor to total capital costs for the facility and 90% of public costs. The Pepsi Center TIF 
zone also includes the neighboring Elitch Gardens amusement park. 
While strong development has occurred in the LODO district beginning east of Cherry 
Creek (approximately 300 meters from the arena) and extending to Coors Field, and much to the 
south is occupied by two university campuses, little development has occurred in the immediate 
vicinity of the Pepsi Center. Besides a Marriott branded hotel between the arena and the 
University of Colorado Denver, and a few dining or bar options, the arena is surrounded by 
surface parking for the arena and amusement park. Although historically the area has been 
limited in development by virtue of being on a flood plain, the nearby university uses are at the 
same grade as the arena.  
Considering the proximity to a booming downtown and its own light rail station, the lack 
of construction activity is surprising and indicative that proximity to the arena has not been a 
primary development driver. However a major 2018 rezoning of the lands to the north of the 
Pepsi Center beside Elitch Gardens may allow for the transformation of the area into a mixed-use 
master-planned development (Gruenauer, 2018b). The amusement park owners’ “The River 
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Mile” project proposes over twelve buildings, including four ranging between 46 and 59 stories 
(Gruenauer, 2018a). Over the 25 year plan, the mixed-use community would expand from the 
parking lots separating Elitch Gardens and the Pepsi Center into the amusement park itself.  
 
Detroit – Little Caesars Arena 
Little Caesars Arena is detailed in the Detroit case study. 
 
Indianapolis – Bankers Life Fieldhouse 
$17.1 million in TIF funding was provided to subsidize the construction of a 28 story 
mixed-use complex on the site of the former Market Square Arena, demolished in 2001 
(Mandzy, 2018). The $120 million project included 292 residential units and a Whole Foods 
Market. Although formal redevelopment efforts of the Market Square site began in 2002, over a 
decade elapsed before the project went forward (2018). While Indianapolis’ downtown 
consolidated TIF area has been deemed a “slush fund” by critics on council due to the ability of 
cash funded projects to be approved by a majority mayoral appointed commission, the Market 
Square TIF project required council approval as bonds were issued (McLaughlin, 2015). 
While TIF has been used in the immediate vicinity of the current arena and to help 
redevelop the previous arena site, it was not directly used in constructing Bankers Life 
Fieldhouse, the successor arena. Three years after TIF bonds were approved for Market Square 
redevelopment, an issue of $17.6 million in TIF backed bonds was approved for a 316 room 
hotel project on a surface parking lot across from the new arena (Olson, 2017). However this lot 
was not within the larger downtown TIF district and instead became a site specific TIF district. 
This TIF project is also notable for shifting the risk of incremental underperformance to the 
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developer – should incremental gains not cover debt service, then the developer is responsible 
for the difference (2017).  
The most significant development around the arena has been seen to its southeast, with 
the major multi-block mixed-use CityWay project emerging across the rail tracks from the arena. 
The two-phase CityWay includes over 600 apartments, 60,000 square feet of retail space, a 
YMCA, and a 200 room hotel. CityWay has also received $15 million in TIF funding for its 
$135 million second phase (Briggs, 2015), following $9 million in infrastructure funding for the 
first phase (Schneider, 2012). However CityWay is constructed next to the Eli Lilly headquarters 
on land owned by pharmaceutical giant. The Eli Lilly campus is itself separated from the arena 
by a massive shared parking deck. Thus the arena is likely of secondary influence in this 
successful mixed-use development.   
 
Los Angeles – Staples Center 
$12 million in TIF funding was provided by Los Angeles’ Community Redevelopment 
Agency (Rosentraub, 2014). The city issued a further $38 million in bonds, which were partially 
paid off by incremental parking taxes (with the other source being admissions fees) (Parlow, 
2002). The LA Live ancillary development opened in three phases, with construction 
commencing in 2005, six years after the Staples Center opened (Knapp, 2008). The complex 
includes a performing arts theatre, ESPN studios, a restaurant and bar area, the Grammy 
Museum, a multiplex theatre, and a 54 story hotel and condominium tower. Further hotel 
expansions have been ongoing since 2015. As with the Staples Center, LA Live is owned by 
sports and entertainment giant AEG.  
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While before the Staples Center the area was home to the Los Angeles Convention 
Center, the neighborhood was blighted, with ample surface parking lots, vacant retail fronts, and 
less than fully occupied low-end apartment buildings (Parlow, 2002). Although development was 
slow until the construction of LA Live, recent years have seen a flood of dense mixed-use 
projects rising in a two block radius from the Staples Center on lands not owned by AEG.  
 
Memphis – FedEx Forum 
There was no direct TIF contribution to the FedEx Forum. The arena is within the 
downtown Tourism Development Zone (TDZ), which acts as a TIF district diverting incremental 
state and county sales taxes for tourism related projects within the zone (Corbet, 2018). Unlike 
many TIF districts, the baseline for a TDZ is adjusted based upon the percentage of general sales 
tax growth in the market, in this respect making for a version of TIF less predatory to general 
revenues (2018). 
TDZ funding was integral in facilitating the conversion of the previous arena, the 
Memphis Pyramid, into a Bass Pro Shop and hotel. Bass Pro Shop, and its subsidiary Cabela’s, 
dominate the outdoor destination retail market, and have been the frequent recipients of local 
economic development subsidies across the US (Capps, 2014). The City of Memphis issued 
$197 million in TDZ backed bonds for the Pyramid conversion project and to acquire Shelby 
County’s interest in the nearby convention center (Memphis Center City Revenue Finance 
Corporation, 2011). The intent was that sales taxes created by Bass Pro (which would be by 
definition incremental) would pay off the substantial proportion of the debt, accompanied by 
lease payments from Bass Pro intended for maintenance and improvements (2011; Arnold, 
2015). 
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As a much greater proportion of TDZ sales taxes come from the state (7%) than the 
county (2.25%) (Corbet, 2018), the TDZ operates as a mechanism to capture revenues that would 
otherwise be spent at the state level. The county sales tax capture also ensures that county taxes 
are retained within Memphis, although with the City accounting for roughly two-thirds of 
County population, this is a less glaring instance of overlaying capture. Projections expected 
Bass Pro to create between $8.1 million and $10.4 million per year between 2014 and 2031 
(RKG Associates, 2011). Future phases of TDZ spending envision the transformation of the 
blocks outside of the Bass Pro Pyramid into the mixed-use Pinch District that would connect 
with the St. Jude’s campus. As it stands however, there is little development beyond the Bass Pro 
Pyramid.  
 
Milwaukee – Fiserv Forum  
The City of Milwaukee is contributing $47 million to the $524 million Fiserv Forum, 
opened for the 2018 season. The City’s direct funding comes entirely from two TIF districts, 
although the City has also provided land to the Bucks ownership (Greenberg and Shaw, 2011). 
The first TIF district includes 45 acres of land assembled by or for the Bucks ownership (25 
acres of which has been transferred from the city, county, or state), which is intended to be the 
site of a master-planned mixed-use development. This first district will pay for a $12 million 
public plaza adjacent to the arena (2011). The second is an expansion of a TIF district in 
existence since 1993 (City of Milwaukee, 2015), and will allocate $27 million to a new parking 
structure beside the arena (Greenberg and Shaw, 2011). The Bucks ownership will be reimbursed 
for $8 million they have provided up front after the City has collected sufficient increment to 
cover the plaza costs (2011).  
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Although the Bucks will be reimbursed from an existing TIF district’s increment – which 
is likely predatory from a but-for perspective in that the increment in that district would have 
been created in any event – the provision for this reimbursement to come after sufficient 
increment is created in the other district to pay the City’s plaza costs is a protection of sorts. As 
the plaza increment is directly reliant upon the Bucks’ real estate interests generating new 
increment, effectively at least a certain component of the Bucks’ proposed developments will 
have to move forward for the Bucks to be reimbursed for their garage contributions.  
While the City has seemingly gotten off light relative to many other municipally funded 
arena projects in the country, the parking garage investment is accompanied by the requirement 
to demolish an existing and fully functional parking garage attached to the Bradley Center (the 
previous arena) across the street from the new Fiserv Forum (2011). Seemingly the only reason 
for the demolition, replacement and relocation of the parking garages is to better facilitate the 
Bucks’ real estate masterplan. For a construction component that does not seem inherently 
critical to the facility’s success and the team’s continued presence in Milwaukee, it possesses a 
tough opportunity cost for a city that has many competing fiscal needs.  
Still, if realized, the Bucks’ planned mixed-use development will transform a downtown 
adjacent area that failed to make a significant transition in the lifetime of the previous arena, 
despite being within two blocks of a performing arts theater, the convention center, a separate 
12,000 capacity college basketball arena, and major civic buildings. As of 2018, construction 
was underway on an entertainment block and a 90 unit apartment building, with more significant 
phases to follow the demolition of the Bradley Center (Hess, 2018). 
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Salt Lake City – Vivant Smart Home Arena 
Salt Lake City’s Redevelopment Agency provided a commitment of $22.7 million in TIF 
reimbursement for the $122 million renovation of the Vivant Smart Home Arena completed in 
2017 (Lee, 2016). TIF accounted for the entirety of the public subsidy in this renovation. As 
unlike many facilities the arena is not exempt from property taxes, TIF effectively acts as a 
property tax reimbursement scheme over an agreement lasting until 2040 (2016).  
The total renovation cost is less than other similar renovations in lieu of a new facility 
such as Minneapolis. While the TIF district is not premised on new development outside of the 
facility and thus can be seen as not creating revenue that would not have otherwise been created 
as quickly, if compared to the alternative of an arena with no NBA tenant, then the relatively 
small TIF subsidy may be viewed in a more favorable light. At the same time, a subsidy to a 
family ownership group with a very strong connection to that particular community, and thus 
unlikely to leave, makes even a relatively small subsidy probably an unnecessary one. Thus, the 
TIF use here can be seen as more of a risk mitigation tactic with the intent of maintaining the 
relationship and protecting against unforeseen future changes. 
Although there is nothing to indicate that the TIF reimbursement was intended to spur 
further ancillary development, the arena block is neighbored by a Hyatt branded hotel on one 
side and a large mixed-use multi-block lifestyle center on another. The multiphase lifestyle 
center, The Gateway, first opened in 2001, months prior to the Salt Lake Olympics. The other 
two blocks bordering the arena contain office spaces and the downtown campus of Brigham 
Young University, with the remaining block dominated by the Salt Lake Palace Convention 
Center.   
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Washington DC – Capital One Arena 
The 2007 Capital One Arena renovation was publicly financed through $50 million in 
TIF loans backed by the incremental proceeds of a sales tax on tickets and merchandise at the 
arena (Downtown DC, 2014). This renovation came only ten years after the arena’s opening, 
although the initial construction was overwhelmingly privately financed (Long, 2013).  
In 2002, $73 million in TIF was allocated to the Gallery Place mixed-use development to 
the arena’s immediate north on the same block (District of Columbia, 2012). The Gallery Place 
project includes retail, entertainment, office space, and apartments. Both the arena and Gallery 
Place have been credited with revitalizing a Chinatown neighborhood with substantial blight and 
safety problems prior to the 2000s, although considerable gentrification has occurred in the 
process (Hackman, 2017).  
Multiple aspects of these downtown DC TIF projects are also worth noting more 
generally. First, the DC TIF Act, which allows for the capture of both property and sales taxes 
(Chief Financial Officer, n.d.), has a ceiling on issues of TIF bonds, which is currently $500 
million (Chief Financial Officer, 2017). This means that in theory the opportunity cost of 
alternative TIF projects must be measured against the perceived benefits of the TIF subsidized 
project. Although a cap may be raised high enough to not really matter, the downtown DC TIF 
area currently only has seven active projects, two of which are the arena and Gallery Place.  
Secondly, the raising of the ceiling in 2002 also made provision for approval of TIF 
projects outside of the scope of these limits (2017) (such as Nationals Park, or the $100 million 
in TIF bonds for The Wharf project). Finally, most of downtown DC acts as a single TIF district 
as the bond market was not at the time interested in bonds limited to increment from TIF projects 
such as Gallery Place alone (Talanker and Davis, 2012, p. 9). This means that general revenues 
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in some of the strongest portions of the District’s tax base effectively backstop TIF bond issues. 
This said, bond market skepticism of Gallery Place has been shown to be somewhat of an 
overreaction, with the development returns in excess of its debt service costs (Archer, 2012).  
 
3.3.4. National Hockey League (NHL) 
With the greatest proportion of Canadian based clubs of the five major leagues, and TIF 
being less widespread in Canada, only 24 of 31 NHL arenas would have been eligible for direct 
TIF at the time of their construction or substantial renovation. Despite a smaller eligible pool, 
nine NHL arenas have used TIF in their capital costs: Columbus, Dallas, Denver, Detroit, 
Edmonton, Los Angeles, San Jose, Washington, and Winnipeg. Although Detroit remains the 
largest TIF contribution to an NHL arena, it is followed somewhat closely by Edmonton and San 
Jose (the latter when accounting for inflation).  
There are ancillary TIF zones near 15 venues, with 14 having a strong connection to the 
arena. Where the 14 strong TIF connection facilities are concerned, five can be viewed as having 
initial development plans (Columbus, Dallas, Detroit, Edmonton, and Los Angeles), and six as 
having these plans later emerge (Chicago, Denver, San Jose, Tampa, Washington, and 
Winnipeg). Thirteen of 14 arenas with strong TIF connections are found in downtowns or 
adjacent locales, with the remaining facility being Chicago’s United Center. Twenty-one NHL 
arenas in general have downtown or adjacent sites, with three otherwise within core cities, two in 
a core city sports complex, and four in suburbs. Nineteen of 31 arenas were intended to spur 
ancillary development, with 21 eventually delivering related ancillary development. 
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Table 7. 
NHL Arena TIF Use 
City Arena Year New/Reno. Direct (D) or 
Strong (S) 
Bonds Property (P), 
Sales (S) 
Taxes 
Chicago United 
Center 
1994 New S Y P 
Columbus Nationwide 
Arena 
2000 New D Y P 
Dallas American 
Airlines 
Center 
2001 New D N P 
Denver Pepsi Center 1999 New D Y P 
Detroit Little Caesars 
Arena 
2017 New D Y P 
Edmonton Rogers Place 2016 New D Y P 
Los Angeles Staples 
Center 
1999 New D Y P 
Nashville Bridgestone 
Arena 
1997 New S Y P 
San Jose SAP Center 1993 New D Y P 
St. Louis Enterprise 
Center 
2017 Reno. D Y P, S 
St. Paul Xcel Energy 
Center 
2000 New S Y P, S 
Tampa Bay Amalie 
Arena 
1996 New S N P 
Washington Capital One 
Arena 
2007 Reno. D Y  S  
Winnipeg Bell MTS 
Place 
2004 New D  Y P 
 
Table 8. 
NHL Arena TIF and Development Use 
 
City Arena Ancillary 
TIF 
Strong TIF 
Connection 
Intent to 
Spur Dev. 
Master 
Planned 
Original 
Intent 
Master 
Planned 
or Block 
Sized 
Dev. 
Later 
Location Pop.  
(2018) 
(‘000) 
Anaheim Honda 
Center 
N N N N Y 4 352 
Boston TD Garden N N Y N Y 1 694 
Buffalo KeyBank 
Arena 
N N Y N Y 1 256 
Calgary Scotiabank 
Saddledome 
N N N N N 1 1,267 
Chicago United 
Center 
Y Y Y N Y 2 2,705 
Columbus Nationwide 
Arena 
Y Y Y Y - 1 892 
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Dallas American 
Airlines 
Arena 
Y Y Y Y Y 1 1,345 
Denver Pepsi 
Center 
Y Y Y N N 1 704 
Detroit Little 
Caesars 
Arena 
Y Y Y Y - 1 672 
Edmonton Rogers 
Place 
Y Y Y Y - 1 932 
Glendale, 
AZ 
Gila River 
Arena 
N N Y Y - 4 250 
Los 
Angeles 
Staples 
Center 
Y Y Y Y - 1 3,990 
Montreal Bell Centre N N N N Y 1 1,704 
Nashville Bridgestone 
Arena 
Y Y Y N Y 1 669 
New York Barclays 
Center 
N N Y Y - 2 8,398 
New York Madison 
Square 
Garden 
N N N N N 1 8,398 
Newark Prudential 
Center 
N N Y N N 1 282 
Ottawa 
(Kanata) 
Canadian 
Tire Center 
N N Y N N 4 90 
Paradise, 
NV 
T-Mobile 
Arena 
N N N N N 2 233 
Philadelphia Wells Fargo 
Center 
N N N N Y 3 1,584 
Pittsburgh PPG Arena N  N Y Y - 1 302 
Raleigh PNC Arena N N N N N 3 471 
San Jose SAP Center Y Y N N Y 1 1,030 
St. Louis Enterprise 
Center 
Y Y N N N 1 303 
St. Paul Xcel 
Energy 
Center 
Y Y Y N N 1 307 
Sunrise, FL BB&T 
Center 
N N N N N 4 95 
Tampa Bay Amalie 
Arena 
Y Y Y N Y 1 392 
Toronto Scotiabank 
Arena 
N N N N Y 1 2,930 
Vancouver Rogers 
Arena 
N N N N Y 1 631 
Washington Capital One 
Arena 
Y Y Y Y - 1 702 
Winnipeg Bell MTS 
Place 
Y Y Y N Y 1 727 
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Columbus – Nationwide Arena 
$16.6 million in TIF bonds were issued for infrastructure improvements in the Columbus 
Arena District (Urban Land Institute, 2015). In addition to the otherwise privately financed 
Nationwide Arena and a minor league baseball stadium, the 75 acre district includes a 300,000 
square foot retail and entertainment district, over 1.1 million square feet of office space, and 
roughly 800 residential units, totaling almost $1 billion in investment by 2014 (Fontaine, 2014; 
Urban Land Institute, 2015). The Arena District sits on the site of the former Ohio Penitentiary, 
which remained a source of blight for almost 15 years after its closure until the arena opening.  
While the Arena District has been successful in spurring a visual and vibrancy 
transformation in the area, there are still at least two full city blocks that remain surface lots, and 
much of a mega-block across the street from the arena that is still occupied by a power 
substation. Still, development continues, accentuated by plans for a 35 story residential, office, 
and retail tower 150 meters north of the arena (Warren, 2017).  
However, both the Blue Jackets and the Nationwide Arena itself have struggled as 
business propositions. Namely, the presence of an arena of comparable size, age, and quality four 
kilometers away on the Ohio State University Campus has undercut Nationwide Arena’s ability 
to draw non-hockey events (Rosentraub, 2014). This issue has been compounded by the 
domination of the relatively modestly sized Columbus market by OSU athletics (2014).  
Though its success has been undermined by the 2012 public bailout of the arena based 
upon poor team and event performance (Fontaine, 2014), Columbus in some ways represents a 
TIF success story. In terms of return on investment relative to the initial subsidy cost in a small 
market, similar private construction investments have been seen in a comparable timeframe to 
 143 
 
Dallas’ Victory Park, a project that received significantly greater TIF and non-TIF subsidies if 
the 2012 bailout deal is bracketed from consideration. 
 
Edmonton – Rogers Place 
Rogers Place and the Edmonton Ice District project is the largest use of TIF in Canadian 
history to date. Rogers Place received C$145 million in direct TIF out of a C$484 million arena 
cost, making TIF the largest single source of public or private funding for the arena (City of 
Edmonton, n.d.). The City set out that a further C$90 million in TIF was provided for pedestrian 
and transit connections, including an enclosed “Winter Garden” bridge, a practice arena, and to 
pay for land acquisition costs. For these ancillary expenses TIF accounted for C$85 million of 
the cost.  
This deal was framed by the City as stemming from a public consultation where four 
objectives were identified:  
1. Protection of the City’s interests 
2. Does not increase current municipal property taxes 
3. Sustains the NHL in Edmonton 
4. Provides public infrastructure as a catalyst for downtown revitalization (City of 
Edmonton, n.d.). 
With the second and fourth objectives, TIF would seem especially appropriate to avoid direct 
increases of property taxes as well as providing public infrastructure.  
In Alberta, TIF is operationalized through the Community Revitalization Levy (CRL). 
This “made in Alberta” take on TIF limits the project duration to 20 years from the enactment of 
a CRL bylaw and allows for the redirection of both municipal and provincial shares of property 
 144 
 
taxes (Sroka, 2016). Unlike many American TIF laws however, Alberta’s is silent on criteria for 
which a CRL can apply, in particular the common blight or but-for tests. The Alberta version is 
also notable for the degree of provincial control maintained – the minister must approve the TIF 
plan and the province must pass the plan into regulation (2016).  
Rogers Place is intended to anchor the ICE District, mixed-use development on 25 acres 
of largely blighted land in a formerly troubled area north of downtown Edmonton and located 
within the Capital City Downtown CRL district (City of Edmonton, 2017). Centered on a public 
plaza, the development also includes a relocated casino, a JW Marriott, condominiums, and two 
office buildings, including the tallest building in Canada outside Toronto. Although there was no 
contractual requirement in the arena funding agreement to complete the ancillary real estate 
development, the project is well on its way to fulfilling its C$2.4 billion vision and generating 
the increment necessary to fund the major TIF contributions.  
Representing an assessed value and visual transformation, the project has been somewhat 
marred by the major commercial office space component being predatory on existing stock in a 
market with significant vacancy rates (NAI Commercial, 2019). More generally, the project is 
extremely ambitious for a metro area with a population of 1.3 million. Yet with a nickname like 
“Deadmonton,” the side-effects of visibly successful ambition may be welcome. Further, that 
ancillary construction has substantially materialized despite the risk of no construction largely 
laying with the public, should be viewed as a potential disaster avoided.  
However the Edmonton case has been best covered in book form by Scherer et al. (2019), 
detailing the dealmaking and development process in the broader context of urban politics. 
Fitting in with much of the literature about local growth coalitions and urban growth machines, 
their conclusions are mostly cautionary – primarily that the deal created a troubling precedent for 
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public finance in other locales. Perhaps the first instance of this difficult precedent has already 
been seen a few hours south in Calgary through similar dealmaking processes for a new arena 
development. 
 
Nashville – Bridgestone Arena 
$25 million in TIF bonds were provided to the Fifth + Broadway mixed-use development 
by the Metro Nashville government (Butler, 2018). Occupying most of the block across 
Broadway (the city’s main entertainment street) from the arena, this site was formerly the 
Nashville Convention Center. The transformation will entail an office tower, retail space, over 
380 residential units, and a museum (Nashville Post, 2019).  
Questions have been raised as to the necessity of TIF for a site deemed by a major local 
newspaper as “the city’s most prime commercial real estate” (Butler, 2018). In a strong economy 
with similarly strong demand for downtown development, it seems a valid question as to whether 
a substantially similar outcome could have been had absent TIF. Instead of but-for or blight, the 
subsidy may have been more the cost of securing the Metro government’s preferred project and 
developer, with TIF viewed as being directly tied to outcome delivery. 
 
Pittsburgh – PPG Paints Arena 
The team controlled redevelopment of the 28 acre former Civic Arena site adjacent to 
PPG Paints Arena, was intended to be subsidized by $22 million to $50 million in TIF over 20 
years, stemming from a 2014 option agreement with the city (Belko, 2014; Sports & Exhibition 
Authority of Pittsburgh and Allegheny County, 2019). However the city wanted to capture 
excess increment and transfer the proceeds to neighboring areas, and (assumedly) did not want to 
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place these areas into the TIF district (Allegheny Institute, 2015). Under Pennsylvania TIF law, 
any remaining funds would have to be redistributed to participating taxing jurisdictions, 
foreclosing the possibility of such a scheme (2015). To get around this obstacle, the parties chose 
to instead use an abatement and tax credit scheme under another local economic development 
law that would compel payments from properties within the 28 acre redevelopment zone to a 
fund redirected to the adjacent areas (2015). The PILOT-like “LERTA” scheme will capture 
increased property taxes, operating in effect much like a TIF project, even if the inventory 
section does not code this use as a strong TIF connection (Urban Redevelopment Authority of 
Pittsburgh, 2019). 
These plans were intended to rectify the planning mistakes made in previous generations 
of urban renewal, whereby roughly 1,300 buildings were demolished to make way for a plan 
anchored by the Civic Arena (Belko, 2014). The Penguins proposed phasing of more than 1,000 
residential units, as well as over 750,000 square feet of commercial retail and office space (Belko 
and Grant, 2017). While a new US Steel headquarters was intended to be part of the site, the 
company withdrew, leaving the team looking for a new primary tenant (2017). 
The Penguins’ option over the Lower Hill site was amended and extended until 2015 
under a 2018 agreement (Sports & Exhibition Authority of Pittsburgh and Allegheny County, 
2018). The first phase of a revised mixed-use project is slated to break ground in 2020 (Belko, 
2019; Urban Redevelopment Authority of Pittsburgh, 2019). However with numerous delays and 
major revisions since the arena’s 2010 opening, construction timelines are very much a question 
mark.  
More broadly from a TIF perspective, Pittsburgh may be an instance where government 
actors were drawn to TIF as a flexible instrument to both spur geographically based 
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redevelopment in a venue adjacent area (indeed upon the site of a former arena) as well as to 
transfer incremental proceeds to other pet projects, without needing further approval or to 
directly touch general funds. When the specific state TIF statute was revealed to be ineffective in 
allowing the transfer aspect, the insufficiently permissive TIF law was passed over for another 
legal scheme that better facilitated the policy objective.  
 
San Jose – SAP Center 
TIF contributed $132 million of a $165 million total arena cost for the SAP Center across 
a river and freeway from downtown San Jose, following a successful 1988 referendum (Gross, 
1994).  These TIF funds came from the merger of 10 scattered redevelopment districts and a 
concerted strategy to bring in new jobs in those districts, then borrow against the increment and 
invest those proceeds into downtown redevelopment as the previously scattered districts included 
the downtown area (1994). Contemporaneously to the arena, major downtown development 
included a convention center, two museums, performing arts institutions, an open air shopping 
pavilion, several large hotels, and light rail (1994).  
Following the lineage of California being the first jurisdiction to see TIF, the “Shark 
Tank” may have been the first TIF use in a major professional sports facility. Here the appeal of 
TIF was seemingly that of a flexible instrument politicians could use to divert revenues while not 
directly increasing taxes or otherwise running afoul of a referendum electorate. This project also 
illustrates an aspect of the permissiveness found within the former California Redevelopment 
Law, which was repealed in 2011 in the wake of a state budget crisis. Specifically, the San Jose 
arena represents a more expansionist form of TIF whereby increment in one area is funnelled to 
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an effectively unrelated area. Diversion along these lines has been more recently seen in 
Winnipeg’s CFL stadium, Dallas, and Washington DC. 
Although the project diverted proceeds of incremental growth from around the city, real 
estate development did not follow in the arena’s immediate vicinity, with lands surrounding the 
SAP Center remaining surface parking. This absence of major ancillary development is likely to 
change in the next several years, with Google intending to acquire $350 million of land interests 
or options to the immediate north and south of the arena for its San Jose campus (Avalos, 2018). 
Central to the plan are the arena’s parking lots, the development of which the Sharks have 
opposed. While the arena may have been an element of the area’s appeal, the mixed-use urbanist 
Google Village project is focused on the Diridon train station 200 meters south (2018). 
 
St. Louis – Enterprise Center 
TIF was not originally intended to be a part of the $67.5 million in public contributions to 
the arena renovation, but emerged as part of a settlement agreement (Rivas, 2018). The Blues 
ownership sued the City of St. Louis, when the City Comptroller refused to sign the financing 
agreement for the arena’s renovation based upon the contention that the debt issue would harm 
the city’s credit rating (2018). Instead of only general fund revenues, the settlement agreement – 
following a court ruling that the Comptroller must sign the original agreement (Spedden, 2017) – 
allows the City to pay off renovation debt with “incremental city tax revenues generated from 
the…project” (Rivas, 2018). Although it is not yet clear what and to what extent, TIF revenue 
sources will cover the renovation debt, this is an instance of TIF being a flexible instrument to 
throw at a funding gap, as well as an attempt to better align expenditure and revenue sources.  
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St. Paul – Xcel Energy Center 
2008 saw the creation of the Minnesota Event TIF district, encompassing the arena, a 
convention center, a museum, and center for performing arts (Havens, 2008). Effectively an 
extension of a previous downtown TIF district, the TIF area was the second choice solution to 
pay off outstanding convention center bonds when the state rejected St. Paul’s preferred debt 
forgiveness option (2008), providing another example of TIF’s flexibility benefits. While 
something of a walkable entertainment district can be found to the southeast of the arena, 
including two blocks dominated by urbanist mixed-use buildings alongside two chain hotels, the 
remaining sides of the arena not committed to other event district uses are occupied by surface 
parking lots 18 years after the venue’s opening. 
 
Tampa Bay – Amalie Arena 
Under the banner of Strategic Property Partners (SPP), the Lightning’s owner formed a 
joint-venture with Bill Gates’ holding company, Cascade Investments (Danielson, 2017). The 
self-financed SPP aims to develop 40 acres around the arena on the Tampa waterfront with 
roughly $3 billion in construction, supported by $100 million in TIF subsidies (2017). The ten 
year masterplan represents one of the most ambitious team-controlled or related real estate 
development projects in history, with plans for 3,500 residential units, 2.4 million square feet of 
office space, over 1 million square feet of retail, and two new hotels with 650 rooms (2017). The 
initial phase of activity has entailed building infrastructure and a new road grid for 16 city 
blocks, with the first buildings set to open in 2020 (2017). With most of the properties currently 
vacant or used as surface parking, the explicitly new urbanist development represents a true 
transformation for the city.  
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Winnipeg – Bell MTS Place 
While TIF did not contribute to the construction of Bell MTS Place in 2004, it did 
directly accompany the transition of the facility into an NHL arena in 2012 with the return of the 
Winnipeg Jets. $8.3 million in infrastructure and streetscape improvements were funded through 
the initial phase of the Sports, Hospitality, and Entertainment District (SHED), an 11 block TIF 
zone linking a blighted area between the arena and the Winnipeg Convention Centre (Romaniuk, 
2012). As with Alberta, TIF in Manitoba includes both municipal and provincial property taxes, 
although amounts equivalent to the school portion of property taxes must be reimbursed by the 
municipality (Government of Manitoba, 2009).  
The calculation for this first phase TIF plan was based upon the completion of a C$75 
million mixed-use hotel and commercial space project across the street from the arena 
(Romaniuk, 2012). Reliance upon taxes from a development that was already moving ahead is a 
clear instance where but-for is not present and TIF is simply diverting increment that would have 
definitely otherwise flowed to the city’s general fund. The positive to this capture tactic is that 
the city was confident that TIF debt would be sufficiently covered from the outset. Similar plans 
have been used in other Canadian TIF projects, such as the Calgary Rivers District and its 
diversion of increment from The Bow project (Sroka, 2016).  
A second phase of TIF in the amount of up to C$12 million was allocated to the $400 
million True North Square project, which includes four towers centered on a public plaza 
adjacent to the arena, and containing over 1 million square feet of residential and commercial 
space (Kives, 2018). True North Sports and Entertainment also owns the arena and the Jets, 
making this a strong instance of club-controlled real estate development. The TIF subsidy will 
come in the form of reimbursement as increment from the development is generated, which 
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again poses but-for questions. Indeed the SHED has been so successful in creating increment, 
that the city removed three residential developments from the SHED and into two separate TIF 
districts, one intended to spur housing starts in other downtown arenas, and another which would 
funnel funds to a convention center expansion (Kives, 2016). 
 
3.3.5. Major League Soccer (MLS) 
Of the 23 MLS stadiums in use during the 2018 season and 18 are soccer primary. Of 
these 18 stadiums, 14 would have been eligible for TIF at the time of construction or substantial 
renovation. Six stadiums have used TIF in capital costs (Commerce City, Columbus, Fresno, 
Houston, Kansas City, and Salt Lake City). Despite MLS stadiums being generally the cheapest 
venues in the major leagues, two stadiums account for some of the largest TIF contributions in 
gross and percentage terms: Dick’s Sporting Goods Park in Commerce City, and Children’s 
Mercy Park in Kansas City. No stadiums beyond the six directly TIF funded have ancillary 
strong connection TIF districts. 
Thirteen of 18 stadiums were intended to spur ancillary development, with 10 delivering 
on these plans. Four of six TIF using stadiums had ancillary development intentions, with some 
significant development plans having been seen in the vicinity of each. Only one is found in a 
downtown or adjacent location (Houston), with one otherwise within a core city (Columbus) and 
the remaining four in suburbs. Generally, MLS stadiums are less likely to be found in downtown 
locations, with only six meeting the criteria. Another five are within core cities outside of 
downtowns, and the remaining seven are in suburbs. The lower costs of MLS stadiums relative 
to other major leagues perhaps creates a larger range of municipalities within a metro area with 
the fiscal capacity to compete for hosting the facility.  
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Table 9. 
MLS Stadium TIF Use 
City Stadium Year New/Reno. Direct (D) or 
Strong (S) 
Bonds Property (P), 
Sales (S) 
Taxes 
Columbus Mapfre 
Stadium 
1999 New D N P 
Commerce 
City, CO 
Dick’s 
Sporting 
Goods Park 
2007 New D Y P 
Frisco, TX Toyota 
Stadium 
2004 New D Y P 
Houston BBVA 
Compass 
Stadium 
2012 New D N P 
Kansas City, 
KS 
Children’s 
Mercy Park 
2011 New D Y S 
Sandy, UT Rio Tinto 
Stadium 
2008 New D  Y  P 
 
Table 10. 
MLS Stadium TIF and Development Use 
 
City Stadium Ancillary 
TIF 
Strong TIF 
Connection 
Intent 
to Spur 
Dev. 
Master 
Planned 
Original 
Intent 
Master 
Planned or 
Block 
Sized 
Dev. Later 
Location Pop. 
(2018) 
(‘000) 
Bridgeview, 
IL 
SeatGeek 
Stadium 
N N Y N N 4 16 
Carson, CA StubHub 
Center 
N N N N N 4 91 
Chester, PA Talen 
Energy 
Stadium 
N N Y Y - 4 33 
Columbus Mapfre 
Stadium 
Y Y N N N 2 892 
Commerce 
City, CO 
Dick’s 
Sporting 
Goods Park 
Y Y Y Y - 4 58 
Frisco, TX Toyota 
Stadium 
Y Y Y Y - 4 188 
Harrison, NJ Red Bull 
Arena 
N N Y Y - 2 17 
Houston BBVA 
Compass 
Stadium 
Y Y Y N Y 1 2,325 
Kansas City, 
KS 
Children’s 
Mercy Park 
Y Y Y Y - 4 152 
Los Angeles Bank of 
California 
Stadium 
N N Y N N 2 3,990 
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Montreal Stade 
Saputo 
N N N N N 2 1,704 
Orlando Exploria 
Stadium 
Y N Y N N 1 285 
Portland Providence 
Park 
N N Y N Y 1 653 
Sandy, UT Rio Tinto 
Stadium 
Y Y N N N 4 96 
San Jose Avaya 
Stadium 
N N Y Y - 2 1,030 
Toronto BMO Field N N N N N 1 2,930 
Vancouver BC Place N N Y N Y 1 631 
Washington Audi Field Y N  Y  Y  - 1 702 
 
 
Columbus – Mapfre Stadium 
The Crewville TIF district was established to pay for up to $2.1 million in road 
improvements to provide access to and from the north of the stadium. The district does not 
actually encompass the stadium, instead generating increment from a retail area that includes a 
Lowe’s and Aldi (City of Columbus, 2012). Besides this retail area, there has been no 
development in the vicinity of the stadium, with the area dominated by surface parking lots 
shared with the Ohio State Fair.  
The TIF district gained some prominence as an issue in the Ohio Attorney General’s 
lawsuit against the Crew’s ownership and their attempt to move the team to Austin. After the 
departure of the Cleveland Browns, the state passed legislation whereby teams using tax dollars 
for their facilities are prohibited from leaving without first providing local groups an opportunity 
to purchase the team. The TIF district spending was cited by the Attorney General as one such 
instance of assistance making the statute applicable (Reding, 2018). 
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Commerce City – Dick’s Sporting Goods Park 
TIF accounted for $133.6 million out of $150.4 million in public funding, and a $182.5 
million of total capital costs for Dick’s Sporting Goods Park in Commerce City, a suburb 
northeast of Denver. Team owner, Stan Kroenke, is a retail real estate developer by background 
and Commerce City’s willingness to use TIF funding, was said to be a crucial reason for the 
stadium’s location in the area (Sanchez and Griffin, 2007). The stadium and an accompanying 
soccer field complex, and local government buildings, constituted the first phase of a multiphase 
mixed-use development on mostly bare-land. Dubbed as Victory Crossing, the masterplan calls 
for over 1 million square feet of offices, retail, and hotel uses (Victory Crossing, 2015).  
With some of the deepest pockets in MLS, it is unlikely that access to capital will play a 
limiting role in Kroenke – married to a Wal-Mart heiress and also owner of Arsenal, the LA 
Rams, the Colorado Avalanche, and Denver Nuggets – from realizing his Commerce City 
ambitions. In some ways Victory Crossing is an earlier version of the Rams Inglewood 
development. 
 
Frisco, TX – Toyota Stadium  
TIF accounted for the entirety of the direct public contribution to Toyota Stadium and 
50% of the $110 million total capital cost (Convention Sports & Leisure International, 2014). 
Three separate taxing jurisdictions contributed TIF backed bonds: the City of Frisco ($20 
million), Collin County ($20 million), and the Frisco Independent School District ($15 million) 
(2014).  
While little existed around Toyota Park after its 2005 opening besides a soccer field 
complex to its north, the stadium was aligned to be the north end of a boulevard leading to a new 
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town center dubbed Frisco Square, 250 meters south. In additional to local government 
buildings, the 147 acre development is intended to include several million square feet of master-
planned urbanist commercial and residential developments (Frisco Square, 2015). Early phases 
have filled in main arteries with four story mixed-used buildings, many with street level retail, 
though over 20 acres still remain to be developed (Slade, 2013).  
Ambitious by TIF in sports standards, Toyota Stadium is placed in further context as 
actually being the second of three distinct TIF funded sports complexes in Frisco, a suburb of 
175,000 north of Dallas. The first centered on a minor league baseball stadium and hockey arena, 
surrounded on a grid by mixed-use apartment complexes and an Embassy Suites. Across from 
the sports complex is a large traditional suburban shopping mall and IKEA.  
The third complex, The Star, is the Dallas Cowboys headquarters and practice facility 
and 12,000 seat indoor stadium. While there are plans for development on 91 acres (Frisco 
Texas, 2019) the initial stages have seen an Omni Hotel and several blocks of mixed-use lifestyle 
center built on a grid pattern, as well as an office building. An apartment complex will soon be 
under construction. 
Also worth noting is the high degree of school district participation. Although many 
school districts recoil at having their increment share captured by overlaying jurisdictions, the 
local district is an explicit proponent of TIF participation in sports venues, citing the potential for 
transformative growth that will improve their longer term bottom line as well as use of stadiums 
for high school football (Frisco Independent School District, 2018). 
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Houston – BBVA Compass Stadium 
The City and Harris County contributed $20 million in TIF bonds. This represented 
approximately half of the $40.6 million in public funding for the $101 million project. The 
stadium site fell into a pre-existing Houston TIF zone (City of Houston, 2017) in an area two 
blocks east of the convention center and four blocks from Minute Maid Park, on the other side of 
I-69. The stadium commitment representing roughly 20% of the total capital budget for the TIRZ 
as of 2017 (2017). As recently the early 2000s, the area was significantly blighted. Recent years 
have seen strong residential infill and corresponding increment generation, largely in the form of 
upscale row-homes and condominiums of up to five stories. Most of the blocks immediately to 
the north and south of the stadium have been built upon in recent years, with surface parking 
remaining on the east and west sides, with the east side surface lot shared with Minute Maid 
Park. Development of condominiums to the north preceded the stadium, while development to 
the south has followed stadium construction. 
Although the team and stadium project was underseen and initially operated by AEG, a 
company that has been quite active in developing entertainment districts such as LA Live around 
its venues, there was no such club controlled real estate development masterplan here. In fact, in 
2015 AEG, an owner of multiple MLS clubs, sold its interests in the stadium and Dynamo. 
 
Kansas City, KS – Children’s Mercy Park/Sporting Park  
The entire $147 million public contribution to the $167.5 million capital cost for Sporting 
Park came in the form of Sales Tax Revenue Bonds (STAR) Bonds. These municipally issued 
bonds combine increment from state and local sales taxes, as well as hotel occupancy taxes, 
within a defined major commercial, tourism, or entertainment area (Kansas Department of 
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Commerce, 2019). In the instance of Sporting Park, the low density STAR district was already 
anchored by the Kansas Speedway, Great Wolf Lodge, an outlet mall, Cabela’s, and an 
independent league baseball stadium, meaning that there was plenty of increment being 
generated by the stadium’s opening in 2011. Team ownership specifically cited the existing 
availability of the STAR bond mechanism as the reason for the stadium’s location on the Kansas 
side of Kansas City (Rishe, 2012), which effectively serves as a suburb of Kansas City, Missouri. 
 
Sandy – Rio Tinto Stadium 
Of the $35 million in public contributions to the $110 million Rio Tinto Stadium project, 
$10 million in TIF backed bonds came from the Redevelopment Agency of Sandy (Convention 
Sports & Leisure International, 2014). Although Real Salt Lake is owned by the founder of a 
prominent Utah property management firm, team related parties do not control stadium adjacent 
lands. Besides a multiplex movie theatre across the street and a convention center to the 
southeast, the stadium is neighbored by residential subdivisions and light commercial and 
industrial uses.  
Property taxes from a 28 acre TIF area (the 9400 South Community Development Area) 
around the stadium were intended to be sufficient to repay the TIF bonds. However increment 
generation has proven insufficient and the Redevelopment Agency has had to redirect increment 
from other TIF areas to service debt obligations (Lewis Young Robertson & Burningham, 2015, 
58). The primary source of this shortfall was a successful property tax appeal by Real Salt Lake 
to Salt Lake County, which saw the club’s property assessment and tax bill decline almost half 
from 2011 to 2017 (McKellar, 2017). Thus despite knowing at the time of the stadium deal that 
much of the city’s contribution was reliant on a certain assessed value of the stadium and 
 158 
 
property taxes based on that assessed value, several years after the stadium opened, the team did 
an end-around the city and appealed for a significantly reduced assessment that would undermine 
debt service on stadium bonds. This is a similar gambit to the 49ers in Santa Clara. 
 
3.4. COMPARING LEAGUES AND 125 VENUES 
Of the 125 non-temporary major league venues in 2018, 107 were located in jurisdictions 
where TIF could have been used in their direct costs at the time of construction or substantial 
renovation. Of these 107 eligible facilities, 22 have seen TIF contributions to direct capital costs, 
while a further 17 have TIF uses deemed as having a strong relation to the facility. These 39 
venues with a strong TIF relation represent almost a third (31%) of stadiums and arenas in the 
five major North American leagues and 36% of venues where TIF use was possible. Incidences 
of direct TIF contributions are most often found in arenas and soccer-specific MLS stadiums. 
Non-direct but strong TIF connections are seen on a roughly equal basis in all leagues except 
MLS. The total direct TIF expenditure was $1.817 billion and the average direct TIF spend was 
$82.9 million, both in 2017 dollars. Where TIF was directly used, it accounted for an average of 
60.3% of public capital costs, and 24.4% of total capital costs. 
 
3.4.1. TIF Over Time 
When considering the dates of construction or substantial renovation completion for the 
125 major league facilities more generally, there is a roughly one third each split between the pre 
2000 (43), 2000 through 2009 (41), and 2010 to 2018 periods (41). Starting with venues with no 
direct TIF funding but an otherwise strong connection to a facility, the distribution is exclusively 
concentrated in the latter two periods, with eight coming between 2000 and 2009, and six since 
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2010. Although some TIF districts in this category have been in existence since well before 2000 
(such as the downtown area encompassing Tampa’s arena), their venue connection has only 
developed later (in Tampa, with a major redevelopment partnership connected to the Lightning’s 
ownership emerging).  
Direct TIF use however, is definitely more back loaded with the same three periods 
respectively accounting for four, 11, and seven venues. Direct TIF contributions over these three 
periods average $74.5 million, $65.1 million, and $114.7 million. While the basic grouping of 
venues by decade shows that TIF use has indeed become more common since 2000, the average 
amounts are warped by significant variance between different projects – some facilities have 
used hundreds of millions in TIF as the entirety of public funding, while others have only seen 
relatively minor TIF contributions.  
Table 11. 
Venues With Direct TIF Contributions 
Venue City Year New or 
Reno. 
League TIF 
$m  
TIF 
$m 
(2017) 
TIF/Total 
Capital 
Cost (%) 
TIF/Public 
Capital 
Cost (%) 
American 
Airlines 
Center 
Dallas 2001 New NBA/NHL 24 33 5 14 
AT&T Park San 
Francisco 
2000 New MLB 15 21 4 28 
BBVA 
Compass 
Stadium 
Houston 2012 New MLS 20 21 20 49 
Bell MTS 
Place 
Winnipeg 2004 New NHL 6 8 6 16 
Capital One 
Arena 
Washington  2007 Reno. NBA/NHL 50 60 14 57 
Children’s 
Mercy Park 
Kansas City, 
KS 
2011 New MLS 147 162 75 93 
Comerica 
Park 
Detroit 2000 New MLB 40 57 10 23 
Dick’s 
Sporting 
Goods Park 
Commerce 
City, CO 
2007 New MLS 134 160 73 89 
Fiserv Forum Milwaukee 2018 New NBA 47 47 9 19 
Ford Field Detroit 2002 New NFL 70 96 14 56 
Levi’s 
Stadium 
Santa Clara, 
CA 
2014 New NFL 40 41 3 37 
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Little 
Caesars 
Arena 
Detroit 2017 New NBA/NHL 324 324 37 100 
Mapfre 
Stadium 
Columbus 1999 New MLS 2 3 5 100 
Nationwide 
Arena 
Columbus 2000 New NHL 17 24 9 100 
Pepsi Center Denver 1999 New NBA/NHL 36 54 22 90 
Petco Park San Diego 2004 New MLB 133 174 29 44 
Rio Tinto 
Stadium 
Sandy, UT 2008 New MLS 10 11 9 18 
Rogers Place Edmonton 2016 New NHL 180 185 39 77 
SAP Center San Jose 1993 New NHL 132 224 82 100 
Staples 
Center 
Los Angeles 1999 New NBA/NHL 12 17 4 17 
Toyota 
Stadium 
Frisco, TX 2004 New MLS 55 72 50 100 
Vivant Smart 
Home Arena 
Salt Lake 2017 Reno. NBA 23 23 18 100 
Total - - - - 1,517 
(avg. 
69.0) 
1,817 
(avg. 
82.6) 
24.4 60.3 
 Note: The Enterprise Center in St. Louis is not included as specific TIF amounts are unclear as of 
writing. 
 
3.4.2. Substantial TIF Contributions 
The grouping of venues by construction timeframe reveals coding facilities by the 
substance of their TIF contributions may also have some value to understanding facility TIF use. 
Substance of TIF contribution is measured in three ways: the share of total and public 
contribution, as well as the gross amount of TIF funding. For total contribution, substantial was 
defined at 20%, while 30% was used for public contribution, and $50 million was the threshold 
for gross TIF funding. All three are intended to represent an element of a larger proxy for 
“substantial” TIF commitment, where TIF by no means has to be the primary source of funding, 
but where the absence of TIF would create a significant financial gap. 
With total cost share there are nine venues that have a least 20% of their capital costs 
covered by TIF. Four of these are soccer specific MLS stadiums (Colorado, Dallas, Houston, and 
Kansas City), and with the exception of Houston, these stadiums actually use TIF for at least half 
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of their total capital costs. These three stadiums are also located in suburbs. A further four arenas 
(Denver, Detroit, Edmonton, and San Jose) and one MLB stadium (San Diego) meet the 20% 
threshold, with all but Denver’s Pepsi Center having TIF contributions measured in the hundreds 
of millions of dollars. 
As for public cost share, 14 venues meet the threshold of 30% TIF. The list includes 
Columbus and the same four MLS stadiums, along with seven arenas, Petco Park, and Levi’s 
Stadium. The other venues present not qualifying under the total cost category are arenas in 
Columbus, Salt Lake City, and Washington DC. This category generally captures largely 
privately financed venues or renovations that used TIF as a high proportion of a relatively low 
gross public contribution.  
Finally there are gross TIF contributions. Eleven venues have adjusted gross 2017 TIF 
contributions of at least $50 million: Detroit, San Diego (MLB); Detroit (NFL); Denver, Detroit, 
Edmonton, San Jose, and Washington DC (arenas); and Dallas, Colorado, and Kansas City 
(MLS). Here the list mostly mirrors that of total cost share. Also worth noting is Milwaukee’s 
new arena which has $47 million in TIF funding, but misses the three thresholds of substantial 
contribution. 
Eight venues, however, reach all three thresholds: San Diego (MLB); Denver, Detroit, 
Edmonton, and San Jose (arenas); and Dallas, Colorado, and Kansas City (MLS). Two (Denver, 
San Jose) are from before 2000, while three apiece are found between the 2000-2009 (San 
Diego, Dallas, and Colorado) and the 2010-2018 periods (Detroit, Edmonton, and Kansas City). 
While all the MLS stadiums on the list are found in suburbs, the remaining facilities are located 
on downtown or adjacent sites. This poses the issue for future work of whether TIF is used in 
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different ways by core cities and suburbs based upon available revenue sources, fiscal capacity, 
and team willingness to locate.  
 
3.4.3. Renovations and Redevelopments 
TIF has become a notable inclusion in several renovations and redevelopments of former 
stadia sites. On the renovation front, TIF has been a primary financial source or public 
contribution for arena renovations or capital upgrades in Salt Lake City, Washington DC, and 
Winnipeg. Likewise, TIF has been central to transforming the former Memphis Pyramid into a 
Bass Pro Shop, and Indianapolis’ Market Square Arena into mixed use developments.  
 
3.4.4. Property and Sales Taxes 
Beyond questions concerning where and in what dollar amount TIF has been used, are 
issues of which types of TIF have been utilized to what extent. The first of these is whether 
property or sales taxes (or both) were available for increment. In the broader TIF context, these 
two sources are the most significant forms in terms of usage and ability to generate revenues, and 
thus allow for a more straightforward reference to the broader TIF literature. While some 
jurisdictions permit incremental income or other taxes to be collected, these sources are generally 
insignificant revenue generators relative to property or sales taxes.  
As with TIF in general, property TIF is far more frequently used in both direct and strong 
connection venue TIF districts. Twenty direct TIF venues have used property tax increments: 
three MLB stadiums, two NFL stadiums, 10 arenas, and five MLS stadiums. A further 16 venues 
have strongly related property tax increment use, although this includes some overlap in that 
multiple neighboring facilities have strong connections (e.g., the Cincinnati stadiums). Unlike 
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with almost any other facility TIF measure, the most strong connections are found in MLB (five) 
and NFL (five) stadiums, leagues where direct TIF use is much more limited. One explanation 
may be that while it is difficult for property based TIF to make a significant dent in the often 
massive public capital costs accompanying football and baseball stadiums, TIF is more 
appropriate to try and stimulate ancillary real estate development around these facilities.  
On the other hand, sales tax increment is not frequently seen in direct capital costs, with 
only two venues using a form of sales TIF (Washington DC’s arena and the Kansas City soccer 
stadium). Indeed, even one of the two direct facility sales TIF uses (the Washington DC arena) is 
limited in scope to incremental sales taxes from merchandise and concession sales. This sales 
TIF component also came to fund a renovation a decade after the arena’s opening, at a time 
where merchandise and concession sales should have been predictable and not subject to whims 
of the broader economy and retail business movement of a more traditional sales TIF district 
(Smith, 2009). 
Sales TIF is present in a further four strong connection TIF districts: St. Louis and 
Washington DC in MLB, the Memphis Pyramid redevelopment, and the St. Paul events district. 
The St. Louis district currently operates similarly to the DC arena sales TIF use, with sales TIF 
directly reliant on club controlled restaurant and bar outlets. As noted, the Memphis Pyramid’s 
conversion into a Bass Pro Shop represents another limited sales TIF zone where revenues 
directly stemming from the project dominate the scope and risk of the sales TIF use. The DC 
Ballpark TIF Area is the only traditional open zone sales TIF area, but (as detailed earlier) sales 
TIF revenues are not actually securing any debt at this point.  
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3.4.5. Debt and Reimbursement 
Generally a TIF project will either issue public debt backed by anticipated future 
incremental proceeds, or pay-as-you-go in which increment funds improvements as it is 
generated. In the latter instance, private parties may use a reimbursement commitment to secure 
their own financing. With sports venues, public debt is most commonly issued for both direct 
capital costs, and facility related TIF projects. A total of 18 venues have seen the issue of TIF 
backed debt for capital costs, while a further 12 strong TIF connection facilities have seen debt 
issues for their TIF related projects. The 18 include all MLB and NFL stadiums with TIF 
contributions to their direct capital costs, as well as five of six MLS stadiums, and eight NHL 
arenas. Only more NBA arenas saw reimbursement based TIF contributions than debt issues. 
Indeed, direct TIF funded NBA arenas were the only stadia subset that saw significant instances 
of reimbursement based TIF, accounting for four of six instances of direct costs.  
Although there has been no comprehensive study of all TIF districts in the United States, 
the proportion of debt issues to pay-as-you-go is likely to be weighted far more in the direction 
of the latter than it is in this data set. Reasons for divergence may include the higher profile and 
higher cost nature of stadia projects, as well as the increased availability of federally tax exempt 
bonds, which allow local governments to effectively provide a higher rate of subsidy with the 
federal government bearing the cost. However further research would need to be conducted to 
move beyond speculation.  
Table 12.  
Number of Venues With TIF Characteristics by League 
League Ancillary TIF  Strong 
Ancillary TIF 
Bonds* Reimbursement* Property 
TIF* 
Sales 
TIF* 
MLB 12 8 8 0 8 2 
MLS 6 6 5 2 6 1 
NBA 18 10 6 4 9 2 
NFL 12 7 4 2 7 0 
NHL 14 14 12 2 13 3 
*Applies to venues with strong ancillary TIF connections. 
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3.4.6. Local and Sub Federal Jurisdictions 
Venue TIF use can also be seen at the jurisdictional level, with the enveloping question 
being whether there are certain local and sub federal jurisdictions (where TIF is available) where 
facility TIF use is also more common? While comparison is limited by jurisdictions having more 
or fewer teams and venues from any combination of factors, there are some trends worth noting 
from both a gross and realization of potential perspective. Starting with cities, Detroit and 
Columbus stand out as having all their professional facilities directly TIF subsidized, although 
Detroit’s TIF use is much more substantial than Columbus’ in terms of gross and share 
contributions and Columbus only has two major professional facilities (plus a minor league 
stadium using TIF). The District of Columbia is also notable for using TIF in two of three 
venues, with the arena renovation and Ballpark TIF Area. With metropolitan areas, the 
comparison issues are somewhat muted by more metro areas having clubs in at least three 
leagues than cities. Beyond Detroit, Columbus, and DC, the metro areas with the most TIF 
facility contributions or strong relations are Dallas (two direct and two strong of four facilities), 
Denver (two direct of four), and Salt Lake City (two direct of two).  
The same cast dominates the sub federal jurisdiction list, with the caveat being that 
relatively few jurisdictions have multiple major league markets. Not surprisingly, California 
leads the way with five direct TIF using facilities (out of 11 eligible), followed by Michigan 
(three of three), Texas (three of nine), Utah (two of two), Colorado (two of four), Ohio (two of 
seven), and another five jurisdictions with one facility (Alberta, Kansas, Missouri, Washington 
DC, and Wisconsin). Of these five, two used TIF on the only eligible facility in the jurisdiction 
(Alberta and Kansas). When strong connections are included, Florida (three), Tennessee (two), 
Ohio (two beyond direct contributions) are also notable, with one strong connection (or 
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additional strong connection) also found in each of Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, Washington DC, 
and Wisconsin. 
The list of jurisdictions with a significant number of venues not using direct TIF funding 
is perhaps just as interesting. Jurisdictions with at least three venues and no direct TIF use are 
Florida, New York, Illinois, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ontario, Georgia, North Carolina, 
Washington, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Tennessee, and Arizona. This list includes 10 of the 15 
largest (by population) sub federal jurisdictions in the US and Canada. While Florida and Illinois 
have strong connection TIF districts, the latter is one of the most prolific TIF users in the 
country, making the absence of direct TIF especially surprising. Conversely, Arizona does not 
have TIF, and Minnesota has a statutory bar on direct TIF contributions to professional sports 
facilities. Of the remaining jurisdictions, all of which have TIF available, Tennessee may be 
most worth mentioning with all three of its facilities having strong TIF connection. Although the 
issue of sub federal legislative impact on TIF use in major league stadia is beyond the scope of 
this work, this initial survey brings up broader questions concerning potential relationships 
between certain elements of TIF legislation and the presence or absence of facility TIF use and 
particular aspects of such uses.  
3.4.7. Population 
  Cities with different populations and fiscal capacities may have a different menu of 
revenue generating potential with various prospective subsidy tools. There is some data to 
indicate that cities with smaller populations use direct TIF in venues more frequently than larger 
cities. However, I have not demonstrated relationships of statistical significance. While average 
populations are lower in direct TIF using jurisdictions in all five leagues, the medians reveal that 
there is a skew. These averages are most often skewed by the large populations of New York 
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City, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Houston. NFL populations are also skewed by four cities with 
populations under 25,000. MLS and the NFL are the two leagues where both the average and 
median populations of direct TIF using cities is lower than those not using TIF. However, with 
only two NFL stadiums using direct TIF, the MLS data with six of 18 stadiums using TIF is 
more interesting and potentially indicative of a relationship. 
Table 13. 
City Population (‘000) (2018) and Direct TIF Use  
League Direct TIF Avg. 
Population 
Direct TIF Median 
Population 
Non-Direct TIF 
Avg. Population 
Non-Direct TIF 
Median Population 
MLS 618 170 1,006 642 
MLB 993 883 1,591 694 
NBA 1,172 702 1,665 683 
NFL 400 400 619 429 
NHL 1,059 809 1,501 471 
 
 
3.5. LIMITATIONS 
Given the baseline setting intent of this study, there are many limitations. These include 
work on associative relationships between variables and controls for non TIF influences, the 
consistency of collected data across a range of public and media sources, and the coding of many 
variables on a simple “yes or no” basis. To the extent associative relationships were evaluated, t-
tests provided results outside the range of statistical significance at a 0.05 level (although some 
tests were near this threshold). The presence of other forms of subsidy and the statutory nuance 
across sub federal jurisdictions are also largely unaccounted for. Likewise there are TIF uses in 
minor league and college venues with major league capacity that are not reviewed. 
 
3.6. IMPLICATIONS 
This chapter has documented the extent to which TIF has become a significant means of 
public finance for major league sports venues in North America, as well as a frequent presence 
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alongside redevelopment projects associated with stadiums and arenas. A primary purpose of this 
chapter is to provide a previously missing general reference resource to governments and citizens 
of jurisdictions considering facility TIF use on the scope, nature, extent, and identity of TIF 
projects related to major league sports venues. To this end, this chapter has found that over 30% 
of the 125 permanent stadiums and arenas studied in the five major leagues have a direct or 
strong TIF connection. Further, total direct TIF usage totaled over $1.8 billion in 2017 dollars. 
Where direct TIF was present, TIF averaged 24.4% of total capital costs and 60.3% of public 
capital costs. 
 Direct TIF contributions to sports facilities, as well as TIF use intended to generate real 
estate development around these venues, are most frequent and financially significant in arenas 
and soccer specific stadiums. Additionally, arena and stadium projects using TIF often 
accompany ancillary real estate development. More generally, the inventory and assessment of 
TIF use in professional sports venues offered by this chapter provide a basis for the rest of this 
dissertation as well as future research on associative relationships between TIF contributions and 
venue finance outcomes.   
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CHAPTER 4. A SURVEY AND DISCUSSION OF TIF STATUTES AND MAJOR 
LEAGUE VENUES 
 
4.1. PURPOSE 
This chapter undertakes a comparative analysis of TIF statutes in 34 American 
jurisdictions (33 states and the District of Columbia) where major league professional sports are 
present, or the capacity to host major league sports exists. While other chapters overview venue 
related TIF projects at the unit level, an analysis of individual projects with the intent of finding 
larger trends cannot be viewed in a statutory vacuum. Accordingly, this chapter aims to set a 
baseline status of TIF statutes in jurisdictions where there are, or the capacity exists for, 
professional sports teams in the five major North American leagues. After a brief discussion of 
the literature gap, as well as the methodology used in this particular study, I proceed to covering 
42 TIF statute variables across 10 categories in 34 jurisdictions. In addition to a broader 
discussion of what the presence or absence of a variable means for a TIF statute, I apply this 
analysis to the venue context. 
In particular, this chapter finds that a lowest common denominator TIF statute – where at 
least 25 jurisdictions agree upon a particular element – will allow both municipalities and 
counties to initiate TIF districts after public hearing, and allocate property tax increments to area 
wide zones and specific projects. While bonds and pay-as-you-go may be used, TIF will be 
limited to public improvements such as infrastructure, land acquisition, and site preparation. The 
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absence of sales TIF and funding of private improvements severely limits the scope of potential 
venue TIF, with the latter creating another incentive for public ownership of sports venues. 
 
4.1.1. The Existing Gap 
As noted in Chapter 2, the legal TIF sub-literature is light on broad comparison pieces 
concerning statutory mechanics and there is no work that applies a comparative survey of 
statutory mechanics to the sports venue context. Thus, this project is intended to address both 
gaps in a complementary way. The primary previous academic survey of TIF statutes was 
published by Johnson and Kriz in 2001, writing from a public administration as opposed to legal 
perspective. As the Johnson and Kriz study repeatedly cites 1997 as a date of reference, and the 
data set still included the Arizona TIF statute repealed in 1999, it is likely that the review 
underpinning their survey is at least 20 years old at writing. Indeed the two states noted as not 
having TIF at the time, Delaware and North Carolina, now do.  
While this project shares significant conceptual overlap with Johnson and Kriz (2001), it 
is not intended to be a direct update. First, seeing that this study intends to serve a larger venue 
focused TIF work, I focus on only 34 jurisdictions with the deemed capacity to host a club from 
one of the five major professional sports leagues. Second, although many of the same variables 
are collected in both studies, this study collects more and somewhat different variables. Third, 
Johnson and Kriz do not provide methodology on review and interpretation. While some 
elements can easily be reduced to a “yes or no” proposition, in many instances (and as made 
evident in the discussion of individual variable outcomes) even within a “yes or no” bifurcation, 
there is subjective nuance that goes into categorization. As I cannot replicate the initial methods 
of Johnson and Kriz, an attempt to include point in time comparison between 1997 and 2017 
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would be inherently flawed. For these primary reasons, this study focuses on the review 
described in the methods below.  
 
4.2. METHODOLOGY 
Since TIF is a financial and policy instrument exclusively operationalized through state 
and local taxes and does not exist at the federal level, state TIF statutes govern the parameters 
and jurisdiction of TIF in the United States. This paper primarily evaluates 10 categories of TIF 
statute elements in the 27 states (plus the District of Columbia) where the five major professional 
sports leagues operate clubs: California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New 
York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, 
Washington, and Wisconsin. While Arizona has major league teams in four sports, the state has 
not reintroduced TIF since its 1999 repeal.  
The data set also includes six states where there are not currently major professional 
sports teams resident, but these states are deemed to have the potential to host a major league 
team. This potential is defined in one of two ways: first, immediate proximity to an urban area in 
another jurisdiction that is home to a major league team, or second, having a metro market with 
sufficient population to support a major league team based upon characteristics of existing 
smaller market teams and expansion candidates. The first category includes Delaware 
(Philadelphia), and Virginia (Washington DC), while the second contains Alabama 
(Birmingham), Connecticut (Hartford), Kentucky (Louisville), and Rhode Island (Providence).  
The 10 categories of TIF statute characteristics are: taxation sources that can be captured, 
permissible accompanying purposes, approval sources, forms of financing, requirements for a 
 184 
 
TIF district, type of TIF district available, permissible uses of TIF for public improvements, 
permissible uses of TIF for private improvements, permissible land uses, and TIF district 
lifespans.  
Data was compiled for 42 variables for all jurisdictions in the data set from a review of 
state TIF statutes, annotated sources, law review and other academic articles, law firm and policy 
documents, and resources from the Council of Development Finance Agencies. Given the 
breadth of this study, variables were coded primarily as “yes or no” propositions, although many 
variables are again conceptualized in such a way that a spectrum of strength is more appropriate. 
However, as the objective of this chapter is to provide a general survey of larger trends across 
states, variables have been coded as to best facilitate this goal. Still, the potential for 
oversimplification as a trade-off for a cohesive state-level discussion, is a notable limitation. 
 
4.3. WHAT TAXES CAN BE CAPTURED BY TIF?  
While TIF is most commonly associated with real property taxation, there are non-
property forms of TIF as well, such as sales and income taxes. Some states also allow for 
PILOTs (Payments In-Lieu of Taxes) to be captured through TIF. For the professional sports 
facility context, sales taxes and PILOTs are most relevant. This study does not collect data on 
income or payroll-based TIF as these amounts are relatively insignificant in comparison to the 
financial impact the included sources can have. 
Table 14.  
Allowable TIF Capture Source by Jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction Property Tax Sales Tax PILOTs 
Ariz. N/A N/A N/A 
Cal. Y N N 
Colo. Y Y Y 
D.C. Y Y N 
Fla. Y N N 
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Ga. Y N Y 
lll. Y Y N 
Ind. Y N Y 
Kan. Y Y Y 
La. Y N N 
Md. Y N N 
Mass. Y N N 
Mich. Y N N 
Minn. Y Y N 
Mo. Y Y Y 
Nev. Y N N 
N.J. Y Y Y 
N.Y. Y N N 
N.C. Y N N 
Ohio Y N N 
Okla. Y Y N 
Or. Y N N 
Pa. Y Y Y 
Tenn. Y Y N 
Tex. Y Y N 
Utah Y Y N 
Wash. Y Y N 
Wis. Y N N  
27 13 7 
Ala. Y N N 
Conn. Y Y N 
Del. Y Y Y 
Ky. Y Y N 
R.I. Y N N 
Va. Y N N  
6 3 1 
 
Not surprisingly, all states studied allow real property based TIF. Property taxes are 
generally controlled by local governments, and as we will see, local governments are 
overwhelmingly the gatekeepers of TIF projects and areas. Thus, property taxes are the logical 
first tool of choice when it comes to TIF. The many variants of property TIF will be discussed at 
length throughout this paper.  
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After property TIF, the next most common form of TIF uses sales or consumption taxes. 
However sales tax-based TIF is not as widespread. Only 13 of 28 jurisdictions with major league 
teams, and a further three of six potential host states, have sales taxes available for TIF capture. 
There are two primary reasons why sales TIF is less common than real property TIF. First, sales 
taxes are mostly imposed at the state level. While counties and cities may have the ability to levy 
their own additional sales tax points, even where this power is present, the local share of sales 
tax is in most cases only a fraction of the total sales tax. Thus, if TIF is applied to sales taxes, the 
effect is the diversion of primarily state revenues for local government projects (Smith, 2009). 
Accordingly, many state legislatures are unwilling to lose both control and agency over 
significant revenue sources. Even where legislatures are willing to provide for sales TIF use, this 
use might be more restrictive than revenues generated through property taxes.  
Secondly, sales TIF is far more volatile and risky than real property based TIF (2009). 
Whereas sharp declines in real property in short periods are relatively rare events, similarly 
severe declines in sales tax receipts are less so. Combined with the ability of sales taxes to often 
generate significantly more revenue than property taxes, projections reliant on sales TIF are 
married to the whims of consumer spending, which itself is more subject to the pitfalls of 
recession, business failure, and business movement. For instance, when a retail business leaves a 
TIF zone, it is possible that the building they leased will lose some of its assessed value, but most 
of the value is in the land and improvements. However with sales TIF, if a business leaves 
without quick replacement, that departure can create a massive hole in TIF revenue and 
potentially wipe out otherwise solid incremental gains from other businesses in the zone (2009).  
The relocation aspect is further focused from a TIF district maximization perspective. 
While the inclination of TIF authorities may be to capture as large of a geographic area as 
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possible, such capture brings the risk that sales TIF revenues are hostage to business activities far 
away from the facility (see Sroka, 2019). Additionally, this may result in a TIF project that is 
simply predatory on impacts that have little to do with the facility or related project that TIF 
revenues are being diverted to fund, in turn being a drag on general revenues. For these reasons, 
there are often more substantial restrictions placed on sales TIF. In some states, there will be 
claw-back provisions whereby the percentage of increment captured by TIF will decrease. In 
other states, sales TIF may be limited to certain projects and state participation may be 
negotiated or represent a further procedural hurdle. Indiana (Stafford, 2017) and Kentucky 
(KEDFA, 2008) have specifically used such structures in the sports facility context.  
Applied to a sports venue, sales TIF has the potential to be a large source of revenue, 
especially if the TIF zone includes significant established retail. The relative impact of sales to 
property TIF depends on the existing and planned economic activities in the TIF zone, as well as 
the project specific objectives that TIF is intended to pay for. In some instances, the nature of 
local activity on its face lends itself towards sales TIF. For instance in Kentucky (and later 
discussed in the Louisville case study), bonds for the NBA sized downtown arena were intended 
to be roughly one-third repaid through TIF and the ratio of sales to property TIF generated has 
been in the range of 10 to 1 (2008, 9). However this is not to say that property TIF is incapable 
of being a primary source of facility finance – in Michigan for instance, property TIF has been 
sufficient to fund hundreds of millions in public contributions to Little Caesars Arena, discussed 
in the Detroit case study.  
The third part of the revenue source story are PILOTs. PILOTs are payments made 
pursuant to an agreement by property owners who have been exempted from local property 
taxes. These payments are often securitized and offered as bonds. PILOTS are a common local 
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economic development subsidy whereby a local government will agree to a PILOT that would 
have been far less than property taxes in order to attract or retain development activity (Kenyon 
and Langley, 2010). Much of the literature classifies PILOTs as a distinct but closely related 
form of subsidy relative to TIF – considering the overlap this work views them as a worthwhile 
inclusion from an inventory perspective. 
A total of eight states in the data set allow for PILOTs to be captured through TIF. In the 
TIF context, those PILOT payments are simply diverted in the same way as property taxes 
otherwise would be, either for a specific project or a designated TIF area. In Missouri for 
example, PILOT increment is calculated by establishing the same baseline for TIF as with 
regular property taxes (Mo. Rev. Stat.). PILOTs above the baseline of what property taxes would 
have otherwise been become increment. Relative to the primary alternative of property TIF, 
PILOTs are less risky propositions as the amounts captured are known factors as opposed to 
projections decades out into uncertain futures.  
Even where PILOTs are not explicitly permitted to be captured through TIF, PILOT 
arrangements share overlap. Such conceptual overlap is found in jurisdictions such as New York 
and the District of Columbia. In fact, PILOTs can be viewed as an alternative path of less 
resistance to the same financing objective in instances where TIF may require further state 
approval and a PILOT would not, or where bonds issued under one form would count against the 
state constitutional debt limit and the other would not.  
The most well-known instance of PILOTs in the venue context is the issue of billions in 
PILOT backed, municipally tax-exempt bonds by New York City for the new Yankee Stadium 
and Citi Field (Gayer et al., 2016). However these deals were structured differently than a 
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traditional PILOT and bear less resemblance to TIF. With Yankee Stadium for instance, the land 
was publicly owned and the PILOT came from stadium related revenues (2016).  
If more traditional PILOTs were committed to a facility project in the place of traditional 
property tax increment, the likely trade-off would be less gross yearly available incremental 
revenue for a more certain source of revenue. PILOT increment would not be directly subject to 
economic or neighborhood declines, but at the same time also not able to increase if the property 
gained assessed value beyond that predicted. Still, if TIF or revenue bonds are being issued, a 
predictable payment source may lead to significantly lower interest rates and a closing of the 
facial present value gap between the PILOT and the property assessment increment. TIF related 
bonds and other means of allocated captured increment will be discussed in more detail in 
subsequent sections. 
 
4.4. ACCOMANYING PURPOSES  
 
4.4.1. Special Assessment Districts 
TIF is one of several local economic development tools that have some sort of district-
like geographic component. Typically known as special assessment districts, these districts allow 
for a property mill rate to be attached to properties within the district to pay for some defined 
improvement. Unlike TIF, special assessments are an additional direct tax burden.  
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Table 15.  
Jurisdictions Allowing Special Assessment District 
Overlap With TIF 
Jurisdiction Special Assessment Overlap 
Allowed 
Ariz. N/A 
Cal. Y 
Colo. Y 
D.C. Y 
Fla. Y 
Ga. Y 
lll. Y 
Ind. Y 
Kan. N 
La. Y 
Md. Y 
Mass. Y 
Mich. Y 
Minn. Y 
Mo. Y 
Nev. Y 
N.J. Y 
N.Y. N 
N.C. Y 
Ohio Y 
Okla. Y 
Or. Y 
Pa. Y 
Tenn. N/A 
Tex. Y 
Utah Y 
Wash. Y 
Wis. Y  
24 
Ala. Y 
Conn. Y 
Del. Y 
Ky. Y 
R.I. N/A 
Va. Y  
5 
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Often associated with sewer, road, or other localized infrastructure, the rationale is that 
the additional tax mill will result in property appreciation for the properties paying the mill (see 
Hoyt, 2005). In the commercial context, business improvement districts are frequently used for 
any number of projects within a concentrated retail area, including capital improvements, 
streetscape beautification, security, and marketing (2005). These districts often allocate funds to 
many of the same purposes as TIF zones, but will be petitioned for and approved by the property 
owners. 
Twenty-nine jurisdictions in the data set allow special assessment districts to overlap with 
TIF zones. Often these overlapping districts will have different boundaries, governing structures, 
and statutory restrictions on funding use. However, if well-coordinated, dual funding sources can 
be leveraged to have a complementary impact. For instance, the model of urban redevelopment 
in Dallas – the Uptown district – benefitted from overlaying both TIF and a business special 
assessment district (Allison, 2014). 
In the venue context, a special assessment district would most likely overlap with a 
commercial and retail strip within a facility TIF zone. Special assessments are unlikely to 
generate the gross return that TIF would, and most states have restrictions on property owners 
being assessed for the sole apparent benefit of a neighboring property owner (the stadium or 
arena) unless the assessment was on lands owned by the same parties as the facility and the 
assessment was a negotiated component of the facility deal. Thus special assessments would 
more likely be dedicated to improvements that would benefit all parcels within the district and 
those that would be most attractive to commercial enterprises – such as beautification, 
streetscape, and branding. 
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4.4.2. Eminent Domain 
Eminent domain often accompanies major redevelopment and local economic 
development projects. These projects can require swaths of contiguously assembled land and 
property owners on required lands either may not be willing to sell, or wish to extract a premium 
well beyond the market value of their land absent the redevelopment project. To solve this 
holdout problem, jurisdictions with the power of eminent domain will exercise their power to 
expropriate and assemble land. Accordingly, eminent domain can be one of the building blocks 
that allows for a viable TIF project in the first place.  
 
Table 16. 
Jurisdictions Allowing Eminent Domain to be Used With 
TIF 
Jurisdiction Eminent Domain Use Allowed With 
TIF 
Ariz. N/A 
Cal. Y 
Colo. Y 
D.C. N 
Fla. N 
Ga. N 
lll. Y 
Ind. Y 
Kan. Y 
La. N/A 
Md. N 
Mass. Y 
Mich. Y  
Minn. Y 
Mo. Y 
Nev. Y 
N.J. Y 
N.Y. Y 
N.C. Y 
Ohio Y 
Okla. N 
Or. Y 
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Pa. Y 
Tenn. Y 
Tex. N 
Utah Y 
Wash. N 
Wis. Y  
19 
Ala. Y 
Conn. Y 
Del. Y 
Ky. Y 
R.I. Y 
Va. Y  
6 
 
Some 25 jurisdictions in the data set allow for TIF to be combined with eminent domain. 
Previous works have noted parallels and complements between state TIF statutes and urban 
renewal acts (Mead and Cole, 1998). Conceptually, the overlap between eminent domain and 
TIF is often a finding of blight, and the need for public intervention to rectify the issue. In the 
wake of 2005’s Kelo v. New London, more explicit leeway was provided to the combination of 
TIF and eminent domain. Kelo saw the Court affirm expropriation and transfer to another private 
owner for an economic development purpose with a public benefit. For public bodies looking to 
assemble land for large scale redevelopment projects, Kelo has been a boon.  
The new scope granted by Kelo however, has been at least somewhat reined in by many states. 
Within two years of Kelo, 41 states passed laws purported to restrict the use of eminent domain. 
Many of these post-Kelo legislative actions were similar in nature to those found in Kansas (Kan. 
Stat. Ann. § 26-501): 
K.S.A. 26-501a. Eminent domain; limited to public use; transfer to private 
entity prohibited; exception.  
 
On and after July 1, 2007: (a) Private property shall not be taken by eminent domain 
except for public use and private property shall not be taken without just 
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compensation. (b) The taking of private property by eminent domain for the purpose 
of selling, leasing or otherwise transferring such property to any private entity is 
prohibited except as provided in K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 26–501b, and amendments 
thereto.  
 
Others actions were even more to the point, such as the successful 2006 ballot measure amending 
the Florida Constitution:   
SECTION 6. Eminent Domain. –  
Private property taken by eminent domain pursuant to a petition to initiate 
condemnation proceedings file donor after January 2, 2007, may not be conveyed to 
a natural person or private entity except as provided by general law passed by a 
three-fifths vote of the membership of each house of the Legislature. 
 
However, Byrne’s 2016 analysis found only 20 states that had functionally restrictive 
eminent domain provisions as qualified by two conditions: the barring of economic development 
grounds for eminent domain, and the absence of significant exemptions from this prohibition for 
instances of blight. Using this test, the Kansas statute did not qualify, but the Florida amendment 
did. Yet even where there were functionally restrictive eminent domain provisions, this was not 
necessarily indicative of lessened eminent domain use – the two states with the most instances of 
eminent domain use (Florida and Pennsylvania) fell in the functionally restrictive category 
(Byrne, 2016). These outcomes can be seen through the tension of strong post-Kelo support for 
legislative action to preclude eminent domain for private economic development purposes, and 
the propensity for lawmakers at the state and local level to see policy value in such takings.  
Applied to the venue TIF context, there are several practical implications based on 
whether a state has a functionally restrictive eminent domain framework or not. In a functionally 
restricted eminent domain jurisdiction, the venue itself is more likely to be publicly owned as 
sufficient land for the facility will be that much harder to assemble. The venue parcels will also 
not be as useful for TIF on immediately ancillary development as publicly owned property will 
be tax exempt and not come with a PILOT payment. Sales TIF on these parcels would be 
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possible assuming this venue was in a sales TIF permitting state. While property TIF could still 
be effective on parcels in blocks surrounding the facility, again, assembling these blocks for a 
private purpose that could maximize assessed values is more challenging. Thus reaching the full 
assessment potential is made more difficult and the time horizon required to assemble land to 
reach a higher assessment potential (with more increment created) is lengthened.  
 
4.5. TYPE OF TIF DISTRICT AVAILABLE 
There are two primary types of TIF districts available: area wide and project specific. 30 
jurisdictions in the data set allow area wide TIF and all but three permit site specific TIF. The 
former is the more traditional concept and entails designating a geographic area of between 
several blocks and several miles. Within this geography, increment will be captured and assigned 
to projects in the same area. The project TIF alternative is simply the limiting of the district 
geography to a single parcel, or a single site of several parcels. A project specific TIF zone is 
generally less ambitious in terms of public improvements and less fiscally risky in that a more 
limited number of parcels will have increment diverted out of general revenues.  
Project specific TIF is likely to entail a negotiated agreement with a single developer, 
whereby increment generated from the project will be reinvested in the project or paid back to 
the developer as a subsidy. Alternatively, a jurisdiction may create a project TIF zone for a large 
development that would otherwise have been constructed anyway, knowing that the project will 
create substantial increment, and then funnelling that increment to other nearby projects. The 
benefit of this latter structure is that money can be diverted to a project through TIF that may 
otherwise struggle to pass via general appropriation from democratically accountable 
representatives.  
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Table 17.  
Jurisdictions Allowing Area Wide and Project 
Specific TIF 
Jurisdiction Site Specific Area Wide 
Ariz. N/A N/A 
Cal. Y N 
Colo. Y Y 
D.C. Y Y 
Fla. Y Y 
Ga. Y Y 
lll. Y Y 
Ind. Y Y 
Kan. Y N 
La. Y Y 
Md. N Y 
Mass. Y Y 
Mich. Y Y 
Minn. Y N 
Mo. Y Y 
Nev. Y Y 
N.J. Y Y 
N.Y. Y Y 
N.C. Y Y 
Ohio Y Y 
Okla. Y Y 
Or. Y Y 
Pa. Y Y 
Tenn. Y Y 
Tex. Y Y 
Utah Y Y 
Wash. Y Y 
Wis. Y Y  
26 24 
Ala. Y Y 
Conn. Y Y 
Del. Y Y 
Ky. Y Y 
R.I. Y Y 
Va. N Y  
5 6 
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There is potential for both area wide and project specific TIF to be used in a venue 
related project. The form of TIF district used will depend on the broader deal negotiated between 
the club controlling parties and the involved local and state governments, as well as state law 
more broadly. For instance, functional restrictions on eminent domain and private use may 
prevent the facility project from being privately owned and thus within a TIF zone, meaning that 
increment would have to be captured from an area TIF district. An area TIF district could 
likewise be attractive to divert more increment to the facility project without a direct 
appropriation from the general fund. Alternatively, project specific TIF could be used as a policy 
tool to throw-in a subsidy that is limited to the project parcels, with the intention of closing a 
deal-making bargaining gap, but stopping short of capturing neighboring activity.  
 
4.6. TIF DISTRICT APPROVAL AUTHORITY 
There are generally two distinct aspects to TIF approval: district creation and approval of 
what projects TIF funds may be directed to within a TIF district. With the former, there are four 
primary potential governmental approval authorities: municipalities, counties, redevelopment 
authorities, and state governments. All jurisdictions in the data set allow municipalities to 
approve TIF districts, while counties are approving authorities in 24 states. A further six states 
allow for redevelopment or other similar public authorities to approve TIF districts. Few states 
however are themselves TIF district approving authorities – instead, state legislatures enable 
local bodies to approve TIF, although coding this variable is a grey area as legislation may be 
designed in order to limit the scope of approval and have de-facto approval control (such as 
certain TIF creation schemes later detailed in Kentucky and Michigan). 
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Table 18.  
TIF Creation Authorities by Jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction Creation 
City 
Creation 
County 
Creation 
State 
Creation 
Redev. 
Authority 
Ariz. N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Cal. Y Y N N 
Colo. Y N Y N 
D.C. Y N N N 
Fla. Y Y N N 
Ga. Y Y N N 
lll. Y N N N 
Ind. Y Y N N 
Kan. Y N N N 
La. Y Y N N 
Md. Y Y N N 
Mass. Y N N N 
Mich. Y Y N Y 
Minn. Y Y N Y 
Mo. Y Y N N 
Nev. Y Y N Y 
N.J. Y N N N 
N.Y. Y Y N Y 
N.C. Y Y N N 
Ohio Y Y N N 
Okla. Y Y N N 
Or. Y Y N Y 
Pa. Y Y N N 
Tenn. Y Y N Y 
Tex. Y Y N N 
Utah Y Y N N 
Wash. Y Y N N 
Wis. Y N N N  
27 20 1 6 
Ala. Y Y N N 
Conn. Y N N N 
Del. Y Y N N 
Ky. Y Y N N 
R.I. Y N N N 
Va. Y Y N N 
 6 4 0 0 
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The distribution of TIF creation authorities reflects TIF’s status as an instrument of local 
economic development. The presence of redevelopment authority TIF indicates that local 
governments have the option to shelter both financial and political risk within a purpose built 
public corporation. These redevelopment and similar authorities are generally entrusted with 
facilitating local economic development with significant autonomy relative to keeping functions 
within the bureaucracy of local governments. Redevelopment authorities also protect local 
governments from transactions gone wrong as TIF obligations are generally limited to the assets 
of that authority. 
The relative role of municipalities and counties in TIF district creation may also depend 
on the taxation powers respectively enumerated to each government by the state legislature, as 
well as their comparative political priorities. In some states, a county may have more capacity to 
generate increment and in others, relatively little. Likewise, the political coalitions in a county 
may lead to certain projects being more or less feasible than they would be in a municipality – a 
county may have greater fiscal capacity to direct increment, but a municipality may have more 
political will to direct increment to a particular project within its boundaries as it will be closer to 
the perceived benefits.  
In other instances, state legislation may allow for counties or cities to participate in one 
another’s TIF projects, providing an impetus for one jurisdiction (typically the city) to make the 
project attractive to the other with the objective of capturing the increment from both 
jurisdictions. In Texas, for example, counties can choose to participate and allocate their 
increment to municipally created TIF districts, which allows counties to have strong effective 
policy influence (Dallas Department of Planning and Development, 2016). 
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This dance of fiscal capacity and political will is often operationalized in the stadium deal 
context more generally – depending on the state legislative framework and the corresponding 
ability and will to pay, a facility may be primarily funded by a country, a city, or a partnership of 
both (see Long, 2013). The same dynamics can be viewed for TIF related facility projects, 
although preliminary data on these projects finds a greater trend toward municipally centered 
projects where there may be overlaying county participation. There are also instances of 
redevelopment authority TIF districts being used in venue development.  
 
4.6.1. TIF District Project Authority 
Once a TIF district is established, authority then shifts to the bodies entrusted to spend 
captured increment on projects. Responsibility for project approval and allocation addresses the 
control, autonomy, and ongoing political oversight of a TIF district. There are five primary 
potential governmental or semi-governmental options through which state TIF statutes delegate 
the power to approve TIF projects: municipalities, counties, states, redevelopment authorities, 
and TIF commissions. The new category of TIF commissions, generally consists of a board 
created alongside the TIF district, which is then delegated the administrative and operational 
functions from the point of creation.  
Twenty-seven jurisdictions allow municipalities to control TIF projects, while counties 
have the same broad powers in 18 states. Unlike with TIF district creation, six states permit the 
state to retain TIF project authority. Meanwhile, 12 states provide redevelopment and similar 
authorities the power to oversee TIF project selection and allocation. Finally, six states allow TIF 
commissions to determine how increment is directed.  
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Table 19.  
TIF Project Authorities by Jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction Project City Project 
County 
Project 
State 
Project 
Redev. 
Authority 
Project TIF 
Commission 
Ariz. N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Cal. N N N Y N 
Colo. N N N N Y 
D.C. Y N N N N 
Fla. Y Y N Y N 
Ga. Y Y N Y N 
lll. Y N N N N 
Ind. Y N N N Y 
Kan. Y Y Y N N 
La. N N N N Y 
Md. Y Y N N N 
Mass. Y N Y N N 
Mich. Y N Y Y N 
Minn. Y N N Y N 
Mo. Y Y N N N 
Nev. Y Y N Y N 
N.J. Y N Y N N 
N.Y. Y Y N Y N 
N.C. N N N N Y 
Ohio Y Y N N N 
Okla. Y Y N N N 
Or. Y Y N N N 
Pa. N N N Y N 
Tenn. Y Y N N Y 
Tex. Y Y N N N 
Utah Y Y Y Y N 
Wash. Y Y N N N 
Wis. Y N N Y N 
 22 14 5 10 5 
Ala. Y Y N N N 
Conn. Y N Y N N 
Del. Y Y N N N 
Ky. Y Y N N N 
R.I. N N N Y N 
Va. Y Y N Y Y 
 5 4 1 2 1 
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4.7. REQUIREMENTS FOR A TIF DISTRICT 
States can have any number of pre-requisites for a TIF district. This study evaluates five 
of the more common requirements: blight, but-for, public hearings, feasibility or property 
condition analysis, and financial or cost-benefit analysis.  
 
Table 20. 
Requirements for a TIF District by Jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction Blight Quantitative 
Blight 
But-
for 
Public 
Hearing 
Feasibility 
or Condition 
Study 
Financial impact 
or cost-benefit 
analysis 
Ariz. N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Cal. Y N N N N N 
Colo. Y N N Y N Y 
D.C. N N Y N Y Y 
Fla. Y Y (Partial) N Y Y N 
Ga. N N N Y N N 
Ill. Y Y (Partial) Y Y N N 
Ind. Y N N Y Y N 
Kan. N N N Y Y Y 
La. N N N Y N N 
Md. N N N Y N N 
Mass. N N N Y Y N 
Mich. N N Y Y Y Y 
Minn. Y Y (Partial) Y Y Y N 
Mo. Y N Y Y N Y 
Nev. Y N N N N N 
N.J. N N Y Y Y Y 
N.Y. Y N Y Y Y Y 
N.C. Y N Y Y N N 
Ohio Y N N N N N 
Okla. Y Y (Partial) Y Y Y N 
Or. Y Y (Partial) N Y Y Y 
Pa. Y Y (Partial) N Y Y N 
Tenn. Y N N N N N 
Tex. Y N Y Y Y N 
Utah Y Y (Partial) N Y Y N 
Wash. N N Y Y N N 
Wis. Y N N Y Y N  
18 7 11 22 15 8 
Ala. Y N N Y N N 
Conn. N N N Y N N 
Del. N N  Y Y Y N 
 203 
 
Ky. Y N Y Y N Y 
R.I. Y N Y N N N 
Va. N N N N N N  
3 0 3 4 1 1 
 
 
4.7.1. Blight 
Blight is at the conceptual core of TIF’s redevelopment roots. Blight stems from the 
concept of urban blight or decay, broadly speaking, a process entailing a general and visible 
neglect of the physical environment. This visible component is often accompanied by 
quantifiable measures such as resident and firm departures, unemployment, crime rates, and tax 
base deterioration. In many respects, the need for the presence of blight is what separates a TIF 
framework from being an instrument of redevelopment and merely a general development 
subsidy.  
Twenty-one states in the data set have some sort of blight requirement for TIF 
designations. Most commonly, blight in TIF statutes includes the designation of the area as an 
economic, social, or public health liability. More specifically, a blight definition may require one 
or some combination of the following to be present: deteriorating or obsolete structures, unsafe 
conditions, vacant lots, assessment delinquency exceeding land value, environmental 
contamination, and inadequate infrastructure. 
Permissive definitions allow blight to be satisfied by meeting one of a laundry list of 
blight qualifiers in the subjective and qualitative opinion of the TIF creation authority. The 
definition of blight in the Tennessee Code is a strong example: 
Blighted areas are areas, including slum areas, with buildings or improvements that, 
by reason of dilapidation, obsolescence, overcrowding, lack of ventilation, light and 
sanitary facilities, deleterious land use, or any combination of these or other factors, 
are detrimental to the safety, health, morals, or welfare of the community. Welfare of 
the community does not include solely a loss of property value to surrounding 
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properties, nor does it include the need for increased tax revenues. Under no 
circumstance shall land used predominantly in the production of agriculture, as 
defined by § 1-3-105, be considered a blighted area. 
 
Although farmland is explicitly exempted, and more than property value loss is required, it 
would not be difficult for any TIF creation authority in a non-rural area to meet one of the 
conditions, and thus find blight. A particularly creative TIF authority could even extend a TIF 
district in an otherwise not blighted area, to include parcels that would meet the blight definition, 
thus making the TIF district itself “blighted”. 
Other states have somewhat less permissive definitions that require multiple elements to 
be met for a blight designation. This list of elements is typically accompanied by a chapeau 
clause. Exemplifying this structure, Florida requires 2 of 15 possible conditions (Florida Statutes, 
2017):  
(8) “Blighted area” means an area in which there are a substantial number of 
deteriorated or deteriorating structures; in which conditions, as indicated by 
government-maintained statistics or other studies, endanger life or property or are 
leading to economic distress; and in which two or more of the following factors are 
present: 
(a) Predominance of defective or inadequate street layout, parking facilities, 
roadways, bridges, or public transportation facilities. 
(b) Aggregate assessed values of real property in the area for ad valorem tax 
purposes have failed to show any appreciable increase over the 5 years prior to the 
finding of such conditions. 
(c) Faulty lot layout in relation to size, adequacy, accessibility, or usefulness. 
(d) Unsanitary or unsafe conditions. 
(e) Deterioration of site or other improvements. 
(f) Inadequate and outdated building density patterns. 
(g) Falling lease rates per square foot of office, commercial, or industrial space 
compared to the remainder of the county or municipality. 
(h) Tax or special assessment delinquency exceeding the fair value of the land. 
(i) Residential and commercial vacancy rates higher in the area than in the 
remainder of the county or municipality. 
(j) Incidence of crime in the area higher than in the remainder of the county or 
municipality. 
(k) Fire and emergency medical service calls to the area proportionately higher than 
in the remainder of the county or municipality. 
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(l) A greater number of violations of the Florida Building Code in the area than the 
number of violations recorded in the remainder of the county or municipality. 
(m) Diversity of ownership or defective or unusual conditions of title which 
prevent the free alienability of land within the deteriorated or hazardous area. 
(n) Governmentally owned property with adverse environmental conditions caused 
by a public or private entity. 
(o) A substantial number or percentage of properties damaged by sinkhole activity 
which have not been adequately repaired or stabilized. 
 
Although somewhat less subjective than the Tennessee-style definition, again there should be 
few problems in manufacturing a blight finding if desired. 
The Florida definition is also useful for exemplifying the entry level partial quantitative 
blight test. Seven states in the data set have a form of quantitative blight finding, meaning that 
some mathematical calculation and objective threshold is required for at least an aspect of a 
blight provision. The five quantitative Florida blight conditions (b, g, h, i, and l) are fairly 
representative of basic quantitative blight provisions in other states. 
   Illinois’ Municipal Code has a similar structure to Florida, but its quantitative condition 
has more depth: 
74.4 ILCS Illinois Municipal Code. 
(F) The total equalized assessed value of the proposed redevelopment project area 
has declined for 3 of the last 5 calendar years prior to the year in which the 
redevelopment project area is designated or is increasing at an annual rate that is less 
than the balance of the municipality for 3 of the last 5 calendar years for which 
information is available or is increasing at an annual rate that is less than the 
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers published by the United States 
Department of Labor or successor agency for 3 of the last 5 calendar years prior to 
the year in which the redevelopment project area is designated. 
 
As seen in the Florida conditions (Fla. Stat. § 163.330-463), quantitative methods of 
determination are not necessarily complicated. Even where there are more complex tests (such as 
in Illinois), the statute allows these hurdles to be avoided through alternative conditions. In fact, 
many projects passing the purely subjective blight definitions (such as Tennessee’s) may easily 
meet basic (and more advanced) quantitative measures as well. However, even basic quantitative 
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means that are independently verifiable and transparent, can provide a check on TIF over-
proliferation. 
The most restrictive blight test is likely found in Utah. The Utah statute has both a 
restrictive and often quantitatively defined conception of blight, and a requirement for a “blight 
study”. Blight in Utah Code is defined as: 
Conditions on board determination of blight -- Conditions of blight caused by 
the participant.  
(1) A board may not make a finding of blight in a resolution under Subsection 
17C-2-102(1)(a)(ii)(B) unless the board finds that: 
(a)  
(i) the proposed project area consists predominantly of nongreenfield parcels; 
(ii) the proposed project area is currently zoned for urban purposes and generally 
served by utilities; 
(iii) at least 50% of the parcels within the proposed project area contain 
nonagricultural or nonaccessory buildings or improvements used or intended 
for residential, commercial, industrial, or other urban purposes, or any 
combination of those uses; 
(iv) the present condition or use of the proposed project area substantially impairs 
the sound growth of the municipality, retards the provision of housing 
accommodations, or constitutes an economic liability or is detrimental to the 
public health, safety, or welfare, as shown by the existence within the 
proposed project area of at least four of the following factors: 
(A) one of the following, although sometimes interspersed with well maintained 
buildings and infrastructure: 
(I) substantial physical dilapidation, deterioration, or defective construction of 
buildings or infrastructure; or 
(II) significant noncompliance with current building code, safety code, health 
code, or fire code requirements or local ordinances; 
(B) unsanitary or unsafe conditions in the proposed project area that threaten the 
health, safety, or welfare of the community; 
(C) environmental hazards, as defined in state or federal law, that require 
remediation as a condition for current or future use and development; 
(D) excessive vacancy, abandoned buildings, or vacant lots within an area zoned 
for urban use and served by utilities; 
(E) abandoned or outdated facilities that pose a threat to public health, safety, or 
welfare; 
(F) criminal activity in the project area, higher than that of comparable 
nonblighted areas in the municipality or county; and 
(G) defective or unusual conditions of title rendering the title nonmarketable; and 
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(A) at least 50% of the privately-owned parcels within the proposed project area 
are affected by at least one of the factors, but not necessarily the same factor, 
listed in Subsection (1)(a)(iv); and 
(B) the affected parcels comprise at least 66% of the privately-owned acreage of 
the proposed project area; or 
(b)  the proposed project area includes some or all of a superfund site, inactive 
industrial site, or inactive airport site. 
(2) No single parcel comprising 10% or more of the acreage of the proposed 
project area may be counted as satisfying Subsection (1)(a)(iii) or (iv) unless 
at least 50% of the area of that parcel is occupied by buildings or 
improvements. 
(3)  
(a) For purposes of Subsection (1), if a participant involved in the project area 
development has caused a condition listed in Subsection (1)(a)(iv) within the 
proposed project area, that condition may not be used in the determination of 
blight. 
 
Yet the satisfaction of the blight definition is only one aspect that the blight study must satisfy: 
(1) Each blight study required under Subsection 17C-2-102(1)(a)(i)(A) shall: 
(a) undertake a parcel by parcel survey of the survey area; 
(b) provide data so the board and taxing entity committee may determine: 
(i) whether the conditions described in Subsection 17C-2-303(1): 
(A) exist in part or all of the survey area; and 
(B) qualify an area within the survey area as a project area; and 
(ii) whether the survey area contains all or part of a superfund site, an inactive 
industrial site, or inactive airport site; 
(c) include a written report setting forth: 
(i) the conclusions reached; 
(ii) any recommended area within the survey area qualifying as a project area; 
and 
(iii) any other information requested by the agency to determine whether an urban 
renewal project area is feasible; and 
(d) be completed within one year after the adoption of the survey area resolution. 
 
The Utah blight study requirements close much of the gap for expansionism. Yet, these 
more onerous requirements create a transaction cost that may impact the feasibility in the first 
place. Beyond ensuring that blight is truly present, high transaction cost hurdles may be designed 
in part to dissuade projects that cannot generate sufficient increment for the project financial 
cost-benefit to make sense after start-up expenses. It is also worth noting that many of the 
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reporting requirements found in the Utah blight sections may be to a certain extent found in 
financial or cost-benefit analysis provisions in other state TIF frameworks.  
For an urban stadium, arena, or ancillary real estate project, blight is unlikely to be a major 
obstacle in most states. Even where there are more restrictive quantitative blight conditions, the 
size of the project will mute the impact of transaction costs, and most projects are likely to 
satisfy blight anyway. For suburban facilities however, a blight finding may be harder to 
substantiate.   
 
4.7.2. But-for 
After blight, but-for is the second primary traditional TIF requirement. In the TIF context, 
but-for typically means that absent TIF, real estate development would not occur, would not 
occur as quickly, or would bring less fiscal benefit to the implementing jurisdiction. Despite its 
conceptual role alongside blight, only 14 jurisdictions in the data set have direct but-for 
requirements. However, even where there is no state requirement, sometimes local authorities 
can add one. Further (and discussed later), some other states have requirements for cost-benefit 
or fiscal impact studies that include many elements of but-for.  
Depending on the jurisdiction, but-for findings can be made solely by the TIF creation 
authority, or based upon a project proponent signing a contract affirming that but-for the TIF 
subsidy, they would not undertake the project or modify the project to the extent that the costs of 
the change (to the taxing jurisdiction) would exceed the TIF subsidy. In either event, but-for 
provisions are generally framed in cost-benefit terms through comparing alternatives where the 
subsidy is not present. For instance, the District of Columbia’s but-for requirement, determined 
by the District’s Chief Financial Officer, is set out as follows (DC Code, 2018): 
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(2) Whether the project will likely result in a net increase in the taxes payable to the 
District, taking into consideration income taxes, franchise taxes, real property taxes, 
without regard to the real property tax increment revenues to be applied to payment 
of the TIF bonds, sales taxes, without regard to the sales tax increment revenues to be 
applied to payment of the TIF bonds, parking taxes, use taxes, and other taxes, over 
the amount that would have been payable to the District in the absence of the project; 
 
Minnesota’s provision incorporates both the “development would not have happened” 
and “fiscal benefits” aspects, but delegates determinations to municipalities (Minn. Stat.):  
(2) that, in the opinion of the municipality: 
(i) the proposed development or redevelopment would not reasonably be expected to 
occur solely through private investment within the reasonably foreseeable future; and 
(ii) the increased market value of the site that could reasonably be expected to occur 
without the use of tax increment financing would be less than the increase in the 
market value estimated to result from the proposed development after subtracting the 
present value of the projected tax increments for the maximum duration of the district 
permitted by the plan…  
 
This local subjectivity problem has been mitigated against in Wisconsin, which requires a local 
TIF creation authority’s finding to be studied by a Joint Review Board, composing of one 
member from each taxing district – typically a city, county, and school district (Wis. Stat.). 
While the Wisconsin statute is otherwise permissive in blight and but-for, the review board is an 
additional check. The review board must base its “decision to approve or deny a proposal on the 
following criteria”: 
a. Whether the development expected in the tax incremental district would occur 
without the use of tax incremental financing. 
b. Whether the economic benefits of the tax incremental district, as measured by 
increased employment, business and personal income and property value, are 
insufficient to compensate for the cost of the improvements. 
c. Whether the benefits of the proposal outweigh the anticipated tax increments to be 
paid by the owners of property in the overlying taxing districts. 
 
If the review board denies a proposal, the board is also required to provide written explanations 
as to why a criteria was not met, providing transparency and future predictability to the process 
(2017).  
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In the venue context, but-for has far more potential to pose a substantial obstacle to TIF 
use than blight. While jurisdictions with a but-for test left to the subjective determination of a 
local government eager to use TIF to close a facility related deal are not likely to see but-for 
represent a major hurdle, those with more restrictive tests may. Specifically, jurisdictions that 
require detailed financial analyses undertaken by independent actors may return findings that 
venue related projects do not have net fiscal or economic benefits. However in practice, even 
where there are but-for tests requiring financial impact calculations administered by independent 
experts, the TIF deal may get through – this was the case in Washington DC with the Capital 
One Arena renovation.  
 
4.7.3. Public Hearings 
A common element of land use approval in many states, a public hearing requirement in 
theory provides two things to a potential TIF project: a procedural brake and an opportunity to 
hold decision makers accountable. Some 26 jurisdictions in the data set require a public hearing 
prior to approving a TIF zone. Public hearing requirements generally require notice being sent 30 
to 60 days prior to the hearing to affected property holders and any overlaying taxing 
jurisdictions. In some places, such as Portland, Oregon, notices will be sent to all property 
holders in the city (Griefer, 2005). Notices usually contain a description of the TIF plan and 
where the entire plan may be viewed, the time, place, and location of the hearing, as well as a 
representation that affected parties may be heard. A TIF project public hearing would likely be 
one of several public hearings in relation to a major facility project. While the hearing can slow 
down and bring a measure of transparency to a process, a hearing alone is not likely to be a 
major obstacle where political will is present. 
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4.8. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES REQUIRED 
Nineteen jurisdictions in the data set require some form of feasibility or property 
condition analysis prior to TIF district creation or project approval. A non-binding feasibility 
study (alternatively dubbed as a financial or cost-benefit analysis) can be viewed as a softer form 
of but-for and a property condition analysis as a muted variety of a blight test – while many 
points of analysis will overlap, these studies are intended to inform decision makers as opposed 
to forcing their hands. However, these studies may in some jurisdictions effectively serve to 
satisfy state statutory but-for or blight tests. 
As with many but-for requirements, feasibility study provisions will often be vague. For 
instance, Oregon outlines its feasibility and financial analysis requirements as follows (Or. Rev. 
Stat. § 457): 
(3) An urban renewal plan shall be accompanied by a report which shall contain: 
 (g) A financial analysis of the plan with sufficient information to determine 
feasibility; 
 (h) A fiscal impact statement that estimates the impact of the tax increment 
financing, both until and after the indebtedness is repaid, upon all entities levying 
taxes upon property in the urban renewal area; and 
 (i) A relocation report which shall include: 
(A) An analysis of existing residents or businesses required to relocate permanently 
or temporarily as a result of agency actions under ORS 457.170; 
(B) A description of the methods to be used for the temporary or permanent 
relocation of persons living in, and businesses situated in, the urban renewal area in 
accordance with ORS 35.500 to 35.530; and 
(C) An enumeration, by cost range, of the existing housing units in the urban renewal 
areas of the plan to be destroyed or altered and new units to be added. 
 
Other jurisdictions, such as Minnesota, require financial effects of TIF to be calculated for all 
potentially fiscally impacted jurisdictions (Minn. Stat.): 
 
469.175 Establishing, Changing Plan, Annual Accounts. 
(a) A tax increment financing plan shall contain: 
(6) statements of the authority's alternate estimates of the impact of tax increment 
financing on the net tax capacities of all taxing jurisdictions in which the tax 
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increment financing district is located in whole or in part. For purposes of one 
statement, the authority shall assume that the estimated captured net tax capacity 
would be available to the taxing jurisdictions without creation of the district, and for 
purposes of the second statement, the authority shall assume that none of the 
estimated captured net tax capacity would be available to the taxing jurisdictions 
without creation of the district or subdistrict; 
 
Beyond vague or incomplete statutory requirements however, feasibility and cost-benefit 
studies, especially those on a project specific basis, will often include similar elements to those 
undertaken by prospective private sector developers and financial institutions considering 
lending to developers. They may begin with defining the local marketplace in terms of land and 
construction costs, location, impact of land use regulations, rents, and vacancy rates (Gromacki, 
2014). From here, a cash flow projection can be developed to determine net present value and 
internal rates of return (2014). Then the cost of development can be estimated and compared to 
the developer’s sources of capital to ascertain a gap (2014). This gap, and the evaluation or proof 
of this gap, is the core of many TIF feasibility studies (2014). Once this but-for like feasibility is 
satisfied, it may be complemented by evaluation of TIF as the appropriate means through which 
to close a development gap. This will be calculated through prediction of TIF district increment 
available, the value added by the project, and the increment available after project cost and/or 
debt coverage.  
Property condition analysis typically entails tedious low level data collection about the 
parcels in a proposed TIF district or project. These data points can include the parcel number (or 
“PID”), street address, whether the parcel is improved or vacant, the property area, the 
improvements coverage area, the coverage ratio, the number of structures on the property, the 
replacement cost of structures on the property, and the survey method. If need be, this 
assessment can be the basis for a blight finding.  
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Major venue projects are almost certain to already include a number of public and private 
feasibility, cost-benefit, financial, and property condition analyses, both for the entire project and 
for any specific TIF component. These requirements may not be particularly burdensome. Where 
these requirements might have more of an impact however is in a transparency function if these 
reports are made public. As with the many venue related economic feasibility studies that have 
been placed into serious question, manipulated TIF studies can serve as a platform for public 
critique and second guessing.  
 
4.9. FORMS OF FINANCING AND SPENDING 
There are three primary forms of TIF financing: general obligation bonds, revenue bonds, 
and pay-as-you-go. Twenty-two jurisdictions in the data set allow for general obligation bonds to 
be issued based on future TIF revenues, while 29 permit the issuance of revenue or TIF bonds, 
and 27 have pay-as-you-go schemes.  
Table 21. 
Forms of Financing 
Jurisdiction Pay-
as-
you-
go 
General 
obligation 
bonds 
Revenue 
bonds 
Ariz. N/A N/A N/A 
Cal. Y N Y 
Colo. Y N N 
D.C. Y N Y 
Fla. Y N Y 
Ga. Y N Y 
Ill. Y Y Y 
Ind. Y Y Y 
Kan. Y Y Y 
La. N Y Y 
Md. Y N Y 
Mass. Y Y Y 
Mich. Y N Y 
Minn. Y Y Y 
Mo. Y Y Y 
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Nev. N N Y 
N.J. Y Y Y 
N.Y. Y N Y 
N.C. N Y Y 
Ohio Y Y Y 
Okla. N Y Y 
Or. Y Y Y 
Pa. Y Y Y 
Tenn. Y Y N 
Tex. Y N Y 
Utah Y N Y 
Wash. Y Y N 
Wis. N Y N  
22 16 23 
Ala. Y Y Y 
Conn. Y Y Y 
Del. Y Y Y 
Ky. Y Y Y 
R.I. N Y Y 
Va. Y Y Y  
5 6 6 
 
 
4.9.1. General Obligation Bonds 
          General obligation bonds are at the same time the riskiest, highest leverage, and potentially 
most cost efficient TIF instrument. Instead of being limited to revenues produced by TIF, a 
general obligation bond is backed by the full credit of the issuer. This means that if TIF revenues 
are insufficient to service the bonds, the general fund of the issuing government is responsible to 
make up the deficit. Where TIF revenues may be volatile or predictions unreliable, these general 
obligations may constitute a substantial risk – if TIF falls short, it will likely be basic municipal 
functions that bear the cost. In jurisdictions with strong debt ratings, the potentially substantial 
risk of backing bonds with the general fund can result in a lower interest rate, and thus lower cost 
of borrowing. However, where local government bonds are closer to “junk” status, a better 
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interest rate may well be had through cordoning off TIF proceeds into revenue bonds. In many 
places however, general obligation bonds require voter approval, which can serve as a substantial 
political brake.  
 
4.9.2. Revenue Bonds            
          TIF, PILOT, or revenue bonds are the primary debt alternative to general obligation bonds. 
Revenue bonds are issued in anticipation of being paid off by a particular income source, in this 
instance TIF. A primary benefit of revenue bonds is that the issuing jurisdiction’s risk is limited 
to the TIF district. However, as there is no further backing from the general fund, the cost of 
borrowing is likely to be higher unless if the issuer has a poor credit rating. Further, even though 
the general fund is not formally responsible to fill an underperformance gap, many issuers will 
either feel political or policy pressure to make up any gap, as the jurisdiction will not want future 
revenue bonds to have junk status. Finally, revenue bonds have the advantage in some states of 
not counting against state debt ceilings.  
In addition to a federal tax exemption on interest payments, TIF related bond issues more 
generally have the benefit of allowing TIF funded improvements to be constructed up front. If 
the theory is accepted that TIF improvements should spur further incremental growth beyond 
their financial cost, then the more quickly these improvements can be constructed, the better. 
However there are many instances where instead of being a self-financing proposition, TIF is a 
deadweight loss subsidy. The key calculation then is whether the revenue gains that can be 
generated by financing improvements upfront exceeds the cost of borrowing and the risk of 
underperformance (Weber, 2013).  
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4.9.3. Pay-as-you-go 
Where jurisdictions find in the negative for the previous question, or are more risk 
adverse, or are limited by statute or policy, the primary alternative is pay-as-you-go. In most 
cases pay-as-you-go entails a TIF district being approved, followed by the creation of a 
prioritized list of TIF improvements. As increment is generated for the TIF fund, that fund will 
be used to allocate money to projects in the order of priority. While pay-as-you-go eliminates the 
previously discussed risks associated with both general obligation and revenue bonds, the 
generation of increment is likely to be back loaded in the later years of a TIF district, meaning 
that improvements intended to spur further growth may not arrive for years. In many instances, 
the lost increment through delayed improvements may well exceed the borrowing cost up front. 
To solve this potential loss problem, some jurisdictions allow for developer 
reimbursement. Here a private developer will pay for improvements upfront with the promise of 
being repaid from the TIF fund as increment is generated. Usually the developer’s costs will be 
included in their larger project loans. Thus the above mentioned borrowing risks associated with 
general obligation and revenue bonds are shifted to the developer. However with developer 
reimbursement the issue becomes whether TIF was even necessary in the first place. If the 
developer had the means to afford the project then the concept of but-for may not be satisfied 
and the TIF reimbursement is simply a subsidy to a project that would have gone ahead in the 
much the same way absent the subsidy. 
In the venue context any of these payment and borrowing forms can exist depending on 
the statutory bounds, available debt limits, tolerance for risk, and deal-specific bargaining 
outcomes. The developer reimbursement form of pay-as-you-go has been seen in the ambitious 
Victory Park real estate development surrounding the Dallas arena discussed in subsequent 
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chapters, while revenue TIF bonds have more recently made up the overwhelming contribution 
to Detroit’s Little Caesar’s Arena (as discussed in the Detroit case study). General obligation 
bonds intended to be repaid through TIF were central to the failed Boston Olympic Stadium plan 
(Ryan, 2015).  
 
4.10. ALLOWABLE PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS 
TIF statutes generally specify what increment proceeds (through either debt issues or 
pay-as-you-go) can be spent on. This study collected data on six categories of publicly owned 
improvements particularly relevant to the facility context: public infrastructure, public 
beautification, land acquisition, site preparation, parking structures, and soft development costs. 
 
Table 22.  
Allowable Public Improvements by Jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction Public 
Infra. 
Public 
Beaut. 
Parking 
Structures 
Land 
Acquisition 
Site 
Preparation 
Planning or 
Engineering 
Ariz. N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Cal. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Colo. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
D.C. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Fla. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Ga Y Y Y Y Y Y 
lll. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Ind. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Kan. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
La. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Md. Y Y Y Y N N 
Mass. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Mich. Y Y Y Y Y N 
Minn. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Mo. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Nev. Y Y Y Y Y N 
N.J. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N.Y. Y Y Y N Y N 
N.C. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Ohio Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Okla. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Or. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Pa. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Tenn. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Tex. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
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Utah Y Y Y Y Y N 
Wash. Y Y Y N N Y 
Wis. Y Y Y Y Y Y  
27 27 27 25 25 22 
Ala. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Conn. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Del. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Ky. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R.I. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Va. Y Y Y Y Y Y  
6 6 6 6 6 6 
 
 
4.10.1. Public Infrastructure 
Public infrastructure refers to any publicly owned infrastructure improvement that is not 
primarily used to visually improve the public realm, although there is inevitable overlap. Parking 
is also under its own heading. Relevant to the venue context, this category includes works such 
as roads, sewers, utilities, bridges, lighting, sidewalks, and light rail. Most often these 
infrastructure elements will be found in publicly owned rights of way. More generally, this 
category of infrastructure investments represent the building blocks of a new neighborhood – a 
previously blighted area that sees a venue development will require major infrastructure repair 
and replacement. Every jurisdiction (meaning all but Arizona) in the data set allows for TIF to be 
allocated to this broadly conceived form of public infrastructure. 
 
4.10.2 Public Beautification 
All jurisdictions in the data set also allow for public beautification to be funded by TIF. 
Public beautification includes infrastructure intended to improve the public realm and make an 
area more attractive to multi-modal traffic. This can include streetscape improvements (sidewalk 
widening, public furniture, indented parking, decorative paving, and banners), trees and 
landscaping, parks, pathways, and roadway descriptions. These improvements can in theory help 
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make an otherwise bland and unappealing area into a destination in which people will want to 
spend time and money. For a venue project intended to transform a neighborhood, these visual 
elements are especially crucial.  
 
4.10.3. Parking Garages 
The importance of parking to venues makes it worth its own improvement category. All 
TIF using jurisdictions in the data set allow for TIF to be directed to public parking structure 
costs. While significant event parking is generally required for major professional sports 
facilities, outside of event periods, surface lots often sit empty. Depending on the volume of 
events, parking structures may not be financially viable, but allow parking spaces to be stacked 
and free surface lots for construction. In turn, parking deserts can gain more vibrancy in non-
event periods and a more cohesive neighborhood can emerge. A particularly well-conceived 
parking garage can even include retail uses at ground level to facilitate an active streetscape. 
Thus a TIF investment in public parking structures can fill a valuable gap between what the 
market can support and the best outcome for catalyzing neighborhood development – the more 
quickly surface lots can be built on, the more quickly activity outside of event periods (and 
increment) can be generated.  
 
4.10.4. Land Acquisition 
As discussed in the eminent domain section, land assembly can be a substantial challenge 
for major facility and real estate development projects. TIF funds can be used to buy parcels – 
whether through negotiated purchases or eminent domain – to complete assembly sufficient for 
the envisioned project. Since publicly owned lands are generally not subject to property taxes, 
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the point of assembly is either for a publicly owned facility, or to transfer assembled parcels to a 
private developer to maximize future increment. Thirty-one jurisdictions with TIF statutes in the 
data set permit TIF funds to be used for land acquisition by public authorities.  
 
4.10.5. Site Preparation 
Thirty-one jurisdictions in the data set also allow for TIF funds to be allocated towards 
some or all site preparation costs. Site preparation can include environmental remediation, 
demolition, utility relocation, excavation, land clearing, and testing. Many brownfield sites will 
require substantial site preparation investments to make them development ready and 
competitive with greenfields. For developers weighing returns on a range of prospective 
investments, public contributions to site preparation can both tip the financial return scales to an 
urban site, as well as expedite projects with an unclear timeframe. For a venue development, an 
already prepared site can bring quicker development.  
 
4.10.6. Soft/Consultant Costs 
Almost all projects and districts will have a variety of soft costs attached. These costs are 
most commonly incurred for external planning, engineering, architecture, real estate, parking, 
and environmental consultants, as well as TIF administration. Twenty-eight jurisdictions in the 
data set permit at least some public soft expenses to be covered by TIF funds.  
 
4.11. ALLOWABLE PRIVATE IMPROVEMENTS 
Some jurisdictions allow for TIF monies to be allocated for private infrastructure related 
improvements. However while almost all TIF statutes in the data set permit TIF diversion to fund 
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public improvements, a minority of jurisdictions allow the seven categories of private 
improvement costs covered in this study: new construction, renovation or rehabilitative 
construction, soft/consultant costs, parking structures, beautification, privately owned 
infrastructure on private rights of way, and site preparation. Note that private land acquisition is 
not included in the category list as my review did not identify any jurisdictions in which this 
form of TIF allocation is permitted. 
 
Table 23.  
Allowable Private Improvement Costs by Jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction New 
Private 
Buildings 
Renovated 
Private 
Buildings 
Private 
Soft 
Costs 
Private 
Parking 
Structures 
Private 
Beaut. 
Private ROW 
Infra. 
Private 
Site Prep. 
Ariz. N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Cal. N N N N N N N 
Colo. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
D.C. N N N N N N N 
Fla. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Ga. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
lll. N Y Y N N N Y 
Ind. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Kan. N N N N N N N 
La. N N N N N N N 
Md. N N N Y N N N 
Mass. N N N N N N N 
Mich. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Minn. N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Mo. N N N N N N N 
Nev. N N N N N N N 
N.J. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N.Y. N N N N N N N 
N.C. N N N N N N N 
Ohio Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Okla. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Or. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Pa. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Tenn. N N N N N N N 
Tex. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Utah N N N N N N N 
Wash. N N N N N N N 
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Wis. N N N Y N N Y  
11 13 13 14 12 12 14 
Ala. N N N N N N N 
Conn. N Y Y N Y N Y 
Del. N N N N N N N 
Ky. Y Y Y N Y Y Y 
R.I. N N N N N N N 
Va. N N N N N N N  
1 2 2 0 2 1 2 
 
 
4.11.1. New Construction 
A total of 12 states in the data set authorize TIF increment to be dedicated to new private 
construction projects. This is a direct subsidy of new private construction, but implicitly with an 
eye to make financially feasible projects that otherwise would not be. This category of provision 
is the most viable path to directly subsidizing a privately owned venue development. 
 
4.11.2. Renovation and Rehabilitative Construction 
Fifteen states in the data set will allow TIF to be directed to renovation and rehabilitation 
of already existing structures. As many modern and urban stadium related projects attempt to 
incorporate historical structures into their design (notable examples include Baltimore’s Camden 
Yards and San Diego’s Petco Park), where this form of TIF subsidy is permitted, it can be quite 
useful in the venue context.  
 
4.11.3. Soft/Consulting Costs 
In some cases private development parties will experience duplicative soft and consulting 
costs to those incurred by public bodies. Fifteen jurisdictions in this paper’s data set allow for 
soft costs to be reimbursed to private parties. In jurisdictions where these costs cannot be covered 
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by TIF funds for private parties, there is an incentive for the public sector to formally take on as 
much as possible to allow for more permissive reimbursement.  
 
4.11.4. Parking Structures 
Fourteen jurisdictions allow for increment to fund privately owned parking structures. 
Where these structures cannot be both privately owned and funded by TIF, there are two likely 
effects: surface lots will remain longer until real estate values and development demand become 
sufficiently lucrative for construction, and public authorities will feel more pressure to construct 
publicly owned structures if the option of closing a cost gap for a private structure through TIF is 
made more difficult.  
 
4.11.5. Beautification 
Fourteen jurisdictions in the data set allow for private beautification projects to be funded 
through TIF. Such projects will share similar characteristics to public projects, although these 
will be on private rights of way. A likely allocation for these funds will be for landscaping and 
street interfacing required by the local government development approval. 
 
4.11.6. Private Infrastructure 
Although sharing some similarities with the broadly conceived public infrastructure 
category, private infrastructure focuses more on connections to, and integration with, municipal 
infrastructure from private property – utilities, roads, lighting, and pedestrian access. Thirteen 
jurisdictions in the data set allow for these types of private infrastructure costs to be covered 
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through TIF funds. Again, subsidizing these improvements goes to closing a prospective 
financial feasibility gap. 
 
4.11.7. Site Preparation 
Much the same applies here as with the discussion of public site improvement as well as 
the discussion of financial gap closure. The primary difference here is that instead of preparing 
publicly owned land, or acquiring and preparing land for development and then transferring it to 
the private sector, the TIF jurisdiction could directly fund preparation of privately held land. 
While in theory the TIF jurisdiction intending on assisting a private party can get around a 
statutory bar through expropriation and shell corporations, the explicit power for a direct subsidy 
provides more planning flexibility. Sixteen jurisdictions in the data set allow for TIF to fund site 
preparation on privately held land. 
 
4.12. LAND USE 
There are three primary land use categories that state TIF statutes generally permit TIF 
districts to be created in that are of interest to the stadium context: mixed, commercial, and 
residential. The overwhelming trend in facility ancillary development has been towards mixed-
use development, but within that development there can be projects that are exclusively 
residential or commercial. In this project’s data set, 30 jurisdictions allow for TIF use in mixed-
use zones, 32 in commercial zones, and 28 in residential zones.  
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Table 24. 
Permissible Land Use Zoning for TIF Districts 
Jurisdiction Mixed Commercial Residential 
Ariz. N/A N/A N/A 
Cal. Y Y Y 
Colo. Y Y Y 
D.C. Y Y Y 
Fla. Y Y Y 
Ga. Y Y Y 
lll. Y Y Y 
Ind. Y Y N 
Kan. N Y N 
La. N Y Y 
Md. Y Y Y 
Mass. Y Y Y 
Mich. Y Y Y 
Minn. Y Y Y 
Mo. Y Y Y 
Nev. Y Y Y 
N.J. Y Y Y 
N.Y. Y Y Y 
N.C. Y Y N 
Ohio Y Y Y 
Okla. Y Y Y 
Or. Y Y Y 
Pa. Y Y Y 
Tenn. Y N Y 
Tex. Y Y Y 
Utah Y Y Y 
Wash. Y Y Y 
Wis. Y Y Y  
25 26 24 
Ala. Y Y Y 
Conn. Y Y N 
Del. Y Y Y 
Ky. Y Y N 
R.I. N Y Y 
Va. Y Y Y  
5 6 4 
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4.13. LENGTH LIMITATIONS 
There is a wide range of TIF district lengths across the jurisdictions in the data set. Where 
maximum lengths are defined, the range is between five and 50 years. However 10 jurisdictions 
do not have specific limits on TIF district length, although some outline that length will be 
specific to a TIF agreement or plan (DC, Tennessee, and Utah), or that the TIF district terminates 
once costs are fully paid (Florida). At least four jurisdictions allow for extensions that can 
significantly lengthen lifespans (three to four times) and – as increment generation will typically 
be back loaded – increase the increment captured. The ability for TIF districts to be modified or 
extended can also be seen as some retention of political control by authorizing bodies, especially 
where the TIF authorizing body differs from the governing body. This power is again reinforced 
by the later years of a TIF district likely to be more valuable in gross and present value terms.  
Table 25.  
TIF District Lifespan by Jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction Length (Initial Years/Extension of Years) 
Ariz. N/A 
Cal. 45 
Colo. 25 
D.C. TIF agreement specific 
Fla. 20-40 
Ga. Until costs paid 
lll. 23/35 
Ind. 25 
Kan. 20 
La. 30 
Md. N/A 
Mass. 5/20 
Mich. 30 
Minn. 26 
Mo. 23 
Nev. 30 
N.J. 20 
N.Y. No limit 
N.C. 30 
Ohio 10/30 
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Okla. 25 
Or. N/A 
Pa. 20 
Tenn. Specific to plan 
Tex. None 
Utah Agreement specific  
Wash. None 
Wis. 27/40 
Ala. 30 
Conn. 50 
Del. 30 
Ky. 20-40 
R.I. 25 
Va. 30 
 
The policy balance in TIF district length is between enough time to create sufficient 
increment to pay for planned improvements and to prevent an overly drawn-out TIF district from 
failing to deliver upon longer term net benefit to general revenues and thus being predatory on 
the general fund. While a jurisdiction may in theory wish to diligently guard against the 
possibility of a predatory TIF district, this tendency will in many instances be weighed against 
ensuring there will be sufficient increment to pay back TIF debt and to guard against volatility. 
Thus, beyond the retention of political control, this ability to alter district length to potentially 
create more increment for debt service is another reason for variable TIF sunsets.  
 
4.14. LIMITATIONS 
 The primary limitation of this chapter is the coding of variables on a “yes or no” basis. 
While this coding allows for effective comparison between jurisdictions, it is probable that some 
degree of statutory nuance has been lost. For instance, some states have multiple TIF frameworks 
with different scopes and inclusions – leaving coding to generally reflect the most inclusive 
outcome. However more complex coding may have undermined the feasibility of this chapter 
 228 
 
more generally. Likewise, as the illustration of particular statutory sections is meant as a counter 
to provide some opportunity to consider framing and nuance. A second notable limitation is the 
absence of Canadian data. Three Canadian provinces permit TIF, although venue TIF is only 
present in two. 
 
4.15. DISCUSSION  
This overview of state level TIF statute components reveals certain areas where there is 
broad consensus between statutes, and many more variables in which divergence prevails. When 
defining a “very strong” consensus as the presence of a variable in 30 or more jurisdictions in the 
data set, “strong” as 25 to 29, and “moderate” as 20 to 24, there are 11 variables with a very 
strong consensus, eight with a strong consensus, and only three in the moderate category. 
Thus, the lowest common denominator “very strong” consensus TIF statute will allow for 
municipalities to create TIF districts and select projects to allocate increment to, the increment 
will be limited to property taxes and both site specific and area wide TIF projects can be pursued. 
However, TIF funds can exclusively be used on public improvements, specifically infrastructure, 
beautification, parking structures, land acquisition, and site preparation. Finally, the very strong 
consensus statute allows TIF to be used mixed-use and commercial zones. If strong consensus 
variables are added-in, then the statute would also require public hearings, allow counties to 
create TIF districts, as well as permit the use of eminent domain, spending on soft costs, revenue 
bonds, and pay-as-you-go structures, the overlay of special assessments, and residential zoning.  
At the same time, there are important components that are absent from most jurisdictions 
– namely the funding of private improvements, but-for and quantitative blight tests, financial or 
feasibility studies, and the inclusion of sales taxes or PILOTs. These exclusions trend towards 
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making the creation of TIF districts more procedurally permissive, but restricting both the money 
available to spend and what it can be spent on. 
For the venue context there are several key takeaways. First, the absence of sales TIF 
availability in most jurisdictions closes off the largest source of potential revenue, but also the 
most volatile form of TIF. Second, the general absence of substantive restrictions on TIF creation 
means that if proponents and political actors want to use TIF in the context of a venue deal, then 
they will likely have the option to do so. Third and finally, the limitation of TIF spending to 
public improvements means that TIF will either be a subsidy to address public infrastructure 
needs for a facility with perhaps an overlaying special assessment for certain private 
infrastructure, or that the venue will need to be publicly owned to directly use TIF. The latter 
outcome, like tax-exempt bonds, is something of a perverse incentive for public ownership and 
subsidization of professional sports venues.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 230 
 
REFERENCES 
 
53 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 6930. 
 
65 Ill. Comp. Stat. §5/11-74.4. 
 
Ala. Code § 11-99. 
 
Allison, W. (2014). How to Build Another Uptown. D Magazine. Retrieved from 
https://www.dmagazine.com/publications/d-magazine/2014/may/the-next-uptown-dallas/  
 
Andreana, M. (2016, February 4). Connecticut TIF Districts Understanding Public Act No. 15-
57. Pullman & Comley. Retrieved from https://www.gfoact.org/images/customer-
files/TIFDistricts02-04-16.pdf  
 
Byrne, P. F. (2016). Have Post-Kelo Restrictions on Eminent Domain Influenced State 
Economic Development?. Economic Development Quarterly, 31(1), 81-91. 
 
Cal. Com. Code § 3300. 
 
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-25-101. 
 
Conn. Pub. Act No. 15-57. An Act Establishing Tax Increment Financing Districts. Retrieved 
from https://www.cga.ct.gov/2015/act/pa/pdf/2015PA-00057-R00SB-00677-PA.pdf  
 
Council of Development Finance Agencies. TIF State by State Map. Retrieved from 
https://www.cdfa.net/cdfa/tifmap.nsf/index.html 
 
Council of Development Finance Agencies. Summary Table: Tax Increment Financing State 
Statutes. Retrieved from 
https://www.cdfa.net/cdfa/cdfaweb.nsf/ord/tifsummary.html/$file/Statute%20Summary.pdf  
 
Dallas Department of Planning and Development. (2016). 2016 TIF District Status Report. 
Retrieved from 
https://www.dallascounty.org/department/plandev/documents/2016TIFDistrictStatusReport.pdf 
 
Del. Code tit. 22 § 17. 
 
D.C. Code § 2-1217. 
 
Fla. Const. art. X, § 6. 
 
Fla. Stat. § 163.330-463. 
 
Ga. Code Ann. § 36-44. 
 
 231 
 
Gayer, T., Drukker, A., & Gold, A. K. (2016). Tax-exempt municipal bonds and the financing of 
professional sports stadiums. Economic Studies at Brookings. 
 
Griefer, N. (2005). An Elected Official’s Guide to Tax Increment Financing. Government 
Finance Officers Association. Retrieved from 
https://www.gfoa.org/sites/default/files/EOGTIF.pdf   
 
Gromacki, J. (2014, August 14). A Madison Approach to TIF Feasibility Analysis. City of 
Madison. Retrieved from 
https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/misc/lc/study/2014/1192/020_august_14_2014_meeting_10_00
_a_m_413_north/gromacki 
 
Hoyt, L. (2005). Planning through compulsory commercial clubs: Business improvement 
districts. Economic Affairs, 25(4), 24-27. 
 
Ind. Code § 36-7-14.  
 
Johnson, C. L., & Kriz, K. A. (2001). A review of state tax increment financing laws. Tax 
increment financing and economic development: Uses, structures, and impact, 31, 38. 
 
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 12-1770-1775. 
 
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 26-501. 
 
Kentucky Economic Development Finance Authority (KEDFA). (2008). Louisville Arena 
Project Revenue Bonds Series 2008. Louisville Arena Authority.  
 
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 
Kenyon, D., & Langley, A. (2010). Payments in Lieu of Taxes: Balancing Municipal and 
Nonprofit Interests. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. Retrieved from https://community-
wealth.org/sites/clone.community-wealth.org/files/downloads/report-kenyon-langley.pdf 
 
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 65-680-700. 
 
La. Stat. Ann. § 47:8001-8027.  
 
Long, J. G. (2013). Public-private partnerships for major league sports facilities. Routledge. 
 
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40Q, § 1-4. 
 
Md. Code Ann. § 14-201-214. 
 
Mead, S., & Cole, A. (1998). Eminent Domain in Tax Increment Financing Districts and Other 
Redevelopment Areas: A Developer's Perspective. Urban Lawyer, 30, 619. 
 
 232 
 
Mich. Comp. Laws § 57-2018. 
 
Mich. Comp. Laws § 125.2651-2672. 
 
MI Tax Increment Finance Authority Act § 125.1801 et seq. 
 
Minn. Stat. § 469.174-469.179.  
 
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 99.800-865, 
 
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 279. 382-685. 
 
N.J. Rev. Stat. § 52:27D-459-489. 
 
N.Y. G.M.U. Law § 18-970. 
 
N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §159-6. 
 
Ohio Rev. Code § 5709.40, 5709.43, 5709.73, 5709.75. 
 
Okla. Stat. tit. 62, § 850, 853. 
 
Or. Rev. Stat. § 457. 
 
R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-33.2. 
 
Ryan, G. (2015, May 28). Bond Experts: Boston 2024 Financing Plan Contradicts Vow to Avoid 
Public Funds. Boston Business Journal. Retrieved from 
https://www.bizjournals.com/boston/news/2015/05/28/bond-experts-boston-2024-financing-
plan.html 
 
Smith, L. A. (2009). Alternatives to property tax increment finance programs: Sales, income, and 
nonproperty tax increment financing. Urban Lawyer, 41, 705. 
 
Sroka, R. (2019). Getting STIF [ed]: Louisville’s Yum! Center, sales-tax increment financing, 
and megaproject underperformance. Urban Affairs Review, 1078087419830527. 
 
Stafford, J. (2017). Sales Tax Increment Financing in Indiana: Putting HB1144 Into Historical 
Perspective. Indiana Fiscal Policy Institute. Retrieved from 
http://indianafiscal.org/resources/IFPI%20session%20report%20No.%204%20.pdf  
 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-20-201-214. 
 
Tex. Tax Code § 311.  
 
Utah Code § 17 B-4. 
 233 
 
 
Va. Code Ann. § 58.1-4.1. 
 
Wash. Rev. Code § 39.89. 
 
Weber, R. (2013). Tax increment financing in theory and practice. In Financing economic 
development in the 21st century (pp. 297-315). Routledge. 
 
Wis. Stat. § 66.1105. 
 
 
 
 
  
 234 
 
 
CHAPTER 5. TIF, BUT-FOR, AND DEVELOPER CAPTURE IN THE  
 
DALLAS ARENA DISTRICT4 
 
 
5.1. PURPOSE 
This Chapter broadly evaluates the Dallas Sports Arena TIF District (SATD) that was 
created to reimburse public improvements surrounding the American Airlines Center (AAC), as 
well as the Victory Park real estate development that has been constructed within the SATD 
since the arena’s 2001 opening. Specifically, this study views the SATD through two common 
TIF criticisms that the literature has identified as especially valid: that many TIF projects lack a 
legitimate but-for element and that sub-optimal transparency allows projects to escape sufficient 
scrutiny.  
Beyond the categories TIF discussed in Chapter 2, this study specifically builds upon the 
work that has covered the issue of TIF disproportionately serving the interests of private 
developers (see e.g., Briffault, 2010; Lefcoe, 2011). This avenue is an extension of the public 
choice based theory on rent-seeking and regulatory capture. As noted in Chapter 2, the former 
entails the extraction of rents by private actors that exceed the value of wealth or productivity 
created by those actors. The latter outlines that private interests can become the dominant 
objective of public regulatory agencies due to the cost-benefit imbalance between prospective 
capturing actors (with high potential gains) and the general public (with a relatively minimal and 
                                                          
4 A version of this Chapter was published as: Sroka, R. (2017). Pyrrhic Victory: Tax Increment Financing, but for, 
and Developer Capture in the Dallas Arena District. Marquette Sports Law Review, 28, 201. 
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diffused stake in outcomes) (see Laffont and Tirole, 1991; Levine and Forrence, 1990). As 
explained, in combination with basic bargaining theory, the use of TIF in the SATD can be fairly 
well understood through these aspects of the literature and its theoretical parents.  
After a conceptual overview of TIF, TIF in Texas, and local Dallas TIF policy, the SATD 
story is set out prior to an analysis of results through these two critical lenses. This chapter 
argues that the weak legal standard of but-for in Texas has allowed TIF to subsidize SATD 
projects that would have gone ahead in much the same way absent TIF. Further, the transparency 
issue has manifested itself in a form of regulatory capture where the developer parties have 
garnered the spoils at the cost of the greater polity through timely leveraging of bargaining 
power, contractual structure, and alignment of interests with the local economic development 
agency. Ironically, the built-in failure of the framework emerging from this developer capture 
has provided the SATD its most legitimate claim to but-for in resolving a completely 
manufactured brake on development and area success. 
This chapter has several primary findings. First, Dallas has seen TIF subsidize an arena 
development project that probably would have gone ahead similarly absent the TIF subsidy, thus 
showing but-for to be largely absent. Second, TIF has been a flexible instrument to correct 
mistakes in the initial development structure over a decade after the arena deal. Third, the 
inclusion of TIF in the first place, as well as the use of TIF as a corrective agent, also bring forth 
major issues of transparency. In particular, the arena proponents can be seen as having captured 
the local economic development agency to do its own bidding (through TIF funding) at the 
expense of the broader public interest, placing a different lens on the role of local growth 
coalitions discussed in Chapter 2 (and indeed throughout this dissertation). 
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5.1.1. Method 
This chapter uses a snowball technique to find and synthesize documents. These 
documents are primarily sourced from government and media. The government review 
encompasses city, county, and state government sources, including those from local economic 
development authorities and planning departments. Particularly important were the master 
development and related agreements for the arena, which were obtained through a freedom of 
information request. The media review collects newspaper, opinion, and magazine sources from 
local and national outlets. Particular emphasis was placed on sources interviewing or quoting key 
actors (such as politicians, developers, and team related parties) which were used to provide 
support for contemporaneous actor intent. Complementing the extensive discussion in Chapter 2, 
there was also a literature and statue review, which included academic and policy works relevant 
to the Texas and Dallas contexts, as well as the Texas Tax Code and relevant local ordinances. 
 
5.2. TIF IN TEXAS AND DALLAS 
 
5.2.1. TIF Statute  
As coded in Chapter 4, Chapter 311 of the Texas Tax Code governs TIF in Texas. Both 
municipalities and counties can create TIF zones, initiated through either private petition or local 
government discretion. While focused on property tax increment, sales-tax increment may also 
be included in a TIF zone pursuant to §311.0123. The two core traditional components of TIF, 
but-for and blight, are respectively addressed by §311.003 through 311.005. The former 
describes that a “reinvestment zone” requires local government determination “that development 
or redevelopment would not occur solely through private investment in the reasonably 
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foreseeable future” and that an ordinance creating a “reinvestment zone” must clearly describe 
the geographical boundaries, create a board of directors, as well as outline effective and 
termination dates for the zone.   
§311.005 then provides a number of avenues for a blight finding. At its most basic, only 
one of the blight sub-conditions needs to be made out in addition to the section’s general blight 
chapeau.5 Combined with the lack of further definition or detailed quantitative thresholds, the 
requirements are not difficult to meet and are evaluated in the subjective opinion of the 
jurisdiction. Yet there are additional paths, including a petition by property owners accounting 
for over 50% of assessed values in a proposed district, and for being a primarily open or 
undeveloped area substantially “impairing” the jurisdiction’s growth. This latter provision means 
that a greenfield site can be designated a TIF area, which literature has viewed as being less than 
best practices (see e.g., Knavel, 2002), and makes the test more one of underdevelopment than 
strictly blight. Finally, a reinvestment zone can be designated simply because an existing or 
proposed mass transit rail system passes through, which further simplifies the process for transit-
oriented development (Tex. Tax Code, §311.005). 
§311.006 places some restrictions on the composition of a TIF zone, the most notable 
being a cap for TIF at 15% of a jurisdiction’s assessed value. This precludes a Chicago-like 
situation, where over 30% of the city was inside of a TIF district as of 2014 (Wilson, 2015). 
§311.015 explicitly limits TIF bond repayment to funds from the TIF zone the debt was incurred 
for, meaning that there is no claim against general revenues of the issuing jurisdiction. 
Effectively limiting the debt pool to the TIF area reduces local government risk, but makes the 
                                                          
5 The §311.005 chapeau reads: “substantially arrest or impair the sound growth of the municipality or county 
designating the zone, retard the provision of housing accommodations, or constitute an economic or social liability 
and be a menace to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare in its present condition and use because of the 
presence of…” 
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debt a more risky proposition for investors (see Heins, 1962). In turn, interest rates will be higher 
and the project becomes more costly to the local government in the long-term.  
The Texas TIF law may however be more notable for the restrictions not present. First, 
there is no time limit for a TIF district, allowing a jurisdiction to reinvest increment within the 
TIF zone indefinitely, important because the eventual reversion to general revenues is a 
commonly cited benefit to TIF. Also absent is a sufficient limit on the but-for test, which is 
solely and subjectively determined by the local authority, meaning that there is little objective 
limit. The obvious issue is that TIF may merely be capturing increment that was likely or even 
certain to occur in any event as opposed to spurring new investment. Similarly, the Texas statute 
lacks quantitative means for evaluating the presence of the blight pre-requisites that are present, 
allowing local interpretation whims and preferences to prevail in both traditional core 
components of a TIF use test. Indeed relative to the statutes inventoried in Chapter 4, Texas can 
broadly be seen as being on the permissive end. 
Still Texas does incorporate some less explicit TIF brakes. First, as TIF does not capture 
state revenues, the intent of the legislature may have simply been to provide local governments 
leeway to use TIF within the 15% cap as a percentage of assessed value, trusting that local 
governments would have the incentive to develop best practices from collective experience. 
Likewise, participation in a TIF zone by overlaying jurisdictions such as school districts and 
counties is negotiated, meaning that it is up for the TIF proposing jurisdiction to sell the benefits 
of capture to an inherently skeptical audience. Without overlaying capture, TIF has been seen as 
less attractive relative to other economic development schemes (Lefcoe and Swenson, 2014), 
meaning that counties and school districts can act as a further check beyond the assessed value 
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share cap. The importance of a check on overlaying capture unwanted by school districts will be 
placed into further focus in the Detroit case study. 
 
5.2.2. Case Law on Texas TIF 
Although the 30 years since TIF’s arrival in Texas have seen numerous TIF-related 
lawsuits, none have provided substantial direct guidance on the issue of but-for. The most 
interesting case from a blight and but-for perspective concerned the TIF subsidization of a 
Cabela’s in a prosperous and fast growing area of Fort Worth (ironically as we will see, on land 
bought from Hillwood Development) (Montgomery, 2014). Here the legitimacy of the §311.005 
designation based upon a stream and pond on the property was unsuccessfully challenged by a 
citizen’s group, although only the issue of blight was tried (McGraw, 2006). While in the context 
of the traditional TIF concept of blight, the conditions found in Fort Worth do not pass muster, 
this decision highlights the many possible routes through which the Texas blight test has 
effectively become one of underdevelopment.  
In terms of reviewing perceived local government over-permissiveness in TIF zone 
creation, the appellate court in Hardwicke v. City of Lubbock (2004) outlined that absent 
arbitrary or “capricious” and willful “disregard of the facts and circumstances,” a local decision 
will be maintained. Applied to the but-for element in the creation of a TIF zone, it appears that 
any challenge will have the substantial hurdles of a wide scope within which local government 
decisions will be deemed defensible, as well as a broader judicial reluctance to intervene in such 
determinations. 
The relatively limited case law on Texas TIF is complemented by a series of Advisory 
Opinions from the Attorney General’s Office. Of the 15 plus opinions on record, the most 
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relevant to the SATD context outlines that a petitioned for TIF zone must meet the standard of 
“unproductive, underdeveloped or blighted” in §311.005. However the assessment of whether 
this standard has been met is in the “good faith” judgment of the local government, although 
subject to (the relatively weak standard of) judicial review (Texas Municipal League, 2015, p. 
238). Yet despite over 15 unique issues being addressed through these opinions, there is no 
coverage of but-for, although it may implicitly be seen in the same way as blight.  
 
5.2.3. Literature on TIF in Texas and Dallas 
There have been several works on TIF in Dallas and other major Texas cities. Loessberg 
(2012) evaluated the relative roles and merits of TIF, tax abatements, and HUD Section 108 loan 
guarantees in the Dallas in-town housing program, an initiative designed to convert underused 
office space to both populate urban areas and reduce the glut of office square footage on the 
market. Although TIF was intended to be a supporting instrument, Loessberg argues that TIF has 
been by far the most successful form of assistance, in large part due to its flexibility in being 
adapted to the infrastructure needs of a particular project.  
In a survey of Dallas TIF district outcomes using data from the City’s Office of 
Economic Development (OED), Bland and Overton (2016) found that public participation 
through TIF was an essential element to TIF success. In particular, they argued that the public 
side allowed for value maximization through leveraging the impact of private investment via 
“operational and institutional knowledge” and project credibility (2016, pp. 431-432). This built 
upon their previous work evaluating the impact of the post-2008 recession on TIF zone 
assessment growth (Overton and Bland, 2014). Here Overton and Bland (2014) concluded that 
pre and post-recession private investment in a TIF zone was strongly related to the total planned 
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TIF expenditures over the district’s lifetime as opposed to annual disbursements. The recession 
years however saw a different pattern, whereby public outlays of TIF dollars became an 
important source of tangible reassurance to developers of the City’s ongoing investment in TIF 
success. The findings in both of these articles are quite relevant this chapter’s primary discussion 
concerning the SATD.  
At the statewide level, Scott (2013) found that adoption of TIF by neighboring 
jurisdictions had a measurable positive impact on TIF district size. Arvidson et al. (2001), in a 
high-level review and survey of TIF use across Texas, set out that TIF using jurisdictions have 
been fairly successful in their primary objectives of tax base expansion and business attraction. 
The authors here also noted an average private to public spending ratio of 8:1 and the majority of 
TIF projects being funded on some form of a pay-as-you-go basis, as well as TIF being more of a 
petition (as opposed to municipality) driven exercise in most jurisdictions. These findings are 
consistent with the early TIF experience in Dallas, the relative success of which has set the stage 
for significant TIF expansion since the article was written, including in the SATD at the core of 
this chapter.  
As for how Texas TIF compares across state lines, in addition to my own analysis based 
upon Chapter 4, the broader TIF literature has repeatedly placed Texas on the more permissive 
end of statutory TIF schemes (Arvidson et al., 2001; Farwell, 2005). However, because of this 
flexibility, the Texas framework has been cited as a template for solving issues in other 
jurisdictions. For instance, Lefcoe asserts that many of California’s TIF problems could be 
addressed by adopting the Texas process of negotiation with overlaying jurisdictions for their 
increment, and cap for increment percentage of a local government’s assessment base (see 
Lefcoe, 2012). This form of negotiation is further considered in Chapter 9. 
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5.2.4. City of Dallas TIF Policy 
Both the City and Dallas County have detailed TIF policies. The City policy outlines a 
scoring system for prospective TIF districts based on a series of financial and policy objectives, 
something akin to a traditional procurement process. The financial measures include up to 50 
points for new tax generation exceeding public investment, 20 points based on a review of 
financial projections, as well as 15 points for each of participation from overlaying jurisdictions 
and whether at least $100 million of new development will occur within five years (Dallas Office 
of Economic Development, 2009). The same document then scores policy benefits on eight 
criteria. Twenty-five points are available based on enhancement of “core City assets,” 20 points 
apiece can be had for “direct benefits” to distressed areas and enhancement of the public realm, 
10 points for affordable housing provision and design guidelines, and 5 points for impact on 
green space and compliance with affirmative action guidelines. Financial and policy scores are 
each maximized at 100 points, with a minimum of 70 points in each category needed to move 
forward. The City also requires a 10% affordable housing component for all TIF districts.  
While state statute has no TIF sunset requirement, the City standard is 20 years (2009). 
Where an extension of the City standard is contemplated, another list of boxes must (literally) be 
checked, these concerning new market conditions, extension of financial benefits, and 
preconditions. A TIF district can then be extended for a maximum of one further 10 year period, 
although the TIF plan can be amended on an ongoing basis in response to market conditions.  
Likewise worth noting is that sub-districts within existing TIF districts can be 
established. Here the expiry is linked to the sub-district creation date as opposed to the TIF 
district sunset (Tex. Tax Code, §311.005), a model that has been used in the SATD (see Dallas 
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Office of Economic Development, 2012a). New sub-districts can draw on the increment of more 
established districts for the remaining life of the senior district until development allows the new 
sub-district to generate greater (and implicitly self-sustaining) increment in its later years. This is 
effectively a TIF bond issue for a pay-as-you-go TIF model absent the risk of debt.  
 
5.2.5. Dallas County TIF Policy 
Dallas County’s policy is framed by its status as a participant in the TIF schemes of its 
constituent municipalities. As of December 2016, the County participated in 24 TIF districts, 17 
of which are within the City of Dallas, accounting for all but one of the City’s active TIF projects 
(Dallas Office of Economic Development, 2016). In evaluating prospective TIF participation, the 
County will first assess a proposal against five core gatekeeper criteria: statutory eligibility, an 
increase in County tax base by at least $15 million within three years of final plan approval, a 
present value analysis demonstrating additional tax revenues will equal forgone increment 
“within a reasonable period of time,” sufficient safeguards for the failure of proposed 
development to occur, and no diversion of firms or facilities from another County municipality 
(Dallas County, 2011, pp. 2-3). Of these requirements, the “no diversion” requirement is 
particularly notable for explicitly precluding predatory use of TIF within the County, but not 
extending a collaborative approach to neighboring counties, the absence of which some suggest 
predicates a race to the bottom (see Lefcoe, 2011). 
Upon passing these gatekeepers, the County can elect to provide up to 35% of increment 
with a further 10% able to be committed, up to a maximum of 75%, for meeting each of the 
following: location in a distressed area, an 8:1 ratio of increment to public investment over a 20 
year period, an exclusive purpose of creating at least 450 single-family homes with 35% or more 
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being affordable by HUD standards, facilitation of rapid transit use or trail extension, “regional 
economic implications,” and a determination that County participation will expedite proposed 
public investments by a minimum of two years (Dallas County, 2011, pp. 3-4). Although not all 
of these criteria are easily met, meeting some is not overly burdensome. The County will then 
more broadly consider impacts on transportation, services, the nature of the investment and 
development, geography, as well as the generation of sales and hotel taxes. With these latter two 
components, since sales and hotel tax increment are excluded from the County’s participation, 
the ability for a TIF district to offset property tax diversion through increased hotel and sales tax 
revenues seems especially pertinent.  
In Dallas, the natural brake on TIF risk is the County. A TIF project becomes far more 
powerful with County participation, but the County has a different incentive structure and far 
less of a vested stake than the Dallas OED in being viewed as successful. Instead the County has 
to evaluate a project as being beneficial in the long run to County revenues and if there is no but-
for threshold met, then its revenue is being transferred from non-Dallas City taxpayers to the 
City for no net benefit. Thus the extent of County participation can be seen as a less biased 
evaluation of but-for and to some extent a functional closing of the statutory but-for gap. 
 
5.3. THE AMERICAN AIRLINES CENTER AND TIF IN THE DALLAS SATD 
 
5.3.1. Overview of the Arena Framework and the SATD 
Passing a 1998 city-wide referendum by a mere 1,642 votes and completed in 2001, the 
AAC was financed and developed under an Arena Master Agreement by the City and the Center 
Operating Company (the COC), the latter a joint-venture between the arena’s two major league 
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tenants, the NHL Stars and NBA Mavericks. Following the referendum, the same year saw the 
creation of the SATD to reimburse infrastructure and public improvements in relation to arena 
development. Running parallel to the Stemmons Freeway and a DART light rail line, the original 
SATD ran roughly 2000 feet north and south of the arena, extending south to the edges of 
downtown and the infamous Texas School Book Depository (Dallas Office of Economic 
Development, 2012a). Formerly used for a railyard and power plant, 70% of the site was 
considered a highly contaminated brownfield (Dallas Office of Economic Development, 2013). 
The geography was also notable for its exclusion of entire blocks surrounded by included streets, 
although this is best explained by these blocks already being built-out with public housing and 
market apartments and the City seeing no point in capturing the non-arena related market 
development or the exempt public housing.   
TIF funds were not part of the formula for funding the arena itself, which instead saw a 
public contribution in the form of rental car and hotel taxes, with the remaining costs split 
between the Stars and Mavericks ownership groups (City of Dallas, 1997). Additional bonds for 
infrastructure were approved previous to the SATD, but insufficiently covered planned 
improvements. In terms of Texas Tax Code §311.005, the City went with a deteriorating 
structures blight determination, although any number of subsections could have been made out 
considering the legitimately blighted state of the area. Dallas County contributed one-third of 
County (and County-controlled Hospital District) increment for 10 years or until a net present 
value of $1.93 million was achieved (Dallas Office of Economic Development, 2012a). The 
Dallas Independent School District, seemingly a party where the benefit experienced would be 
more tenuously connected, allocated 50% of its increment with a sunset scheduled for 2013 
(2012a).  
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Alongside the SATD’s creation, the City entered into agreements with the COC for 
certain infrastructure improvements (primarily roadways) to be paid for from the TIF fund 
(2012a). Instead of borrowing against the projected increment through TIF bonds, the COC paid 
for these costs as they were incurred and received priority reimbursement plus agreed interest as 
increment was generated. As noted, the interest aspect makes this similar to borrowing from a 
financial perspective, but moves risk from the TIF zone and the City to the developer insofar as a 
priority reimbursement is only valuable if sufficient increment is created.    
Beyond the arena and TIF agreements also came three contracts and accompanying 
easements concerning parking rights (the PRAs) between the City, the COC, Hillwood 
Development Company (Hillwood), and the COC’s lender (Dallas Office of Economic 
Development, 2012b). The PRAs required 3,000 spaces on Hillwood controlled lots within the 
SATD and 841 of those spaces to be 400 feet or less from the arena (2012b). These PRAs also 
included an easement over the designated lots to the benefit of the COC, meaning that lots could 
only be released from the agreement for development upon COC approval. Further, the PRAs 
outlined that any subsequently displaced parking spaces had to be relocated on the designated 
parking lots prior to a City building permit or certificate of occupancy being issued (2012b). 
 
5.3.2. Initial Development in the SATD 
Victory Park, the 75 acre luxury real estate development adjoining the AAC, was the 
grand vision of Ross Perot Jr., the then Mavericks owner and principal of Hillwood. While the 
first phase of Victory brought hundreds of millions in assessed value to a blighted urban location, 
the project followed a common course for real estate in the late 2000s – insolvency. Accordingly 
some of its more ambitious elements were axed, including a 43-story Mandarin Orient hotel 
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(Schnurman, 2010). The stalling in progress, combined with overbuilt luxury components 
relative to market demand, contributed to a sterile and largely empty environment on non-event 
nights (2010). An almost exclusively upscale retail mix was also a poor match for the 
consumption tastes of both lunchtime and game-night traffic, further impacting the viability of 
retail and restaurant businesses (2010).  
The property tax picture was far less bleak however, with the OED claiming that assessed 
value increased by over 2,000% between 1998 and 2012 (2012a). The most significant year-
over-year increases occurred between 2006 and 2008, where anticipated captured value leapt 
from $37 million in 2005, to $163 million in 2006, $361 million in 2007, and $557 million in 
2008, before a decline consistent with the recession (2012a). This timeline runs parallel to the 
completion of the first major phase of Victory Park, including the W Hotel, several office towers, 
a 28 story residential tower, and multiple lower-rise apartment complexes (Dallas Office of 
Economic Development, 2016). These overwhelmingly high-end developments accounted for 
almost 800 apartments and condos, 250 hotel rooms and 200,000 square feet of retail space 
(Schnurman, 2010). 
The projects initially reimbursed concerned what was contemplated by the original TIF 
fund agreements, with approximately $32 million spent on road construction, extension or 
revitalization and the remainder of almost $5 million primarily going to storm drainage and the 
West End Plaza (Dallas Office of Economic Development, 2012a). The total cost of the 
reimbursement by the time of completion in 2012 was over $38 million, of which roughly $15 
million was interest (2012a). While interest has eaten a significant share of generated increment, 
the SATD has been able to fund its intended list of infrastructure projects with reduced risk 
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relative to a TIF bond issue (for instance, the post-2008 downside of would not have been 
experienced by the City on this project the same way as if debt had been issued). 
 
5.3.3. SATD Redux 2012 
The 2012 Amended TIF Plan (Amended Plan) is far more ambitious in scope and 
directed to address the very mixed development experience of Victory Park to date. Beyond 
major investments in the immediate vicinity of the AAC, the geography expanded to two entirely 
new sub-districts, Riverfront Gateway and West Dallas, with the original SATD being re-
designated as the Victory sub-district. The Amended Plan saw the Victory sub-district extended 
through 2028 and the new Riverfront Gateway and West Dallas sub-districts set to run until the 
end of 2042, with an earlier sunset possible for all sub-districts if the full project costs are paid 
(2012a). Dallas County also amended its participation – now the County provides 55% of 
increment in the new West Dallas and Riverfront Gateway sub-districts through 2029, and 
Victory sub-district increment has increased to 45% through 2022 (Dallas Office of Economic 
Development, 2016). 
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Figure 1. Sports Arena TIF District After 2012 Amendment 
 
Orange Victory sub-district 
Red Riverfront Gateway sub-district 
Green West Dallas sub-district 
Source: Dallas Office of Economic Development 
 
As seen above, Riverfront Gateway extends from the southwest edge of the Victory sub-
district, across the Trinity River and narrowly connecting to the West Dallas sub-district. This 
creative mapmaking has produced a new SATD that bears more than a passing resemblance to a 
gerrymandered political ward. When viewed in the context of the Amended Plan TIF spend 
where West Dallas accounts for a third of projected spending and Riverfront Gateway less than 
5% (Dallas Office of Economic Development, 2012a), the objective seems to be to leverage 
development in Victory Park for the benefit of West Dallas. In fact, the Amended Plan document 
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explicitly outlines that 10% of Victory increment will be reallocated to West Dallas (2012a), a 
traditionally poor, blighted, and contaminated neighborhood (see Wigglesworth, 2012).  
The Amended Plan had 10 primary goals, overwhelmingly focused on rectifying 
Victory’s previously mentioned planning and development shortcomings (Dallas Office of 
Economic Development, 2012a). With the former, the OED outlined that the street network was 
designed to move event traffic and cut-off Victory from neighboring clusters of development, 
with attendees having no reason to travel down the development’s commercial spine. Combined 
with a poorly designed retail landscape that failed to attract business from the event and office 
traffic Victory did garner (Schnurman, 2010), the development’s issues were punctuated by an 
absence of sufficient density, in large part due to the PRA restrictions. On a quantitative plane, 
the Amended Plan also proposed attracting new private investments totalling almost $1 billion, 
including at least 250,000 square feet of new retail space and 3,000 additional housing units, 
while ensuring that this time there was a diversity in retail, commercial, and residential mixes 
(Dallas Office of Economic Development, 2012a). With over 243,000 square feet of retail space 
and 3,151 residential units completed or under construction through 2016, these construction 
objectives are well on their way to being greatly exceeded (Dallas Office of Economic 
Development, 2016).  
The OED and City Planning Department believed that the SATD development objectives 
could be best facilitated through using increment to build parking structures to eliminate over 12 
acres of surface lots effectively mandated by the PRAs (2016). Thus, the overwhelming 
increment focus in the Amended Plan was on parking garages, with the two completed in 2014 
and 2015 lifting the SATD to over 3,600 garage spaces (Dallas Office of Economic 
Development, 2012b). One of these garages was built on the abandoned Mandarin Oriental site 
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and includes a street-facing retail component that will provide a more complete block of Victory 
Park Lane across from both the W Hotel and AT&T Plaza (the local attempt to replicate Times 
Square (Jones and Hunt, 2002), minus sustained vibrancy and human presence).   
Most of the remaining TIF spend has gone to street improvements focused on place-
making; sidewalk widening on key pedestrian thoroughfares to allow for flow and ancillary uses 
(such as patios), traffic calming, and bike lanes (Dallas Office of Economic Development, 2016). 
However the first almost $2.7 million of increment has flowed to reimbursing planning and 
consulting fees from the COC and Hillwood under the TIF grant program, authorized by 
§311.010 (h) of the Texas Tax Code (Dallas Office of Economic Development, 2012a). These 
priority allocations strongly relate to the discussions of but-for and capture below. 
 
5.4. CRITICAL LENSES OF TIF AND THE SATD 
 
5.4.1. But-For and Developer Capture 
In the most comprehensive review of six common TIF criticisms, Lefcoe isolates two 
interrelated sets of “convincing” issues, the first and most relevant to this paper being that a but-
for standard is often not adhered to, leading to developer-driven TIF projects that capture 
unnecessary subsidies (Lefcoe, 2011). Secondly, Lefcoe (2011) sets out that these transactions 
are often accompanied by a lack of public transparency that benefits the cause of welfare-seeking 
developers, as well as politicians and development agencies in pursuit of specific development 
and political objectives. In Dallas, both these criticisms exist accompanied by the transparency 
issue, but the local overlap lends to a better-organized conversation under the intertwined 
headings of but-for and developer capture.  
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5.4.2. But-For 
Starting with but-for, most jurisdictions that have an explicit but-for test set out that 
without public subsidy private investment would not occur at the site in the “reasonably 
foreseeable future” (2011, p. 467). With some tests the standard is weakened with caveats that 
development would not happen as quickly, or with the same scale and benefit to the public 
(2011). In Dallas, TIF is subject to the blanket test that but-for the incentives sought, the 
proposed project would be “substantially altered such that the economic returns to the city would 
be reduced or the project would not otherwise occur in the city” (Dallas Office of Economic 
Development, 2016b). This mirrors the state statutory standard, and as far as the strict language 
goes, this test is far from the most permissive end of the spectrum (see Farwell, 2005). However, 
strict language matters less than standards of interpretation and enforcement. 
  Lefcoe outlines that ideally but-for will be assessed with detailed financial data, checked 
by outside auditors, and then presented alongside specific explanations on why particular aspects 
of the development justify a TIF subsidy and why such a subsidy is the most efficient 
prospective use for public monies (Lefcoe, 2011). In Dallas, the OED provides in-depth and easy 
to access information on year-to-year TIF results, but the TIF plan explanation of how the but-for 
standard was measured and deemed met is lacking. Beyond outlining that the SATD was created 
to reimburse public improvements “necessary or beneficial for the development of the American 
Airlines Center and private development within the surrounding area, which such development 
or redevelopment would not otherwise occur solely through private investment in the reasonably 
foreseeable future,” there is no further detail on why TIF was necessary (Dallas Office of 
Economic Development, 2012a, p. 4). 
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  While the TIF plan imports the but-for language from §311.003 of the Texas Tax Code 
to meet the statutory standard and thus formal legality from a strict interpretation perspective, 
instead of satisfying that a detailed assessment of but-for has been undertaken, it merely 
highlights the permissive and subjective standard, as well as the lack of but-for enforcement in 
Texas. Although there have been multiple decisions on the issue of blight or underdevelopment, 
as noted, there has been a lack of judicial guidance on but-for. Where there has been direction on 
the TIF issue, case law and reference opinions from the Texas Attorney General have shown 
deference to specific local government determinations of blight under §311.005 so long as the 
necessary elements can be made out in the first-place under a literal and plain meaning statutory 
interpretation (Texas Municipal League, 2015). Combined with judicial deference to local 
government decisions on land use in general (Hightower, 2007), even TIF-opposing elected 
officials from large cities operated (contemporaneously to the SATD project) on the assumption 
that broad local discretion exists on the process and finding of but-for and that this represents a 
“real open hole in the statute” (Cook, 1999).  
Yet beyond the State statutory standard, the SATD project does not seem to necessarily 
meet the City standard for project assistance “that ‘but for’ the incentives sought, the proposed 
project would be substantially altered such that the economic returns to the city would be 
reduced or the project would not otherwise occur in the city” (Dallas Office of Economic 
Development, 2016b, 13). Even if there was a legitimate finding under the City standard, neither 
the TIF plan or readily available OED documents provide any detail or discussion on how this 
decision was made. Combined with weak State but-for enforcement, a transparency-based 
critique of the SATD gains credibility.   
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With the Arena Master Agreement and Perot ownership options over, and vision for, 
most of the surrounding parcels, it seems that much of the initial phase of development would 
have occurred with the construction of the arena. The question, based on the formal justification 
provided by the City, then becomes threefold:  
1. Would the arena have occurred as it did without the TIF district being part of the 
Arena Master Agreement with the City? 
2. Would the Victory development have happened with only the arena being subsidized? 
3. Did the use of TIF facilitate faster or more substantial development than would have 
otherwise occurred in the absence of TIF after the formal authorization in 1998 of the 
TIF contemplated in the Arena Master Agreement? 
On the first count, it seems unlikely that the absence of a $24 million infrastructure 
contribution would cause the Stars and Mavericks to walk away from their preferred location and 
$125 million in direct arena subsidies. Despite on-ice success, the Stars were hemorrhaging 
money in the AAC’s predecessor, Reunion Arena, and ownership was eyeing new revenues from 
luxury boxes to close the deficit and then sell the team at a profit (McGraw, 2002). Combined 
with Hillwood having acquired rights to (contingent on a successful arena referendum) 46 acres 
of land surrounding this preferred location (City of Dallas, 1997, p. 31), the argument that if the 
City failed to provide a TIF district that the first phase of Victory Park would not have 
materialized is highly questionable, especially considering that Victory was something of a 
vanity project for one of the state’s wealthiest families.  
In fact, the reason Perot acquired the Mavericks in 1996 was to realize a vision for a 
master-planned urban district centered on a new arena – without the team, Perot had little 
leverage (Jones and Hunt, 2002, p. 2) and without the prospect of a major downtown 
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development Perot had little interest in basketball (Donald, 1997). Although several sites were 
supposedly considered, Perot himself noted that a location at the south end of the Dallas North 
Tollway was important as 80% of season ticket customers at Reunion Arena lived within a mile 
of this road (Jones and Hunt, 2002, p. 2). The only sufficient concentration of urban land at its 
south end was the contaminated brownfield-turned Victory site. According to Perot, “[w]e 
picked that area north of the West End because it was the last blighted area…it was an area 
where you could have a big impact” (Brick, 2002). Once Perot achieved his arena deal, the 
Mavericks were sold to Mark Cuban for a reported $285 million prior to the AAC even opening, 
more than doubling Perot’s investment in less than four years (Price, 2015), and inadvertently 
setting the stage for future clashes over parking. 
 Likewise, in the absence of TIF subsidies and given the structure of the Arena Master 
Agreement, it is hard to accept that Perot and Hillwood would simply let controlled land adjacent 
to the arena with hundreds of millions in planned construction lay fallow because a 
comparatively minimal infrastructure subsidy was not reimbursed. The entire point of acquiring 
the Mavericks was to build an arena near downtown Dallas that could be the anchor of a major 
real estate development (Jones and Hunt, 2002, p. 2) – again, why would Perot turn away after 
the arena anchor was funded? The TIF as a development accelerant argument is further 
undermined by the funds for infrastructure being spent out of pocket years in advance of TIF 
reimbursement. While it may be suggested that the priority repayment guarantee provided 
collateral upon which the developer could borrow and thus accelerate access to capital for 
subsequent development, Perot was seemingly not lacking for finance at the time. Instead, the 
more likely brake would seem to be market demand, which is supported by the first phase 
outcomes.  
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 However, the development accelerant argument is not without some merit. There are 
newspaper reports from the 1998-2003 period showing continued wrangling between the City, 
the COC, and the involved development companies on what would be built by whom, on what 
timeline, what share of public infrastructure subsidy would be granted, and whether that subsidy 
would be reimbursed or paid for via bond issue. Although the development had $600 million in 
financing by 2002, ground had not been broken, and the proposed structure of the deal whereby 
the COC would actually sell the land upon which the first phase of Victory was built to a third-
party developer (Palladium) and retain a minority stake, fell through (Brick, 2002). It took until 
2003 for the first post-arena construction to commence and the parties involved cited the first 
round of $24 million in TIF commitments as being an insufficient incentive and floated multiple 
bond issue scenarios that would either exceed or replace the TIF commitment (2002). In this 
sense, the argument can be made that the project returns (increased property assessments and 
economic activity in the zone) were delayed by the absence of subsidy, although the problem is 
that the subsidy in question (approved in 2000) was deemed insufficient by the developers to 
influence them to start construction before they eventually did so in 2003 (2002). 
Instead, it seems that market conditions were far more influential than TIF or other 
subsidies on the actual commencement of construction. Dallas at the time had a glut of 
competing office space (2002) and a luxury apartment surplus. Combined with 9/11 impacting 
the perceived viability of new hotel projects (Schnurman, 2010), an issue as the Victory 
centerpiece was a W Hotel, as well as the actual performance of Victory’s first post-arena phase, 
it seems that market demand was more of a brake and influence on development timelines than 
the presence or absence of TIF. To this end (then Stars owner and 43% partner in the arena-
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adjacent land holdings (Brick, 2002)) Tom Hicks noted in 2005 that construction would 
commence on the primary office element once 50% was pre-leased (Perez, 2005). 
So while the City’s but-for standard may have to a certain extent been met at various 
points after the fact, it did not seem to reasonably exist at the time of the TIF authorization 
ordinance in 1998, which is the point at which the City’s own documents seem to have evaluated 
but-for. The but-for argument is further undermined by the TIF subsidy guarantee not being a 
sufficient incentive to spur the initial post-arena development faster than market demand 
dictated. Yet with no precedent to indicate that local government prerogative to assess the state 
or local government standards of but-for is at issue, and little propensity for judicial review of 
such standards in Texas (Hightower, 2007, pp. 7-13), there is no foreseeable legal consequence 
to a loose interpretation that serves a desired political outcome. Indeed the laissez-faire judicial 
approach to TIF review has helped create the scope for further and self-reinforcing proliferation 
of loose standards – cities are effectively free to do what they wish within the 15% of their 
assessment base that can be included in a TIF zone. 
There is also a somewhat different element of but-for in the post-recession phase of the 
SATD with the Amended Plan. The aftermath of 2008 saw Hillwood’s German financiers take 
control of Victory, leaving Hillwood with ownership of undeveloped SATD land at the time 
bound by the PRAs, and only in a management role over what had been built (Wilonsky, 2009). 
Considering the financial uncertainty of the recession, the oversupply of luxury residential, the 
perception of initial failure, and the primary ownership interest now residing with a party other 
than that which was the visionary driving force, there were legitimate questions concerning the 
speed of further development. In turn, the state standard of but-for (that in the reasonably 
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foreseeable future private finance alone would not solely cause development) is more likely to 
have been met in the post-2008 years leading up to the 2012 Amended Plan.  
Beyond the recession and finance issues however, even as the economy has recovered 
and strong development has been seen in Victory and neighboring areas, the PRAs have still 
limited the speed of build-out by necessitating parking replacement within the SATD. Typically 
the construction of parking garages is a less efficient investment for a developer, and this may be 
accentuated where the build-out of uses that can make for a strong internal rate of return on 
parking (such as commuter commercial office space) is incomplete and there are ample lower 
cost alternatives (such as surface lots) (see generally Arnott, 2006). While event periods provide 
obviously stronger demand, they overlap with downtimes for commuter parking, allowing 
commuter parking to undercut the event premium. In the SATD, the mandated space 
requirements have retained a glut of surface lots that have reduced the viability of parking 
garages.  
Thus the City’s TIF subsidization of a necessary but less attractive investment for the 
private sector (especially considering the change in Victory’s ownership), may be the strongest 
fulfilment of but-for in the entire 20 year exercise. However, this is undermined by the driving 
cause of but-for being artificially imposed minimum parking requirements. Absent the PRAs 
many of the surface lots would not have had to await the construction of garages for 
development to commence. In turn, especially considering the strong construction market 
immediately outside of where the PRAs apply, surface lots would have likely been more rapidly 
built upon and garages would have more quickly become financially viable due to the reduced 
surface lot competition and increased demand from build-out.  
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5.4.3. Capture 
Intertwined with the analysis of but-for is the issue of capture throughout the SATD 
development, including the arena construction, as well as the pre and post-recession phases of 
Victory Park. In each period the incentives, objectives, and options present for the driving 
government and development parties have uniquely altered the form and outcomes of capture. 
However, the oscillating phases of bargaining have seen the underlying theme of the City’s 
actions framed by its competition with other jurisdictions for desirable forms of development and 
population, and the ability of the involved developer parties to exploit, capture, and monetize the 
City’s pursuit of those ends. Furthermore, this sequence and the subsequent outcomes can be 
largely viewed through the lens of basic bargaining theory, namely that the involved developer 
parties used the timely exercise of both “outside” then “inside” options to leverage public means 
(such as TIF) to their benefit, with the City left to make the most out of ever more limited and 
unattractive alternatives (see Muthoo, 2000). 
What is Capture? 
There is little consensus on the definition and conceptual scope of capture. Wilson (2019, 
76) views capture as occurring “when most or all of the benefits of a program go to some single, 
reasonably small interest (and industry, profession, or locality) but most or all of the costs will be 
borne by a large number of people (for example, all taxpayers).” Capture can also be thought of 
as a spectrum between more broad and narrow definitions (Wren-Lewis, 2010). Dal Bo (2006, 
203) proposes that broadly “regulatory capture is the process through which special interests 
affect state intervention in any of its forms,” while it is more “specifically the process through 
which regulated monopolies end up manipulating the state agencies that are supposed to control 
them.” Closely related to capture are two concepts noted in Chapter 2: first, the principal-agent 
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problem whereby an agent acting for a principal is incentivized to act in its own best interests as 
opposed to those of its principal (see Boehm, 2007). This problem is often compounded by, 
second, information asymmetry where the agent’s position becomes further entrenched through 
the absence of an informational basis for the principal or third parties to attack questionable 
practices (2007). 
In the case of the SATD, this section argues that the developer interests leveraged their 
bargaining position and asymmetric information to create a de-facto monopoly within the SATD 
that was able to affect the range of options available to the City, and allowed for the subsequent 
manipulation of the City’s local economic development agency (the OED). In turn, the agency 
itself was able to use information asymmetry to implement outcomes that benefited the agency’s 
own interests more than those of the general polity. However, the benefit to the agency’s welfare 
was eclipsed by the upside the special-interest group (the developer parties) experienced. 
 
Capture in the SATD 
The initial arena deal phase saw the City seemingly driven by two related objectives: 
retaining the teams within the City, and transforming its central core neighborhoods from a 
commuter office cluster to a more diversified urban experience with a stronger tax base that 
could compete with the suburbs. By 1995 Dallas had elected Ron Kirk, who had explicitly 
prioritized a new downtown arena as central to the fight against tax base erosion (Pendleton, 
1995). While the previous ownership of the Stars and Mavericks had lobbied hard for a new 
facility and threatened suburban relocation, public professional sports subsidies were a hard sell 
with taxpayers still paying debt from the then 15 year old Reunion Arena (1995). These 
difficulties were consistent with the literature discussed in Chapter 2 showing that high-growth 
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western and southern cities lack the entrenched local growth coalitions and economic desperation 
of older cities in the northeast and Midwest that drove publicly funded projects in these locales 
(see Delaney and Eckstein, 2006). Particularly relevant to Dallas, the same study demonstrated 
that arena proposals pushed primarily by teams and local government figures, as opposed to 
strong local growth coalitions, faced more substantial hurdles through more directly visualized 
corporate welfare (2006). 
For Dallas then, with the absence of an entrenched local growth coalition to take the lead, 
the answer came in much the same form as it had for Reunion Arena – a promise of major 
master-planned private real estate development centered on a publicly funded arena (D 
Magazine, 2013). Despite the uneven outcomes of the Reunion project, Perot’s acquisition of the 
Mavericks to facilitate an arena-driven urban development was the value-add needed to build a 
sufficient political coalition to surmount the structural obstacles and move the process forward.  
In the stops and starts of deal-making, with lingering memories of losing the Cowboys to 
suburban Irving and failed development promises around Reunion Arena (see Miller, 1997), TIF 
was a relatively benign addition to both sweeten the deal for the teams and an incentive that 
would only be realized upon delivery of the promised real estate development. Although with the 
stated goal of using public funding sources that would supposedly not be borne by local 
taxpayers through so-called “tourist taxes,” there were alternatives more directly tied to the arena 
to increase the upfront public funding package. However, options such as ticket or arena parking 
taxes would have cost the teams more on the backend through limiting their room for price 
increases. Thus TIF can be seen as the next best option for both the clubs and the City, with the 
theory being that the subsidy would only arise if development was delivered, regardless of 
whether or not the subsidy spurred faster development.  
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With eyes fixed on first building the arena to retain the teams and using the promise of 
adjacent development to build an arena coalition, the City was primed to be captured by the 
developer parties in ways that did not cost the taxpayer up-front and that were not likely to be 
issues in the near future. The manifestation of this capture was the TIF subsidy that had 
questionable relation to spurring development on a but-for standard, and the PRAs that 
hamstrung build-out in more recent years. Yet at the time, the political objective of building the 
arena and retaining the teams was achieved alongside the likely realization of a potentially 
transformational neighboring development – efficiency or mitigating against what should have 
been foreseeable but longer-horizon problems was not likely to get in the way of the primary 
objectives.   
Further, while these issues should have been foreseeable by sophisticated parties, less 
sophisticated opponents or the public would have more difficulty both identifying possible issues 
and their adverse consequences. However, the problem of capture driven by asymmetric 
information took a unique turn in this instance as Hillwood itself partially miscalculated – the 
primary issue with the PRAs has debatably inflicted greater pain on Hillwood than the City (see 
Case, 2011). Namely, the PRAs were to the benefit of the City and the lease-holding clubs, the 
Stars and Mavericks (Dallas Office of Economic Development, 2012b). At the time of the PRAs, 
since the teams were owned by parties directly invested in and driving ancillary development, 
making the PRAs to the benefit of the clubs seemed to be a means of protecting club resale value 
by ensuring that the teams would have sufficient nearby parking. However in the context of 
Perot’s initial interest in the Mavericks stemming solely from real estate development, when 
Perot sold the club to Mark Cuban in 2000 (albeit at a hefty profit), the benefit of the PRAs 
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passed to an owner far more concerned with ensuring adequate event parking (Case, 2011) than 
sacrificing fan convenience for someone else’s grand real estate ambitions.   
 
Bargaining and Capture After Arena Construction 
The initial post-arena deal problem however stemmed from Hillwood and Perot being 
able to dictate the pace of development as they saw fit, made evident when shovels failed to 
break ground on projects beyond the arena. As Hillwood attempted to extract a more generous 
subsidy package than had already been authorized, the City Council, now with the arena built 
and vocal arena opponent Laura Miller in the mayor’s pulpit, had far less will to give in. 
Combined with no contractual obligation (City of Dallas, 1997) to provide adjoining real estate 
development, as well as the less attractive post-9/11 finance and market landscape, the parties 
were at an impasse.  
In this instance there was a mutual breakdown driven by two exogenous interventions: 
the election of the arena deal’s strongest public opponent as mayor and the change in market 
conditions. Instead of spurring impatience (the valuing of time over money) from one or both of 
the parties to cause a deal to close more quickly, the breakdown did the opposite. Here the 
developer was willing to wait out the recession or receive a further subsidy to move more 
quickly, and the City Council at this point was not open to new subsidies (see Brick, 2002). This 
impasse was accentuated by the developer parties’ “inside” option – their control of the 
undeveloped SATD lands allowed them to benefit through increased demand for both developed 
and bare land if the recession was waited out.  
Hillwood’s inside option can likewise be viewed as a form of capture over the OED 
insofar as the COC and Hillwood, through their exclusive ownership of developable SATD 
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lands, were the only means through which the OED could achieve what would appear to be its 
best outcome. While the OED is City Council’s agent, it has an institutional incentive for success 
in its economic redevelopment programs, the most significant and localized of which are TIF and 
Public Improvement Districts. Thus, while the City at this point had leadership far less politically 
interested in further subsidizing Hillwood, and the optimal public benefit outcome would have 
likely been expedient development with no new subsidies, the OED’s internal incentive was to 
assist in the execution of a successful TIF district in terms of both visual transformation and 
assessed value increases.   
For the OED, a bolstered TIF incentive could demonstrate the validity of but-for and 
showcase a TIF success story directly prompting development. However, when the developer 
parties revealed their preferred further subsidy to be some form of general bond issue as opposed 
to expanded TIF, or even in lieu of TIF altogether (Brick, 2002), there became far less 
institutional incentive for the OED to desire, let alone actively pursue a non-TIF centered 
outcome. Thus, no further development occurred until a market recovery. 
While all parties were generally pleased with the market-prompted development in the 
2003 to 2008 period, the Great Recession changed matters significantly. Beyond the stalling of 
construction leaving Victory in a seemingly half-finished state, the previously noted urban 
planning failures and the transfer of ownership interest for the completed portions of Victory 
contributed to a second breakdown. Here the entry of new ownership for Victory and the sports 
teams, the weakening of the original developer parties, and natural turnover in elected officials, 
all still bound by the original framework, left the City as the party with the greatest capacity to 
rectify the situation. With new elected officials having a questionable political stake in decisions 
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made more than a decade prior, the operationalization of the City’s capacity to act came from the 
institutional interest of the OED in seeing a successful SATD project.  
 
The Amended Plan 
The 2012 Amended Plan was the core element of this course correction. This Plan had 
two primary objectives: first to rectify the public realm shortcomings, and secondly to build 
parking garages to free surface lots for construction (Dallas Office of Economic Development, 
2012a). Alongside the obvious perception that public funds were being used to correct 
Hillwood’s mistakes to the primary benefit of Hillwood (still the owner of most undeveloped 
surface lots in the SATD), implicitly came the inclusion of a third objective to construct the 
necessary political coalition. This third objective was to divert increment from the SATD to fund 
a new sub-district in West Dallas, a long blighted and traditionally poor neighborhood on the 
other side of the Trinity River. To solve the problem of a Texas TIF district needing to be 
geographically contiguous, a second long and narrow new sub-district, Riverfront Gateway, was 
also added. With almost all of the non-Victory increment allocated to West Dallas, Riverfront 
Gateway can be literally viewed as a money funnel to West Dallas. 
The benefit to attaching a West Dallas sub-district to the SATD amendment as opposed 
creating a new TIF district is that increment has flowed much faster than it otherwise would have 
for an area where developer interest is weak. In West Dallas, while assessed value has increased 
from the 2012 base of $11.6 million to $25 million in 2016, this translates into less than 
$100,000 in increment for the City and is well below the 2012 projections (2012a; 2016). 
Compared to the hundreds of millions in increment generated by the SATD, the up-front effect is 
similar to that of a TIF bond issue without the corresponding interest or risk. Ironically enough, 
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in the process of political logrolling to attach the West Dallas sub-district, the SATD perhaps 
found its strongest organic component of but-for – West Dallas is truly blighted and there was 
seemingly little prospect for major development in the near future without public subsidy.   
With the syphoning of a significant share of increment to West Dallas, the political 
coalition was in place to fund the triage job necessary to transform Victory into a completed TIF 
success story. The importance of West Dallas, alongside the residue of previous developer 
capture, can be seen through the priority of TIF reimbursement in the Amended Plan. After pre-
existing obligations, the first priority went to interest bearing grants in equal amounts to 
Hillwood and the COC for parking-related consulting, and the West Dallas “set-aside” received 
second priority (Dallas Office of Economic Development, 2012a, pp. 31-33). These priorities 
were most notably in advance of funding for the parking garages that would negate the adverse 
impacts of the PRAs. 
While the West Dallas priority can be logically attributed the necessity of political 
coalition building for the Amended Plan (akin to the concept of pork identified in Chapter 2, or 
logrolling discussed in Chapter 3’s overview of Nationals Park), the consulting fees are more 
puzzling. In a strengthening nearby real estate market, Hillwood seemingly had even more to 
gain from a quick resolution of the parking situation and no real bargaining power over the City 
to extract the priority concession. On their face, the parking consulting fees were a direct public 
subsidy to study a mostly private problem mostly created by the private parties subsidized to 
study the problem. By 2012 however, arena parking had become the subject of multiple lawsuits 
between Perot and Cuban (Case, 2011), and the COC, instead of being a joint venture between 
Perot and Hicks, had passed along with the majority stakes in the Mavericks and Stars to Cuban 
and Tom Gaglardi respectively. Thus, the priority can be seen as a “children play nice” grant – 
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an attempt to facilitate a solution to the parking issue that could satisfy all parties with the City, 
through the OED, trading the reimbursement priority for expediency.  
While rewarding the spats of billionaires may not seem like a subsidy that would pass 
public scrutiny, it can be explained through the concept of slack. As described by Levine and 
Forrence (1990) in the broader regulatory capture context, “slack” is created by “high 
information, monitoring and organization costs” that protect bureaucrats and politicians from 
being held accountable – the public has insufficient “incentive to learn issues well enough to 
comprehend their impact or to monitor and discipline the behavior of all those officials whose 
acts might affect them” (1990, p. 185). While the authors assert that slack can be used to benefit 
special interests in return for campaign contributions, support for appointment, or future private 
sector opportunities, there is nothing to suggest anything as nefarious in the SATD context. 
Instead, slack was more likely used to move a project forward that the OED could honestly 
believe was of benefit to the greater polity, while also promoting the OED’s institutional utility.  
Thus the slack-covered sausage-making process to provide $50 million in funding to the 
most crucial aspect of the Amended Plan, parking garages, came at the expense of more than $3 
million in “children play nice” grants to the COC and Hillwood, and over $90 million in 
increment syphoning to West Dallas (Dallas Office of Economic Development, 2012a). While in 
2012 this may have been the most expedient way to spur new construction and assessment gains 
for the City, as well as correct previous public realm shortcomings, the benefit for municipal 
coffers is a fraction of that to be seen by the very parties responsible for underperformance and 
through which an effective monopoly capture was created. However for the OED, the ultimate 
success of a flagship incentive project and (as noted in Chapter 2) execution of a typically once-
in-a-metro area development opportunity (a major professional sports arena district), could sell 
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its value in making Dallas a more complete and attractive destination in the competition for 
firms, talent, and tax-base.  
In the end though, the Amended Plan has been a success in its primary Victory Park 
objectives. As of 2015, available garage spaces have released many of the remaining Hillwood 
surface lots for development (Dallas Office of Economic Development, 2016). With a strong 
market for land in the vicinity, a complete, connected, and sustainably vibrant urban community 
is beginning to emerge 20 years after the major arena negotiations took place. However, the 
success in neighborhoods immediately outside of the Hillwood-dominated TIF zone leaves the 
glaring question of whether a far more efficient and taxpayer-friendly result could have been 
achieved without the false barriers imposed by the PRAs? 
 
5.5. IMPLICATIONS 
In the 20 years since the Arena Master Agreement, the original SATD lands have gone 
from a contaminated brownfield to the home of one of the busiest sports arenas in North America 
and an estimated $1.6 billion in new construction. Yet as a neighborhood, Victory Park is locally 
regarded as a bust and development has been uneven at best, especially when compared to 
certain nearby areas (elaborated on in the subsequent Dallas case study). While TIF has paid for 
substantial public improvements, the SATD has fallen victim to two common, and in this case 
overlapping, TIF criticisms. First, there is little to indicate that prior to the 2008 recession there 
was but-for present – instead, market conditions as opposed to TIF subsidy drove developer 
timelines. Secondly, the issue of TIF transparency manifested itself through regulatory capture. 
Here the developer parties were able to leverage bargaining power and overlapping interests with 
the local economic development agency to garner unnecessary subsidies that the broader polity 
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had less individual interest in and capacity to challenge. Once the capture framework was 
established, the decisions available to the City were limited to making the best of a flawed 
existing structure. Although TIF funds later became important in correcting mistakes and freeing 
surface lots to be built upon, this iteration of but-for was manufactured out of poor decisions 
driven by the developer parties at the project’s inception. 
This faux but-for and use of TIF as an instrument of developer capture was incubated by 
Texas’ highly-permissive TIF statute as well as the will of elected municipal leadership and the 
City’s agents to compete for firms and talent through the provision of the amenities and built 
forms that these targets were perceived as desiring, as noted in Chapter 2. At the end of the day 
however, Dallas will broadly get what was originally envisioned, but on a longer and more 
painful timeline, and with a TIF subsidy that appears to have not been truly necessary beyond its 
role in removing artificially imposed parking restrictions.  
The Dallas SATD experience demonstrates how TIF can be a relatively low-risk throw-in if a 
subsidy package requires bolstering to complete a facility deal insofar as the subsidy (in a pay-
as-you-go TIF) will only materialize proportionate to new development. However, for both cities 
and citizens, the Dallas case also underlines the importance of initial deal frameworks. The 
SATD serves as a warning that unintended consequences (in Dallas, the PRAs) and sub-optimal 
bargaining positions can result in the capture of public agents and the provision of unnecessary 
subsidies to private parties. More specifically, if the facility project is premised on the promise of 
ancillary real estate development, a legal commitment to that end with penalty clauses for non-
compliance places the public jurisdiction in a stronger position relative to an instance, like 
Dallas, where there was no such obligation. These threads are further built upon in subsequent 
case study chapters as well as Chapter 9.  
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CHAPTER 6. DOES THE ARENA MATTER? COMPARING REDEVELOPMENT 
OUTCOMES IN CENTRAL DALLAS TIF DISTRICTS 
 
6.1. PURPOSE 
Using a comparative case study approach, this chapter builds upon the work of Chapter 5, 
and examines the use of TIF more broadly in Dallas downtown redevelopment. The range of 
similarly core proximate Dallas TIF districts without a major sports venue, provides a strong 
opportunity to relatively situate the use of TIF in a sports venue context, with the primary aim of 
the study being to find out whether the arena anchor makes a substantial difference in 
development outcomes? For this chapter, development outcomes are conceived and measured in 
two ways: quantitative value and urbanist revitalization. The almost two decades of comparison 
available in Dallas provides rare quality of reference for jurisdictions contemplating similar 
projects. 
This survey and comparison indicates that the SATD can be viewed as a qualified success 
at a premium price. Other adjacent districts have been able to create more vibrant urbanist infill 
more quickly with fewer subsidies. However relative to the larger suite of downtown adjacent 
TIF districts studied, the SATD has almost 20 years later delivered a mostly complete, high-
density neighborhood where several other similarly core adjacent TIF districts have seen lesser, 
little, or no transformational investment.  
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6.2. METHODS 
To facilitate comparison between downtown area Dallas TIF districts, this chapter uses 
comparative case studies to assess quantitative and urbanism performance. First, adding to the 
study in Chapter 5, a comprehensive data set was created for eight active and expired Dallas TIF 
districts from City and County annual reports. Five of these TIF areas have been developed into 
brief descriptive cases representing the arena district (the SATD), as well as two instances each 
of developer-driven (State-Thomas and Cityplace) and city-led (Deep Ellum and Grand Park 
South) revitalization efforts. As expanded upon in the subsequent TIF district overview, the 
descriptive cases beyond the arena are also selected for how well they represent either 
significance to the history of TIF development in Dallas, or common socio-economic profiles. In 
all eight TIF districts the following variables have been collected: increment generated, average 
annual increment generated, percentage of increment projection met, annual per acre assessment 
gains, increment gain per unit of subsidy, incremental gains per acre, and population density.  
While it is highly unlikely that any study of this nature including a TIF utilizing major 
league sports facility will have a perfect baseline, the framing of the study and variables selected 
are intended to account for as many sources of divergence as possible. First, the TIF districts are 
selected for their similar relative core proximity in the same legal jurisdiction. Although a study 
comparing TIF districts in different cities may be tempting, the deviation of TIF statutes by state 
law and local policy is a very difficult obstacle to accounting for the same baseline. Likewise, 
legal jurisdictions in different regions (or even within the same region) will have a diverse range 
of economic and market conditions that will make baselining a further challenge.  
Having sidestepped this primary problem through comparison within the same legal 
jurisdiction, the collected variables are designed to mitigate other outstanding baseline issues, 
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based upon data consistently provided by the City. For instance, average annual gain addresses 
the difference in active years, growth per acre accounts for different TIF district sizes, 
incremental gain per unit of subsidy accounts for how much TIF funding is used, and gain per 
subsidy unit per acre is intended control for the amount of subsidy provided and the size of the 
district.  
Urbanism performance is designed as a further means of alleviating baseline issues if this 
were solely a quantitative study. For the five descriptive case studies, this gage of performance is 
conceptualized and synthesized as market demand for the built form, vibrancy, and local 
perception of area success as recorded through government, academic, media, and industry 
sources, with a focus on reviewing interviews with key actors. The primary method is document 
review, with sources found through a snowball technique. This extends to the interview 
component, as analysis and synthesis of past interviews and opinion in media sources allowed 
for considerably more access to important actors, as well as perspective contemporaneous to 
events that cannot be spun later to portray these events in a way these actors may prefer.  
Finally, these documentary and previously discussed quantitative sources are 
complemented by Walk Score data, which effectively aggregates key neighborhood level 
principles of urbanism. Walk Score is also collected for the three TIF districts not built into case 
studies. With Walk Score, each street address is provided a score out of 100 through analyzing 
density, block length, and walking distance to amenities. Previous work has found strong 
correlations between Walk Score and reliable assessment of pedestrian access to amenities (Carr 
et al., 2010).  
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Table 26. 
Walk Score® 
 
Description 
90–100 Walker's Paradise 
Daily errands do not require a car. 
70–89 Very Walkable 
Most errands can be accomplished on foot. 
50–69 Somewhat Walkable 
Some errands can be accomplished on foot. 
25–49 Car-Dependent 
Most errands require a car. 
0–24 Car-Dependent 
Almost all errands require a car. 
 
The primary limit on Walk Score data is that it only goes back to 2014. Thus Walk Score 
can assess the current condition and changes since 2014, which is useful in establishing what has 
happened in the SATD relative to other TIF districts in the period where SATD development has 
been most active (Dallas Office of Economic Development, 2016a). The current baseline is 
created through averaging the 2017 Walk Score of the 10 largest developments (in construction 
value) in a TIF district since its inception. To compare with 2014 results, the aggregate is 
reduced by the score for the zip code best overlaying the district.  
 
6.3. COMPARING TAX INCREMENT FINANCING DISTRICTS IN CENTRAL 
DALLAS 
 
6.3.1. The Eight TIF Districts 
The TIF districts in this chapter all roughly touch the tangle of freeways surrounding the 
Dallas central business district and were substantially blighted at their respective times of TIF 
district initiation. From the SATD in the west, Downtown Connection fills much of the real 
estate to the northeast until the borders of State-Thomas and Cityplace. With the exception of 
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Downtown Connection, these four districts are developer-driven TIF districts. The other four 
districts for which data is collected are clustered in a southeasterly direction. While Grand Park 
South and Deep Ellum are well discussed later, Cedars is a district to the south that shares many 
demographic and development challenges to Grand Park South. Likewise, Farmers Market, 
based upon the anchor of the Dallas Farmers Market, has demographic and locational similarity 
to Deep Ellum, with the two being separated by the freeway loop. All four of these southeasterly 
clustered district fit the City-led development heading.  
Table 27. 
Central Dallas TIF Districts 
Name Years 
active 
before 
2016 
Density per sq. mile Acres County 
rating 
State-Thomas 
(1) 
27 32319 100 1 
Cityplace (2) 24 14476 160 1 
Cedars (3) 24 1156 247 3 
SATD-Victory 
(4) 
18 9315 72 1 
Farmers Market 
(5) 
18 3998 43 1 
Downtown 
Connection (6) 
11 7894 450 1 
Grand Park 
South (7) 
11 4256 228 4 
Deep Ellum (8) 11 2931 157 3 
 
Table 28. 
Central Dallas TIF District Performance 
Name Value 
gain 
($m) 
Ann. 
gain 
($m) 
Share 
proj. 
met 
(/1) 
Grow. 
per 
acre 
($m) 
Ann. 
per 
acre 
growth 
($m) 
Gain 
per unit 
TIF 
Gain per 
subsidy 
unit per 
acre 
State-Thomas (1) 568.9 21.1 0.85 5.69 0.21 21.8 .0081 
Cityplace (2) 775.9 32.3 1.25 4.85 0.20 18.4 .0048 
Cedars (3) 104.8 4.4 0.67 0.42 0.02 13.6 .0022 
SATD-Victory 
(4) 
684.6 38.0 0.89 9.50 0.53 6.7 .0052 
Farmers Market 
(5) 
260.9 14.5 1.15 6.07 0.34 8.9 .0115 
Downtown 
Connection (6) 
2614.8 237.7 1.38 3.48 0.52 6.6 .0013 
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Grand Park 
South (7) 
13.8 1.3 0.18 0.06 0.01 65.7 .0262 
Deep Ellum (8) 183.3 16.7 1.12 1.17 0.11 27.8 .0161 
 
Table 29. 
Walk Score Performance by District 
Name Comp Walk 
Score 2017 
(/100) 
Walk Score 
gain since 
2014 
State-Thomas (1) 91 3.5 
Cityplace (2) 89 5.2 
Cedars (3) 62 14.0 
SATD-Victory (4) 80 9.0 
Farmers Market (5) 75 7.0 
Downtown Connection (6) 85 9.0 
Grand Park South (7) 50 14.0 
Deep Ellum (8) 75 7.0 
 
Figure 2. Approximation of Dallas Core TIF Districts (numbering same as Tables 26. through 28.) 
 
 
 280 
 
6.3.2 The Sports Arena TIF District – Victory Sub-district (SATD)6 
To recap from the previous chapter, after several false starts, the first phase of Victory 
Park rose between 2005 and 2008, seeing the construction of 800 high end apartments and 
condos, office towers, and a W Hotel, alongside 200,000 square feet of retail space (Dallas 
Office of Economic Development, 2016a). However, the Great Recession led to cancellation of 
the Mandarin Oriental anchored bookend to the W Hotel, as well as foreclosure on most of 
Hillwood’s Victory interests (Lau, 2015; Schnurman, 2010). The half-finished streetscape 
experience was accompanied by occupancy struggles for the completed luxury retail and housing 
elements (2015; 2010).  
Figure 3. Sports Arena TIF District (Dallas Office of Economic Development, n.d.). 
 
                                                          
6 Unless otherwise noted, “SATD” in this Chapter refers to the original SATD Victory Sub-district. 
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Quantitatively, the SATD has generally performed well. Of this chapter’s TIF districts, 
the SATD has seen the second greatest annual growth, and its gross and annual growth by acre is 
second to none (Table 28.). Yet despite some of the strongest gross and annual average 
performance in assessment growth, the underperformance of lofty projections has overlapped 
with the local perception of Victory Park as an underachieving project (Schnurman, 2010; Table 
28.). 
As noted in Chapter 5, Victory has been marred by planning, phasing, and use mix issues 
that have produced an experience not reflective of the financial investment (Dallas Office of 
Economic Development, 2013a; Schnurman, 2010). The coupling of luxury residential and 
services hindered by a lack of residential demand, starved retail of traffic and the streetscape of 
vibrancy (2010). Even during event periods, there has been a mismatch between patrons and 
amenities, extending to the influx of office workers following the construction of commercial 
space (2010). This was compounded by one-way roads surrounding the arena designed to move 
vehicles at speed, with the effect of prohibiting a pedestrian friendly connection to adjacent 
neighborhoods (Dallas Office of Economic Development, 2013a). The arena parking and 
transport options also meant that most visitors could easily avoid Victory altogether. 
Other issues have stemmed from the parking agreements whereby an effective veto was 
provided to the major league tenants over adjacent surface lot construction. While the developers 
originally also owned the sports teams, ownership has changed, with the clubs more interested in 
ensuring easy parking access than realizing the real estate vision. Combined with the recession, 
which saw Victory foreclosed and Hillwood relegated to a secondary role, the SATD was left 
half-finished (Schnurman, 2010).  
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These shortcomings were well explained in the 2012 Amended Plan. Increment was 
prioritized for parking garage construction, streetscapes, storefronts, traffic routing, and 
pedestrian access, as well as diversifying the retail and commercial mix (Dallas Office of 
Economic Development, 2012b). However the challenge of replacing surface lots with garages 
has consumed the majority of TIF funds, seeing much of the increment generated by one of the 
most financially successful Dallas TIF districts allocated to rectifying a flawed legal and parking 
framework (Dallas Office of Economic Development, 2012a; 2013a; 2016a). The outcome is 
sharpened considering the strong demand for developable land immediately adjacent to where 
the parking agreements apply (2016b). 
This combination of activity accompanied the average Walk Score for the zip code 
overlaying the both the SATD and this adjacent zone increasing nine points between 2014 and 
2017, with the most recent SATD composite score at 80.3. As later discussed, these gains might 
be best explained two ways: TIF improvements solving parking and planning issues, and this 
area representing the next best land option to build upon previous neighboring success. 
 
6.4. TIF DISTRICTS WITH DEVELOPER-LED URBANISM 
 
6.4.1. State-Thomas TIF District 
The Dallas TIF story starts in 1989 with the 100 acre State-Thomas district. Partially 
encompassing the Uptown neighborhood, the area was 95% vacant at the time of its creation, 
allowing for easy assembly (Dallas Office of Economic Development, 2018a). The ensuing 20 
years saw 3,000 residential units and $350 million in construction value added, with assessed 
value increases in excess of 800% (2018a). TIF funded 15 residential projects with a combined 
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$22 million in grants over the district’s lifespan, and these TIF funded projects accounted for 
roughly 75% of incremental construction value (2018a). 
Relative to the SATD, financial performance appears inferior (Table 28.). Much of the 
difference can be reconciled through density and scale – while the SATD is still far from filled-in 
and State-Thomas lacks development sites, the SATD has far taller buildings (Dallas Office of 
Economic Development, 2010; 2016a). Although in some ways Victory is more densely built, 
State-Thomas and Uptown have density on a scale more attractive to the market (Allison, 2009). 
Indeed, State-Thomas is considered in City documents to be one of Dallas’ “most successful 
examples of mixed-use neighborhood development” and has been offered as a model for the 
benefits of TIF (Dallas Office of Economic Development, 2010, p. 4; 2018a). This image 
extends to more general perceptions in media, with developers, and external governments 
(Allison, 2009; 2014; Davis, 2013; Lentz, 2008; Shaw, 2005).  
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Figure 4. State Thomas TIF District (Dallas Office of Economic Development, 2010, 2). 
 
 
Important to the success of Uptown was the right developer with the right vision, who 
was able to prove a concept new to Dallas, and in turn attract a snowballing movement of 
investment to infill the area (Allison, 2014; Leinberger, 2010; Shaw, n.d.). The developer, Robert 
Shaw, studied and implemented the vision of Jane Jacobs (2014). Although Jacobs proposed that 
an absence of zoning would deliver organic and vibrant outcomes, since this form was so alien to 
Dallas, Shaw pressed the City to codify concepts such as narrow setbacks and indented street 
parking, along with a plan for streets that prioritized walkability and density (2014). Likewise, 
the remaining stock of historic Victorians were saved (Prior and Kemper, 2005). 
Taking advantage of low land prices and being a rare source of investment in a local 
downturn, the vision was able to gain initial financial viability and leverage City support 
 285 
 
(Allison, 2014; Shaw, n.d.). By 1997 however, the Shaw proof of concept had not quite reached 
critical mass and much of State-Thomas remained vacant. Here TIF reimbursement for 
infrastructure costs helped close a financial gap to make projects viable for developers more 
quickly than they otherwise would be. These TIF investments in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
contributed to almost 1,500 units of housing completed between 2000 and 2003, and brought a 
critical population mass (Allison, 2014; Dallas Office of Economic Development, 2010). This 
was followed by other projects not using TIF, which saw the district almost infilled by its final 
report in 2010. 
Today, Uptown and State-Thomas are the respective urban gold standards in Dallas 
neighborhoods and development incentives. Uptown is a primary nightlife hub, but maintains 
vibrancy through the day with café-culture, restaurants, and unique retail. The mix in uses and 
demographics is complemented by a variety in street-focused architecture and a pedestrian-
centered environment (Allison, 2009; 2014). The State-Thomas composite Walk Score is 91, 
with zip code scores having increased by 3.5 points in four years, also representing the second 
highest score in Dallas. While scores have improved in the past four years, there is little left to 
infill, leaving developers with the objective of building another Uptown (2014). For taxpayers, 
hundreds of millions in assessed value has come from clear blight and relatively limited 
subsidies (Dallas Office of Economic Development, 2010).  
 
6.4.2. Cityplace TIF District 
Just beyond State-Thomas, the Cityplace TIF district is bisected by the North Central 
Expressway approximately 1.5 miles north of the SATD. Initial TIF funds subsidized 
infrastructure to lure national retailers through closing a land cost gap relative to the suburbs 
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(Garrison, 2006). Subsequent phases moved to attract residential development. Although retail 
construction saw external developer interest, the Cityplace Company held out for its preferred 
urbanist vision, eventually building its own residential proof of concept (2006). However, a flood 
of residential construction did not follow until the early 2000s after the opening of Cityplace’s 
DART (light rail) station and the boom in neighboring Uptown. 
 
Figure 5. Cityplace TIF District (Dallas Office of Economic Development, n.d.). 
 
This second phase development, the master planned and mixed-use West Village sub-
district, has become the core of Cityplace and its connection with Uptown. The West Village was 
planned on a TIF funded street grid, surrounded by TIF funded infrastructure, with ground level 
retail and three to five stories of residential above (Dallas Office of Economic Development, 
2013b). As in Victory Park, there was pre-existing land assembly (Prior and Kemper, 2005) cited 
as helping facilitate phasing opportunities (Garrison, 2006).  
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Cityplace has seen the construction of over 3,300 housing units, as well as 740,000 
square feet of commercial space, translating to $660 million of incremental assessment by 2013 
(2013b). Of the $43 million raised by TIF, almost $7 million went to direct development 
reimbursement grants (2013b, 23). Compared to TIF districts in this chapter, Cityplace has seen 
the second most assessment growth, the third greatest annual gross growth, and has exceeded its 
initial growth projection by 25% (Table 28.). As of 2018, the composite Walk Score in the West 
Village was 89, while in Cityplace as a whole it was 83, with zip code scores increasing by 5.2 
points from 2014. 
 
6.5. TIF DISTRICTS WITH CITY-LED REDEVELOPMENT  
 
6.5.1 Deep Ellum TIF District 
Opposite the elevated Interstate 345 spur to the Farmers Market, Deep Ellum is a former 
warehouse district turned nightlife area. By the 1990s, Deep Ellum had almost 60 bars and 
nightclubs, but crime, closure of music venues, and the departure of start-ups saw the area 
decline by the mid-2000s (Gage, 2017). Instead of a developer driven vision based on previous 
land assembly, the City-led plan saw potential to use TIF in transforming Deep Ellum (Dallas 
Office of Economic Development, 2016d). With a DART station less than three blocks from 
both the nightlife core and the Baylor University Medical Center, a more diversified, mixed-use, 
and transit oriented vision seemed viable. 
Since TIF’s inception, Deep Ellum has seen the construction of over 700 residential units, 
65,000 square feet of office space, and 15,000 square feet of retail (Dallas Office of Economic 
Development, 2016d). However Deep Ellum significantly trails State-Thomas, Cityplace, and the 
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SATD in almost all quantitative categories (Table 28.), with the County giving the district a 
third-tier rating (Dallas County, 2016). Besides reimbursed subsidies for commercial office 
space, TIF commitments were concentrated on streetscape and infrastructure (Dallas Office of 
Economic Development, 2016d).  
Figure 6. Deep Ellum TIF District (Dallas Office of Economic Development, n.d.). 
 
Beyond purely quantitative comparison, the area has regained vibrancy and safety, with 
an increased ratio of restaurant and retail to nightlife venues (Gage, 2017), a composite Walk 
Score of 73, and zip code scores improving by seven points since 2014. In large part the 
investors that have upgraded existing buildings have put the City’s mixed-use vision into 
practice through limiting nightlife dominance and not necessarily choosing the highest rent 
offered to maintain the draw of “cool” (Gage, 2017). However, it has taken time for major 
residential projects to emerge, with the first large complex completed in 2015, and a 17 story 
tower under construction in 2017 (Dallas Office of Economic Development, 2016d). These 
larger scale residential projects have been located on the relatively few mostly assembled blocks 
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in the area (2016d) and this absence of efficient assembly opportunities has hampered the ability 
for a critical resident mass to emerge, despite the area having many desirable components.  
 
3.4.2 Grand Park South TIF District 
Contemporaneously to Deep Ellum, the City created the Grand Park South TIF District. 
Grand Park is separated from Deep Ellum by Interstate 30 and a rail yard, and bordered to the 
west and east by Interstate 45 and the State Fairgrounds. With its land 35% vacant, many 
deteriorated structures, and existing infrastructure inadequate for new development, the area may 
have most visually resembled State-Thomas at its inception, although State-Thomas was both 
more abandoned and assembled.  
Figure 7. Grand Park TIF District (Dallas Office of Economic Development, n.d.). 
 
Whereas State-Thomas had a developer willing to commit capital and sell what turned 
out to be a winning vision, and Deep Ellum had a collection of developers willing to effectively 
implement the City’s vision, Grand Park has had none of the above. Although there are assembly 
opportunities in the northern portion of the district walkable to light rail, most of the area 
consists of single family lots (Dallas Central Appraising, 2017). While sharing similar straight 
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line core proximity to State-Thomas and Cityplace, Grand Park is cut off by a deeper tangle of 
freeways and rail.  
The absence of developer interest has seen Grand Park become by far the least successful 
Dallas TIF district by almost any quantitative measure (Table 28.). This failure has been 
explicitly acknowledged by both the City and County – in fact, Grand Park is the only TIF 
district with more than five years’ activity to receive the lowest County rating (Dallas County, 
2016). As of 2016 increment had reached a mere 18% of already low projections (Dallas Office 
of Economic Development, 2016e; Table 28.). The composite Walk Score is 55 and zip code 
scores have ranged from 46.7 to 60.9 since 2014, reflecting continued low density and car 
dependency. Although the challenges were significant, the “TIF and it will come” strategy of 
Deep Ellum has not been useful without private interest. 
 
6.6. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
6.6.1. Comparing Core TIF Districts 
The comparison of core districts provides several larger takeaways. First, the City has 
seemingly been able to obtain similar or superior TIF district outcomes in a range of qualitative 
and quantitative categories absent an arena or comparable anchor, but with many other 
characteristics relatively consistent. Each of State-Thomas, Cityplace, and the SATD had largely 
been assembled at the onset of their respective TIF districts, but were substantially undeveloped 
and unpopulated. With Cityplace and the SATD, the similarities extend to master planning, light 
rail access, geographic size and core proximity. While Cityplace’s West Village lacks the large 
destination amenity found in Victory Park, Cityplace has provided a mixed-use development 
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vision and experience more aligned with what the market wants, and has accordingly been 
deemed a success (Allison, 2009; Brown, 2010; Dallas Office of Economic Development, 
2018b; Garrison, 2006), a notion supported by the collected Walk Score data. 
Yet it is also worth noting that the County’s classification of the 28 TIF districts in its 
jurisdiction rated the SATD, State-Thomas, and Cityplace among the five highest performing 
projects based on increases in construction value, outlining that these TIF uses “have 
dramatically transformed large areas that were previously vacant, blighted, or heavily under-
utilized and produced a unique high-level/high-density form of development” (Dallas County, 
2016, p. 4). The County makes the point that the most successful TIF districts have been those 
that either saw heavy interest from developers prior to their inception, or those that were 
developer initiated (Dallas County, 2016). It is also probably no coincidence that the most 
successful districts are geographically contiguous and center on Uptown – if developer interest 
indicates TIF success, then market demand for a similar location would seem to be a root of 
developer interest.  
Indeed Farmers Market highlights the role of proximity to what has already worked. 
Contemporaneously to the SATD, much of the site was assembled by one developer and TIF 
closed an infrastructure gap to help spur mixed-use infill that has seen smaller scale success 
premised on a similar vision to Cityplace and State-Thomas (Dallas Office of Economic 
Development, 2016c). However, Farmers Market is at the opposite end of downtown from 
Uptown and has not led to the snowballing effect seen on the north side. While TIF has funded 
better pedestrian connections under the freeway to Deep Ellum, Farmers Market is still an 
urbanist island lacking critical mass, supported by a decent, but not exceptional Walk Score of 
75. 
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Where a City-led vision has not been accompanied by a creative-class friendly draw or 
developer interest (Grand Park), progress has been difficult despite the presence of light rail and 
strong core proximity. Instead, TIF subsidized development has been most effective in Dallas 
when paired with a competent developer who can utilize and leverage TIF to more quickly 
catalyze a winning vision. This winning developer vision has been walkable mixed-use with 
mixed everything. The original and most successful inner city redevelopment partnership, 
Uptown and State-Thomas, saw a wide mix in uses, prices, rentals and owner-occupied housing, 
street fronts, as well as assembled and small lot developments. This mix has provided the 
experiential diversity sought by professional workers, and once a critical mass was achieved, a 
rapid buildout of anything proximate to this new core. Conversely, a vision premised on an 
exclusively luxury product was unsuccessful in Victory Park, despite itself providing a novel 
experience adjacent to Uptown.  
 
6.6.2. Did the Arena Matter? 
Quantitatively, TIF district performance and the impact of the arena relative to other 
districts without an arena can be conceived in a number of ways. This chapter frames the issue in 
two questions: what did each district create in gross terms, and what did each district create per 
unit of subsidy? As mentioned, in gross terms the SATD has performed at or near the top of its 
central Dallas peer class in a number of variables (Table 28.). In comparing starting states to 
2016, there are three TIF districts that have seen over $500 million in assessed value growth and 
at least 10 times the starting assessment, as well as assessment growth of over $5 million per 
acre: State-Thomas, Cityplace, the SATD. Together these three measures can be considered 
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indicative of a transformation as they represent a district that has started from little and added a 
lot on both a total and a per unit basis.  
 Perhaps a more interesting question is what financial cost does performance come at? A key 
measure here is the ratio of incremental value to planned subsidy divided by years of TIF 
activity. While this measure can spuriously exaggerate small subsidies in underperforming 
districts (such as Grand Park), and not explain districts seeing back-loaded gains over longer 
horizons, it is the only measure in either official materials, or created based upon these materials, 
that accounts for each of the increment created, the subsidy to be provided, and the timespan 
since district creation. Planned subsidy is used as previous Dallas TIF research by Bland and 
Overton (2016) showed a significant relationship between planned TIF subsidy and private 
investment.  
Although the SATD has impressively redirected real estate investment within the Dallas 
region, the SATD has seen substantial public subsidies expended in pursuit of that investment. 
The $685 million increase in assessed value in the SATD’s first 18 years came at the cost of over 
$100 million in TIF subsidies spent through 2016, a ratio of 6.7 to 1. State-Thomas and 
Cityplace, where strong gross outcomes have also been seen, were able to respectively achieve 
assessment gains ratios of 21.8 and 18.4 to 1.  
When the 2016 present value of the original $125 million direct arena subsidy is added to 
the SATD subsidy however, the ratio of assessed value created per subsidy dollar becomes 2.4 to 
1. In this light, the SATD has seen assessment gains come at a considerably higher cost than in 
any other comparable TIF district. The arena can then been viewed as a relatively inefficient 
subsidy that has not produced assessment gains that could justify the large public cost.  
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Another aspect that the assessment gain to subsidy average overlooks is density. The 
argument for major league venue-based neighborhood development is partially premised on an 
arena being able to transform an underused area more quickly than alternatives through an influx 
of visits to a non-replicable regional amenity. This transformation can be viewed through 
development density, which is conceived as average yearly assessment gains per unit of subsidy 
divided by TIF district gross acreage. This conceptualization is in part selected upon the 
availability of mostly consistent data points across Dallas TIF districts. 
Here the 72 acre SATD does well, nudging Cityplace for second among the TIF district 
peer class. Both far exceeded the performance of the 450 acre Downtown Connection (.0013), 
but trailed State-Thomas (.0081). Downtown Connection’s lagging outcomes (as well as a 
limitation of this measure) can perhaps be explained by its significantly larger size and that much 
of the district was already infilled (although not the part outside of the freeway loop adjacent to 
the SATD), compared to the relative blank slates of the SATD, State-Thomas, and Cityplace.  
Likewise, relative to State-Thomas, each of Cityplace and the SATD have had major 
limitations to development density – Cityplace originally saw much of its land allocated to low 
density big box retail and the SATD is restricted by minimum parking requirements that have 
seen the retention of surface lots. While State-Thomas has experienced the greatest assessment 
gains per unit of subsidy, its development has not seen the high rises of Cityplace or the SATD. 
Instead, State-Thomas is generally five stories or less, but was almost completely infilled by the 
TIF sunset in 2010 (OED, 2010) and had a much higher 2016 population density per square mile 
(32,319) than Cityplace (14,476) or the SATD (9,315). 
From here the conversation moves to actual assessment gains relative to expected 
assessment gains. Expected assessment gains provide some insight into what the TIF jurisdiction 
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believes is feasible given the characteristics of the available land, land use regulations, and the 
market – three of the four commonly understood components of “highest and best” use. Further, 
TIF district expected gains can be amended over time to reflect new conditions. With this 
measure, the strongest results have been found in Downtown Connection (138%), Cityplace 
(125%), Farmers Market (115%), Deep Ellum (112%), and Design District (110%). Here State-
Thomas and the SATD have slightly underperformed projections (respectively 85% and 89%), 
while Cedars and Grand Park saw the worst results (67% and 18%). 
 Yet with State-Thomas almost completely infilled and heralded by the City as a great TIF 
success but lagging its assessment projections, and Cityplace well-exceeding projections and 
shifting focus over time from a first phase low density retail plan, to higher density mixed-use, 
there would seem to be some daylight between expectation and reality. The very different 
projections for districts with similar core proximity similarly highlights diverse ambitions and 
concepts of “success”. 
 Finally, the SATD does well in applied Walk Score (80), but is still roughly 10 points 
behind each of State-Thomas (91) and Cityplace (89). Although these two districts precede the 
arena, the more recent Downtown Connection (85) district splits the difference between the 
groupings, much as it occupies the space between the SATD and State-Thomas/Cityplace. Still, 
the SATD has a superior Walk Score to the remaining five districts, edging Deep Ellum and 
Farmers Market by five points, and the struggling Grand Park South by 30 points. 
 
6.6.3. Contextualizing Performance 
The SATD has issues on multiple fronts that may have made achieving “highest and 
best” use a challenge. First, arena parking requirements have limited what can be built on the 
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SATD lands and have created requirements for parking garages to free up further development 
lots. Second, the high-rise and ultra-modern nature of Victory Park was by the developer’s own 
admission intended to be something alien to the Dallas marketplace. Third, Victory contained 
components that were seemingly well beyond what the market could bear.  
As both State-Thomas and Cityplace brought new market standards and characters to 
their districts where nothing existed before, this in itself is not a problem. Rather it was building 
too much of a product that the market did not demand and overpricing it that led to over-
improvement of some parcels. At the same time, the combination of arena imposed parking 
requirements and recession left contrast with many under-improved parcels, making the district 
as a whole less attractive relative to State-Thomas and Cityplace’s West Village, where 
development more consistent in scale, form, and market demand was found, even if full market 
potential on any given parcel may have been more restricted by height and density limits than in 
the SATD. 
The strong post-2012 activity in the SATD can be seen twofold: first through infill and 
public improvements normalizing the streetscape, and second, the reduced supply of 
development lots and upward price pressures in Uptown or Cityplace pushing the market toward 
next best alternatives. Based on proximity to Uptown (made more feasible by post-amended plan 
improvements) and development lots freed by parking garage construction, the SATD, alongside 
the area of Downtown Connection between the SATD and Uptown, became the next best option. 
This second best alternative was made stronger by the Klyde Warren Park freeway covering 
project that allowed for a direct pedestrian-friendly connection to the central business district and 
became a draw for development in itself. 
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Did the presence of the arena also contribute to this second best draw? Perhaps, but the 
concentration of SATD development almost two decades after the arena’s opening, as well as the 
reality of where successful development was first found, indicates that the attraction was more 
proximity to the successful mixed-use urbanism of Uptown (and more recently Klyde Warren 
Park) than the inverse of proximity to the arena district being a spur for development in 
neighboring areas. While access to amenities as conceptualized by Walk Score has risen, it has 
taken almost 20 years for a coherent, connected, largely filled, and more vibrant neighborhood to 
materialize. These results are qualified by possibility that the story may have been different if the 
development mix and form had been more amenable to the marketplace and better connected for 
pedestrians from the outset. 
The question also arises of whether similar or superior results could have been seen if 
TIF commitments were made to developers in the absence of a heavily subsidized arena? While 
land assembly premised on an arena district allowed for the possibility of more concentrated and 
frequented development more quickly, this potential was not realized. The absence of any legal 
requirement for the developer to move quickly, and the substantial wait for market demand to put 
shovels in the ground despite the arena being complete for five years, indicates that the arena 
was not some beacon that either created demand itself or drew projects from alternative 
locations. 
Once perceived market demand materialized, then the SATD saw concentrated master-
planned development, but there is nothing to indicate that arena traffic provided significant 
surplus value relative to other successful developments in Cityplace and Uptown. When also 
considering the arena subsidy, the development came at a much greater public cost. Given the 
pattern of development spurred by the Uptown corridor, and the almost 15 year delay after arena 
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construction for substantial build-out of the SATD, it is reasonable to believe that the SATD land 
could have seen similar development in a similar timeframe had a different party attempted a 
mixed-use and price master-planned development without the arena.  
While it may be argued that absent the Victory project, the SATD would more resemble 
failed redevelopment areas such as Grand Park South, the SATD had the benefits of proximity to 
the most successful urbanist redevelopment in Dallas (Uptown and State-Thomas) and land 
assembly where large parcels creating a mass of activity could transform an area in several years, 
as was the case in the West Village with a fraction of Victory’s subsidies. Yet at the same time, 
in 20 years the SATD has gone from a desolate brownfield to a mostly infilled, walkable mixed-
use neighborhood, nearing $1 billion in new assessed value. While it may have been an 
inefficiently expensive exercise, there has been a transformation nonetheless.  
 
6.6.4. Building a Better Arena District 
For cities considering similar projects, this chapter introduces the question of whether the 
finished product provides value justifying the large public cost or could lesser developer 
subsidies see the construction of cheaper (in subsidy cost terms) and almost as transformational 
substitutes? This is a question that is later examined in further detail in the Detroit case study. In 
Dallas, while the finished product has eventually provided the city a functional entertainment and 
mixed-use district, there is little to demonstrate that the Victory Park development justified the 
substantial subsidies provided to build the American Airlines Center itself and infrastructure in 
the SATD. Though substantial assessment gains and construction have been seen, it has not been 
until the past five years where Victory Park has flirted with becoming a viable and complete 
district. Further the construction that has occurred has come at a high financial price relative to 
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other TIF subsidized developments in similarly core-proximate locations, with similar starting 
states. When the arena subsidy is added in, the gains seen in Victory Park are by far the most 
expensive in this chapter’s suite of comparable TIF districts.  
Given the pattern of successful development spurred by the Uptown corridor, and the 
almost 15 year delay after arena construction for substantial build-out of the SATD, it is 
reasonable to believe that the SATD land could have seen similar development, in a similar 
timeframe, had a different developer attempted a mixed-use and price point master-planned 
development without the arena. While it may be argued that absent the Victory project, the 
SATD would more resemble failed redevelopment areas such as Cedars or Grand Park, unlike 
these neighborhoods, the SATD had the benefits of proximity to the most successful urbanist 
redevelopment in Dallas (Uptown and State-Thomas) and land assembly where large parcels 
creating a mass of activity could transform an area in several years, as was the case in 
Cityplace’s West Village with a fraction of Victory Park’s subsidies. 
Although the arena brought further experiential diversity to the Uptown corridor that the 
post Amended TIF Plan changes have been able to effectively leverage, the arena also brought 
challenges that were not present in comparable alternatives. Namely, and as also noted in 
Chapter 5, the original legal framework did not allow for full commitment to an urbanist vision 
by requiring thousands of dedicated arena parking spaces. Again, this requirement has not only 
hampered Victory’s buildout in a corridor where development lots are in short supply, but 
required considerable TIF subsidies to be directed towards parking garages to solve a self-
manufactured problem. 
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6.6.5. Limitations 
There are a number of limitations to this study. Primarily, as noted, there is a baselining 
issue that has been mitigated through using the same legal jurisdictions, and the collection of 
variables intended to account for differing TIF district lifespans, geographical sizes, and subsidy 
spends. Likewise, Walk Score data is limited by its five year history, which only allows for 
relatively recent changes to be detected. Finally, the interview review is limited to secondary 
sources, although as discussed, this has some advantages over primary interviews.  
 
6.7. KEY IMPLICATIONS 
This chapter has evaluated TIF subsidized attempts at urbanist redevelopment with 
similar proximity to downtown Dallas, including one district anchored by a major sports arena. 
In this peer class, the most successful districts have emerged and clustered after a strong lead 
developer has attained a critical mass of mixed-use and price urbanism. While more successful 
redevelopment projects have been found outside of the SATD, significant gross financial gains 
have been seen around the arena, although these gains have been far more expensive in public 
subsidy terms than in any other TIF area discussed.  
The winning developer vision in Dallas has been walkable mixed-use with mixed 
everything. The original and most successful inner city redevelopment partnership, Uptown and 
State-Thomas, saw a wide mix in terms of uses, prices, rentals and owner-occupied housing, 
street fronts, as well as assembled and small lot developments. This mixed everything has 
provided the experiential diversity sought by creative class workers, and once a critical mass was 
achieved, a rapid buildout of anything proximate to this new core. Conversely, a vision premised 
on an exclusively luxury product and market was unsuccessful in Victory Park, despite itself 
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providing a different experience within Uptown. While there are thriving luxury focused areas, 
the pairing with an arena traffic has not proven successful. 
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CHAPTER 7. LOUISVILLE’S KFC YUM! CENTER, SALES TAX INCREMENT  
 
FINANCING, AND MEGAPROJECT UNDERPERFORMANCE7 
 
 
7.1. PURPOSE 
This chapter connects sport venue TIF to a larger discussion of infrastructure 
megaprojects through a case study that stands out as one of the worst examples of financial and 
revenue underperformance of a major North American sports facility in decades. In Louisville, 
Kentucky, the original revenue structure of the KFC Yum! Center has completely failed to cover 
the arena’s debt. As a result, the Louisville Arena Authority (LAA), responsible for the facility’s 
construction and operation, was left headed towards default before a substantial restructuring in 
2017. Now state taxpayers are responsible for a far larger share of debt service than under the 
original deal. This financial failure has centered on two elements: sales TIF and the arena lease. 
The primary purpose of this chapter is to evaluate how these outcomes arose and shine light on 
the use of sales TIF in the sport venue context. Although this case concerns a venue that does not 
host a major league team, it is a major league quality arena in a market that has been directly 
considered for NBA expansion, and with a location and development intent much more akin to 
major league arenas than college arenas. 
After an expanded literature review on megaproject underperformance and sales TIF, the 
chapter moves to the Louisville case. The core of the chapter then evaluates the Louisville 
                                                          
7 A version of this Chapter was published as: Sroka, R. (2019). Getting STIF [ed]: Louisville’s Yum! Center, sales-
tax increment financing, and megaproject underperformance. Urban Affairs Review, 1078087419830527. 
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experience through works representative of the primary explanatory lenses in the megaproject 
underperformance literature. This is followed by broader conclusions on how the Yum! Center 
debacle came to fruition, as well as key lessons for future projects. In particular, the Louisville 
case demonstrates how a local growth coalition can strategically misrepresent and push forward 
a deal subject to optimism bias in projections, and how the use of sales TIF can be further seen as 
both enabling the deception and enlarging the scope of damage. In addition to being another 
cautionary tale of local growth coalitions, the use of sales TIF highlights the volatility and 
transparency risks associated with reliance on this form of finance. 
 
7.1.1. Explaining Megaproject Underperformance 
While any project may be prone to underperformance, the scale, complexity and financial 
cost of megaprojects makes the risks associated with their failure far more potentially damaging 
to governments and firms. These magnified consequences have inspired a vibrant literature, 
some of which has been covered already in Chapter 2. For the purposes of this chapter, the 
relevant sub-literature can be seen as being well discussed under three theoretical headings by 
Sanderson (2012): the planning fallacy and rent-seeking, flawed governance structures, and 
project culture. Indeed, each of these categories has some merit in evaluating the Yum! Center. 
The rent-seeking heading is dominated by Flyvbjerg and collaborators (2002; 2003; 
2005; 2005; 2008; 2009; 2009; 2014). Again, these articles highlight the role of over optimism 
and intentional misrepresentation in forecasting costs and benefits by key decision makers and 
influencers to ensure the approval of poorly conceived projects (Sanderson, 2012). The primary 
alternative explanation is failed or inadequate governance structures (see De Meyer et al., 2002; 
Loch et al., 2006; Miller and Hobbs, 2009; Morris, 2009; Winch, 2009). Sanderson (2012, p. 
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437) summarizes these authors as focusing on “the presence of incoherent, inappropriate or 
underdeveloped governance arrangements that are incapable of handling the risks, uncertainties 
and turbulence inevitably associated with these endeavours.” The main distinction between the 
rent-seeking and governance explanations is explained as the former being concerned with how 
the deal was made and the latter on the inadequacy of governance frameworks to deal with 
unforeseen problems (2012). Finally, Sanderson’s (2012) third heading can be viewed as 
approaching underperformance as arising from a divergent range of cultures and project 
rationales frequently at odds with one another (Alderman et al., 2005; Atkinson et al., 2006; 
Clegg et al., 2002; Pitsis et al., 2003; van Marrewijk et al., 2008). Here underperformance is 
viewed more as a product of “managers trying to cope with an organizational environment that is 
complex, ambiguous and often highly conflictual” (Sanderson, 2012, p. 438). 
 
7.1.2. Sales TIF 
Building upon the discussion in Chapters 2 and 4, sales TIF is far less common than 
property TIF in jurisdictions with the capacity for major league venues. There are multiple 
explanations for this, some of which have already been touched upon. First, sales taxes most 
often flow to state governments. Where sales TIF is present, local governments have every 
incentive to capture locally created sales taxes as opposed to having taxes diffused at the state 
level (Mikesell, 2001). This is contrary to property TIF where increment is overwhelmingly 
diverted from local revenues. For sales TIF, the overlapping capture incentive is still present 
(Smith, 2009), but more directed towards state revenues than counties or school boards 
(Mikesell, 2001).  
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Likewise, sales TIF helps detach the local incentive for capturing state revenue from the 
traditional TIF objective of alleviating blight. Without proper controls in sales TIF legislation, 
such as functionally restrictive blight and but-for tests, local governments intent on sales tax 
capture will be incentivized to design zones to maximize increment (Mikesell, 2001; Smith, 
2009). By definition, the most prospectively lucrative sales TIF districts are not likely to include 
blighted areas where redevelopment is a tough prospect, but will encompass places where retail 
development would already proceed (Mikesell, 2001). Yet sales TIF does have significant 
potential benefits (2001). For instance, sales TIF revenues can greatly exceed the revenue 
potential from property TIF, meaning that sales TIF can retire bonds more quickly and allow 
projects to be larger in scope (Smith, 2009).  
These benefits are clouded by major risks. Foremost is volatility (Smith, 2009). 
Regardless of tenancy, property values will not disappear overnight. With sales taxes however, 
amounts generated in any geographical area are hostage to the continued presence of sales tax 
generating trade – the same building that may suffer a slight assessment decline will cause a 
more significant hole in sales tax revenues if retail tenants leave the TIF boundaries without 
replacement (Mikesell, 2001). Thus a sales TIF project with construction and retail tenant gains 
can be financially undermined by a major business departure. When a district is over inclusive, 
revenues legitimately spurred by the TIF funded project may be undermined by departures at the 
distant edges. This is compounded by sales TIF’s exposure to recessions (Smith, 2009). 
Consumption driven revenues are among the first tax streams to experience negative recession 
impacts (Chapman and Gorina, 2012). If sales TIF projections assume linear growth based on 
historical results, they are susceptible to normal economic downturns. 
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7.2 METHODS 
Using a retrospective, single case study method (in the framework of Thomas, 2011), this 
Chapter evaluates the Yum! Center project through three representative lenses corresponding to 
each of the previously listed theoretical headings in the megaproject literature. From this 
exploration of a key case, the study aims to add new perspective to this literature that can be 
instructive to the understanding of similar projects. 
Data is synthesized using a snowball technique from sources under three broad 
categories: the LAA, government, and media. The first focuses on the original 2008 bond 
prospectus, the 2017 refinance prospectus, the loan agreement, audited LAA financial 
statements, LAA meeting minutes between 2006 and 2017, as well as ancillary contracts (such as 
lease and management agreements). Of particular note, the 2008 prospectus includes detailed 
cash flow projection consulting reports from Leib Advisors, as well as state TIF projections and 
methodology.  
The initial LAA review described government documents of potential relevance which 
were then located through search engines and directly on government sites. These searches 
revealed further sources for the media review. The media review consists of press releases, 
interviews, editorials, and general reporting, with a focus on public statements from prominent 
actors. Media sources filled the place of traditional interviews, with the benefit of being able to 
identify the contemporaneous comments of key actors and local media.  
 
7.3. THE ARENA DEAL 
In a city with no major league team, the Cardinals are the closest alternative. Building the 
University’s reputation through basketball success, Athletic Director Tom Jurich was able to 
 310 
 
intertwine the University of Louisville Athletic Association (ULAA) with the local growth 
coalition. Surrounded by comparably sized cities with professional sports however (Indianapolis, 
Nashville, Cincinnati, and Columbus), many in this power elite – including “mayor for life” 
Democrat Jerry Abramson – aspired to more, and saw a model for downtown revitalization and 
image transformation in Nashville’s arena project (Nocera et al., 2017).  
After losing the Grizzlies to Memphis and a prospective Houston Rockets relocation 
largely due to the absence of an adequate arena, this aspirational local growth coalition set its 
sights on the Charlotte Hornets (Nocera et al., 2017; Poynter, 2000). By 2003 a non binding 
agreement was reached to relocate the Hornets to a new downtown arena shared with the 
Cardinals. Despite Louisville being a prime relocation candidate (Rascher and Rascher, 2004), 
Jurich and influential coach Rick Pitino wanted no part of sharing an arena or market, leading 
NBA Commissioner David Stern to question “if Rick Pitino doesn’t want us there, why are we 
going there?” (Nocera et al., 2017). 
Undeterred, the local growth coalition continued pursuing arena driven downtown 
development, this time financially premised on the arena hosting the Cardinals with the 
possibility of a future NBA tenant. However the ULAA, favoring a campus site, had no interest 
in Mayor Abramson’s preferred location adjacent to the convention center (Crawford, 2017). In 
April 2005 detailed proposals emerged for a campus arena supported by the ULAA, Republican 
Governor Ernie Fletcher, and the Kentucky State Fair Board (KSFB). However Metro politicians 
pushed back and refused to consider funding the campus site. This stalemate ensued until the 
Courier-Journal’s publisher proposed a riverfront site occupied by a power substation and near 
the proposed 62 story Museum Plaza project (Crawford, 2017). 
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Later that month Governor Fletcher appointed the Louisville Arena Task Force, mostly 
consisting of representatives from business, political, institutional, and University interests 
(including Athletic Director Jurich) (Louisville Business First, 2005). Effectively headed by 
sport business dealmaker and then state Commerce Secretary Jim Host, the Task Force 
eventually voted 16-1 for the riverfront site, citing greater economic development benefits than 
the alternate downtown locale (LEO Weekly, 2006a; 2006c). With lowest common denominator 
support from the Governor, Mayor, ULAA, the primary local newspaper, and major Louisville 
businesses, a formidable coalition was assembled for the riverfront site (LEO Weekly, 2006b). 
The lone Task Force dissenter however, pizza mogul “Papa John” Schnatter, was 
concerned with transparency, that the number of events required for debt service was severely 
underestimated by Host (who, as put by a local newsmagazine in 2006, played “fast and loose 
with the facts”) and that the arena cost was a “fictitious number” (Kahne, 2016; LEO Weekly, 
2006a). Schnatter claimed the Task Force was a “waste of time” and “rigged for the [riverfront] 
site” (Courier-Journal, 2005; Kahne, 2016; Wolfson, 2013). Papa John was joined in skepticism 
by Humana co-founder David Jones, who alleged that that he passed on information about 
alternatives to Governor Fletcher, Mayor Abramson, and Host, “and nothing happened” (LEO 
Weekly, 2006a). 
After the Governor’s office confirmed months later that the Task Force cost estimates 
were $50 million too low, Schnatter and Jones funded a comparison study between the two 
downtown sites (LEO Weekly, 2006a). Concluding that a substantially similar arena would cost 
$114 million more at the riverfront, the study made Schnatter, Jones, and some skeptical 
politicians fodder for the Courier-Journal (LEO Weekly, 2006a). Coach Pitino piled on further, 
telling a local television station that “everybody should be united because Louisville is not 
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playing at the other site” (Platt, 2006). By June 2006, Schnatter and Jones publicly “surrendered” 
in a letter to council, outlining that “[w]hile we think the arena plan as currently proposed 
remains very risky, we feel we have fulfilled our promise to the community of providing the 
decision makers with all the relevant facts before they have to decide” (LEO Weekly, 2006d). 
However, the decision was already made. At a March 2006 “Louisville Arena Unity 
Rally” Fletcher outlined that “[t]here's been a lot of speculation about where the arena should be 
located. But at the end of the day the arena will be built at the riverfront site. End of story” 
(Governor Ernie Fletcher’s Communication Office, 2006). The arena was an electoral 
opportunity for Fletcher in populous Jefferson County, and a chance to flip the switch from a 
major hiring scandal that led to a 2006 indictment (LEO Weekly, 2006b; Urbana, 2006; 
Wolfson, 2013). With a $75 million state grant to cover land costs signed into law, and a TIF 
agreement accompanying the Metro yearly payment commitment, the arena could proceed under 
the auspices of the LAA. Chaired by Jim Host, now labelled “easily the most powerful non-
elected official in the state,” (LEO 2006d) the LAA was delegated responsibility for site 
acquisition and preparation, construction, arena operations, lease negotiation, and debt 
repayment. 
 
7.3.1. Arena Finance and Revenues 
The arena was primarily financed through a $349 million bond issue by the Kentucky 
Economic Development Finance Authority (KEDFA) (KEDFA, 2008), which loaned the 
proceeds to the LAA (KEDFA, 2008). The issue included almost $27 million in capital 
appreciation bonds, frequently used to defer larger payments until revenues can grow. The bonds 
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closed on September 3, 2008, with Host bragging about sealing the deal despite predicting that “I 
think the markets are going to come unglued after Labor Day” (Sonka, 2013).  
The ULAA signed a lease through 2044 to become the primary tenant (KEDFA, 2008) 
and was granted priority from October to the end of basketball season, meaning that less attended 
Louisville teams could block major concert tours. Management was contracted to the KSFB, but 
the KSFB was replaced by AEG (the world’s largest owner of sports teams and events, and 
second largest presenter of live music) in 2012 (LAA, 2012). 
 Arena debt was to be repaid by three roughly equal sources: yearly payments from Metro 
Louisville, TIF revenues, and arena operations (see KEDFA, 2008, Summary of Flow of Funds). 
Metro payments were intended to cover shortfalls and scheduled to run from 2010 through 2039 
(KEDFA, 2008). Minimum payments ranged from $6.5–6.8 million, and the maximums from 
$9.5–10.3 million (KEDFA, 2008). The lease divided arena revenues into Category A and B, the 
former “Contractually Obligated Income” and the latter “Other Operating Income” (KEDFA, 
2008). Category A included naming rights, corporate sponsorship, and premium seating (club 
seats and luxury boxes), while other revenues generally fell into Category B. “A” revenues were 
committed directly to debt service and “B” revenues were first applied to operational expenses 
with the remainder diverted to debt coverage (with priority over additional payments from Metro 
Louisville).  
 
7.3.2. Kentucky Fried TIF 
Kentucky was a latecomer to TIF, with the 2000 pilot program introduced to fund 
megaprojects in Louisville. The Yum! Center was one of two pilot projects (Think Kentucky, 
2016). Under the pilot, up to 80% (the Yum! Center used the full 80%) of all incremental 
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property, sales, and income taxes for 20 years in a designated TIF area was available under 
contracts between the state (“acting by and through the Governor”) and a development authority 
(KRS, 2006, §65.490-95). Of particular note is the governor’s exclusive power to enter into TIF 
contracts with no further legislative authorization required (2006, §65.495).  
As the pilot was primarily intended for projects in the Democrat stronghold of Louisville 
– formally limiting TIF to “first class” cities with populations over 100,000 – one potential 
explanation for this design was as a hedge against a Republican controlled state senate from 
killing future projects under Democrat governors. At the time of the TIF pilot Democrats had 
controlled the governor’s mansion since 1972 and had held almost 65% or more of the state 
house since the 1920s, but Republicans possessed a narrow senate majority. Leaving control with 
the governor and only needing a few Republican votes for initial passage could have been 
viewed by Democrats as a safer way to ensure the program’s continued availability to divert state 
sales taxes to Democrat leaning areas. 
The original TIF district extended six square miles south from the arena, encompassing 
almost all of downtown Louisville (Office of the State Budget Director, 2008). Baselines and 
projections were created for the three taxation categories: property, sales, and employment 
withholding (2008). A 1.9% inflation multiplier was applied for property and sales taxes from 
the 2005 baseline year (2008), ostensibly so increment was closer to reflecting new growth 
instead of inflation. Two forms of modeling were applied with sales taxes. First, the zone was 
divided into three districts based on proximity to the arena, assuming that “sporting arenas have a 
gravitational economic impact inversely proportional to the distance from the Arena” (2008, p. 
7). Establishments were then categorized by use – those associated with event demand were 
assumed to experience larger incremental gains. A further assumption was made that economic 
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development close to the arena would see sales tax growth rates for arena complimentary 
businesses of 7%, above the 6.3% compound annual statewide 20 year growth rate (Leib, 2008). 
Non event related businesses were estimated to see gains below this statewide average. The 
percentage reductions for the second 10 year period were lessened “to accommodate the 
empirical observation that the excitement of a new sporting arena tends to dissipate after a 
number of years as the facility takes on age” (Leib, 2008, p. 158). However, the state’s 
hypothetical sales TIF calculation showed that a growth rate of 5.66% was only 3.69% once the 
1.9% inflation multiplier was applied (Office of the State Budget Director, 2008). 
Still, $531 million was expected to be collected over the TIF lifespan, with $486 million 
from sales taxes and $44 million from property assessments (Office of the State Budget Director, 
2008). These steady projections were assumed despite reports upon which the numbers were 
grounded showing considerable variance (Leib, 2007). This variance was made more 
troublesome due to the selection of 1990 as the baseline year, meaning that the 27% increase 
between 1990 and 1991 was included in the compound annual change rate. As highlighted by the 
2017 state audit, this increase can be mostly explained by the 1% sales tax rate increase in 1990 
as opposed to economic growth between 1990 and 1991 (Weber, 2017). 
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Table 30. 
Jefferson County and Kentucky Sales Tax Growth Rates 1990-
2006 
Year County (% change) State (% change) 
1990 Base year  Base year 
1991   43.4 27.0 
1992  -10.3 -4.5 
1993   15.6 16.0 
1994   9.2 12.5 
1995   -0.2 1.1 
1996   7.0 8.9 
1997   11.7 4.6 
1998  -10.7 6.1 
1999  12.4 5.3 
2000  4.1 4.1 
2001  3.5 3.5 
2002  2.3 2.3 
2003  19.4 1.5 
2004  3.5 3.5 
2005  6.0 6.0 
2006  6.0 6.0 
Avg. change  12.4 10.3 
Compound  7.1 6.3 
Source: Leib, 2007, 158 
 
Table 31.  
Arena Zone TIF projections and yield 2010-2016 
Year Projection ($m) Yield ($m) Percentage  
2010 5.184 0.678 14.13 
2011 6.674 2.168 32.48 
2012 8.273 3.542 42.81 
2013 9.987 5.177 51.84 
2014 11.823 7.410 62.70 
2015 13.790 8.109 58.80 
2016 15.896 10.500 66.05 
Sources: Boyd, 2014; Finley, 2017; Leib, 2008, 26; LAA, 2016, 4. 
 
Although the basis for the projections at the time may have been defensible (or designed 
to be so), performance has reflected historical variance and there has been a massive shortfall in 
TIF revenues since the first year of increment, 2010. At the heart of this failure, consistent with 
the literature, has been the conceptualization of sales TIF projections. With property taxes, 
regardless of occupancy land and improvements will maintain some assessed value that will not 
immediately leave the TIF zone. However with sales taxes, a business can depart for whatever 
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reason. While in a healthy market there is an expectation of replacement, Louisville’s downtown 
has been plagued by storefront vacancies, including near the arena (Boyd, 2014). Even if there is 
growth in other places, the removal of sales tax revenue does not necessarily alter the baseline 
value down – rather it creates a deficit that incremental increases will have difficulty making up.  
The risk of business departure is heightened by the possibility of recession or low growth 
years. In a recession, revenues would lose years of assumed positive compounding that later 
years would struggle to make up. Further, a severe recession in the zone’s early years (which 
occurred in 2008-2009) could reduce revenues well below the baseline. This combination of 
business departure and major recession is why Louisville TIF revenues are wildly off from 
projections. Indeed public officials have cited departing businesses miles away from the arena as 
costing “several million dollars in cash flow” (Robinson, 2013). While the projections 
contemplated new businesses on vacant properties, the methods did not anticipate retail loss 
without replacement (Office of the State Budget Director, 2008). 
In pursuit of a solution the TIF baseline and zone boundaries were adjusted. After 2009 
saw an 8% reduction in sales tax revenues, the state lowered the baseline and outlined that the 
1.9% inflation adjustment would only apply in years where a minimum ratio of 1.3 times debt 
coverage was achieved – a ratio not met in any year to date (Reuters, 2012). The revenue 
maximization analysis then reduced the TIF zone from six to two square miles to exclude areas 
with less expected growth. Since this 2011 formula change and 2013 zone redraw, increment 
results came closer to projections, but significant gaps persisted (KEDFA, 2017).  
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7.3.3. Lease Outcomes 
Major TIF underperformance has been accompanied by event revenues failing to meet 
projections, while Louisville saw its revenues surge beyond any other college basketball program  
(Sonka, 2016). This contrast has largely arisen from a lease that sees the ULAA only paying 10% 
of gross receipts and 12% of premium seating revenues in rent, while the LAA is responsible for 
event expenses (KEDFA, 2008). Yet these revenues have not been the principal issue – although 
consistently failing to meet projections, “A” underperformance has still seen revenues in the 80–
95% range of expectations. The five year average “A” revenue shortfall of 13% has translated 
into $4.3 million and 28% of the combined gross event underperformance.  
With Category B (other operational income) however, the gap between projections and 
reality has been more severe. This difference can be largely accounted for by the net nature of 
Category B – any “B” revenues are first applied to operating expenses, so this category is 
vulnerable to both underperformance and cost overruns. Once the arena opened, the KSFB 
experienced operating expenses well beyond projections combined with softer event revenues. 
After the KSFB was replaced by AEG in 2012 (LAA, 2012), a 2013 uptick quickly reverted to 
underperformance. In fact, after 2013 net “B” revenues have largely mirrored the guaranteed 
profits AEG has committed to the LAA under its management agreement (LAA, 2012). 
Table 32. 
Category A Revenues ($m) v. projections 
Year A revenue A projection A% of proj. Shortfall 
2011 5.607 5.912 94.84 0.305 
2012 5.659 7.008 80.75 1.349 
2013 6.417 7.075 90.70 0.658 
2014 5.833 7.144 81.64 1.311 
2015 6.641 7.357 90.26 0.716 
Total 30.157 34.496 87.64 4.339 
Source: LAA Financial Statements, 2011-2015 
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Table 33.  
Category B Revenues ($m) v. projections 
Year B net B projection  B% of proj. Shortfall 
2011 0.520 3.703 14.04 3.183 
2012 1.611 3.763 42.81 2.152 
2013 2.438 3.328 73.26 0.890 
2014 1.553 4.054 38.30 2.501 
2015 1.492 3.900 38.26 2.408 
Total 7.614 18.748 41.33 11.134 
Source: LAA Financial Statements, 2011-2015 
 
Category B revenues have seen an almost 60% shortfall. But for the minimum guaranteed 
net operating profit in AEG’s contract, the outcome may well have been worse (LAA statements 
report the final number after AEG’s minimum payment is applied). For the ULAA however, the 
combination of rent payments amounting to only 10% of non premium gross and 88% retention 
of premium seating revenues (LAA, 2008), allowed its basketball team to become the NCAA’s 
most profitable by a considerable margin (Sonka, 2016). Effectively the ULAA, a non profit 
public entity, has filled the role of a rent-seeking professional club extracting the upside of a new 
venue while being shielded from risk.  
However, a lease with a more equitable division of revenues or residual protection to 
allow ULAA windfalls to be shared with the LAA in the event of distress, was not a likely 
outcome. With only one possibility for a primary tenant to make the arena feasible “[Athletic 
Director] Jurich took advantage of a city that was willing to do anything to get a downtown 
arena” (Nocera et al., 2017) and exercised bargaining power typically associated with monopoly-
scarce professional teams.  
 
7.3.4. A Flawed Deal 
Combined with continued far weaker than expected event revenues despite a change in 
management, the LAA chairman publicly outlined in 2016 that debt obligations may not be 
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covered as soon as 2020 (Green, 2016). Although Metro Louisville was responsible for roughly 
$3 million per year beyond its minimum payment to cover shortfalls, after this the $15 million 
reserve fund was all that remained between a default (Leib, 2008). Tapping the reserves was 
already once avoided through $5 million in debt forgiveness by the KSFB that was due under the 
original management contract’s termination clause (Boyd, 2013).  
On the other hand, Louisville men’s basketball saw its net revenues greatly exceed those 
of other top NCAA basketball programs since moving downtown (Sonka, 2016). This prompted 
strong bipartisan criticism, with a Republican state senator commenting: “[y]ou open an arena, 
and the athletic association sees an annual increase of $15 million in revenue. The taxpayers are 
being fleeced, period” (Weber, 2017). A Democrat colleague agreed: “[i]t’s scandalous how 
much they are taking away” (Weber, 2017). Responding to public pressure, the ULAA floated 
building its own campus arena (Mason, 2016), but this was implausible with the basketball 
program committed to the Yum! Center through 2044 and being hard pressed to create a better 
financial reality. 
In March 2017, a legislative solution emerged with a TIF zone extension through 2054 
(Sonka, 2017). Eventually Metro Louisville committed to paying $10.8 million annually 
regardless of revenues, and the ULAA agreed to increase its yearly payments by $2.42 million 
(KEDFA, 2017), setting the stage for refinancing. Despite a major scandal and FBI investigation 
into the Cardinals leading to the ouster of Athletic Director Jurich and Coach Petino, which was 
viewed as a threat to event revenues, the new bonds received significantly improved ratings 
(Bailey, 2017).  
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7.4. EXPLAINING THE HOUSE OF CARDS 
The Yum! Center is not an isolated instance of an underperforming megaproject. This 
section evaluates the Louisville case through three explanatory lenses, each a particularly 
appropriate representation of the theoretical headings in the megaproject literature: rent-seeking, 
failed governance structures, and project culture. 
 
7.4.1. Rent-seeking and Optimism Bias 
Representative of works from Flyvbjerg and collaborators explaining underperformance 
from a rent-seeking perspective, this section focuses on “Delusion and Deception” (Flyvbjerg et 
al., 2009). These models understand forecasting errors in megaprojects as a combination of over 
optimism and strategic misrepresentation (2009). 
 
Delusion: The Planning Fallacy and Anchoring 
Flyvbjerg et al. (2009) argue that decision makers too often succumb to the planning 
fallacy, meaning that estimates are biased towards optimism over realism. Anchoring – where 
the first estimate becomes a reference point from which insufficient adjustments are made – 
compounds this issue (2009). We see examples of both in Louisville. The underperformance of 
TIF has only been exceeded by the failure of event revenues to produce any revenue for debt 
service beyond that guaranteed by the new facility management contract (LAA Financial 
Statements, 2011-2015). Likewise, the linear projection of sales TIF based on historical averages 
did not properly account for the possibility of recession or business movement, despite the 
consultant’s report explicitly noting significant variance (Leib, 2007).  
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When it became clear that both TIF and event revenues were nowhere near projections, 
adjustments did not adequately correct the situation. For instance, upon the management switch 
to AEG, Metro Council President and LAA Board member Jim King commented: “I don’t think 
there is any question that there will be more events and more concerts and more dates here 
because we have set up a model where the operator of the arena has incentive to accomplish that. 
They make more money if we make more money and that’s the way it should have been set up to 
begin with.” Despite this optimism and AEG’s record of turning losing buildings (such as 
London’s O2 Arena) into winners, event revenues have not sufficiently changed (LAA Financial 
Statements, 2011-2015).  
While the 2013 TIF readjustment reduced the deviation of forecast from reality, there 
remained a roughly 40% gap (from the 45% to 85% previously experienced). Yet after the 
supposed fix, King suspected bond rating agencies would “like what they see with the new TIF 
numbers” as revenues were “going up on a pretty strong basis” and that growth was more than 
enough to cover escalating payments (Kitchen, 2014). King also expected to reduce the 
Louisville yearly payment below the maximum, and that a new financial forecast “show[ed] no 
problems with cash flow out into the future” (2014). The same year Host expressed that there 
was no financial danger: “the operational side is fixed and the TIF district is fixed.” A local 
reporter summarized: “[then LAA Chairman] Hayes and King have admitted that the original 
arena financing plan was not well thought out and did not provide incentive to maximize 
revenues. Yet they are both confident things will get better by making minor tweaks to the 
management of the arena while hoping for the best with regards to TIF revenues” (Stahmer, 
2012). Within three years the arena was headed towards default. 
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Deception: Strategic Misrepresentation and Agency Problems 
Strategic misrepresentation arises through divergent incentive structures leading to risk 
minimization and upside inflation (Flyvbjerg et al., 2009). In megaprojects, a second tier agency 
problem complicates matters with local governments conflicted by the duty to propose value for 
money and incentives to capture scarce state resources that may go elsewhere (2009). This issue 
can be compounded by asymmetric information, differences in risk perception, and 
accountability diffusion (2009). 
In Louisville, sales TIF was a volatile means of debt coverage, but without the arena the 
taxes may have been diverted from the region. State TIF allowed the project to be sold locally as 
requiring no new taxes and to the state (in the words of Mayor Abramson) as being “generated 
by the folks who use the facility and the surrounding property owners where jobs are created and 
the appreciation for taxes will occur” (McArthur, 2009). Louisville leaders had the incentive to 
believe that the project could be both efficient and beneficial with safeguards sufficient to 
mitigate major risks. Secondary parties (consultants, professionals, and bureaucrats) benefitting 
from the project process (Flyvbjerg et al., 2009) were able to help frame deal structures in 
sufficiently safe terms for decision makers with the help of TIF’s masking functions, despite red 
flags.  
The powerful elite coalition, covered by the Task Force recommendation, was able to 
prevail over dissent. The then Lt. Governor and formal Task Force chair framed the project as 
having “…scientifically chosen a site that will continue to pay the city and the state cultural and 
economic dividends for decades. The time has come to stop debating and start building the 
arena" (Governor Ernie Fletcher’s Communication Office, 2006). He was supported by Mayor 
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Abramson commenting that “[i]t's the best investment because it will serve as a catalyst that will 
spark private investment…It isn't the cheapest choice, but it is the best choice” (2006).  
 
7.4.2. Governance and Risk Management 
Alternatively, the failings of the Yum! Center can be explained through the inability of a 
governance structure to manage risk profiles. Providing an apt lens for evaluating Louisville, De 
Meyer et al. (2002) categorize project uncertainty in four ways: variation, foreseen, unforeseen, 
and chaos. The TIF and arena revenue problems in Louisville could feasibly be placed under the 
headings of “foreseen” or “unforeseen”. Foreseen uncertainties are viewed as identifiable, but 
possibly requiring “full-blown risk management with several alternative plans” (2002, pp. 61-
62). Unforeseen risks are those that cannot be “identified during project planning,” although may 
arise through the interaction of more foreseeable events (2002, p. 62). De Meyer et al. (2002) 
contend that both sets of risks can be dealt with through decision trees.  
With event revenues, the primary problem came from the arena being more costly to 
operate than expected. This fits better as a foreseeable risk. With TIF revenues, the applicability 
of foreseen or unforeseen largely turns on whether the Great Recession was a foreseeable event. 
While the extent of this recession was unforeseen, recessions are a normal part of the economic 
cycle. If when the bonds were being closed on, indicators such as the housing bubble bursting 
and that the LAA was having trouble selling the bonds due to credit market turmoil should have 
been cause for decision makers to take a step back on a project where TIF revenues were reliant 
on linear consumer spending growth, a degree of foreseen risk analysis may be appropriate.  
The prescription for foreseen uncertainty is anticipation of alternative paths and 
contingency planning, then triggering contingencies when risks materialize and motivating 
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stakeholders to deal with changes (De Meyer et al., 2002). In Louisville, the primary contingency 
was the supplemental Metro payment. Beyond this and a $15 million reserve fund, there was no 
contingency for recession impacting TIF or event performance, and little appetite from 
stakeholders to contribute more when large shortfalls arose. The governance structure did not 
specify what happened if revenue holes emerged larger than the Metro supplemental payment 
and reserve fund capacity, and the LAA lacked the ability to motivate the three key stakeholders 
to cover the shortfalls until the bonds faced obvious default. While there was default insurance, 
the state (the party of the three with the most to lose in a default) blinked and used its powers 
over a public university to force the ULAA to also contribute more.  
However the scope of impact beyond a “normal” range recession and the Great Recession 
can be viewed as an unforeseen risk. De Meyer et al. (2002, p. 63) propose that managers can 
still add new contingencies and mobilize new partners, while using “flexible relationships” with 
existing stakeholders to “develop mutually beneficial dependencies.” To this end, the LAA can 
be seen as implementing new contingencies through TIF zone and baseline tinkering. Beyond 
these relatively minor concessions from the state, the LAA did not have the capacity to bring 
about sufficient change as there was no other contractual contingency. Nor were there 
relationships with the ULAA that could overcome its entrenched refusal to contribute more of its 
record revenues. Instead of softening up resistance, these efforts saw the ULAA threaten moving 
to a campus arena. 
Many of the problems faced in Louisville could have been mitigated if the original 
contracts spelled out who would pay what in the event of a structural shortfall larger than the 
maximum Metro payment. While the extent of the TIF hole created by the Great Recession can 
be viewed as an unforeseen risk, much of the deficit (what a “normal” recession and scope of 
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arena underperformance could have expected to impact) can be attributed to foreseeable risks. 
The absence of better contingencies is a clear governance failure, if not a direct explanation of 
how such a bad deal emerged in the first place.  
 
7.4.3. Project Culture 
A third lens comes from the project culture literature. As an explicit rebuke to 
Flyvbjerg’s concepts, this subsection evaluates alternatives offered by van Marrewijk et al. 
(2008). Specifically, these authors contend that megaproject performance can be better explained 
by project design and culture “determining how managers and partners cooperate to achieve 
project objectives to a greater or lesser extent” (2008, 591). Van Marrewijk et al. collect data 
from interviews, observations, and transcript review for cases with “high uncertainty, ambiguity 
and complexity,” in order to evaluate five “issues of social construction”: “(1) basic project 
orientations, (2) social interaction, (3) dominant paradoxes between the players, (4) how these 
configurations were structured and disciplined via power-related connections, and lastly, (5) the 
way knowledge was distributed between partners” (2008, p. 593). 
In Louisville, the evolutionary deal-making process framed the basic project orientation. 
The initial social interaction was dominated by a largely cooperative local growth coalition, 
where early resistance from the ULAA was overcome and the construction phase proceeded 
without notable conflict or overrun. This first phase was seemingly smoothly overseen by the 
LAA, itself a melding of state and local interests directed by a dominant player in the initial 
social interaction, Jim Host. Despite delivering during construction, once event and TIF revenues 
massively underperformed, the dominant paradox became how to close revenue gaps that the 
original contractual structure proved inadequate in solving.  
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Power relations then became ruled by a combination of hoping revenues would improve, 
while stakeholder parties (and new politicians) did not want to be held individually responsible 
for shortfalls. This moved the LAA from being a cooperative melding of growth coalition actors 
to being powerless to force its constituent parts to sufficiently rectify the revenue holes. While 
the LAA was able to work with stakeholders to implement stopgap measures such as the TIF 
zone adjustment and management change, it was ineffective in bringing substantial financial 
amendments that would directly burden Kentucky, Metro, or the ULAA. Instead, it took the near 
term prospect of bond default for the state to step in and force concessions that appear to have 
finally solved revenue gaps.  
With knowledge distribution, van Marrewijk et al. argue that the presence or absence of 
such distribution and organizational harmony between partners is a key attribute of success or 
failure. This heading shares some common ground with the Flyvbjerg concepts of agency 
problems and information asymmetry. The difference arises with intent: Flyvbjerg believes that 
these problems stem from strategic misrepresentation and van Marrewijk et al. blame less sinister 
roots. Seen from the latter perspective, while key actors were savvy enough to take lessons from 
past construction failures and place delivery underperformance at the risk of contractors, this 
being a pilot TIF project, there was little local experience to draw upon that could have 
highlighted issues with heavy sales TIF reliance.  
More generally, the van Marrewijk et al. lens is useful in adding color to why over 
optimism could take root as well as the inability of the governance structure to force sufficient 
correction. In the smooth early phases, the growth coalition got along well as there was no major 
financial threat to any party’s interests. When things went wrong, the LAA managers were 
unable to correct the financial structure because the governance structure did not have built in 
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levers to do so, and the constituent parts did not want to bear the cost. Instead, the LAA was left 
rearranging deck chairs by tinkering with TIF geography or firing arena managers. Perhaps a 
more compromising, realistic, and resilient project culture could have allowed revenue problems 
to be more expediently solved without formal governance provisions detailing contingencies, but 
new money would have come from someone.  
 
7.5. WHAT BEST EXPLAINS THE YUM! CENTER? 
When returning to the question of how such a flawed structure arose, project culture is a 
more viable explanation to the extent that the growth coalition was driven by the need to build 
the arena. While van Marrewijk et al. (2008, p. 592) agree that “getting megaprojects off the 
ground and keeping them going…presents ample opportunity for…the organisation of 
hypocrisy,” they argue that this stops short of the systematic misrepresentation and 
underestimation of risks proposed by Flyvbjerg. Instead van Marrewijk et al. emphasize that 
“practical rationalities and practices of the players whose projects are at stake, need to be 
considered and analysed in the context of their project designs and project cultures” (2008, p. 
599). This said, although case specifics matter, megaprojects commonly share over optimistic 
projections as well as unaccounted risks.  
There are also instances where strategic misrepresentation manifests. In Louisville, a 
state audit underlines the extent to which public officials now believe deception to have been 
present. Examining “unrealistic” TIF projections, the state auditor explained that:  
[w]hen they were beginning to set those TIF boundaries, they looked at 10 years of 
property tax and looked at 16 years of sales tax, and of course sales tax makes up the 
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primary amount of the TIF, and during that year 1990, 1991, that included a 1% increase, 
which was adopted, so that kind of skewed the numbers (Weber, 2017).  
Yet this was not a sole instance of questionable numbers – years earlier, Metro Council President 
and LAA board member Jim King admitted that the arena maintenance fund: 
is just an arbitrary number that was picked and no one ever did the math and said, ‘This is 
what we’re going to need to do and this is what we’re going to need to repair.’ It was just 
a nice round number that was picked (Stahmer, 2012).  
For the state legislature, Louisville’s theoretical shortfall responsibility reduced the 
incentive to ensure that the projections were accurate. More deviously, Governor Fletcher 
wanted an arena to help with a tough election fight (Fletcher ultimately lost by 20 points in 2007) 
(Wolfson, 2013) and TIF was a revenue source controlled completely by Fletcher. Without the 
need for further legislative approval, the Governor controlled each of whether the state entered 
into a TIF contract, the creation of the other contracting party (the LAA), as well as who would 
run the other contracting party (Jim Host). The $75 million state grant for site preparation, which 
required new legislative approval, was likely far more politically palatable than a grant for the 
entire state TIF contribution plus potential further liability for underperformance. 
Agency issues persisted in the operational phase. The state audit outlined that 
“operational analysis is based on the [LAA]’s reliance on information from parties that have a 
vested interest in maintaining their contracts” (Finley, 2017). Elaborating before the Capital 
Projects and Bond Oversight Committee, the state auditor highlighted the development of 
asymmetric information and accountability concerns arising from the LAA’s lack of internal 
controls:  
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Other than its board of directors for whom this is not a full-time job, all functions of the 
arena, including management, are outsourced. This had led to a web of contracts, and 
some revenue generated by the arena is not reported to the authority (Weber, 2017).  
After hearing from the state auditor, a state senator outlined: 
[i]t’s [the Capital Projects and Bond Oversight Committee’s] belief when this project was 
initiated, the intent was you make the numbers look appropriate to pass what we need to 
pass to put this arena here. There was manipulation of data, in historical tax data, to get 
us to the point and I think it was simply intended to get the arena built and punt on the 
payments of it” (Weber, 2017).  
Another committee member added: 
[t]he original projections were made just to get the deal done - taxpayer be damned. They 
understood the bonds would default but they didn't care. They knew that once the YUM! 
Center was built, taxpayers would be forced by legislators and Metro Council to bail it 
out or there'd [b]e a massive scar in the middle of the state's marquee city (Moffett, 
2017). 
While van Marrewijk et al. (2008, p. 599) may explain this as “post hoc moral outrage,” 
the sales tax manipulation is a compelling indicator of strategic misrepresentation. To the extent 
project culture mattered, it may have been that the local growth coalition was too eager to get the 
deal sealed considering the history of lost opportunities. This dominant culture allowed a certain 
amount of deception to take advantage of actors primed to succumb to over optimism through 
their willingness to close a deal and lack of experience with TIF. The result was a deal with an 
absence of governance controls that could address the lurking flaws before a near default 
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prompted state action. Thus, the culture perspective provides context to key governance failures 
in a project that more broadly fits rent-seeking models.  
 
7.6. IMPLICATIONS 
This chapter has documented the performance failings of the Yum! Center in Louisville, 
which have been most pronounced in sales TIF and lease revenues, with the objectives of 
explaining how such a deal arose in the first place and making observations about the central use 
of sales TIF in a venue finance structure. Whereas the literature concerning public subsidization 
of sports facilities often focuses on economic impact underperformance or cost overruns, 
Louisville provides one of the most extreme instances in recent decades where revenue bond 
repayment streams for a sports facility have failed and led to a public bailout. This failure links 
the arena to a wider literature on megaproject underperformance, characterized by three primary 
threads: rent-seeking, inadequate governance structures, and project culture. Although in many 
respects the arena’s problems can be explained through rent-seeking and governance failure, 
understanding the local growth coalition provides important cultural context. More specifically, 
the Yum! Center debacle demonstrates the presence of optimism bias in deal design and revenue 
projections, incidences of strategic misrepresentation and agency issues, as well as the failure to 
identify and manage risks through formal governance or informal relationship structures. The use 
of sales TIF can be further seen as enabling the deception. 
The process leading to severe revenue underperformance has made the Yum! Center the 
source of two primary lessons for future stadia and megaprojects. First, local growth coalitions 
can strategically misrepresent risks and succumb to over optimistic projections, making projects 
vulnerable to failure from the outset. In order to craft politically saleable projects and bring on 
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necessary partners, rent-seeking behavior can create governance structures unable to survive 
foreseen and unforeseen turbulence. The transparency issues associated with TIF may make 
these issues more pronounced. Second, the Louisville project is a reminder of sales TIF volatility 
relative to property based TIF due to sales TIF’s vulnerability to business movement and 
recession. Although sales TIF may tempt governments with high revenues, Louisville shows that 
reliance on sales TIF should serve as a major warning sign in projects where the financial stakes 
of failure are high. 
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CHAPTER 8.  A HOT-N-READY DISAPPOINTMENT: LITTLE CAESARS ARENA 
AND THE DISTRICT DETROIT 
 
8.1. PURPOSE 
    Detroit’s Little Caesars Arena is the single largest use of TIF in a sports venue. A total of 
$324 million TIF funding has been provided to the arena, with a further $74 million available for 
hitting ancillary development targets. The arena is perhaps most interesting as a larger part of the 
more ambitious neighborhood redevelopment plan by the owners of the Red Wings, Tigers, and 
Little Caesars, the Ilitch family, through their Olympia Development Company. The 50 block 
District Detroit intends to infill vacant lots into a coherent mixed-use district anchored by the 
arena, the football and baseball stadiums, as well as the Ilitch owned Fox Theatre, while more 
broadly connecting the downtown and midtown neighborhoods. However the deal and its 
outcomes have been criticized on a number of fronts, many of which overlap with criticisms 
noted in the TIF literature.  
Building upon work in the first Dallas chapter concerning but-for and transparency, this 
chapter evaluates these two criticisms from slightly different perspectives in the Detroit context, 
as well as adding discussion under two other important headings: overlaying capture and 
community benefits. After two initial parts respectively detailing the deal structure and origins, 
as well as the District Detroit development plan, this chapter specifically aims to understand and 
assess the Detroit arena project through these four headings of inquiry. 
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There are four primary findings in this chapter. The first is that enforceable contractual 
obligations are the bottom line of what public partners can rely upon private partners actually 
delivering. Second, state level politicians need to be more than a rubber stamp for amendments 
enabling venue TIF projects, otherwise quick and flawed deals pushed by local growth coalitions 
can have long term deleterious consequences. Third, venue TIF projects that are not premised on 
new increment and instead draw existing increment away from schools should be heavily 
scrutinized. Finally, public partners should also consider the opportunity cost of venue TIF 
subsidies in terms of what results could be otherwise had for the same subsidy dollars and 
whether activity that would occur in the absence of subsidies is being crowded out. 
 
8.2. METHODS 
Using a snowball technique, documents were collected from government, media, 
industry, community, legal, and academic sources. Documents were then reviewed for their 
prospective relevance. Once preliminary application was assessed, documents were analyzed and 
synthesized across source headings as appropriate under one of the primary body subjects in this 
chapter. As with the Louisville chapter, a review of secondary media sources was conducted in 
lieu of traditional interviews in order to facilitate access to key actors as well as their public 
statements over time. 
 
8.3. HOW TO SUBSIDIZE AN ARENA IN A BANKRUPT CITY 
With the riverfront Joe Louis Arena long obsolete, the owners of the Red Wings and 
Little Caesars Pizza, the Ilitch family, had been assembling land throughout the 1990s and 2000s 
for a new arena and entertainment district between downtown and midtown Detroit. In 2012, the 
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Ilitches hired stadium architects to design the arena (Muret, 2012), and Olympia Entertainment 
announced its intention the same December for an arena focused entertainment district. The new 
arena district would be geographically between other significant Ilitch interests: the Detroit and 
Wayne County owned Comerica Park (home to the Ilitch-owned Tigers), the Fox Theater on 
Woodward Avenue, and the MotorCity Casino to the northwest. While Comerica Park had 
received significant direct public subsidies from Wayne County (in the form of land, and hotel 
and rental car sales taxes) and the State of Michigan (land and infrastructure), there appeared to 
be little appetite from senior governments to provide major funding in the wake of the Great 
Recession. Yet the recession also moved the City of Detroit to the brink of bankruptcy and 
eventually past. For Mike Ilitch, apparently unwilling to proceed without significant public 
subsidy, the question became how to gain hundreds of millions in arena subsidies in a bankrupt 
city and distressed state? 
The answer lay in TIF. While the City of Detroit, under emergency state management 
from March 2013 to December 2014, had no capacity or credit worthiness to provide direct 
funding and the county and state lacked political will to do so, the Detroit Downtown 
Development Authority (DDDA) had the potential to bridge the gap through bonds tied to 
specific revenue streams. In Michigan, the Downtown Development Authority Act of 2018 
(replacing the original 1975 Act) enables cities to create a Downtown Development Authority 
(DDA) to facilitate and fund improvements in defined downtown business districts. The primary 
means of financing is TIF.  
The DDDA has been in existence since 1976 and is mostly encompassed by the 
downtown freeway loop. Although much of early 2010s Detroit was abandoned and of little 
assessed value, the DDA covered the city’s most valuable real estate and dependable taxpayers, 
 342 
 
even if its assessments had declined from a 2008 peak of $778 million to $576 million in 2012 
(Michigan Strategic Fund, 2014). Yet since the tax increment baseline was set far lower, the vast 
majority of property revenues in the original DDA area are allocated to the DDDA. Further, even 
a recovery to pre-recession levels would create hundreds of millions in supposedly new 
increment. Indeed by 2018, pre-recession levels were exceeded, with assessments reaching $816 
million (DDDA, 2018). While the DDDA is entitled to the bulk of property taxes in the 
downtown area (specifically the city, county, community college, and regional parks), three 
education taxes (respectively from the state, county, and city), the most potentially lucrative form 
of overlaying capture, were excluded by the DDA Act (see Michigan Strategic Fund, 2014).  
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Figure 8. DDDA Historical Incremental Value – Development Area (DDDA, 2018, 104). 
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Although neither the Governor nor state legislature had a desire for direct state 
appropriation for the arena, the Governor’s office was extremely interested in the arena project, 
and the state legislature was able to help facilitate a deal through amending TIF law to allow for 
greater DDA capture in certain instances. Namely, a 2012 amendment to the DDA Act (2012 PA 
396; Mich. Comp. Laws, §126.1651), directly intended to enable the Detroit arena, permitted a 
“catalyst development project” to capture the three school taxes (Michigan Strategic Fund, 2014, 
4). A catalyst development project was defined as a capital investment of at least $300 million in 
a city with more than 600,000 in population, ensuring that only a Detroit project could qualify. 
DDA Act amendments also allowed for the retroactive capture of these school taxes from 2010 
to provide an additional $34.75 million to the project (Mich. Comp. Laws, §126.1651(cc)(vi)),  
The retroactivity became an issue in the later discussed lawsuit challenging the constitutionality 
of diverting taxes from the State School Aid Fund (see Davis, 2017). Geographically, the DDDA 
boundaries were revised to include the new “Catalyst Development Area.” This new zone 
expanded the DDDA area north of the Fisher Freeway and west of Woodward Avenue, as well 
as covered several blocks of the pre-existing DDA area south of the freeway. 
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Figure 9. DDDA Area Map (Michigan Strategic Fund, 2014). 
 
 
These DDA Act amendments and streams of incremental school taxes became crucial to 
the arena finance structure and enabled the 2013 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
between the DDDA, Olympia Development of Michigan (the Ilitch development company), and 
the state (Morante, 2013). This MOU set out that the DDDA would own the arena, and through 
the Michigan Strategic Fund, there would be an issue of two series of bonds. The $250 million in 
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2014A Bonds were secured by two streams of TIF revenues, while $200 million in 2014B Bonds 
were secured through concession fees from Olympia to the DDDA (Morante, 2014). The Series 
B Bonds were retired by Olympia in 2017 through a refinancing. The 2014 Series A Bonds were 
intended to be primarily covered by school tax capture in the catalyst project area, in the range of 
$11 million to $17 million per year for 30 years (the maximum term under Michigan TIF 
statute), although with substantial support from general DDDA revenues depending on increment 
generation (Michigan Strategic Fund, 2014). Because the 2014 Series A Bonds were secured by 
revenues technically unrelated to the venue, they were able to attain federal tax-exempt status, 
while the Series B Bonds were taxable. 
From the original MOU, which was substantially reflected in the December 2014 Master 
Development and Reimbursement Agreement (MDRA) executed upon issue of the 2014 Series 
A and B Bonds, the arena cost significantly expanded. By 2017, the total project cost ballooned 
to $862.5 million, with the public cost increasing to $324.1 million (Whitaker, 2017). Beyond 
the $250 million Series A debt issue and the $34.75 million in retroactive school tax capture, an 
additional $34.5 million in TIF was added for adapting the arena to the NBA’s Pistons (Guillen, 
2017). A further $4.85 million was allocated for closing costs (2017). The Pistons move to Little 
Caesars also increased the potential reimbursement to Olympia for ancillary development. 
Specifically, the MDRA made possible $62 million in reimbursement to Olympia for providing 
$200 million in ancillary development within five years of the arena’s opening (DDDA, 2019), 
with the potential for this amount to be increased to $74 million with the approval of the 
Michigan Strategic Fund and DDDA – the Pistons’ move downtown was the triggering event for 
the $74 million (Reindl, 2019a). 
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The recitals of the MDRA made clear that the $200 million in ancillary development was 
a “material inducement” for DDDA support of the larger arena project, and without this 
commitment the DDDA would not have entered an agreement to fund the larger arena project 
(DDDA, 2019, p. 2). What constituted “eligible costs” for the $200 million was subject to 
definitions in the MDRA and plan approval by the DDDA, as well as a hard cap of $50 million 
in “infrastructure” expenditures (2019, pp. 4-5). While surface parking was excluded from 
eligible costs, parking garages were not, and these did not fall under the “infrastructure” 
definition either (2019, pp. 4-5). 
The additional Pistons money was accompanied by a refinancing of the Series A Bonds 
in 2018. Even without the Pistons, the bonds would have been refinanced as after five years the 
interest rates would have spiked significantly (Michigan Strategic Fund, 2014; Pinho, 2019a). 
However the lack of ancillary development progress was cited as making the refinancing more 
difficult for the DDDA, with lower investment grades and higher interest rates offered than 
expected (Pinho, 2019a). In explaining its almost bare minimum investment grade “BBB” rating, 
a bond rating agency specified that there was “expectation of more growth in the tax base” and 
“growth had not occurred to [the] degree as originally expected” (2019a). 
 
8.4. THE DISTRICT DETROIT 
The catalyst development area in which construction was seen by the bond markets and 
many others as underperforming, mostly consists of Ilitch controlled properties and substantially 
overlays the District Detroit. Formally announced in advance of the 2014 MDRA and bond issue, 
the District Detroit was at the center of a plan to transform 50 blocks around the arena through 
mixed-use real estate development in five designed neighborhoods: Columbia Park, Columbia 
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Street, Woodward Square, Wildcat Corner, and Cass Park Village (Crain’s Detroit Business, 
2014). In theory, the District Detroit solved a major planning objective for the City, connecting 
its downtown to midtown along the intended Woodward Avenue development corridor. The 
District Detroit was intended to substantially rise alongside the arena in 2017. Olympia President 
Chris Ilitch claimed that “[t]he idea is to have it all come out of the ground at once” (Aguilar, 
2019a). This included a specific commitment to 184 apartments which were to rise alongside 
Little Caesars, as well as a 2017 plan for six buildings with 686 new housing units, none of 
which have not commenced construction as of writing in 2019 (Aguilar, 2019a). 
 
Figure 10. District Detroit Neighborhoods (Crain’s Detroit Business, 2014). 
 
The ability to make bold promises on a vast scale was supported through major land 
assembly. In addition to the almost $50 million spent on 56 parcels that the Ilitches had 
assembled over two decades through shell companies and non-disclosure of sales terms (a 
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common assembly tactic for developers looking to avoid holdout problems), the City transferred 
74 properties through the DDDA for the arena and entertainment district site (Aguilar, 2019a). 
This included 39 parcels for the arena site itself conveyed from the City to the DDDA for $1 (the 
assessed value was almost $3 million) (Felton, 2014) and then sold on to Olympia. As a 
condition of this transfer, the Neighborhood Advisory Committee (NAC) was established, which 
is central to the community benefits discussion later in this chapter.  
A comprehensive 2019 analysis of over 500 District Detroit property records by The 
Detroit News found Ilitch control (defined as ownership, leasehold, or management rights) over 
properties consisting of 84 acres out of 243 acres in the District (Aguilar, 2019a). Although these 
holdings only make up a third of the District Detroit’s gross land mass, when accounting for 
presumptively unavailable parcels such as Cass Technical High School, Ford Field, dedicated 
parks, and a utility substation, Ilitch control was deemed to be at no less than 64% (Aguilar, 
2019a). A subsequent analysis including properties outside of the District Detroit found Ilitch 
related interests hold 147 unused properties in Detroit as of October 2019 (Aguilar, 2019b; 
2019c). Outside of the District, the report found 64 vacant lots and 13 unused buildings, 
primarily concentrated around the Ilitch owned Motor City Casino (44 vacant lots and eight 
vacant buildings) not far from the formal District Detroit boundaries (Aguilar, 2019c). Ilitch 
acquisitions over two decades were generally unimproved, leading to further blight and 
reductions in property values. Alongside community destabilization, this allowed the Ilitches to 
acquire more land for cheaper (Elliott, 2018) and position themselves to solve a planning 
problem of their own creation – connecting downtown and midtown over a no man’s land of 
largely Ilitch owned blight.  
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The vision for District Detroit was based upon the Ilitches appreciation for San Jose’s 
Santana Row, a master-planned 42 acre, $450 million retail and residential district developed in 
2001 (Aguilar, 2014). In pursuing a similar vision for Detroit, the Ilitches hired one of Santana 
Row’s primary designers in 2007 (Aguilar, 2014; Aguilar, 2019a). The tightly controlled 
planning of Santana Row (and other similar high end “lifestyle center” developments in the 
country) may explain some of the frustration potential development partners have expressed with 
Olympia in terms of strict specifications and controls for District Detroit (Pinho, 2019a; 2019b).  
As the District Detroit has idled and seen at least two development partners walk away 
from the Ilitches (Pinho, 2019a), the areas to the immediate north, south, and east of the District 
have been experiencing a rapid construction boom. Indeed, a major national development 
company, American Community Developers, pegged to build and manage five of the six 
buildings proposed in 2017 (and 538 of 686 units), parted ways from the Ilitches (Pinho and 
Shea, 2019). According to Chris Ilitch, the relationship fell apart when “it became apparent that 
our long-term interests weren’t exactly aligned,” while the developer noted that Olympia wanted 
to change two of five buildings to office space instead of residential and the inability to come to 
terms on the remaining residential projects, with “tensions over control” being cited by a local 
business magazine (Pinho, 2019a). Interestingly, despite moving on from its Olympia 
partnership, American Community Developers has embarked upon their own $46 million, 180 
unit project two blocks east of the District Detroit in Brush Park (2019a). 
Brush Park is especially interesting as it is the equally neglected mirror image of the 
primary arena and District Detroit area on the other side of Woodward Avenue. As of writing in 
2019, American Community Developers have been joined in Brush Park by another 18 planned 
developments, with eight of these either under construction or completed (Runyan and Mondry, 
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2019). The largest currently under construction is the 400 unit City Modern by Dan Gilbert’s 
Bedrock, which will soon be eclipsed by the same company’s 900 unit development on the 
Brewster-Douglas site (2019). 
Yet despite being roundly criticized in the local, national, and even international media 
(see Perkins, 2018) for its lack of delivery on promises, Olympia has met its commitment of 
$200 million of defined “eligible costs” for ancillary development in the MDRA, as approved by 
the DDDA. The accepted $200 million primarily consists of $150 million for the Little Caesars 
headquarters on an already rapidly developing Woodward Avenue at the south edges of the 
District. Additionally, there was $17.8 million approved for offices attached to the arena building 
(home to Google and other tenants), $24.4 million for a parking garage with 7,000 square feet of 
street level commercial space, and $30 million for a second parking garage designed to attach to 
future residential or office uses (Reindl, 2019a). While the parking garages are operational, 
attached non-parking uses have been left some combination of winterized and waiting. 
Olympia will receive its additional $74 million for ancillary development as catalyst 
development revenues are released from lien under the Series 2018A Bonds (DDDA, 2018). As 
the bond structure calls for a number of reserves, Olympia may not see these funds until the 
2040s (2018). However in theory, if Olympia develops faster, they will create more catalyst 
project revenues, and in turn more quickly create catalyst project revenues released from the 
bond lien, which will see their $74 million paid more quickly and have a higher present value. In 
this relatively minor respect, Olympia will be incentivized to gain more valuable increment 
through delivering development. Yet even DDDA bond repayment scenarios including new 
revenues directly from Olympia development only account for roughly $2.5 million out of $40 
million in increment projected for each year (2018). 
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Figure 11. Projected TIF Revenues by Source for Series 2018A Bonds (DDDA, 2018, 124). 
 
 
Still the present value difference between a portion of $74 million in 2025 versus 2045 
pales in comparison to the already provided subsidies (at most $20 million versus $324 million). 
While the ancillary development may have been a “material inducement” for the arena deal 
without which the state and DDDA would not have proceeded, there is a massive gap between 
the fulfilment of the MDRA’s concept of ancillary development and the District Detroit vision 
that publicly sold the project. In fact, when the Michigan Strategic Fund Board was asked to 
approve the use of “Catalyst Project Revenues”, their package included an extensive PowerPoint 
outlining cases where arena and stadiums have transformed the neighborhoods around the venue. 
One slide, labelled “The Vision” provided five points of reference (Morante, 2013, p. 24): 
- A district that accommodates a variety of uses 
- A blend of revitalized landmarks and new buildings 
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- An eclectic mix of restaurants and street-side shopping 
- A central gathering place 
- A venue that will serve as a point of destination.”  
      When asked about the arena, Governor Snyder, the single politician with the greatest 
ability to make or break the funding structure, commented that: 
[a]s an old accountant I’m always somewhat challenged on projects like that…And if it 
was just a project like that [a publicly funded arena], I would probably have even more 
skepticism. But this is a wonderful project, particularly because of where it’s located — I 
think that’s where it adds tremendous value (Felton, 2014).  
Snyder’s comments at the project’s announcement also indicated that the deal moved forward 
because of the ancillary development promises:  
When you look at a project like that, what I find so exciting is that the Ilitch’s are moving 
ahead very aggressively — not just with the arena, but with additional 
development…Where this project is going I think is really exciting because it would be 
the connector between Midtown and Downtown and we could really create something 
special through a much longer corridor than we have today with these two somewhat 
separate areas (CBS Detroit, 2014). 
Of course again, the “two somewhat separate” areas existed in large part because the Ilitches 
bought the land in-between and tried to drive down property values through inviting further 
blight. 
This disconnect with the promised vision is in part reflected in certain amendments to the 
2014 MDRA. Two of the amendments specifically extended the time Olympia had to provide an 
“approved development plan” for lots on Woodward Avenue near of the arena. Without these 
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extensions, the properties without an approved plan conveyed to Olympia through the MDRA 
could revert to the DDDA (DDDA, 2019). While in theory a contractual land reversion or option 
clauses upon development targets not being met are a powerful tool, the submission of a plan is a 
far less strong control than actual construction targets – the only construction target was the five 
year ancillary development deadline for the additional reimbursement, a low target which 
Olympia was able to easily meet without delivering on the vision it publicly sold. Further, the 
DDDA would have to pay the MDRA Ancillary Land Transfer Agreement definition of fair 
market value, which required an assessment of market value within the previous year, meaning 
that the assessed value may be more than what Olympia paid in the first place (DDDA, 2019). 
The minimal protection provided by the reversion clause was completely undermined by the 
DDDA being willing to extend the deadline as Olympia needed. 
Other amendments concerned the Eddystone Hotel, a 13 story abandoned historic 
building which in 2015 Olympia promised to rehabilitate into housing in return for being allowed 
to demolish its companion, the Hotel Park Avenue, for the arena loading docks. With the 
Eddystone left unsecured from the elements (Ross, 2019), Olympia missed an August 2018 
construction deadline and agreed to put up a $33 million performance bond to ensure that the 
renovation took place on schedule (Ferretti, 2019). This performance bond was the first 
enforceable promise for District Detroit ancillary development. Members of the Neighborhood 
Advisory Committee were highly critical of the lacking progress – chair Frances Grunow 
commented that  
[i]t's over a year behind schedule, and they opened the arena ahead of schedule. It 
underscores where their priorities lie in terms of rebuilding a neighborhood that was 
supposed to be part of District Detroit…Eddystone, in my mind, is an example for the 
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rest of the district. If we can't get started with a building like the Eddystone, what hope do 
we have for the rest of the district? (Ferretti, 2019).  
Another member, Eric Williams, was more pointed: "The city of Detroit has gone out of their 
way to give Olympia Development whatever they want…It's a joke. Economic development in 
Detroit is on the verge of becoming a scam" (2019). 
There are a range of views as to why Olympia has largely failed to implement a vision it 
promised would rise alongside its arena. Some experts see development as a more complex and 
competitive process than the Ilitches had bargained for, citing the difficulty of obtaining 
financing as well as the presence of Dan Gilbert’s aggressive Bedrock potentially 
outmaneuvering demand for Olympia’s prospective projects (Aguilar, 2019c). Others have 
ascribed more nefarious motivations to the Ilitches.   
The latter are lent support through the history of Ilitch development proposals in the same 
area. In their pursuit of a new baseball stadium in the 1990s, the Ilitches promised an 
entertainment district around the stadium on Columbia Street. While that district never emerged, 
the renderings resemble the promised District Detroit neighborhood of Columbia Street, which 
the Ilitches released vibrant mixed-use renderings for in both 2014 and 2018. However 
references to these five District Detroit neighborhoods were subsequently removed from the 
District website.  
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Figure 12. Columbia Park Rendering (Pinho, 2019a). 
 
Figure 13. Columbia Park in 2019 With Arena Top Right (Pinho, 2019a). 
 
Ilitch critics have also noted a pattern of exposing buildings to the elements, painting 
limestone and brick bright red, then when the properties are sufficiently blighted, applying for 
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demolition on health and safety grounds (Derringer, 2018). After demolition, the parcels are 
converted to surface parking. This pattern precedes the District Detroit, with the Ilitches 
thwarting attempts to preserve historically significant structures such as the Hotel Madison-
Lenox, and instead demolishing buildings and paving them over (Young, 2011). Sometimes 
however, preservationists have won out, including with the establishment of the Cass-Henry 
Historic District to place another hurdle between the Ilitches and demolition of several historic 
apartment buildings (Pinho, 2018). 
Even where seemingly serious interest has been expressed in moving on a project, Ilitch 
representatives or partners have made misrepresentations to the City. With the United Artists 
Building, the Ilitches provided a 70 year lease to a partner seeking to redevelop the building 
through a HUD loan. While the partner claimed to the City that HUD required demolition of the 
adjacent historic United Artists Theater as a loan condition, HUD representatives said that this 
was not the case (Williams, 2019a), with the developer subsequently saying they misspoke after 
reporting from The Detroit News (Williams, 2019b). Photos from 1996, the year prior to the 
Ilitch acquisition, show much of the original theater and architectural details intact, but pictures 
of the current condition demonstrate serious neglect over more than 20 years as the developers 
argue the theater is too far gone to be saved (Terrible Ilitches, 2019). 
However as shown in Dallas, where the most successful TIF spurred developments have 
come from areas where there were no existing structures as opposed to scattered retention of 
historic properties, there is merit in land assembly to implement a transformational vision on a 
block level. Still, the merit is grounded in the assumption that landowners wish to actually 
develop the lands and not perpetually maintain surface parking. With Olympia, this baseline 
assumption is not clear several years after the arena’s opening. Likewise, Dallas’ Victory Park 
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also demonstrated that surface parking lots can hinder the growth and vibrancy of an arena based 
district that had an initial vision sharing more than a few similarities with the District Detroit. 
Chris Ilitch has claimed that the city zoning ordinance requires over 3,000 off street 
parking spaces within 1,000 feet of the arena (Gallagher, 2019a). Indeed a review of the 
ordinance indicates that based upon arena capacity ranging between 19,515 for hockey, and 
20,491 for basketball, this translates to a requirement of between 3,253 and 3,415 spaces (based 
upon a ratio of one spot per six seats) (City of Detroit, 2017). Between the three arena garages, 
there are 2,381 spots, seemingly leaving a gap of over 1,000 spaces that may at first make the 
surface parking necessary. While Olympia has been reluctant to spend on ancillary real estate 
construction, ODM Parking, an Ilitch holding, was loaned $135 million in 2017 to construct and 
renovate six parking garages and 27 surface lots, seeing that its arena surface lots combine for 
2,686 spaces (Guillen, 2018). 
However, unlike in Dallas where the requirement came from the arena contracts, 
Olympia has several viable options to gain relief. In addition to a variance, Olympia could apply 
for authorization for reduction through a “Transportation Demand Management Plan,” which has 
no limits on potential space reductions for large developments required to provide over 250 
spaces (City of Detroit, 2017, s. 61-14-114). In particular, the Ilitches control a further three 
parking garages within 1,000 feet of the arena, two on the north side of Comerica Park and the 
third attached to the Fox Theater, which combine for 2,844 spaces (Parkopedia, 2019). The 
parking garages would seem to be complementary for sharing between the three Ilitch controlled 
entertainment venues. As Comerica Park has a capacity of 41,297, there is likely to have been a 
similar sharing plan or variance for the baseball stadium as the Olympia controlled off street 
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parking capacity within 1,000 feet is significantly less than the 6,882 spaces that would be 
required under the same formula. 
Additionally, such a reduction plan would be consistent with shared parking provision in 
s. 61-14-109 of the Detroit Zoning Ordinance, which while specific to theaters or other non-
stadium entertainment or assembly venues, outlines that “[i]t is the City’s stated intention to 
encourage the efficient use of land and resources by allowing users, wherever feasible, to share 
off-street parking facilities.” This leaves the question of whether the Ilitches really believe that 
the both the City and the Board of Zoning Appeals would be unwilling to relax parking 
requirements to further facilitate development? Further, the Ilitches have had no hesitation to use 
the planning process to increase parking allowances at their nearby MotorCity Casino, or to gain 
permits to allow parking lots to not meeting zoning code requirements for interior landscaping. 
The Detroit Free Press estimated that the exemption from landscaping requirements on their 
surface lots translated to an additional 269 spaces and an estimated $1 million per year in 
additional revenue (Guillen, 2018). 
Still, from the perspective of maximizing revenues while minimizing risks, the outcomes 
in the District Detroit make sense. The Ilitches have already extracted the maximum public 
financial benefit available through constructing the arena, parking, and office space for mostly 
Little Caesars. There is no additional subsidy to be gained through embarking upon further 
ancillary real estate development. Thus for Olympia, the prospects of additional ancillary 
development have to be measured through potential financial gain against loss. While money can 
be made through development, it might not be as simple as other more experienced developers 
operating in the same area (mostly Gilbert’s companies) make it look – there are no guarantees 
the development would be sufficiently profitable after financing costs. Further, to obtain the 
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financing required to embark upon ambitious ancillary development, the Ilitches may have to 
collateralize other profitable aspects of their business empire and thus risk losing control over 
those assets should the developments fail.  
The alternative to uncertainty and risk associated with a competitive local real estate 
development market, is to wait for opportunities where projections are sufficiently profitable to 
outweigh the risks. In the meantime, sitting on land in one of the country’s busiest urban 
development corridors, while bringing in significant net and relatively risk free cash flows 
through parking, makes a lot more sense. An estimate from the Detroit Free Press set out that the 
Ilitches may bring in over $10 million per year from their surface parking spaces in the District 
Detroit (Guillen, 2018). Instead of competing with other developers for the same market, the 
Ilitches can allow others to take the financial risks. At the same time, Ilitch lands will become 
more valuable as other developments succeed in making the local geography more desirable, as 
well as reducing the inventory of lots in this more desirable location.  
In some respects, the question is not so much why has the District Detroit not delivered, 
but why would the government actors think that the deal structure provided would make 
unenforceable concept renderings come to fruition? While many may believe that Olympia 
should live up to an implied moral obligation to deliver the substance of promised development 
without which it would likely have not received almost $400 million of public subsidies from a 
bankrupt city, there is no contractual obligation to do so.  
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8.5. BUT-FOR AND LITTLE CAESARS ARENA 
 
8.5.1. Michigan TIF Statute 
Evaluating the Detroit arena and District Detroit through but-for, first leads to the 
enabling statute. In Michigan there are two primary vehicles of TIF: DDAs and Brownfield 
Redevelopment Authorities (BRAs). Unlike with DDAs, which are geographically limited to 
downtown areas, BRA TIF is project based, requires an eligible brownfield site and an initial 
investor or developer (Michigan Department of Environmental Quality, 2017, p. 14). In addition 
to local property taxes, BRAs can capture certain school taxes that non-catalyst project DDA TIF 
cannot. School tax reimbursement is however subject to state control. BRA TIF, outside of the 
later discussed Transformational Brownfield Program, is basically limited to costs from 
demolition, substance abatement, site preparation, and infrastructure (Michigan Economic 
Development Corporation, 2016). These spending limitations, combined with the existing 
revenue capacity of the DDDA may have been why the arena was funded through DDA Act 
amendments as opposed to brownfield TIF or attempts to amend the Brownfield Redevelopment 
Financing Act (such as those later pursued by Dan Gilbert). 
Like Texas, Michigan TIF law is relatively wide open, with two primary limitations. 
First, for DDA based TIF in Michigan only property tax increment can be captured (Michigan 
Legislature, 57-2018-2, s. 125), and where brownfield TIF may make school taxes available, it is 
subject to state oversight. Second, TIF districts are for the most part limited to downtown areas 
through DDAs and specific brownfield project sites. Compared with Texas where local 
governments can strategically choose which 10% of their assessed value base that they would 
like to capture through TIF and negotiate with overlaying jurisdictions for their increment shares, 
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in Michigan capture is either tied to more specific geography where a municipality is willing to 
assign many aspects of its jurisdiction to an authority, or to a specific brownfield project. 
Beyond these limits, the DDA form of TIF lacks critical controls such as effective blight or but-
for tests. Although blight is mentioned in establishing the authority for DDA TIF in the first 
place (s. 125.4201a), a blight test is not applied to any specific project (unlike with a brownfield 
TIF project). A DDA will have to have a public hearing for the implementation or amendment of 
a development plan. While the plan must meet 15 elements, the financial elements are not 
required to go beyond description or estimates to assess financial feasibility (s. 125.4217).  
 
8.5.2. Three Related Issues of But-for 
For the purposes of this chapter however, there are three related issues touching upon 
but-for that I will explore: 
1. To what extent would the incremental revenues relied upon have been generated in 
the absence of the arena and District Detroit project? 
2. What was the likely no subsidy alternative? 
3. How do the arena and District Detroit subsidies compare to those provided to other 
developments in the same Woodward Avenue corridor? 
 
To what extent would the incremental revenues relied upon have been generated in the absence 
of the arena and District Detroit project? 
     Whereas TIF can be theoretically conceived as securitizing the future streams of revenues 
from a project that would not occur as quickly or significantly without the promise of subsidy, 
this is not the case with Little Caesars Arena. The primary revenue pledge for the arena bonds 
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are the catalyst development revenues in a geography that substantially corresponds to the 
District Detroit. While these revenues were not previously accessible to the DDDA prior to the 
legislative amendment to provide for catalyst development projects, the bonds are secured based 
upon increment projections without reliance on adjustment for increased valuations – thus this 
stream is based upon capture, not creation. Additionally, while properties in the area have 
appreciated in recent years, the DDDA area as a whole has experienced a significant 
appreciation, which can also be seen as regaining the significant losses seen during the Great 
Recession. In the arena area itself, the absence of substantial construction improvements means 
that gains come from mostly bare land value or speculation based upon proximity to the future 
construction. The most significant construction improvement is the arena itself, which is owned 
by the DDDA and is tax exempt. 
The secondary stream of bond revenues is surplus revenues from the original DDDA 
zone. Again, while assessments in the original DDDA area have increased in recent years beyond 
inflation, only in 2018 have they exceeded their 2008 levels. There has also been massive 
downtown area development in recent years, with over $3 billion in projects under construction 
as of 2018 (Moutzalias, 2018). The strong majority of this construction as well as development 
during the preceding five year boom has come from Dan Gilbert’s companies. For instance, 
between 2011 and 2016, Gilbert related companies purchased 62 downtown properties for a 
combined $451 million, and this tally excludes the Greektown Casino (Aguilar, 2016). The issue 
is to what extent the arena amenity is influencing downtown development activity? Considering 
the scale and timeline of Gilbert’s downtown holdings and construction, as well as the already 
existing sports stadiums, it is difficult to attribute most downtown development decisions in 
significant part to the new arena. Instead, Gilbert’s companies are likely far more influenced by 
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their own hard timelines to receive hundreds of millions in BRA TIF incentives, and within those 
deadlines, construction costs and labor supply that can be influenced in the local market by 
Bedrock’s scale (Aguilar, 2018; Slowey, 2019).  
 
What would the likely no or less subsidy alternatives have been? 
It is possible that a more aggressive negotiation could have derived similar outcomes for 
a lesser subsidy cost. There are two main alternatives to the original deal: the Ilitches could have 
pursued options in the suburbs, or waited longer to develop the arena and district while 
improving the Joe Louis Arena in the meantime. Though metro area relocation is often an option 
for sports teams, the prospect of the Ilitches seeking or NHL approving relocation of one of its 
most storied and successful franchises from a large traditional hockey market is remote.  
Like Perot in Dallas, the Ilitches had been assembling land for years in a particular geography for 
an arena district plan. This land assembly was accompanied by their accumulation of other 
considerable assets in the immediate vicinity, such as the Fox Theater, the MotorCity Casino, 
and control of Comerica Park. Unlike in Dallas, there do not appear to be realistic alternatives for 
major arena subsidies outside of Detroit itself. Since the major state legislative maneuverings to 
free up increment for arena bonds were initiated by a Governor’s office intent on seeing Detroit 
succeed (Egan, 2019), state-level assistance to move an asset away from Detroit seems doubtful. 
Nor was the Pistons 1988 arena in the distant suburbs a viable longer term option for hockey. 
The Ilitches would have had to spend money and perhaps significant time acquiring a suburban 
site and paying for it themselves. 
If the Ilitches had moved to build at an alternative suburban site, they may have also 
disposed their assembled District Detroit lands to developers more willing build, much as the oft 
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criticized Maroun family eventually sold the Michigan Central Station site to Ford. This said, the 
Ilitches may have strategically retained their properties to benefit from land values generated by 
the upswing in construction and activity in most neighboring areas. Still, there is a strong 
possibility that Bedrock or a competitor would have made an offer on assembled arena lands too 
lucrative for the Ilitches to refuse, in which case the development boom in Brush Park – again 
something of a mirror image in terms of geography to the District Detroit – may have been a 
likely outcome. 
However the more likely of the two primary alternatives is that the Ilitches would have 
waited longer to build their arena and district. Yet since only really the arena has been 
constructed, and the arena is exempt from property taxes, there is not much negative impact on 
the property tax base by delaying the activity.  
Beyond delaying major construction in an area where there is already billions in ongoing 
construction and shortages in construction trades, the benefit of incremental activity generated 
relative to the existing Joe Louis Arena on the other side of downtown is likely primarily limited 
to increased concert traffic and the Pistons move from the suburbs. The redirected activity from 
The Palace of Auburn Hills is significant, with over 40 Pistons games per season combined with 
the closure of the previous most lucrative regional concert venue for arena tours. In 2018, for 
instance, 845,000 tickets were sold for concerts at Little Caesars Arena, third most among US 
arenas (McCollum, 2018). The construction and specific economic activity from the Pistons’ 
new practice facility also likely would not have happened in Detroit at that time, although this 
activity came two miles north of the arena and with a $16 million brownfield TIF subsidy 
(Associated Press, 2017). Considering the project also contains health care uses and is on Henry 
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Ford Hospital campus parking lot, future alternative health industry projects may have been 
crowded out. 
A delay also had significant potential to lessen the public cost either through negotiating 
a less generous deal in gross terms, and the present value gain of delaying expenses. The 
spiraling of the original $450 million arena cost up to $862 million was largely covered by the 
Ilitches, meaning that they were not short of financing to build the arena. These overruns made 
Little Caesars Arena in many ways a “state of the art” facility. Specifically, the Ilitches spent 
$538 million on Little Caesars Arena, not including the $50 million in previous land assembly. If 
the state had limited subsidies to $100 million for instance, would the Ilitches have not spent 
$400 million on building an excellent, but perhaps not “state of the art” arena that still would 
have significantly improved revenue streams (releasing the Ilitches from yearly revenue sharing 
payments to the City in the range of $7 million) beyond the antiquated Joe Louis? The answer is 
unclear – the Ilitches are both patient and adept at extracting corporate welfare.  
Alternatively, the state and DDDA could have created a structure whereby the same gross 
subsidies were available, but were far more contingent on the Ilitches delivering on the District 
Detroit renderings – for instance, making $200 million of subsidy contingent on delivering more 
than projects that were quite likely to be built anyway. This latter scenario may be more realistic, 
as the Governor’s office driving the deal had a window for completion hemmed in by emergency 
management of Detroit and the Governor’s term. As many other stadium subsidy stories have 
told, if key politicians want a deal done, they will often overpay with taxpayer money. 
The other commercial use included in the $200 million calculation was an office block 
attached to the arena primarily occupied by Google. Initially Google brought 100 employees 
downtown from the suburbs and are expanding on to another floor. No direct subsidies were 
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provided to Google. The image of having Google in downtown Detroit is a positive and attracted 
national media. However the subsidy is paid to Olympia, so again the issue becomes would 
Google have relocated its activity downtown or midtown absent the arena office space? While 
the office space attached to the arena by atrium is a rare property, many historical office blocks 
are currently under renovation downtown – would Google have not wanted to locate downtown 
in another space? Would Dan Gilbert’s real estate companies have not seen the value in 
providing Google options for attractive spaces? From comments by Google’s facility manager 
for Michigan that the firm “…came down here [to Detroit] to tap into that talent pool and be a 
part of the city and give back to the community” as well as from the company’s site leader that 
“Detroit was always important…We really focused on where we could build, attract and retain 
talent. That helps here,” the general downtown location appears more determinative than the 
specific office space (Gallagher, 2018; Walsh, 2018). 
Building from discussion under the previous heading, it is also possible that the arena 
crowded out a potential soccer specific MLS stadium. Gilbert’s shift in plans from having a 
mixed-use development anchored by a soccer stadium in pursuit of a MLS club to a revised 
version without the stadium with the MLS bid offering Ford Field may indicate belief in there 
already being enough sporting venues in the area (Ellis, 2018). The planned 23,000 seat soccer 
specific stadium would potentially compete with the arena for summer concert traffic, and 
Gilbert’s partner in the soccer proposal, Tom Gores, moved his Pistons to the arena after the 
initial MLS bid announcement (2018). The Pistons’ vice chairman commented in 2018 that:  
[w]e also feel strongly it would be irresponsible to not have it at Ford Field…To build 
another stadium when you have three great facilities in this city already in Ford Field, 
Comerica Park and Little Caesars Arena, it would be irresponsible to build another one. It 
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would be just the wrong use of land in the city when it could be used for housing, for 
offices or multi-purpose development. The city doesn’t want that (2018). 
 
How do the arena and District Detroit subsidies compare to those provided to other 
developments in the same Woodward corridor? 
While the arena and District Detroit have received major subsidies, these are not the only 
heavily subsidized projects in downtown and midtown Detroit. In fact many projects in this 
Woodward Avenue development corridor have received a range of subsidies from local, state, 
and federal sources. The justification has been that market rents alone do not make construction 
financeable for banks and subsidies are needed to close a feasibility gap. Where contaminated 
brownfields and complex restorations are involved, there can be a legitimate need for subsidies if 
a public authority wants a project to move faster than the market would otherwise demand.  
This was often the case with projects in the early 2010s, such as the Whole Foods Market 
in midtown. Opened in 2013, Whole Foods received a reported $5.8 million package of local, 
state, and federal tax credits and grants (McMillan, 2014; Pothukuchi, 2015). $7.1 million of the 
remaining $12.9 million in cost was covered by the developer, with Whole Foods paying the rest. 
The objective of subsidies was to reduce Whole Food’s cost per square foot to where the store 
would be profitable even if poor sales projections came to fruition (McMillan, 2014). 
While the share of subsidy was high, it paled in comparison to Little Caesars Arena or 
some of Bedrock’s developments described below. Hundreds of new housing units have emerged 
in nearby mixed-use projects, including in the same complex as Whole Foods itself. Although 
these are hard to unequivocally tie to Whole Foods, with ever increasing retail and dining 
options, the full range grocer was a missing link to make an area with destination amenities (the 
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Detroit Institute of the Arts), and employment clusters including an adjacent hospital and Wayne 
State University, into a livable neighborhood. In addition to positive national media, the 
supposed “Whole Foods effect” of higher property values in areas near a Whole Foods, retailers 
such as Whole Foods, Trader Joe’s, and Target, like Starbucks before them, can be seen as signs 
of gentrifying neighborhoods that are on their way to becoming more desirable for higher income 
residents and young professionals (Guedell, 2017). For Detroit, Whole Foods has been relatively 
low cost, high return neighborhood development tool. 
Both the largest and largest TIF subsidies in Detroit have been provided to Dan Gilbert’s 
companies however. In 2018, a $618 million subsidy package was provided for four Bedrock 
projects worth an estimated $2.15 billion in construction value: the former Hudson’s site, 
Monroe Block, the Book Tower, and an 11 story annex to Quicken Loans’ headquarters at One 
Campus Martius. The estimated $900 million Hudson’s development is the most ambitious, and 
fills a 35 year hole at the center of the city where the namesake department store once stood. The 
project will have a podium and tower combining retail, office, residential, and hotel uses. While 
Bedrock is the city’s most proficient developer, the tower component has shifted several times in 
both use mix and height, and two years after ground breaking, nothing has risen beyond the 
underground excavation (Gallagher, 2019b) and external financing has been hard to come by 
(Dixon, 2019). Likewise, the Monroe Block project has become less ambitious from its original 
vision of three midrise buildings accompanied by 35 story office and 27 floor residential towers, 
and has been delayed. Bedrock has cited the challenges of simultaneous construction of multiple 
major projects, while others have noted lack of leasing demand from higher end tenants that 
Bedrock may wish to pursue (Dixon, 2019; Pinho, 2019c). However the $313 million Book 
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Tower restoration is substantially in progress, as is construction on the $95 million One Campus 
Martius expansion. 
The subsidies were enabled through passage of a 2017 Transformational Brownfield Plan 
amendment into the Brownfield Redevelopment Financing Act, which allowed for three sources 
of tax increment to be captured for “transformational projects”: construction period taxes, 
income taxes, and withholding taxes (Michigan Economic Development Corporation, 2019). 
These are in addition to property taxes enabled through a carve out to the general and catalyst 
state TIF provisions previously discussed. Income and withholding tax capture is limited to 20 
years, while property taxes may be captured for up to 30 years. Unlike the DDA TIF statute, 
there is a legitimate but-for requirement alongside quantitative feasibility study. In particular, 
TIF may only be approved to the extent an underwriting-based analysis finds that it will fill a 
demonstrated financing gap, as well as a net positive fiscal impact for the state (Center for 
Creative Land Recycling, 2018).  
The state bill, championed by Dan Gilbert, was passed on its second attempt after initial 
failure in 2016 (Aguilar, 2018). The passed version found broader support through opening up 
the mechanism to all localities, with different thresholds of investment based upon population. 
While the thresholds for cities between 25,000 and 599,000 range from $15 million to $100 
million, for a city with a population of at least 600,000 (which can only be Detroit) is $500 
million (Michigan Economic Development Corporation, 2019). Along with a cap of five plans 
per government, this effectively guaranteed that Dan Gilbert would be by far the best positioned 
prospective recipient in Detroit. 
Specifically, the primary increment sources broke down as $274.5 million from state 
income taxes, $229.6 million from property taxes, $60.6 million in state sales taxes on 
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construction materials, and $51.7 million in new resident state income taxes (Aguilar, 2018). For 
the $256.3 million of the $274.5 million anticipated to be generated in income taxes from new 
workers in the buildings as opposed to construction workers, the state will retain 50% of the 
increment (Morris, 2018). All of those sources except the construction sales tax increment went 
to secure a $250 million bond issue, making the present value of subsidies much closer to the 
Olympia arena package. Additionally, if the projects are not completed by May 2023, the 
increments will be clawed back (Zaretsky, 2017). 
There are but-for questions with the Gilbert subsidies too. While serious commercial real 
estate lenders external to Gilbert’s companies have made clear their belief that the Hudson’s and 
Monroe projects would not happen, even on a smaller scale, without state subsidies (Dixon, 
2019), some beneficial projects could have likely occurred on those properties without state 
assistance given their proximity to activity on Woodward Avenue. In particular, the Hudson’s 
site is primed for growing retail demand (with tenants such as Nike, Under Armour, Lululemon, 
and H&M either already or soon to be across the street) and a successful retail ground level 
mixed-use project could likely already be closer to completion than the current plans. The 
vertical ambition of Hudson’s and Monroe will also compete with projects that could more 
quickly fill in the many surface parking or empty lots in the downtown core and provide a more 
complete infilled urbanism, as opposed to a development corridor concentrated on Woodward. 
Thus the question is more whether “Cadillac” projects reminiscent of the flawed 1970s era 
Renaissance Center are drawing unnecessary subsidies where merely good projects could 
succeed with far more modest subsidies? Likewise, since mostly state taxes are being captured, 
the but-for picture is further clouded as the state’s bottom line would only benefit from activity 
that would otherwise not occur in Michigan, as opposed to Detroit. 
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However when compared to the arena, Gilbert has to actually deliver much more 
construction value to obtain a similar present value subsidy to the Ilitches. Additionally, while 
the main new draw to Detroit from the arena was the Pistons, the upside of Gilbert’s projects 
include the attraction of multinational or Fortune 500 corporate offices and the potential to 
populate Detroit neighborhoods with the stability and local consumption demand of their well 
paid workers. Still, the most efficient and least risky subsidy of the three discussed in this section 
may be Whole Foods. For roughly 1/50th of the present value subsidy received by the Ilitches, 
Whole Foods has debatably done more to make the former Cass Corridor an attractive and 
liveable neighborhood for a professional workforce that a successful city needs. 
 
8.6. TRANSPARENCY 
Little Caesars Arena and the District Detroit also bring up issues of TIF and transparency. 
There are three primary elements here: that Detroit was under emergency state management 
when the primary deals were made, the primary formal local approving authority was the 
unelected DDDA, and the state legislature had limited debate on the enabling legislation. 
While many argue Detroit’s managed bankruptcy was in large part responsible for the 
city’s improved conditions in the years following, the appointment of an emergency manager 
assigned many powers of mayor and council by the Governor, provided an opportunity to 
leverage a fusion of state and local power into an arena deal. The limited time nature of 
emergency management may have meant that the state level actors felt pressure to close a deal 
before the state would have to also negotiate with potentially less cooperative local elected 
officials. Additionally, the arena was one of many often far larger issues before the Emergency 
Manager, bankruptcy lawyer Kevyn Orr. In particular, the $1.4 billion loan provided to the City 
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in the mid 2000s to address a pension fund shortfall was retired by Orr through providing the 
creditor the land on which Joe Louis Arena resided (Dolan, 2014). Few City owned sites could 
have the same potential value as the downtown riverfront arena lands, but for this major deal to 
go through, the Red Wings needed a new home. For a Governor and Emergency Manager 
looking at a larger bankruptcy and growth picture, taking more risk on the Olympia deal to 
secure the new Red Wings home so one of the City’s largest debts could be taken care of, may 
have made more sense than driving a harder bargain with the Ilitches. 
The Mayor of Detroit since 2014, Mike Duggan, was not pleased with the arena deal or 
his lack of ability to impact the agreement however. Duggan commented in 2019:  
I was angry at being excluded from the negotiations on the hockey arena deal…I’m not a 
person who spends a lot of time talking about things I can’t do anything about. I’ve been 
through the contracts. We have enforceable provisions and we have things that are not 
locked into the contract…We have a contract and the city executed its responsibility 
under the contract, and the Ilitches have executed their responsibilities. They stood up 
and made a bunch of promises with a lot of pictures, none of which were included in the 
contract (Finley, 2019). 
The mayor however does have a seat (represented by a designee) and significant 
influence on the DDDA, an entity which was unaffected by the bankruptcy. In fact the DDDA is 
governed by a Board of Directors, which is for the most part selected by the mayor and approved 
by council. In addition to the mayoral designee, the Board at the time of the 2014 bond issue had 
12 members (Michigan Strategic Fund, 2014). The membership comprised of four City staff 
members, with the remainder dominated by business and development interests, in some ways 
quite reminiscent of the local growth coalitions discussed elsewhere in this dissertation. However 
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the MOU, which approved the basic deal and finance structure, was approved by voice vote by 
the previous Board in June 2013, six months prior to Duggan taking office in January 2014 
(Pinho, 2013). 
The DDDA was also a driving force in finding a legislative sponsor for amendments to 
the DDA Act to facilitate the arena (Felton, 2014), and aligned with the will of the Governor and 
Emergency Manager to move ahead with the arena deal as presented. Even if the new Mayor was 
unhappy with the arena contracts or process, the deal presented may have been seen as better 
than returning to the table – for a bankrupt city with few working street lights and police 
emergency response times in the one hour range, it may have simply been a case of not allowing 
perfection to get in the way of a perceived net positive. 
While the Detroit City Council had the opportunity to sign off on the expansion of the 
DDDA area for the arena, approve of certain land sales to the DDDA, as well as vote on the 
demolition of the Joe Louis Arena, this was the extent of their role in the deal. Also their 
opposition could have been eventually overridden by the Emergency Manager, although council 
had some leverage in the ability to delay proceedings (Felton, 2014). 
The third element of lacking transparency was the enabling TIF amendment’s swift pass 
through the state legislature in the 2012 lame duck session. Initial attempts to amend and 
substitute House Bill No. 5463 in the Senate fell victim to larger legislative battles (Felton, 
2014). However, the session after the 2012 election proved productive. When State Senate 
Government Operations Committee took up the substitute bill on December 4th, the same day 
the Ilitches publicly announced their arena vision, the Committee spent all of 35 minutes before 
voting 5-0 to send the bill to the full Senate (2014). The next day, the Senate approved by a 27-
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11 vote. A week later, the House concurred on the Senate substitute by a vote of 58-49, sending 
the bill to the Governor’s desk (State of Michigan, 2012b, p. 2749). 
However prior to the Senate vote an official protest was undertaken by one of the 
Committee members who had voted to send the bill to the Senate the previous day: Gretchen 
Whitmer, who would become Michigan’s next Governor in 2019. Whitmer’s objections came 
through the realization that roughly $13 million in school taxes would be diverted each year as 
well as the fiscal impact of that diversion on top up payments to meet minimum student funding 
formulas (Felton, 2014; Michigan Senate Fiscal Agency, 2012; State of Michigan, 2012a). 
Whitmer claimed:  
it is pure greed by the business community that continues to push the things they are right 
now, and it makes me sick. I hear my colleagues say, “Oh, this is for Detroit, so we’re all 
in favor of Detroit now”—because one billionaire called you (State of Michigan, 2012a, 
p. 2388).  
A Republican Senate colleague noted that:  
there frankly wasn’t a lot of discussion on this bill at all…Let’s put it this way, we’ve had 
hours and hours and hours of discussion on feral swine. When it comes to [the arena 
legislation], no, there wasn’t much discussion at all (Felton, 2014). 
In short, these three pillars of lacking transparency provided by TIF allowed a local 
growth coalition headed by the Governor’s office to fund an arena deal in a bankrupt city and 
better reorganize the city’s finances through the Joe Louis land swap. TIF made feasible a sales 
job on the premise of the public subsidy coming from local taxes (as opposed to being 
backstopped by state top-up aid) created by transformational real estate development in 
Olympia’s impressive renderings and vision. As explained, the outcomes in the renderings were 
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far from contractually guaranteed. However, for the Ilitches and other rent-seeking stadium 
actors, there will likely be a new set of politicians and top bureaucrats by the time big promises 
are found empty.  
 
8.7. OVERLAYING CAPTURE 
While TIF is commonly a favorite of local governments because of the opportunity to 
capture increments from overlaying jurisdictions even if but-for calculations limited to a 
municipality’s own mills show no positive fiscal impact, the Detroit arena is the most extreme 
example of overlaying capture to fund a sports facility. Although school tax capture was not 
permitted under the general DDA Act until the amendments for catalyst projects, the DDDA had 
previous legislative authorization for bond issue and those bonds were retired in 2010 (Michigan 
Strategic Fund, 2014). Where other projects may seek to rely upon legitimate reallocation of 
growth within a metro area that includes overlaying jurisdictions, or even the reallocation of 
municipal mills, the Detroit arena merely captured school increment that had returned to the 
DDDA after debt retirement. Thus increments created by properties such as General Motors’ 
headquarters that would in theory otherwise flow to Detroit schools or the State School Aid 
Fund, are going to subsidize a sports arena. 
The reality is slightly more complex, but still predatory on school funding. Like the City, 
Detroit Public Schools (DPS) also went into emergency management. As a result of a state 
bailout to avoid bankruptcy, there are two public school districts: DPS, and Detroit Public 
Schools Community District (DPSCD). DPS still exists solely to pay off the substantial debt of 
the old district, while DPSCD is funded by the state for actually educating 50,000 students. 
Accordingly, the local school increment collected by the DDDA would otherwise flow to DPS 
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debt holders until its debt was retired (Bradley, 2014). Likewise, the state education mill that 
would otherwise flow to the state per pupil education allotment, is diverted to the arena (2014). 
The former again means that capital improvements to obsolete school facilities must wait even 
longer for the old district debt obligations to be retired. The latter means that state taxpayers are 
indirectly on the hook to make up shortcomings to the State School Aid Fund (Senate Fiscal 
Agency, 2012; Bradley, 2014).  
The legality of the school increment capture was challenged in federal court in Davis v. 
Detroit Public Schools Community District (2017). Claims in both state and federal law were 
brought. While the federal law claims concerning First Amendment retaliation, Equal Protection, 
Procedural and Substantive Due Process, and the Voting Rights Act were easily swatted away by 
the court, one of the state law claims was of interest. This was the Michigan “Bigger” doctrine 
concerning challenges of public finance based upon the legal concept of latches. The court cited 
precedent that “[i]n cases where because of the nature of the subject matter, absolute time limits 
must be observed, the law requires speedy resort to the courts by those who wish to prevent or 
modify contemplated transactions or procedures” (Davis, 2017). Effectively, where the legality 
of major publicly financed projects are concerned, challenges must be made quickly – the 
challenge of the means to finance a “widely publicized” project years after legislative and local 
approvals, as well as bond issue, was viewed as a general bar to all state law claims. While this 
case was appealed, the decision was affirmed by the Sixth Circuit for a lack of standing and no 
other issues were adjudicated (Davis, 2018). 
Combined with the discussed shortcomings in transparency, Detroit again shows that TIF 
is an ideal means to obscure, deflect, and overcome opposition to stadium subsidies. No tax rates 
are being directly raised and it is difficult to tie second or third order tax increases to the project. 
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That someone as sophisticated as a future Governor would have to take pause in order to figure 
out the nature of the consequences, leaves little hope for opposition to successfully mobilize and 
communicate the complexity to the public. Even if opponents could have organized, it would not 
have likely been sufficient to overcome swift passage of state legislation shepherded by a 
coordinated coalition of key elected officials, bureaucrats, business interests, and project 
proponents, all protected by an emergency manager. 
 
8.8. COMMUNITY BENEFITS 
In the past decade, many North American cities and communities impacted by major 
infrastructure or resource projects have sought forms of benefits or advisory roles for affected 
communities. Often this entails formal benefits contracts and in other cases an advisory 
committee to bring forward and address community concerns. The thought is that impacted 
persons and communities should have a say in the direction or outcomes of a project, and 
depending on the scope and nature of the effects, benefit in financial, employment, or amenity 
terms. For instance in Canada, impact benefit agreements have become a fixture of relations 
between resource companies and Indigenous communities on whose traditional lands projects are 
undertaken – resource companies have found involving impacted Indigenous communities at the 
front end of a project makes for greater certainty in the long run. 
While Indigenous communities in Canada frequently have constitutional and legal rights 
to consultation or accommodation backing up their negotiations, neighborhood groups have less 
solid grounding from which to claim benefits. In the urban context, community groups or local 
government can conceivably draw upon state law if present, or more likely a local ordinance. 
The US has seen an estimated 30 community benefits agreements (Brennan et al., 2018).  
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The neighborhoods adjacent to the arena project had experienced significant blight, 
abandonment, and depopulation in the decades prior, but were still home an estimated 3,500 
residents. According to 2015 Census data, over three-quarters of these residents were Black, and 
roughly half of households reported below poverty line incomes (2018). 
Still, one advantage of Detroit City Council’s ability to delay, if not stop, an arena deal 
during the bankruptcy administration, was to negotiate certain hard and soft community benefits. 
The primary hard benefits were the contractual obligation that Detroit residents received 51% of 
all arena construction work hours, as well as 30% of construction contracts to Detroit based 
businesses (2018). However the former aspect has long been a requirement for major projects in 
Detroit (Livengood. 2018a). With only about a quarter of the 51% requirement met, Olympia’s 
contractors had to eventually pay $5.2 million in fines. In Olympia’s defense, this has been a 
difficult target to meet for many developers due to a lacking pool of skilled trades resident in the 
city (Frank, 2019; Livengood. 2018a). 
More interesting was the Neighborhood Advisory Committee (NAC). Although Detroit 
later brought in a local community benefits ordinance that formalized the role of a NAC, it was 
not in place for Little Caesars Arena. Instead, in a precursor to the ordinance, an ad-hoc NAC 
was established. Implemented as a condition of the 2014 city land transfer to the DDDA and 
Olympia, the committee was entitled to regular meetings with Olympia for a five year period.  
Approved by Council as a whole, this less formalized version of the NAC was driven and 
organized almost exclusively by one councilmember (Brennan et al., 2018). This councillor put 
together “brainstorming” sessions that preceded the formal NAC, and once formed, conducted 
the membership application process (2018, p. 29). It was determined that members would have 
to live or be business operators within a quarter-mile of the development (2018). A public 
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community meeting resulted in nine elected members, and was complemented by three members 
appointed by Council through an interview process (2018). 
Olympia actually requested the NAC to provide a “wish list” of “design aspirations” for 
the arena and ancillary project in July 2014 (Brennan et al., 2018, p. 30). From a series of 
meetings, the NAC provided a report overviewing desired outcomes for “construction and 
design, employment and small business, housing and historic preservation, and traffic, parking, 
and public safety” (2018, p. 30). From these positive beginnings, the NAC requests were 
effectively ignored as the ancillary project failed to materialize. While Olympia had to meet with 
the NAC and inform it of developments, there was no legal obligation for Olympia to implement 
NAC requests or recommendations (Mondry, 2019). By the time of the NAC’s dissolution in 
2019, fewer than a tenth of its recommendations were implemented by Olympia (2019). 
However the NAC was not in vain. Even if it was unable to force the Ilitches to take 
action or implement the vision upon which their subsidies were gained, the NAC was effective in 
drawing public and media attention to their failures. NAC members have been regularly quoted 
in local and national media critical of the Ilitches and their unmet promises (Mondry, 2019). The 
arena NAC also provided lessons for future iterations of community benefits in Detroit, as well 
as the basis for a formal community benefits ordinance applicable to the subsequent wave of 
major developments in the city.  
 
8.9. IMPLICATIONS  
As with major elements of the Dallas and Louisville cases covered previously, Little 
Caesars Arena is another instance of stadium subsidy procurement largely conforming to the 
local growth coalition theory of Delaney and Eckstein (2006; 2007), and building upon the 
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broader urban growth machine theory preceding it. Again, TIF is a particularly flexible tool that 
is difficult for the public to understand, and thus harder for opponents to mobilize against. Even 
if the best deal may in many instances be no deal, the Detroit case, representing the single largest 
use of TIF in a sports venue, provides some specific lessons that can substantially inform this 
dissertation’s conclusions on how to mitigate public harms related to venue TIF use. 
In particular, Detroit highlights that contractual commitments are all that can relied upon. 
Fancy renderings and big promises must be put in writing. The disconnect between the 
renderings of five neighborhoods that were promised to rise alongside the arena and the actual 
results could have been predicted from the obligations embedded in the MDRA. The Ilitches 
were easily able to maximize their subsidy benefit through executing a limited number of 
projects, while taking a very conservative approach to realizing their public, but not contractual, 
promises on ancillary transformation.  
Moreover, if contractual obligations are not met, public authorities must consider what 
remedies they have, and project whether those remedies will bring satisfactory outcomes. For 
instance, while repurchase options are valuable, the appraisal guidelines in the MDRA meant 
that the most sensible decision was to not exercise the option, meaning that the Ilitches were able 
to delay build out on certain lots without realistic fear of financial loss.  
Public authorities contemplating TIF subsidies for a venue, implicitly reliant on delivery 
on tax base and property valuation growth related to the subsidized project, should also consider 
the developer as a partner. In Detroit the track records of the Ilitches and Dan Gilbert’s 
companies are quite different. Although both have been recipients of heavy subsidies over a 
number of years and projects, Gilbert’s companies have delivered far more tangible results. The 
Ilitches, on the other hand, have a history of unfulfilled promises of transformational real estate 
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development around subsidized anchors such as Comerica Park or the MotorCity Casino. Based 
upon past performance, is it much of a surprise that the District Detroit has delivered on little 
more than surface parking? Even where there are not questions of good faith in a potential 
partner, there should be questions of sophistication and experience in real estate.  
Also, comparing the impact and cost of alternatives highlights that governments should 
consider what activity their subsidies may be crowding out. Likewise, even if subsidies are 
pursued, sometimes comparatively modest subsidies can have significant impact on the course of 
a neighborhood. Whole Foods in Midtown gives support to the notion that the right retailer, in 
particular a grocer, can be a magnet for making a neighborhood both desirable and livable for 
professionals without school aged children. While a sports stadium is likewise potentially an 
attractive amenity for these demographics, the difference is that closing the feasibility gap to 
attract Whole Foods was less than 1/50th the public cost of Little Caesars Arena. Yet if one were 
to survey which of the two projects (separated by a few hundred meters on Woodward Avenue) 
has had a more significant positive impact on midtown Detroit, Whole Foods may win the day. 
Although the utility of corporate welfare should be viewed with suspicion, if a locality is looking 
to make an investment to spur neighborhood development, a relatively small and low risk 
investment in an amenity such as a Whole Foods, Target, or Trader Joe’s, might return more 
significant yields than a far more risky and costly investment in a sports venue. 
Local governments and school boards should also be wary of projects that rely mostly 
upon increment capture as opposed to new growth. While the guarantee that revenues will be 
available to pay bonds may make a project more credit worthy, dependency on existing revenues 
dedicated to other important public functions are likely to prey upon another jurisdiction. The 
ultimate result will be that some other taxpayers pay the cost even if the nature of TIF makes it 
 383 
 
less likely that these second order taxpayers can relate the cause to the effect. In Detroit, the 
arena has mostly been funded through a school tax shell game, which has led to state per student 
revenues having to be made up somewhere and further delays in retiring local school debt that 
blocks Detroit from making capital investments in its crumbling school buildings (Livengood, 
2018b; 2018c). 
Finally the experience of the NAC raises questions of community impact and benefits in 
the context of a TIF funded sports facility. First, by drawing upon tax increments generated by a 
specific geography that would otherwise be destined for other revenue pools, the issue is posed 
of whether the local community should have some formal and binding role in the allocation of 
those increments? Second, would it be appropriate for certain shares of increments diverted to a 
facility TIF project to be controlled or released through compliance with community benefits 
contracts? Third, even if the first two questions are answered in the affirmative, is this simply a 
new form of rent-seeking, albeit one driven by community (as opposed to corporate) welfare? In 
addition to representing potential future paths of inquiry in the realm of venue related TIF 
projects, each of these headings brought to the forefront by the Detroit arena TIF experience will 
be further explored in the final chapter of this dissertation. 
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CHAPTER 9. RESULTS, DISCUSSION, A WORKING THEORY OF VENUE TIF, AND 
POLICY FOR HARM REDUCTION 
 
9.1. REVISITING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This final chapter begins with a brief revisiting of the secondary research questions and 
results of this dissertation’s studies. Following the secondary research question discussion, the 
chapter moves to address the two primary research questions respectively through 
complementary exercises of theory development and policy proposals. Finally, I will succinctly 
review key limitations as well as potential avenues of future research. 
 
9.1.1. To What Extent Has TIF Been Used to Subsidize Major League Sports Venues? 
As detailed in Chapter 3, this dissertation has found that 39 of the 125 permanent major 
league arenas and stadiums have direct TIF contributions to venue costs, or a deemed strong TIF 
connection. In the 22 venues with direct TIF contributions the total TIF expenditure was $1.817 
billion and the average direct TIF spend was $82.9 million, both in 2017 dollars. Where TIF was 
directly used, it accounted for an average of 60.3% of public capital costs, and 24.4% of total 
capital costs. TIF bond issues have been more common than reimbursement and property taxes 
much more frequent than sales TIF. Nine venues have had at least 20% of their capital costs 
provided by TIF, 14 venues have seen TIF provide 30% of public costs, and eleven venues have 
had TIF contributions of more than $50 million in 2017 dollars. Although there is a roughly one 
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third each split between venues in the pre 2000, 2000 through 2009, and 2010 to 2018 periods, 
direct TIF use has been heavily concentrated in the latter two groupings. 
 
9.1.2. To What Extent Has TIF Been Used to Facilitate Real Estate Development Ancillary 
to Major League Venues? 
Chapter 3 has similarly documented the extent to which TIF has accompanied real estate 
development ancillary to major league venues. Ancillary TIF uses with strong connections to a 
venue have been found in 8/30 MLB stadiums, 6/18 MLS stadiums, 10/29 NBA arenas, 14/31 
NHL arenas, and 7/29 NFL stadiums studied. This dissertation has found that TIF frequently 
accompanies venue ancillary development, both where the ancillary elements are master planned 
alongside facility development and when a development vision emerges later into the venue’s 
life cycle. As with economic development more generally in many localities across the US, TIF 
has become a go-to subsidy for real estate development and infrastructure around major league 
stadiums and arenas. 
 
9.1.3. What Are the Prospective Risks and Benefits of Using Property Tax Verses Sales Tax 
Based TIF in a Venue Context? 
The Louisville case study in Chapter 7 has detailed perhaps the most significant failure of 
sales TIF as a revenue bond repayment source in any project. This case highlights and confirms 
many of the risks identified in the TIF literature with sales TIF. Namely, sales TIF is far more 
vulnerable to business movement and recession. Whereas land value within a TIF district will 
not quickly disappear, retail departure without replacement or a recession can completely 
undermine the creation of incremental revenues if sales TIF bonds are issued. However sales TIF 
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can generally create considerably more revenue than property TIF and can allow local 
governments to retain revenues that may otherwise be diffused at the state level. The policy 
recommendations for harm reduction later in this chapter further discuss sales TIF. 
 
9.1.4. Is There a Relationship Between TIF Statute Permissiveness and Venue TIF 
Outcomes? 
The inventory of venue TIF projects reveals a concentration of direct TIF use in 
particular sub-federal jurisdictions. Within these jurisdictions venue TIF use was sometimes 
concentrated in particular cities in the few states with multiple major league capable cities, 
indicating that even where TIF is available, local policy preferences still have to align for TIF 
use. Likewise, statutory restrictions or less permissive TIF statutes in terms of the ability for TIF 
to create significant capital to potentially finance a venue were often overlapping with 
jurisdictions where direct TIF contributions to major league venues were absent. However 
relationships of statistical significance were not found. 
The composite lowest common denominator strong consensus TIF statute in the major 
league capable jurisdictions allows municipalities and counties to initiate TIF districts following 
public hearings and use property tax increments to fund projects. While site specific and area 
wide projects will be allowed across mixed-use, commercial, and residential zones, as well as 
permit eminent domain and overlaying special assessment districts, TIF will be limited to public 
infrastructure.  
The largest TIF uses have been either where sales TIF has been available, where 
legislative amendments have been made to enable venue TIF, or where permissive TIF laws have 
allowed TIF agencies have major leeway to capture and administer significant incremental 
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revenue. The absence of sales TIF in most jurisdictions precludes the largest single source of 
potential TIF revenue. The lack of substantial controls on TIF use still allows many more venues 
to have TIF subsidies present in real estate projects ancillary and related to the venue. Even 
where TIF is not available or chosen for major venue subsidies, or when ancillary development 
emerges years after initial venue construction, TIF is frequently present with a deemed strong 
connection to the venue. 
 
9.1.5. Does the Presence of a Major League Sports Venue Make a TIF District More 
Successful in Terms of Construction and Neighborhood Desirability Outcomes Relative to 
Similar TIF Districts Absent Such an Anchor? 
Primarily addressed through the second Dallas case study in Chapter 6, the TIF 
subsidized development ancillary to the American Airlines Center failed to exceed the perceived 
success of TIF subsidized redevelopment in two nearby districts. While significant gross 
financial gains have been experienced in the arena district, these gains have been much more 
costly in subsidy terms than any other comparable Dallas TIF district. This said, the arena TIF 
district has been much more successful than other similarly core proximate TIF districts where 
either developer interest has been absent, or there has not been a critical mass of amenities and 
residents. A flawed arena ancillary development vision has still resulted in a relatively successful 
neighborhood development at a premium price. 
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9.1.6. When a Major League Venue Uses a TIF Subsidy, is But-for Present, and How is 
But-for Determined? 
The case study chapters addressing but-for in both Dallas and Detroit propose several 
means of checking but-for. Perhaps the best starting place is that but-for the subsidy, the 
subsidized activity would not occur to the same present value fiscal benefit of the initiating 
jurisdiction – either the project would not occur on the same timeframe, or when adjusted for 
present value, would create less revenue. The mechanics of but-for can be assessed through 
financial feasibility studies by arm’s length experts, comparison to other projects with a similar 
market position, as well as evaluating the opportunity cost of what actions or projects may 
emerge or not emerge in the absence of the subsidy. 
The case studies and summaries on venue TIF uses in this dissertation indicate that TIF 
often subsidizes projects that likely would have happened in much the same way absent the TIF 
subsidy. Often TIF can be viewed more as a subsidy used to ensure that a deal is closed that 
probably would happen roughly the same way anyway – something like a flexible, low cost 
insurance policy. The policy recommendations sub-section later in this chapter provides a more 
detailed discussion on how but-for should be determined and pursued in a venue TIF context. 
 
9.2. A WORKING THEORY OF TIF USE IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS VENUE 
PROJECTS 
Through an exploration of the two primary research questions, this section evaluates 
differences between major league venue related TIF use and TIF projects more generally, the 
“why” of stadium and arena related TIF, before concluding with a brief normative discussion on 
the application of TIF to the venue context. To recap, the primary research questions were: 
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1. Why TIF Has Become a More Frequent and Substantial Form of Major League Venue 
Subsidy? 
2. Should TIF Be Used to Subsidize Major League Facilities? 
 
9.2.1. Why is Venue Related TIF Use Different? 
Prior to more squarely addressing the first question, there is an initial issue of 
justification – why is venue related TIF any different than other TIF use? There are a few 
overlapping reasons. Primarily I argue that in major venue related TIF projects, relative to most 
other TIF projects, increased financial risk combines with greatly increased public attention 
driven by scarcity and emotion to create a heightened political risk for governments. Further, the 
more connected the TIF allocation is to the decision to locate, retain, or relocate a team through 
building or renovating a venue, the more the TIF project can be distinguished from the body of 
non-venue based TIF.   
Breaking down the component parts of these arguments, first, major professional venues 
are far larger financial investments than the vast majority of TIF projects. Most arenas have 
construction costs in excess of $500 million, and most NFL and MLB stadiums are in the range 
of $1 billion, whereas most TIF grants support projects under $10 million. Even MLS stadiums 
generally cost in excess of $100 million. As seen by the significant distress that venue projects 
can cause for local governments in some instances, the financial stakes are higher in both gross 
and public cost.  
However, there are some instances of TIF supported projects that compare in financial 
heft to new major league venues. Likewise, TIF has been used for less expensive facility 
renovations, or often the venue related TIF project is focused on ancillary development similar to 
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that seen in many TIF zones intended for neighborhood or downtown renewal. Thus in the 
smaller share of TIF projects where financial impact is similar, a second reason comes into play 
– visibility. A project directly related to the retention of a major professional sports team has a 
far higher public profile than most TIF-involved projects. Whereas many TIF projects are as 
banal as street lighting, sidewalks, or sewers, even those having a higher profile, such as new 
office buildings, manufacturing facilities, or retail centers, will see this profile remain 
geographically localized. While any number of retail, commercial, or industrial projects are of 
comparable economic impact to stadiums, these activities are replicated many times in any given 
metro area. Outside of metro residents whose employment prospects or property values are 
directly impacted, or residents within a retail project’s intended trade area, these projects are 
unlikely to capture much public attention or electoral saliency absent a political scandal. 
Major professional sports venues then have two primary differences: scarcity and 
emotion. First, these venues are typically a once in a metro-area opportunity. Second, the debate 
surrounding stadium subsidy is emotionally charged – any one of prospectively losing the team, 
losing or gaining status as a “major league” city, or subsidizing billionaires to pay millionaires to 
play a child’s game, can elicit strong emotional responses. In addition to these strong emotional 
responses, the geography of emotion is more likely to extend throughout a metro area, especially 
if multiple jurisdictions within the metro area are competing to host the facility. Emotional 
interest incentivizes media attention, in turn drawing further public attention to the project.  
 
9.2.2. Why TIF is Used in Major League Venue Projects? 
Shifting to the “why” of major league venue TIF projects, once there is some political 
will to embark upon potentially subsidizing a stadium project, key local politicians must decide 
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how to best provide that subsidy. In calculating the “best” course of action, there will be a 
number of competing and interrelated objectives, classified under the broad headings or public 
approval and minimizing political risk, minimizing financial risk, as well as legal and financial 
availability. Depending on the subjective nature of the actors involved, as well as the system of 
government (ie: strong mayor, mayor and council, strong manager) these objectives and their 
sub-headings will be of varying salience and weight. This section briefly demonstrates how a 
cost-benefit analysis framed through this set of objectives can lead to the decision to use TIF in a 
variety of major league venue projects.  
 
Public Approval and Political Risk 
Beginning with the objective of public approval for a public investment in a stadium 
project, the contingent valuation literature discussed in Chapter 2 highlights that – broadly 
speaking – the public is willing to place some financial value on a venue amenity, but that there 
is a gap between willingness to pay and the actual cost of public subsidies. In turn, the 
professional club is likely to have an expectation for public funding based upon comparable 
subsidies of similar venues in similar markets. Again, the nature of the market matters as a more 
valuable market provides the local government with more bargaining leverage. 
While the prospective bargaining gap could be closed through any number of previously 
noted financial means, TIF is particularly attractive because of its ability to be sold as self-
financing instrument that does not increase anyone’s tax rate. Through a TIF allocation, while 
the club is getting closer to its desired subsidy objective, local politicians can plausibly say that 
the public subsidy cost has not increased. Even though this argument may be something of a 
fiction, TIF provides a more saleable fiction than a direct grant.  
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In jurisdictions where TIF approval and governance is a step removed from local 
officials, TIF can also be a way to bypass opposition to subsidy on council, or provide cover for 
elected officials. Sometimes a TIF authority (such as that seen in the Detroit case) has very 
different membership composition from city council, and considerable leeway to operate without 
direct oversight from elected members. With control and an already earmarked revenue source, 
TIF can be a means to efficiently reallocate money without new approval and scrutiny. One 
briefly overviewed instance of the musical increment game was seen in the funding mechanics 
and contracting between the city, county, and redevelopment authorities for Marlins Park in 
Miami. 
The lessening of adverse public opinion resulting from increased subsidization to close 
bargaining gaps, combined with the below described financial risk management benefits, allows 
TIF to likewise reduce electoral risk for local government decision makers. By smothering 
potential public opposition to the highly visible venue deal, the prospective oxygen for new 
electoral opponents is likewise reduced – anti-subsidy politicians will have a less obvious base to 
draw and raise money from, and local elites will be less likely to be sufficiently dissatisfied to 
fund new challengers. Likewise if public officials believe that a venue deal is very likely to be 
closed at some point without the TIF subsidy, TIF is a lower risk means of more quickly 
finishing the deal before favorable conditions potentially change – effectively an insurance 
policy against a team finding a better deal in a competing region or jurisdiction within the same 
region. 
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Financial Risk Management 
Alongside minimization of political risk, an instrument premised on development around 
the stadia site – whether that revenue is derived through gains in assessed value, or commercial 
activity – not only makes it easier to sell the project as urban redevelopment, but can serve as a 
shield to the public’s downside financial risk. Whereas other prospective revenue bond sources 
with federal tax exemption have no direct relation to development outcomes, TIF can be 
structured so that the club only gets paid the subsidy if new development or commercial activity 
occurs in the stadium district. Thus TIF can facilitate better project conformance to the 
benefitting party pays principle than most alternatives, while likewise allowing the risk of 
underperformance – in completion, budget, or revenue terms – to be shifted to the private party. 
Even if some instances of TIF use fail to sufficiently shift financial risks, TIF again makes it 
more plausible to politically sell the shifting of these risks. 
TIF also allows for the capture of revenue from overlaying jurisdictions, such as counties 
and school boards. Thus only a portion of the TIF cost will typically be borne by the proponent 
local government and this captured revenue would otherwise not be controlled by the proponent 
local government. The prime target for this capture is often revenue that would otherwise flow to 
public school districts. This form of capture was best evidenced by Little Caesars Arena in 
Detroit.  
Why would local politicians tolerate stripping schools of funding for stadiums? Building 
off of local growth coalition theory, in some urban centers there may be a preference in some 
quarters for attracting professional workers at the expense of educating children of existing 
poorer residents. If a school district is already failing due to structural revenue or demographic 
issues, then even if there is a will to improve local schools, the stronger bet may be seen as 
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attracting higher paid residents and jobs in order to address the structural problems. The stadium 
or arena may be an amenity intended to attract firms and workers and a potential tax base, 
regardless of whether there is realized benefit to these ends. 
The concept of revenue capture can also be extended vertically to the use of federally tax 
exempt bonds. Unlike many revenue sources that are directly related to a venue that have been 
barred from direct inclusion as collateral for federal tax-exempt municipal bonds, TIF revenue 
(through incremental sales and property taxes) is a permissible inclusion. Although TIF bonds 
backed by increments from ancillary real estate can be considered more connected to the venue 
than other revenue streams used to support stadium bonds (such as tourist taxes), TIF does not 
constitute revenue from the venue itself for federal tax exemption purposes (as a ticket tax would 
be).  
 
Sub-Federal Political and Financial Risk Management 
In certain cases however, instead of shifting risk from public to private partners, TIF can 
be used as a means of downloading facility underperformance risk from state to local 
governments. This shift has two primary benefits for state (or provincial) governments, 
respectively based in political and financial risk management. The former benefit is the same 
masking function used by local governments to mitigate against political risk in PPPs – again 
unlike direct grants or sales (or other) tax rate increases, which are easier for taxpayers to see 
both as corporate welfare and an increase to their tax bills to facilitate corporate welfare, TIF is 
not visible on anyone’s tax bill.  
Building off of this masking function, whereas the transfer of direct grants and tax rate 
increases place the financial cost squarely with the state, these up-front transfers are no guarantee 
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of the project meeting longer-term performance expectations. Structuring TIF so that local 
governments are responsible for covering TIF revenue shortfalls, serves three purposes: 
transferring financial risk to local governments, dissuading local governments from embarking 
upon projects reliant upon incremental state revenues where the local government does not truly 
believe the TIF district will meet necessary financial viability projections, and protecting state 
governments from local government optimism bias commonly found in megaprojects.  
 
Financial Availability 
For some jurisdictions that lack local fiscal capacity for bonds backed by other revenue 
sources, TIF can allow stronger bids for major league venues than would otherwise be possible 
without help from senior governments. As a senior sub-federal government would seem to only 
have incentive to provide funding where the outcomes can be framed as the team staying or 
leaving the state, local jurisdictions are more likely to be on their own when competing for an 
existing team within a metro area that is unlikely to leave that metro area. This group of fiscally 
limited jurisdictions can include fiscally stressed historic core cities (such as Detroit), or small 
but growing suburbs (such as Frisco, Texas). With Frisco, a suburb that has grown from 6,000 to 
177,000 in 30 years, TIF has been central to deals for minor league baseball and hockey venues, 
a MLS stadium, a NFL practice facility, and the PGA headquarters. Each of these four distinct 
venue clusters has been premised on ancillary real estate development to generate increment. 
This suburban or small center category can be extended to places such as Ashwaubenon, 
Wisconsin, where proximity to Lambeau Stadium has provided the opportunity to host the 
Packers’ Titletown ancillary development, and TIF has been the subsidization instrument of 
choice for the Village of 16,000. 
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Local economic development agencies also have institutional incentives for their 
programs to be successful and expanded. This institutional incentive is complemented by belief 
in the merits of local economic development programs themselves, despite academic evidence to 
the contrary. These agencies also often pursue big ticket amenities with the perceived potential to 
transform a neighborhood while attracting professional jobs and firms. Depending on the legal 
jurisdiction and local policy landscape, TIF may be their primary instrument to achieve their 
purpose – often as the active agent of a more amorphous local growth coalition. Where 
institutional and private club incentives align, there is further potential for these agencies to be 
effectively captured by industry. Such outcomes have been evidenced in this dissertation’s first 
Dallas case study. 
 
Legal Availability and Form 
Venue TIF use is also influenced by statutory availability and parameters. The first issue 
is availability. A sub-federal instrument like TIF permits states to have varying scopes for TIF 
use. For instance, and as noted in previous chapters, Arizona does not permit TIF, and the 
elimination of California’s TIF law put a freeze on venue TIF use in a state where TIF had been 
a frequent inclusion in new venue projects in the late 1990s and 2000s. Now that a revised but 
weakened version of TIF has returned to California, it is being proposed as a central subsidy 
element for a new Sacramento soccer stadium as of writing in late 2019.  
Even if TIF is available, the framing, scope, and specific elements of a TIF statute may 
make TIF a more or less attractive subsidy alternative. For decision makers considering TIF, the 
question becomes how and to what extent does the relevant TIF law allow access to the above 
discussed benefits of TIF? The range of TIF statute qualities and limits (or lack thereof) 
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evidenced in Chapter 4 may provide more or less utility to a prospective use. In particular, the 
availability of sales TIF and bonds, subsidization of private construction, and the strength or 
absence of limitations may influence the shape of a deal, while control over TIF approval and 
administration may facilitate ease of use and protection from political risks. In some instances, 
an insufficiently flexible TIF statute may give rise to attempts to amend state law to enable a 
particular TIF project (as seen in the Louisville and Detroit cases, as well as with Nationals Park 
in Washington). 
Finally, where TIF is a viable option, the combined utility of a prospective TIF use as 
enabled by the relevant statute will be measured against alternative legal mechanisms for 
subsidy. Some jurisdictions may have a TIF framework to draw upon, but another means may be 
more attractive. For example, where TIF was originally to be the core subsidy for a massive 
ancillary development project led by the Pittsburgh Penguins, limits in the state TIF statute were 
worked around through another local economic development scheme that was more able to meet 
subsidy objectives. 
 
The Ticket and Tourism Tax Alternatives 
Although there are many alternative funding sources through which a bargaining gap 
could be closed, two sources are particularly viable because of their ability to similarly address 
political and financial risks: ticket and tourist taxes. A ticket tax, typically a flat rate fee of a few 
dollars attached to the price of most event tickets for a venue, can in some respects more directly 
and with more certainty raise revenue than TIF. While there will be somewhat predictable event 
attendance and the taxed parties are the event attendees – conforming to the benefitting party 
pays principle – ticket taxes are at the same time a flawed alternative, and no alternative at all.  
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First, clubs are reluctant to agree to ticket taxes as the tax reduces their scope to increase 
ticket prices. While new venues can garner premium prices, a market can only bear so much – 
thus a ticket tax takes money out of the team’s pocket, running against the revenue maximizing 
objective of building a new venue in the first place. Second, until two Internal Revenue Service 
private opinion letters in 2008 which allowed stadium related revenues to be used for PILOTs 
contributing to debt service for tax exempt bonds, ticket taxes would have been squarely outside 
the scope of revenues for stadium debt service. Thus even in this relatively recent expanded 
range of what may service tax exempt bonds, ticket taxes would only be permissible should they 
come in the form of PILOT payments – debatably making such taxes a variant of TIF.  
When compared to commonly used tourist taxes, which are portrayed as only affecting 
visitors, TIF perhaps has a more easily hidden cost and comes without the potential to offend 
tourism and business interests. The masked cost of tourist taxes is that the direction of increased 
rate increment is only denying the opportunity for future tax increases to flow towards other 
projects or the general funds, or the opportunity for tourism related firms to increase their 
margins. However, unlike TIF, tourist taxes are highly visible on the bottom line for hotel stays 
and car rentals, although the argument is that they are insufficiently elastic to change behavior 
(Bonham et al., 1992; Mak and Nishimura, 1979). More pertinently however, tourist taxes 
threaten the narrow margins of the tourist industry (Hiemstra and Ismail, 1993) and diversion of 
this source from a traditional tourism promotion role can harm destination development (Wilson 
et al., 2001). Whereas the opportunity cost of TIF is diffused very slightly among all taxpayers, 
tourist tax hikes and diversion harm a concentrated and significant constituency, often with little 
or no relation to the venue, with the means to mobilize and fund political opposition. 
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While TIF has certain advantages over these two competing categories, property TIF 
revenues are often insufficient to cover the entirety of a public venue subsidy and sales TIF can 
be far too volatile to be relied primarily upon. Accordingly, we should keep in mind that TIF will 
sometimes be used in concert with ticket or tourism taxes. As noted elsewhere, a key use of TIF 
can be to close a smaller bargaining gap between an initial subsidy offer from a city and the 
subsidy that a club decides is sufficient to move forward with the venue in that city as opposed to 
alternative locations.  
 
9.2.3. Should TIF Be Used to Subsidize Major League Sports Venues? 
This sub-section does not intend to make the case that governments should provide 
substantial subsidies to professional sports venues – the previously reviewed literature has shown 
that there are not strong economic returns to be had from public stadium investment. Instead, 
there are two more nuanced arguments for public investment in sports venues. First, while the 
economic impact literature indicates that a venue is likely not worth hundreds of millions in 
public subsidy, contingent valuation studies establish that professional sports venues have some 
value as a public investment. Likewise, the literature on economic redirection and local 
economic development can place some utility (economic or non-economic) value on a venue 
anchoring a revitalized neighborhood relative to alternative locations. 
Second, despite the extensive and relatively consistent literature on the economic merits 
of stadium public finance, local and sub-federal governments continue to provide substantial 
subsidies. Thus, assuming that for whatever reason governments have made the decision to 
invest, the normative objective then centers on harm reduction and fairness. With the former, the 
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question becomes of the numerous venue subsidy options, which means limits the public’s 
financial risk and maximizes utility? With the latter, the issue is more who should pay what?  
If the venue project is premised on anchoring ancillary real estate redevelopment, and the 
proponent will only receive reimbursement upon increment generation, then TIF can force 
proponents to deliver on construction promises or be left without the TIF subsidy, in turn 
limiting public financial risk. However, as expanded upon below, it is critical for performance 
risk to be with the private partner. If TIF is relied upon to repay public venue debt, then the 
project may become insolvent if ancillary development in the TIF zone underperforms. Still even 
in this scenario the consequences can be limited to TIF-backed bonds and protect local or senior 
sub-federal government general funds from covering shortfalls, although in practice bailouts may 
happen (as seen in Louisville) to protect ratings of future debt issues. 
As noted, TIF also can be seen as conforming to the benefitting party pays principle in 
that TIF ostensibly comes from activity that but-for the activity, the revenue would not have been 
produced or produced as quickly. In the many instances where but-for is something of a fiction 
however, TIF then becomes predatory on general and overlaying revenues. The relative benefit 
of TIF is then tied to what role the TIF subsidy plays in getting a deal completed. If TIF is 
crucial in closing a bargaining gap, then its risk shifting function provides relative utility over 
many alternative means to close the gap, and the revenue relied upon stems from the activity in 
question. If TIF has nothing to do with whether and when a project moves forward, then it has 
less fairness utility – effectively everyone’s share of the tax burden is higher than it would have 
otherwise been absent TIF. Even in this scenario though, depending on which partner is 
responsible for financial underperformance, TIF could maintain its financial risk management 
benefits.  
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9.2.4. Harm Reduction for Venue TIF Use 
This section argues that abuses of venue related TIF by rent-seeking actors can be 
mitigated against if a number of protections are implemented. Specifically, I propose seven 
headings of harm reduction: but-for, protection from overlaying capture, avoiding sales TIF 
reliance, shifting of underperformance risk, real estate and planning, transparency, and contract. 
If below discussed measures addressing these elements are not present however, taxpayers 
should be wary – politicians are likely using TIF as a means to mask the true subsidy cost and 
limit their own political risk as opposed to protecting against the financial risks that such venue 
investments pose to the public.  
 
Ensuring But-for 
Jurisdictions using TIF in a venue context must ensure that there is really but-for present. 
This means that the incremental revenue would not be generated, or generated to the same net 
fiscal benefit in present value terms without the TIF subsidies. While clubs and developers may 
argue that they would not move ahead in a particular location, or move as quickly without TIF 
subsidy, these claims should be heavily scrutinized. Where there is not but-for in a TIF project, 
the project is effectively an exercise in rent-seeking.  
How should but-for claims be scrutinized? First, in-depth and duplicative financial, 
feasibility, and fiscal analyses should be conducted by multiple independent and arm’s-length 
parties. Although private parties can pay consultant fees, they should not be allowed to select 
consultants who are incentivized to provide reports favorable to a client’s proposal. Second, 
analysis of a range of alternatives should be undertaken. These include alternative prospective 
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developments on a proposed site, as well as analysis of the club’s bargaining alternatives (such 
as delay and departure) and the mutual risks associated with these alternatives. In all instances, 
while duplication of consultant studies may carry financial costs in the hundreds of thousands of 
dollars, reliance on a single, incomplete, flawed, or biased study may lead to exposures in the 
tens or hundreds of millions of dollars. 
Although there may be flaws and gaps with almost any proposed but-for assessment 
framework, this dissertation has covered several instances where venue related TIF subsidies 
have been provided to projects that would have likely eventually gone ahead in much the same 
way absent the subsidy. In addition to depth and duplication of scrutiny, the imperfection of 
assessing and implementing but-for requirements can be mitigated through the measures 
proposed under the other headings of harm reduction. 
 
Protect Against Predatory Overlaying Capture 
If a project is predicated on overlaying capture of revenue more than new incremental 
revenue, but-for is effectively absent. However, overlaying capture as a motivation for, and 
deleterious impact of, venue related TIF use justifies its own heading. As best evidenced with 
Detroit’s Little Caesars Arena, hundreds of millions of dollars can be redirected from overlaying 
jurisdictions without necessarily creating much new increment. When the bulk of these captured 
revenues would otherwise flow to schools, there are serious issues of morality, utility, public 
policy, and social justice raised. Although often school loses are informally backstopped by state 
minimum per student allocations, this creates new issues of allocative fairness where taxpayers 
across a state will indirectly pay for something they cannot easily see they are paying for. 
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In addition to the direct but-for requirements detailed above addressing the capture of 
revenue versus creation of new revenue, sub-federal jurisdictions should consider percentage 
caps on TIF use as a share of assessment value. While Texas has such an increment cap and has 
seen TIF uses in Dallas with but-for absent, an increment cap limits the damage of capture and 
incentivizes local jurisdictions to allocate TIF to projects that will maximize increment creation – 
ostensibly those projects with but-for present. 
However where sufficient but-for controls are not implemented directly on the TIF 
authorizing authority, then the second best option is for school district veto over capture. School 
districts will in theory be incentivized to only approve projects that they believe will create more 
revenue in present value terms than they will forego. This has seemingly been the case with 
school district support of ambitious TIF funded venue development in Frisco, Texas, for 
instance. Although state per student aid floors may also incentivize approval of predatory 
projects in return for the logrolling of access to non traditional school revenues in addition to 
state aid, a state or province can likewise protect against TIF driven manipulation of state student 
aid amounts through legislation.  
The cooperation of municipalities and school districts to approve major venue TIF 
projects that may possess but-for when strictly considering municipal boundaries, but merely 
draw projects that may have gone ahead in immediately neighboring jurisdictions can be 
considered a further risk of revenue capture. A solution can be a county level control to either 
prevent capture within a county, or an inter-county agreement within a region to mitigate the 
detriments of clubs putting jurisdictions within a region in competition with one another. If 
counties are unwilling to cooperate, this safeguard can be again implemented by a state 
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legislature. More generally, this form of protection can apply to many instances non-TIF venue 
subsidies where rent-seeking clubs aim to create a bidding war. 
 
Avoid Reliance on Sales TIF 
While sales taxes can represent the most expedient way to raise considerable increments, 
the Louisville case makes clear the risks associated with relying upon sales TIF as a primary 
finance source. If sales TIF is included, then the finance structure should be designed to 
withstand substantial underperformance (more than 50%) of projections, accounting for the 
possibility of both recession and business departure. The reference class forecasting method of 
Flyvbjerg et al. (2009) may be an appropriate starting point for mitigating against 
underperformance risk, although the Louisville case indicates that perhaps even more 
conservative protections should be taken. Likewise, sales TIF boundaries should be carefully 
drawn to ensure that a project finance structure is not undermined by business relocation at the 
edges of a TIF district not substantially connected to the venue project. Although seemingly 
counterintuitive, often more compressed sales TIF zone boundaries will be more efficient and 
less risky. 
Sales TIF also poses a similar capture risk to those noted above, whereby neighboring 
municipalities can bid for retail trade that would occur in the area through TIF kickbacks, while 
potentially crowding out other retail activity that may have located absent subsidies to 
competitors. Of course this is a more general issue with sales taxes that extends beyond TIF and 
sometimes sub-federal jurisdictions may have policy reasons to want to redirect retail activity to 
certain locations at the expense of efficient growth maximization. 
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Shifting Underperformance and Legal Risk 
If a venue project is premised on incremental revenue gains from a venue anchor, and the 
subsidy is sold to the public as being part of a greater real estate transformation of an area, then 
the private parties must hold the risk of underperformance. There are two related elements of 
underperformance risk that should be shifted: increment creation and real estate development. 
Though both are implicitly reliant on real estate outcomes, the risk with the former is more 
squarely to public revenues and borrowing costs, while the latter is delayed neighborhood 
development or a venue dead zone outside of event periods. 
The primary way to ensure risk shifting is through contractual consequences for failure. 
While many venue contracts may have penalty clauses or options to repurchase, as evidenced in 
this dissertation’s case studies and TIF use summaries, these are sometimes operationalized in a 
way that fail to place a true burden on club related parties, or the least bad available public 
option becomes to refrain from exercise. Deal framers representing public partners – much as a 
competent transactional lawyer would – must anticipate where a deal may go wrong and the 
likely consequences of those prospective failings. There are several ways to address this 
objective: TIF reimbursement only delivered upon the completion of proposed real estate 
construction to promised specifications, performance bonds or collateralization of club owner 
assets to cover underperformance, and options to purchase related development lands at prices 
that will entail significant loses for club related parties. 
These recommendations are largely influenced by this dissertation’s Detroit and Dallas 
case studies. In Detroit, almost $400 million in TIF subsidies were provided on the premise of 
transformational real estate development, but the relevant contracts only guaranteed a fraction of 
what renderings showed. Club ownership met their relatively limited legal obligations and little 
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more, but had plenty of valuable non-club assets (such as a casino, ancillary land holdings, and 
controlling shares in a global pizza company) that could have been collateralized to ensure the 
publicly sold development vision was actually realized. While it may be argued that such a hard 
deal would not be realistic, the results of the actual deal have shown a harsh reality not worthy of 
the massive TIF investment. 
An additional and primarily public aspect of risk is that of changes in TIF law that 
threaten TIF repayment. As seen in San Diego, even where a primarily TIF funded venue is 
successfully financed by incremental ancillary development, and the construction value of 
development exceeds ambitious projections, the debt repayment structure caused considerable 
stress for the city when TIF agencies were dissolved in California. With Petco Park, the problem 
was city issue of bonds with the promise of revenues from the TIF authority was not 
contemplated in the state process for dissolution of TIF authorities. Again, since much of the 
structure was premised on overlaying capture, the city was left footing the bill for the entirety of 
debt payments without the benefit of overlaying increments that were returned to their home 
jurisdictions. Similar adverse impacts from state legislative amendments is a legal risk that venue 
TIF using jurisdictions, in particular municipalities, should identify and plan for.  
 
Planning for Real Estate Development Success 
Although it is preferable to transfer risk for increment creation underperformance to club 
related parties, if the public partner is responsible for this scope of risk, then there is multilayered 
public financial interest (revenue creation and debt repayment) in the success of ancillary real 
estate projects beyond traditional neighborhood development. Based upon past failings with TIF 
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funded venue construction or ancillary real estate documented in this dissertation, there are 
several pertinent recommendations for TIF using jurisdictions. 
First, prospective TIF using public actors should externally assess market demand for the 
proposed ancillary development. As evidenced by the Dallas experience, there is not necessarily 
demand for what club related developers wish to build. Although the failure of a private 
developer is in many circumstances not necessarily the concern of a local government, where 
government is liable for a revenue shortfall (such as through the issue of bonds) there should be 
realistic assessment by independent experts about the viability of such plans. Again, the 
reference class forecasting method of Flyvbjerg et al. (2009) may be appropriate. 
Second, the Dallas and Detroit case studies indicate that there may be far more efficient 
subsidy alternatives to venue focused real estate development. A major league venue can in some 
instances anchor a successful neighborhood targeting professional and “creative class” workers, 
but there are other formulas to attain similar outcomes. In Detroit for instance, subsidies to a 
Whole Foods Market have been seen as a major success. While perhaps a TIF subsidized arena 
can be a greater gross amenity attraction, for jurisdictions with limited financial resources, many 
problem areas, and high fiscal opportunity costs, a $10 million subsidy to achieve a 7 out of 10 
success may be a better bet than hundreds of millions for an 8 out of 10. 
Third, the Dallas and Detroit case studies also show that venue parking requirements, or 
inclinations to maintain revenue producing surface lots, can inhibit neighborhood buildout, 
which is a particularly pertinent issue where financing feasibility is premised on densely 
developing lots immediately proximate to the venue. Instead of leaving surface lots to fallow 
until increment is created to build garages, complementary uses can be explored to reconcile 
these competing objectives. For instance, scheduling can allow the same off street parking spaces 
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to be feasibly used for both office workers and event attendees. Downtown arenas and stadiums 
in Toronto and Vancouver have demonstrated that the absence of substantial dedicated off street 
parking spaces is not a major problem for fans, and that dense mixed-use real estate development 
can thrive in immediate proximity to these same venues. 
Fourth, real estate development can be difficult to properly phase and obtain financing 
for. Where clubs are not owned by experienced real estate developers, subsidizing governments 
should insist upon the inclusion and financial liability of private partners with a track record of 
success, preferably in comparable venue ancillary projects, or major projects with a similar mix 
of uses in the same region. As seen in Dallas, even where club controlled parties are real estate 
developers, there is no guarantee of success – however at least in Dallas a flawed vision was 
eventually financed and constructed, whereas the transformational promises of Detroit’s pizza 
magnates have led to little more than parking lots. 
 
Transparency 
TIF can be attractive to politicians and rent-seekers alike for its potential to be pushed 
through the political process with more limited transparency than other subsidies. As noted 
throughout this dissertation, the primary transparency failings of TIF can be seen as conceptual 
(the risks of TIF are difficult to communicate) and procedural (TIF can often be pushed through 
outside of the normal budget process). Parties wary of these TIF issues should aim to address 
both sets of risks. 
The best remedy may however be time to consider deals reliant on TIF as well as 
amendments to law or ordinances that would enable venue TIF deals in the first place. Pushing 
deals through and club parties creating false urgency has more generally accompanied many 
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poor venue outcomes beyond the TIF scope. A mutually beneficial deal will still likely be 
mutually beneficial six months later, as a failed deal may be a fiscal albatross for decades. 
Yet where local growth coalitions or economic development agencies aim to use TIF as 
the instrument of surmounting resistance to subsidies, state legislators should be vigilant of TIF 
statute amendments designed to enable TIF projects that may possess many of the above 
discussed risks. As seen in both Louisville and Detroit, the state legislatures failed in gatekeeper 
roles where governors wanted to push through TIF amendments to fund arenas. For state 
legislators who wish to avoid significant risks of similar outcomes, the duty will be to ask 
questions and force due diligence, especially at the committee level. 
Local community groups can also play an important oversight role. Although the legal 
obligations of the Red Wings ownership to Detroit’s NAC were limited, the NAC was able to 
provide the project’s failings a high media profile as well as keep public pressure on the Ilitches. 
Entrenching legal obligations for community oversight in any venue deal, but especially a project 
with major TIF funding and accompanying transparency risks, may represent a pertinent means 
to mitigate the worst abuses of growth coalitions. This said, in some instances provisions of 
community benefits agreements could be viewed as allocating rents or logrolling to special 
interests that may constitute Pareto inefficient activity. Likewise, community benefits with the 
ability for backdoor redirection after key votes are completed, as with Nationals Park in 
Washington, are a further risk for proponents to account for. 
 
Contract and Enforceable Remedies 
Although explicitly or implicitly mentioned throughout this section, perhaps the single 
most critical takeaway for reducing risk and harm associated with venue TIF related projects, 
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and perhaps venue projects more generally, is that enforceable contractual obligations are the 
bottom line of what a public partner will actually receive for their subsidy. Venue deals are 
frequently accompanied with grand promises of transformation and neighborhood development 
that are not delivered upon once subsidies have been locked in. If an outcome is not embedded in 
the venue agreement and is not enforceable through collateralized assets from private partners, 
then the public should have no expectations of flashy renderings coming to life. 
Some may argue that a venue TIF deal with the strong protections enumerated in this 
section is not realistic in a world where teams will use the leverage of their monopoly bargaining 
power to extract greater subsidies from markets that may have less fiscal capacity to pay. In 
some instances, this sentiment may well be correct. The point is that if the public parties engaged 
in venue deal-making cannot come to an agreement that protects the public from the considerable 
downside risks involved in providing tens or hundreds of millions in subsidies to major league 
clubs, then the prudent action is to walk away.  
TIF can be an especially dangerous subsidy because it erodes the potential for citizens 
and skeptical decision makers to identify and oppose rent-seeking deals that may adversely 
impact subsidizing jurisdictions for decades. At the same time, TIF can be utilized with 
appropriate safeguards to prospectively reduce deadweight financial losses and 
underperformance risks relative to some subsidy alternatives. At the end of the day, the contract 
may determine which of these outcomes prevails. 
 
9.2.5. Beneficial Venue TIF? 
Exploring harm reduction for venue TIF use also touches upon the issue of the 
circumstances in which TIF can be a beneficial inclusion in a venue deal for an initiating local 
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jurisdiction. There are three primary components of a prospective beneficial venue TIF use: true 
but-for, significant ancillary construction to TIF ratio as a condition of subsidy, and school 
district participation based on real growth potential.  
The first element of true but-for has been well described in the preceding subsection. For 
a TIF deal to be of potential benefit, the incremental revenue must have present value fiscal 
benefit to the initiating jurisdictions relative to alternatives absent the subsidy. If a deal would 
have occurred in much the same way absent the TIF inclusion, then this criteria is not met. If a 
deal may have happened in similar fashion several years later absent TIF, then perhaps bringing 
the schedule forward can meet the true but-for threshold. To establish this, the previously 
described process of financial, feasibility, and fiscal analysis should be conducted by 
independent actors. 
Second, an aspect of benefit can come from venue TIF if there is significant or 
transformational real estate development that has to materialize as a condition of the subsidy. 
Further, this development must not be simply crowding out other activity that may otherwise 
occur absent the subsidized project. Critical is the notion that the developer parties need to be at 
risk of real estate construction underperformance – if the construction that the subsidy deal is 
premised upon does not materialize then nor should the TIF subsidy. 
What exactly is a significant or transformational development? This is perhaps a matter 
for further debate and research, but based upon the review in Chapter 3, an appropriate broad 
starting estimate for significance may be a ratio of $10 in ancillary construction value for $1 in 
TIF subsidy. This ratio does not include the construction value of the venue itself, and direct 
venue functions, such as parking garages. The ratio also may depend on the realities of a 
particular market – in some cities projects may simply not be feasible on a but-for basis without 
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a higher subsidy ratio. Likewise with the conception of transformational, the Chapter 3 review of 
venue TIF projects indicates that $1.5 billion in ancillary construction value may be a reasonable 
threshold. 
In terms of specific venue TIF projects reviewed in this dissertation, the objective is to 
pay for outcomes closer to San Diego’s ballpark or Edmonton’s arena than Detroit’s arena. The 
social benefit of transformation may also be magnified in blighted inner cities relative to 
greenfield suburban sites. At the same time, it is important to further consider the alternatives to 
venue anchored development. Specifically this should entail whether development plans absent 
the venue could have provided more efficient neighbourhood infill in terms of non-venue 
construction value to subsidy ratio. 
Third is the issue of overlaying capture of school taxes. Schools should be voluntary 
participants in venue TIF deals and their participation should likewise be premised on present 
value revenue growth projection in excess of the no deal alternative. This is opposed to school 
district participation effectively being a fishing expedition where state aid formulas will backstop 
lost increment, with the upside of potential growth beyond either current revenues or state aid. 
While schools are protected in this scenario, the revenue shield is provided indirectly by state 
taxpayers, making this another form of shell game capture activity. 
Beyond these three components, beneficial venue TIF projects will most often be 
premised on property tax increment drawn from ancillary real estate development. However this 
is not to say that a sales TIF project could not be beneficial. Given the well-discussed risks of 
sales TIF, a beneficial sales TIF venue project may best be limited to revenues within the venue 
where the club is fully responsible for underperformance. In this scenario, the key utility limiter 
will be the assessment of but-for.  
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Likewise, transparency is also not necessarily a pre-condition to a beneficial project. 
Rather transparency is a guard against poor and rent-seeking deals. It is possible that a deal 
closed in a non-transparent way can be of financial benefit to the local jurisdiction, even if the 
process is problematic and risky. 
 
 
9.3. PRIMARY LIMITATIONS 
From the baseline setting and case study focus of this dissertation on a largely unexplored 
subject, there are many limitations. Although limitations have been noted in more detail as 
appropriate in previous substantive chapters, this dissertation’s primary limitations include 
baselining across and within different legal jurisdictions, work on associative relationships 
between variables and controls for non-TIF influences, the consistency of collected data across a 
range of public, academic, and media sources, and the coding of many variables in Chapters 3 
and 4 on a simple “yes or no” basis that may oversimplify data in these chapters. Likewise, the 
presence and impact of other forms of subsidy is also largely unaccounted for. 
 The case study chapters also have a recurring sub-set of limitations. Similar to the issue of 
comparing TIF across different sub-federal legal jurisdictions, the cases are limited by the TIF 
laws, policies, other statutes, political cultures, and histories of their respective locales. Data 
collection is also limited by sources missed through the snowball method, and secondary review 
of interview sources, although secondary interviews have some advantages over primary 
interviews that have been outlined in previous chapters.  
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9.4. FUTURE RESEARCH 
This dissertation leaves many avenues for future research. Most obviously, the inventory 
and assessment of TIF statutes in the context of professional sports venues offered by this article 
sets the stage for future research on associative relationships between TIF and venue finance 
outcomes. Likewise, future research may wish to compare real estate development specific cases 
of venue oriented TIF districts in different legal jurisdictions, or particularly promising case 
studies that were not covered in this dissertation (particularly Frisco, Texas). 
Others may wish to examine the relative merits of TIF and competing local economic 
development subsidies in the venue ancillary land use context. More broadly, the Detroit and 
Dallas case studies bring up questions concerning the relative amenity and neighborhood 
development value of sports venues and other amenities, such as grocery stores and performing 
arts facilities.  
TIF’s ability to provide political and financial advantages to other prospective venue 
subsidies positions it as possibly one of the less damaging forms of venue subsidy, albeit one 
with major risks, opening up questions of whether law reform can provide forms of venue 
subsidies with more utility and that better manage financial risks? In particular, could reforming 
the tax law on stadium bonds to allow exemptions for venue revenue backed bonds provide a 
superior alternative? 
Finally, this dissertation’s concluding emphasis on harm reduction and the importance of 
contractually enforceable obligations being the bottom line commitment of private parties 
touches on issues of contractual framing. Specifically, how can venue master agreements, 
whether involving TIF or not, better manage and mitigate public risks? 
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